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Abstract 
 
This study explores borderlands as a function of the imposition of the post-colonial state upon 
primary structures of identity, polity and social organisation which may be sub-state, national 
or trans-state in nature. This imposition, particularly in the postcolonial experience of Asia, 
manifests itself in incongruence between identities of nation and state, between authority and 
legitimacy, and between beliefs and systems, each of which is most acutely demonstrated in 
the dynamic borderlands where the competition for influence between non-state and state 
centres of political gravity is played out.  
 
The instability in borderlands is a product of the re-territorialisation of pre-state primary 
structures, and the state’s efforts in accommodating, assimilating or suppressing these 
structures through a combination of militarisation, providing opportunities for greater political 
enfranchisement, and the structure of trans-borderland economic flows.  
 
The Pashtun tribes of the Afghan borderland between Pakistan and Afghanistan are exhibiting 
a resurgence of autonomy from the state, as part of the re-territorialisation of the primary 
substructure of Pakhtunkhwa that underlies southern Afghanistan and north-western 
Pakistan. This phenomenon is localised, tribally driven, and replicated across the entirety of 
Pakhtunkhwa. It is a product of the pashtunwali mandated autonomy of zai from which every 
kor, killi and khel derives its security, and through the protection of which each is able to raise 
its nang, and is able to realise its position within the larger clan or tribe.  
 
Other examples of competition between postcolonial states and primary structures are the 
Kurdish experience in south-eastern Turkey and the experience of the Arab state. While 
manifesting significant peculiarities, all three cases - the Kurds, the Arabs and the Pashtuns - 
demonstrate that the current configuration of the postcolonial state system in Asia is a fragile 
construction, imposed upon enduring, pre-state primary structures which are resurgent 
through competition with the state. 
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1 Pre-State Structures and the Postcolonial State 
1.1  Introduction 
Volatility in postcolonial states in Asia is perpetuated by incongruity between the contours of 
these states and of enduring pre-state forms of political authority and identity. The 
establishment of postcolonial states across Asia largely disregarded preceding national, tribal 
and clan configurations. Competition between these primary structures of polity and the state 
is most acutely manifest in the dynamic borderlands between states in Asia. The state has 
sought to accommodate, assimilate or suppress these primary structures through the 
militarisation of borderlands, through providing economic and developmental incentives to 
the borderland populations, and through opportunities for political enfranchisement.  
 
Since 2002, the Pashtun tribes of the Afghan borderland between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
are exhibiting a resurgence of autonomy from the state, tribally driven within each 
autonomous zai. The resulting militarisation by the state and its international partners has 
resulted in the proliferation of an anti-state insurgency to which external anti-state elements 
in the form of trans-national jihadists and elements of the former Taliban regime are also 
party. As in the case of the wider insurgency in Afghanistan, the insurgency in FATA and 
contiguous parts of KP is a primarily localised phenomenon that it is being replicated across 
multiple tribal zai. Although it does not evidence a pan-Pashtun nationalist element, the fact 
that it is a localised phenomenon replicated across the wider primary substructure of 
Pakhtunkhwa demonstrates an attempt to return to a pre-colonial form of polity in which 
tribal autonomy is unchallenged, and association with the state is nominal. 
 
The competition between primary structures and the state is observable in other regions of 
Asia. The Kurdish borderland is an enduring national substructure underlying eastern Turkey 
and northern Iraq primarily. The heavy militarisation of this borderland by the Turkish military, 
both in Turkey and through cross-border excursions into Iraq particularly since 1999, has 
diminished the intensity of tribal competition against the state in the borderland. The Arab 
state, particularly in historical ash-Shām and the Arabian Peninsula - which this study refers to 
as Arabia1 - demonstrates competition with the enduring trans-state superstructure of pan-
                                                          
1
 Within the Ottoman administrative context, the Arabian Peninsula, historical ash-Shām and Iraq did 
not manifest a linguistic or cultural Turkification. Beyond Damascus, Jerusalem and the holy sites of 
Madinah and Makkah, Ottoman administration in ash-Shām and the Arabia Peninsula remained 
primarily nominal, and executed through tribal representatives. Iraq did manifest a greater degree of 
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Arab identity, acutely manifest in both the amorphous quality of some border areas, and the 
heavy securitisation of others.   
 
Despite the variation in experience, all three cases - the Kurds, the Bedouin and the Pashtuns -
demonstrate that the current configuration of the postcolonial state system in Asia is 
constructed upon a fragile foundation undermined by enduring, primary forms of polity that 
precede the postcolonial state and are in competition with it.  
1.2 Research Question 
This study examines the Afghan borderland as a process of competition between indigenous 
and primary structures of identity, and the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This process 
determines that the Afghan borderland is in a state of flux, a condition arising from the 
permanent inter-tribal competition for the autonomy and primacy of the tribal zai. The tribal 
agencies of FATA represent the core of the borderland, a region extended into contiguous 
settled districts of KP and southern Afghanistan. Within FATA, the Mehsud, Waziri, Orakzai, 
Mohmand, Shinwari, and Tarklanri tribes are the principal agents of autonomy from the state.  
 
The borderland exists within the larger spatial context of Pakhtunkhwa, representing a 
geographic concentration of the Pashtun who constitute the single largest national group in 
Afghanistan, and are a significant minority in Pakistan, concentrated in and around the 
administrative province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The borderland constitutes a strategic, 
socio-political, economic and military challenge to the Afghan state and the Pakistani state 
particularly, arising from the trans-border reality of a tribally organised society bisected by an 
international boundary. This challenge is compounded by the geography and extreme 
topography of the borderland region, and by the psycho-social impact of the precepts of 
pashtunwali that generate an identity revolving around the primacy of khpal, kor, khel, and 
zai, within the spatial context of the larger atrap of Pakhtunkhwa.  
 
This study explores the relationship between the resurgence of localised tribal autonomy in 
the Afghan borderland, and a wider territorialisation of pre-state and sub-state, trans-border 
identity. This it does in seeking to answer the primary question: What are the underlying 
structural causes of the resurgence of tribal autonomy in the Afghan borderland? In addition, 
the study seeks to address the corollary questions: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
administrative attention through the formation of the Wilayat of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul by the 
early nineteenth century.  See section 1.7.2. (Arabia). See also al-Rasheed (2002: 26-39). 
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What is the impact of resurgent tribal autonomy in the Afghan borderland upon Pakistan’s 
political and military policy towards FATA and KP? What is the impact of resurgent tribal 
autonomy in the Afghan borderland upon prospects for the reconstitution of an effective 
Afghan state presence in the Pashtun belt? What are the implications for the US and NATO 
presence in Afghanistan, of resurgent tribal autonomy in the Afghan borderland? 
  
Further to these questions, the study seeks to draw parallels with other examples of pre-state 
substructures challenging the postcolonial state in Asia. In order to demonstrate the wider 
applicability of its analytical paradigms and findings, the study addresses the case of the 
Kurdish borderland and the borderlands between the Arab states in historical ash-Shaam and 
the Arabian Peninsula.  
 
This enquiry is particularly pertinent at a time where significant resources are being employed 
globally in the prosecution of wars ostensibly being fought to resolve the ideological and 
political ramifications of the aforementioned incongruities of nation and state, which are in 
fact flaws in design and need to be articulated and tackled as such. It is intended that this 
study shed light upon the Afghan borderland as perhaps the most salient case study possible, 
to illustrate the severity of the implications of the design flaw inherent in the imposition of the 
postcolonial state in Asia. It is hoped that this study will facilitate a wider dialogue on both the 
theoretical and practical aspects of the emerging challenges inherent in the design of the 
current international system in the context of Asia, and potential resolutions to its most 
significant shortcomings. 
1.3 Contextualisation 
1.3.1 Asia 
Asia is a vast and varied geographic region across which political experience varies greatly, 
both over time at a specific place in Asia, and spatially across Asia at a given point in time. 
Currently in Asia, heavily securitised praetorian principalities contrast with transnational states 
such as India and China which demonstrate functioning, institutionalised political processes. 
Iran represents an enduring polity driven by a preponderant national grouping, while Pakistan 
demonstrates significant contusion along the lines of national groupings. 
 
Within this varied geo-political context, this study identifies two periods as determinant in the 
subsequent political experience of a number of states in Asia. The first is the concurrent 
Persian and Turkic administration of the overwhelming majority of the geographic regions of 
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West Asia and Central Asia between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries, along with the 
Perso-Turkic Mughal dynasty in South Asia during the same period. The second is the 
European colonisation of West Asia and South Asia during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Section 1.6 (Postcolonialism) of this chapter identifies the attributes of the 
aftermath of the European colonial experience in Asia, primarily the territorial design of the 
postcolonial states, that characterise these state with a volatility most acutely manifest in the 
borderlands between them. 
 
India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are all experiencing 
varying degrees of volatility in their respective borderland regions. Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan manifest a further quality of indeterminacy with respect to 
the configuration of parts their respective borders.  
 
This study addresses the competition between these postcolonial states and the primary 
substructures that underlie them within the common experiential context of Asia. Specifically, 
this study examines the case of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing parallels 
with the experience of the Kurds and of Arabia.  
1.3.2 Defining the nation 
The nation is an abstract quantity that is difficult to define, but generates a socio-economic, 
political and strategic impact upon the enterprise of the state. The term ‘nation’ conveys a 
wide meaning and significant variance.2 A nation is a community with common territorial, 
linguistic and phenotype attributes. These attributes occur in varying degrees and vary over 
time. A population, or indeed an individual, may manifest characteristics of more than one 
nation. This study distinguishes between the nation, as a primary form of identity and 
association, and the state. 
 
In contrast to the nation, the modern state represents permanent sovereignty over defined 
territory. The state may exhibit the preponderance of a single nation within it. It may be 
comprised of a number of nations. It may exhibit no discernable national identity. Thus, this 
study considers the state and the nation to be exclusive quantities in origin. 
 
This study addresses the experience of three nations: the Kurds, the Arabs and the Pashtun. In 
each case, the study identifies the national grouping as constituting a form of collective 
                                                          
2
 Influential works exploring varying understandings of the term include Smith (2002), Gellner (1983), 
Hobsbawm (1997), and Anderson (1991). 
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identity and association in contrast to the state, with each of the three nations experiencing 
territorialisation which is contrasted with the territoriality of the state. Hence, this study 
employs the terms nation and national as relating to the Kurds, Arabs and Pashtun as 
collective and territorial identities exclusive from the state.  
1.3.3  Defining tribes 
While the etymology of the term tribe reveals a Hellenistic origin describing a non-
genealogically based, administrative tripartite division of the polis (Nagy 1990: 276-78), the 
reality of the term as it is employed in anthropological and political discourse refers to a form 
of identity, association and organisation based upon common genealogical origin. As is evident 
from this definition, tribes vary in their forms, degrees of stratification, and size. Tribes can 
function as a primary unit of strategic and political function, or may constitute an amorphous 
and largely retrospective form of identity. In the case of the Arabs, the Kurds and the Pashtun, 
tribes constitute the primary structure of identity and association within the nation.  
From among the three nations considered, the Pashtun demonstrate the greatest degree of 
organisation, stratification, and territorialisation of the tribe.  In the Pashtun experience, there 
is a sequential progression from kor, to khel, to qabeela, to qawm. Kor refers to the family, and 
is interchangeably used with khpal. Khel describes the clan which is a collection of kor. 
However, the size of the khel varies greatly from a few hundred individuals to tens of 
thousands, depending on the tribe in question. Khel amalgamate to constitute a qabeela, 
which this study refers to as the tribe. The qawm, or nation, is the aggregate of multiple 
qabāil.  
 
Territorialisation varies between tribes. Some are nomadic while others have an historical 
association with a particular area. Pashtun tribes exhibit territorialisation in the form of the zai 
which is the space within which the tribe has existed, the autonomy of which is a primary 
concern for every khel and ultimately kor.  
1.3.4  The segmentary nation 
 This study asserts an understanding of the segmentary nation. Insofar as tribes represent 
structures of identity, association and authority arising from the recognition of a common 
genealogical origin, the segmentary nation represents the aggregate of tribal structures that 
identify with a common genealogical origin and manifest commonalities conventionally 
associated with the nation as identified in section 1.3.2. 
 
23 
  
This study considers the Pashtun an example of segmentary nationhood, a phenomenon 
elaborated upon extensively through chapter 2. While the territorial and linguistic 
commonalities among the Pashtun nation distinguish it from other national groupings, it is 
tribal identity that is preponderant among the Pashtun, territorially in the form of the zai and 
structurally in the form of the kor, killi, Khel, zai, qawm matrix discussed in section 2.6. Hence, 
tribalism is the determinant characteristic of the segmentary nation. This attribute renders 
more conventional understandings of the nation, in which the state is a prime component,3 
invalid in describing the phenomenon of the segmentary, or tribal, nation in which the state 
remains ineffective as a structure of authority and legitimacy, those features being the 
preserve of the tribe. 
1.4 Borderlands 
1.4.1  Defining borderlands 
The term ‘borderland’ as it occurs in conventional use, refers to the property of 
indeterminacy. In general linguistic use, the term borderland refers to where things 
overlap: ‘The indeterminate area between two conditions, categories, or activities that is hard 
to define because it contains features or qualities of both’.4 While a functional definition will 
not address all the determinant attributes of such a varied phenomenon as a borderland, it 
will provide an adequate understanding upon the basis of which further detailed realities can 
be introduced as they are deemed to be of relevance to the subject matter of the study.  
 
A borderland may be defined as a populated geographical region contiguous with an 
international border in which the social, political, cultural and economic overlap between 
populations in the two states separated by the border is not effectively mitigated by it.5 
                                                          
3
 Gellner (1983), Smith (2002), Hobsbawm (1997), and Anderson (1991) all assert the abstract nature 
of the nation, with Smith offering that a nation may transcend ethnicity altogether and exist as an 
ideational community. There is significant variance between these authors over the processes that lead 
to the expression of the nation through nationalism. However, in all cases the state is central, whether 
pejoratively or prescriptively, to the expression of nationhood through nationalism. In contrast, the 
segmentary nation may exist as a sub-state or trans-state substructure, underlying the state and in 
competition with it, driven by tribes as centres of political, economic, military and organisational 
gravity. 
4
  „Borderland‟; http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861591914/borderland.html.  Accessed  9th April 
2010.  
5 Definitions for the term „borderland‟ within the discipline of political studies vary, some focusing on the 
remoteness of the borderland from the state‟s core, with others addressing the indeterminate nature of 
borderlands. The definition used here highlights the fact that, while borderlands may vary in their 
constitution, the principal factor underlying the term „borderland‟ is the reciprocal interaction across the 
border among populations separated by it. It is the degree of this interaction, often in contravention of the 
legal environment of the state, which gives the borderland its characteristics.  
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Every state has borders and, by the definition established above, potentially every state 
bordered by another will have a borderland, in so far as populations move across the state’s 
borders. However, the definition offered here for ‘borderland’ seeks to illuminate specific 
conditions that emerge as a result of the interaction between populations across borders 
within a determined geographical space around a border. The degree of development of these 
conditions and the extent of the geographical space within which they emerge is dependent, 
in turn, upon the nature of the particular states and of state responses to cross-border 
population movements.  
1.4.2  Non-borderlands 
Where the state is highly developed and integrated, with a stable and enduring 
institutionalised legislative and executive authority, it is highly likely to retain exclusive 
legitimacy and authority over the vast majority of its population. If a neighbouring state enjoys 
such characteristics, and the two states are not in a condition of belligerence towards each 
other or a third state or entity, then cross-border interaction between the populations of 
these states is unlikely to lead to the development of a unique set of conditions relating to 
identity and attitudes towards the state in the populated geographical space around the 
border. This is particularly the case where the population inhabiting the geographic region 
around the border is not characterised by a pre-existing and sub-state form of identity relating 
to ethnicity, tribe, language or religion. Hence, an examination of the US-Canadian border, for 
instance, will reveal that the development of a unique borderland identity and borderland 
conditions, separate from and in contrast with identity in regions of the state remote from the 
border, is very limited if at all empirically perceptible.6  
1.4.3 Variation in the characteristics of borderlands 
However, a significant variation in conditions can shape the nature of a borderland greatly. 
There are a number of characteristics of the condition of the state, its population and its 
borderland that significantly impact the nature of a borderland and the form of the dynamic 
between the state and its borderland.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
6
 Stuart Surlin and Barry Berlin assert that identity amongst residents of cities close to the US-Canadian 
border reflects highly similar aspects. They consider this evidence of a U.S.-Canadian borderland 
identity. However, their research does not establish whether or not the suggested identity in the 
borderland is unique to it and in contrast to identity in other parts of Canada and the U.S. Evidence 
cited in their research actually suggests that the widespread availability of U.S. media in Canada has 
shaped Canadian attitudes towards identity, leading to a synthesis of Canadian and U.S. cultural norms. 
They do not establish that this is a unique attribute of communities living in the borderland. See: Surlin, 
S.H. and Berlin, B. „TV, Values, and Culture in US Canadian Borderland Cities: A Shared Perspective‟ 
Canadian Journal of Communication 16:3 (1991); available at http://www.CJC-
online.ca/index.php/journal/article/viewArticle/628/534 . Accessed 21st September, 2010  
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States that do not have the benefit of stable and enduring political institutions are likely over 
time to experience crises related to authority and legitimacy in the borderland. The 
institutionalisation of political processes has the potential to transfer structures of power 
rooted in non-state structures to state institutions, therein establishing the authority and 
legitimacy of the state. Where institutionalisation has not effectively taken root, the state 
tends to be characterised by competition between and amongst pre-existing structures of 
identity and representation, and those established by the state. The ensuing instability that 
invariably results is most acutely manifest in the state’s borderlands.  
  
States with a heterogeneous ethno-linguistic constitution may find difficulty in politically 
harnessing borderlands, particularly where an ethno-linguistic grouping is concentrated in a 
borderland. In such situations, a correlation may emerge between a borderland identity and a 
sub-state or trans-state national identity, both in competition with the identity offered by the 
state.  
 
In states where the population in the borderland exhibits frequent and relatively unhindered 
cross-border interaction with communities in a neighbouring state or states, the borderland 
population invariably forges economic and social links across the border that impede the 
efforts of the state to politically harness its borderland through creating political and economic 
dependencies of the borderland upon the core of the state. This situation is compounded 
significantly where the borderland population is ethnically homogenous, distinct from that at 
the core of the state, and of the same ethnicity as the population across the border in a 
neighbouring state or states.  
 
Where the population of a borderland of a state is politically disenfranchised, this may 
reinforce alternative forms of political representation and political identity. Where a state 
lacks a participatory political medium, exclusion from political processes leads to a reliance on 
alternative structures that enjoy local legitimacy. In tribal societies, this is almost always a 
tribal or clan structure of leadership and representation.  
 
Incongruence between the territorial contours of pre-state polity and those of the modern 
state is the most significant single factor contributing to the political instability so prevalent in 
the context of Asia, manifest most acutely in the dynamic borderlands of the region. Indeed, it 
is an assertion of this study that the matrix of postcolonial states across Asia is, in many cases, 
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incongruent with pre-existing, and in many cases enduring, forms of polity and associated 
political identity.  
1.4.4 The militarisation of borderlands 
Further to these observations is the element of military force and militancy. Wars and 
insurgency introduce an inherently unpredictable component into the borderland dynamic. In 
some cases, militarism provides a vehicle for the state through which to forcibly consolidate its 
presence in the borderland and suppress rival sources of identity, organisation and polity. In 
other cases, the militarisation of the borderland results in a weakening of the state presence 
and a strengthening of the position of the borderland in its competition with the state for 
legitimacy, authority and power.  
 
The effects of the militarisation of borderlands can be seen in the Kurdish borderland between 
Turkey and Iraq, and in the Afghan borderland. In the case of the former, the borderland 
manifests many of the characteristics that contribute to the development of a unique 
borderland identity amongst the Kurdish population of south-eastern Turkey. The Kurds are a 
distinct national grouping with a unique language, culture and spatial domain. The Turkish 
military has engaged in a series of large scale military campaigns in recent years targeting 
alleged Kurdish separatists on both sides of the border.7 The extensive employment of military 
force, combined with the legal environment in Turkey that until very recently considered the 
assertion of Kurdish identity a crime, has greatly stifled the emergence of a borderland identity 
amongst the Kurds and Alawites living in the southeast of Turkey8 resulting in a situation 
where the Turkish state effectively dominates the political, economic, social and military 
spheres in the Kurdish borderland. 
 
The Afghan borderland region is predominantly populated by the tribal Pashtuns. The 
borderland has seen the employment of the Pakistani military on the Pakistani side of the 
border since 2002 and US and NATO forces on the Afghan side of the border since 2001, in 
both cases upon the territories associated with largely autonomous tribal groupings. The 
                                                          
7
 Between February and May 2008, the Turkish military engaged in a series of operations against 
Kurdish insurgents based in northern Iraq. See „Turkey Kills 150 Kurdish Rebels‟ 3rd May, 2008; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7382150.stm . Accessed 22
nd
 September, 2010. 
8
 Leyla Zana, an MP in the Turkish Parliament was sentenced to 15 years in prison for treason, after 
having declared herself a Kurd and using the Kurdish language in parliament in 1991, albeit in a 
statement affirming brotherhood between Kurds and Turks. She was released in 2004 after sustained 
pressure from the EU and human rights organisations, to be re-imprisoned in December 2008 after 
being convicted of spreading propaganda for an outlawed organisation. See „Turkey jails Kurdish 
Politician‟ 4th December, 2008; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7765734.stm. Accessed 14th 
March 2011.   
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ensuing insurgency has resulted in both an escalation of force on the part of the state, but also 
an escalation in militancy on the part of the predominantly tribally organised militias or 
lashkars that seek to preserve and enhance the autonomy of their respective zai. In the case of 
the Afghan borderland, the militarisation of the state’s approach has catalysed a reciprocal 
militancy through which the profile of the autonomy of the borderland is being enhanced.     
 
Thus borderlands vary significantly in their characteristics. Some are characterised by limited 
cross-border interaction and the overt and tangible presence of the state, often in a military 
capacity. Others are characterised by the conspicuous absence of the state and the relatively 
unrestricted movement of people across borders. Many are characterised by an oscillation 
between these two conditions, while some others yet are characterised by degrees of state 
presence in reaction to man-made and physical challenges to the security of the state.  
1.4.5  Borderland identities 
The awareness among borderlanders that they inhabit a territory proximal with an 
international border on the other side of which are individuals, like themselves, who are also 
cognizant of the same phenomenon establishes an associative cross-border identity. This 
psycho-social reality forms the foundation of a relationship between borderlanders and the 
state characterised by varying degrees of detachment from the core9 of the state and 
simultaneously varying degrees of attachment with the population across the border and in 
the vicinity of it. Resultantly, borderlanders tend to be characterised as viewing patriotism 
sceptically, and in cases can tend to view the state as an imposition rather than a patron. Thus 
the borderland identity manifests itself as a duality: on the one hand it is a cultural 
phenomenon rooted in a psycho-social construct of identity derived from the conditions 
identified in the preceding sections that are unique to borderlands. On the other hand, from 
the perspective of the state, it is a spatial reality in which the primacy of the state’s authority 
and legitimacy are challenged by sub-state centres of political gravity. The state’s continued 
treatment of borderlands as a spatial challenge overlooks the borderland identity as a cultural 
                                                          
9
 Here, „core‟ is used to describe the regions of the state that are closely associated with the centres of 
state power and authority. This will invariably include the capital territories and those populated by the 
dominant ethnic community, which in turn will tend to reflect the centres of the economic life of the 
state.  This use of the term „core‟ in the field of political science is in contrast to the principally 
economic context of the use of the terms „core-periphery‟ as introduced in Immanuel Wallerstein‟s, 
The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in 
the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974). It should be noted, however, that there is a 
frequent correlation between the „core‟ as Wallerstein describes it and the reality reflected in the use of 
the term „core‟ here. Notable exceptions are the physical resource driven economies of the Arabian 
Peninsula. 
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element in continuity of the borderland, perpetuating the conditions that lead to the 
emergence and development of borderlands.  
 
The cognizance of being borderlanders also manifests itself more fundamentally in questions 
of identity. Identity within the nation-state context is a complex phenomenon from which 
multiple layers can often be distilled. Being borderlanders entails being on the physical 
periphery of the state as well as being, potentially, on the political periphery of the state. This 
increases the potential for contrasting and sometimes contradicting identities to emerge. In 
multi-ethnic states where the borderland is populated by a distinct ethnic community which 
differs from that at the state’s core, the tendency for an alternative ethnic identity to emerge 
is relatively high, a phenomenon in contrast to states with a high degree ethnic homogeneity.  
 
Tribal societies in borderlands exhibit further complexes of identity. Where borderland tribal 
societies are characterised by rigid and defined segmentary structures derived from patrilineal 
descent, identity tends to be clan and tribal first and foremost, then regional and possibly 
affiliated with the state. In such contexts, the identity of being a borderlander is associated 
with, and becomes an expression of, being tribal and then belonging to a specific tribe. The 
Bedouin who populate the northern border region of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and western Iraq 
manifest this characteristic quite evidently. This feature is also evident amongst the Pashtun 
tribes who inhabit the FATA region.  
 
 
 
1.4.6 Borderland opportunities 
Borderlands create opportunities. While borders are demarcated as an expression of the 
sovereignty of the state over defined territory, their practical manifestation is that of 
controlling or limiting the movement of people across them. A border is there to keep people 
out, as well as to keep people in. This barrier to the movement of people creates significant 
opportunities for those able to cross the border in contravention to the aims of the state that 
is imposing and enforcing the border. The opportunities arising from such ability extend from 
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people smuggling and the transit of goods and commodities that form illicit economies, to the 
movement of military hardware and personnel in insurgencies and conflicts.  
 
In the area of trade, a number of styles and means have emerged through which 
borderlanders and others have been able to take advantage of the economic opportunities 
that arise with the imposition of state boundaries. Consequently, borderlands tend to become 
characterised as places on the periphery of the state’s economy, but also as centres of what is 
known as the ‘grey’ economy. This ‘greyness’ arises from two factors. One is the technical 
illegality of much of the trade in borderlands. Arising from the ability of individuals to cross the 
border counter to efforts by the state in controlling such movement, the cross-border ‘grey’ 
trade is conducted without the payment of custom duties or taxes imposed by the state and 
collected by the state as a source of state revenue. The second aspect of ‘greyness’ is the 
nature of the commodities and goods being traded. Such trade occurs in a variety of goods 
and commodities that are in origin illegal or contraband. Narcotics, weapons, currency and 
individuals are traded through these means. While many states do engage in counter-
smuggling efforts, such efforts are often selectively engaged in, largely due to the volume of 
the illegal trade. This selectivity is often attributed by borderlanders to complicity on the part 
of law enforcement personnel in the borderlands. Consequently, borderlands tend to be 
characterised by an opaque legal environment that is on the periphery of the state’s legal 
environment.  
1.5 Introducing the Afghan Borderland 
Conventionally, the Afghan borderland includes the geographic region that comprises FATA, 
the north-west reaches of Baluchistan province that are contiguous with the Durand Line, the 
Afghan provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost; the south-eastern parts of Zabul, 
and southern parts of Kandahar and Helmand contiguous with the Durand Line.10   
 
The Afghan borderland can be illustrated in contrast to the regions which limit it politically and 
geographically. To the south and east, the borderland is bounded by the settled parts of KP, 
which in turn forms the buffer between the core of the Pakistani state - the province of Punjab 
                                                          
10
 The city of Kandahar is dynamic in relation to the borderland, in that the Afghan state has an 
administrative and judicial presence in Kandahar, but the environs of the city can be considered as part 
of the borderland. Lashkar Gah and Qalat-e-Ghilzai in the provinces of Helmand and Zabul 
respectively are considered as part of the borderland in this study, primarily on account of the periodic 
and temporary nature of state and coalition presence in those cities.  For general reference, the 
borderland can be considered to include the territories and population south and east of highway A01, 
known as the „Ring Road‟.  
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- and its north-western borderland. With an ethnically distinct population, the province of 
Punjab contains the social and economic centres of Lahore and Rawalpindi. The former is the 
historical and cultural centre of pre-partition Punjab; while the latter is the centre of Pakistan’s 
praetorian administration, effectively twinned with the capital city Islamabad which lies 7 KM 
north of it. Collectively, this arrangement – Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad- forms the core 
of Punjab, which constitutes the political, military and administrative core of the Pakistani 
state.  
 
The core has historically sought to exercise its writ in KP and the borderland through 
Peshawar. Politically marginal but strategically salient, Peshawar represents the political and 
administrative centre of KP. Importantly, it is the site of the garrison of the Pakistan army’s XIth 
Corps, which is particularly active in counter insurgency employment. With a demographic 
that is overwhelmingly Pashtun and largely tribal, Peshawar is situated at the physical 
periphery of the FATA region and was considered a bastion of the federal administration of 
Pakistan on the edge of the tribe-dominated borderland.  
 
Peshawar constitutes the urban hub of the borderland. It is a regional centre for trade, with 
the bara market lying just west of the city. It also constitutes the medical infrastructure for the 
Afghan borderland, with unrestricted treatment of Afghans and Pakistanis. It is the largest of 
the four main cities of the borderland, the others being Quetta, Kandahar and Jalalabad. With 
Jalalabad being across the Durand Line from Peshawar, and Kandahar being linked directly to 
Quetta across the border by road, the movement of people between these cities serves to link 
both sides of the Durand Line forming a common borderland.  
 
Delimiting the Afghan borderland on the Afghan side of the Durand line is a difficult 
undertaking. Most of the Pashtun belt of southern Afghanistan is tribally organised, and is 
overwhelmingly non-urban. Further, the preceding decades of invasions and civil wars have 
consolidated the well entrenched localism that is borne of identifying with the khpal, kor, khel, 
and zai as the principal sources of identity, and have distanced the population from the 
concept of central governance. The absence of effective state administration in Kabul since the 
US led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 has only enhanced this trend.  
 
Within this environment, there are areas which are characterised by a close association with 
the tribal areas within Pakistan, and are in many cases populated by the same tribe as is found 
just across the Durand Line in Pakistan. These areas see frequent unregulated movement 
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across the border, and in some localities the border remains either undemarcated or 
unrecognised by the tribe through whose zai the border passes. Such areas do manifest the 
characteristics of a borderland and will be considered, by this study, to be part of the Afghan 
borderland. These areas include the Afghan provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar and Khost. In 
addition, much of Paktia and southern Zabul are part of the borderland as are southern 
Helmand, southern Kandahar (province), and southern Ghazni. The cities of Jalalabad and 
Kandahar are physically (in terms of accessibility) and socio-economically closer to Quetta and 
Peshawar respectively than they are to Kabul and are hence considered borderland cities.  
1.6 Resurgence of the Afghan Borderland 
Since 2002, the Afghan borderland has presented a resurgent political and security challenge 
to the Pakistani and Afghan states. Aside from the near permanent state of inter-tribal siege 
that perennially characterises much of the borderland, the last nine years have seen a pan-
tribal insurgency against elements of the Pakistani state in the borderland on a greater scale 
than the insurgency of the early 1960s,11 and greater in scope than the uprising of the Faqir of 
Ipi prior to and during Partition.12 This pan-tribal insurgency has been lent a global jihadist 
character brought to it by transnational jihadist elements engaged in the insurgency in 
Afghanistan against US led NATO forces and their Afghan allies.   
 
Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, tribal insurgency in the borderland was a function 
of tribal militarism as a root component of pashtunwali. This type of insurgency typically 
erupted suddenly, was short lived, and usually dissipated within weeks as clan based fissures 
soon eroded any element of tribal unity. Exceptions to this have been the millennial uprisings 
of the ‘Pathan revolt’ of 1896-1899,13 and the less extensive pan-Pashtun insurgency of the 
                                                          
11
 In 1961, diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were broken off as Pakistan alleged 
Afghan involvement in a series of tribal raids across the Durand Line. Afghan missions at Peshawar 
and Quetta were closed. See Durrani, Mohibullah and Khan, Ashra Pak-Afghan Relations: Historic 
Mirror, Qurtuba University Peshawar, 2009 p. 16 (unpublished). 
12
 The Faqir of Ipi‟s uprising against the British colonial presence in the North-West Frontier was 
centred around North Waziristan. At its peak it attracted around 1000 tribesmen, drawing a force of 
40,000 troops to counter it. See Hauner, Milan „One Man Against the Empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the 
British in Central Asia on the Eve of and during the Second World War‟ Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol.16 No.1 (Jan. 1981) pp. 183-212.  
13
 Most accounts place the scale of the 1896-99 tribal uprising at around 30,000 insurgents at its peak in 
1897. For a contemporary analysis of the revolt from the British military perspective see: Mills, 
Woosnam H. The Pathan Revolt in North-West India (1897) Sang-e-Meel, Lahore 1997.  See also 
Johnson, Robert A. The 1897 Revolt and Tirah Valley Operations from the Pashtun Perspective, Tribal 
Analysis Centre, Williamsburg VA, 2009.   
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early 1960s fomented by the Afghan government.14 All of these were insurgencies against the 
presence of the state in tribal zai, and were termed a jihad by tribal leaders. Even in these 
examples, the notion of jihad in the Afghan borderland was a largely local affair, a view 
afforded by the myopic world view of the tribesman whose existence revolved around khpal, 
kor, khel.15  
 
The 1980s saw the expansion of that element of jihadism, almost exclusively limited to the 
Karlanri tribes of FATA in the preceding decades, to the entire Pashtun belt and beyond in the 
form of the anti-Soviet jihad. Having begun as an extension of the ongoing struggle between 
the predominantly rural and conservative Ghilzai against the progressive and more urban 
Durrani who had largely associated with pro-Soviet interventionists,16 the Afghan insurgency 
of the 1970’s expanded by 1980 into a pan-tribal jihad against the officially atheist Soviet 
Union and the Moscow-aligned government in Kabul. US and Pakistani materiél assistance 
soon saw the development of a jihadist front17 that brought together Ghilzai, Durrani, Karlanri 
and Tajik elements in Afghanistan.18 Incorporating Arab elements that fought for global 
jihadist objectives, the mujahideen as they came to be known were forged in the Afghan 
borderland in a crucible of pan-Islamist ideology and American materiél assistance. This period 
saw the Afghan borderland take on a strategic salience of global import, and the Afghan 
borderlanders become prime agents of transport, accommodation, intelligence and insurgency 
as the seven agencies of FATA became the staging ground for a barely covert, decade long 
operation to firstly reverse the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and then to uproot any 
remaining Soviet influence.19  
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 Durrani, Mohibullah and Khan, Ashra Pak-Afghan Relations: Historic Mirror, Qurtuba University 
Peshawar, 2009 p. 16 (unpublished).   
15
 Pashto expression translated as „one‟s own, one‟s homestead, one‟s clan‟ in reference to the 
defensive priorities of a khan or malik.    
16
 Interview with Professor Shaista Wahab, University of Nebraska Omaha, 18
th
 December 2008. 
Professor Wahab provided an analysis of how the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan patterns of tribal 
alliance and opposition.  
17
 It should be noted that competition between the elements of the jihad front, known as the Ittehad-e- 
Islami da Mujahideen Afghanistan or the Islamic Unified Mujahideen of Afghanistan, laid the 
foundations for what became the inter-mujahideen civil war between 1992-96.  
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 For a comprehensive treatment of the anti-Soviet insurgency see; Alam Mohammed Tauqir The 
Betrayal of Afghanistan: An analysis of the Afghan Resistance against Soviet Invasion University of 
Peshawar and Hans Seidel Foundation, Peshawar 2008.  
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to be known as the Afghan Mujahideen between 1979 and 1989. The longest such operation of its kind, 
it grew to over $600 million in annual assistance, the bulk of which went to Pakistan. For detailed 
analysis see: Bergen, Peter Holy War Inc. Free Press, New York 2001; Rashid, Ahmed Taliban Pan 
Macmillan, London 2001.  
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Following the Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent failure of the mujahideen government in 
Kabul by 1992, the Karlanri tribes of the borderland continued to function as a source of 
support for the newly emergent Taliban who were relatively successful in subduing opposition 
to their rise to power in Afghanistan in the mid 1990s.20 Incorporating many elements of the 
Ghilzai who had fought with the mujahideen in the 1980s, the Taliban continued to receive 
support via FATA, including tribal manpower and Pakistani materiél assistance.21 By 1997, it 
became apparent that the Taliban were facing severe resistance from the Northern Alliance, 
particularly the Tajik militias under Ahmed Shah Masoud in the Panjsher Valley. Despite having 
taken Kabul in 1996, to gain full control of Afghanistan the Taliban would need to attract 
significant Tajik and Uzbek elements away from the Northern Alliance. In order to do this, the 
Taliban had to demonstrate a degree of autonomy from Islamabad, the regime’s principal 
benefactor. Between 1994 and 1998, Afghanistan was a virtual protectorate of Pakistan and, 
despite the Islamist nature of the Taliban, an acceptable policy permutation for the US.22  But 
the Taliban’s increasing distance from Pakistan between 1999 and 2000, and increasingly anti-
US rhetoric, forced Pakistan to initiate a policy shift away from the Taliban in Afghanistan by 
early 2001,23 a direction cemented by General Musharraf in September 2001.24   
 
In the borderland, however, tribesmen had been enjoying an unprecedented period of trans-
FATA traffic in trade, population movement and the illicit trade in opiates and weapons. 
Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy of the 1990’s had brought a ‘boom’ period to the borderland 
economy.25  The mass movement across the borderland of the refugee diaspora, and re-
emergence of pan-tribal militarism that had been a core component of the anti-Soviet 
insurgency, had led by the mid 1990s to the re-emergence of the borderland as the historical 
gateway to Afghanistan, controlled by the tribes that controlled the passes through the 
Suleiman Range and Safed Koh. Hence, Karlanri tribal militarism had gradually given way to 
tribal entrepreneurialsm as FATA came to benefit disproportionately from the unique 
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 For a comprehensive analysis of the emergence of the Taliban see: Nojumi, Neamatollah The Rise of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan Palgrave, New York 2002.  
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 Ibid. pp.120-5, 130-3.  
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 In 1997, a senior delegation of Taliban was hosted by Unocal at the company‟s headquarters in 
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th
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34 
  
constitutional provisions afforded it by the Pakistani state on account of its strategic 
importance.26  
 
All this changed with the decision by Pakistan to abandon the Taliban in late 2001, a decision 
that had been looming for over a year.27 With the deployment of the Pakistani military in FATA 
in early 2002 for the first time since Pakistan’s emergence, the tribal autonomy of the Karlanri 
tribes of FATA had been severely compromised. The initial response of the tribesmen was to 
join the Taliban opposition to the US led invasion of Afghanistan.28 Reeling from the failure of 
that opposition, the tribesmen focused their militancy by 2003 upon preserving the autonomy 
of their respective tribal zai against encroachment by the US allied Pakistani military.  
 
Hence, since late 2003, the Afghan borderland has seen an intensifying insurgency against the 
presence of the Pakistani military in FATA. This insurgency has expanded from two initial 
nodes, one in northern South Waziristan and the other around Bajaur, to include the whole of 
FATA. Beyond FATA, the insurgency and the associated tribal autonomy from the state has 
extended to Dir, Malakand, Swat, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan, and the environs of Peshawar. 
Contiguous areas on the Afghan side of the border which are tribally populated have also been 
subsumed by the greater tribal autonomy that is the associated result of the insurgency.  
 
This dynamic of tribal militancy in the borderland against the state is not unique to the Afghan 
borderland.  The case of the Kurds, for instance, offers parallels as well as notable differences 
with the example of the Afghan borderland. The Bedouin experience in Jordan, Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia is another area of particular similarity with the experience of the Afghan borderland, 
again with notable differences. The principal commonality, however, between the Kurdish, 
Bedouin and Pashtun experience is that they represent tribal polities, transected by 
international borders that configure postcolonial states, with whom these tribal polities 
compete for survival, legitimacy and influence. A natural place for this study to proceed from, 
therefore, is the discourse addressing postcolonialism and borderlands.  
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 Article 247 (3) of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan establishes that FATA lies outside the legislative 
authority of Parliament (Majlis ash-Shura). This extends to immunity from right of the government to 
exact taxation. See: „The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Section XII, Chapter 3, 
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1.7  Postcolonial Studies  
Postcolonialism is a wide and dynamic theoretical area. Conventionally, it addresses the 
experiences of modern states emerging from the period of European colonisation of Africa, 
Latin America and Asia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A number of 
postcolonialist theoreticians draw parallels between the experiences of the postcolonial states 
in these different regions, a perspective derived from both the nature of economic flows that 
characterise the relationship between postcolonial states and their former colonial overseers, 
but also a result of the intellectual approach of the architects of postcolonialism, which to a 
significant degree reflects a Marxist derived analytical paradigm.   
1.7.1 Orientalism and the subaltern 
Amongst the principal architects of postcolonialism as a theoretical area are Edward Said and 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. A work of particular note is Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978). In 
this work, Said suggests that the conception of Orientalism as an approach to study Asiatic 
society is an occidental construction, derived from a deliberate historical unfamiliarity with 
what Said calls the ‘Arab-Moslem World’ (Said 1978: 50). Through this observation, Said 
initiates an examination into how the West understands the Middle East in terms of 
intellectual processes, deriving that western scholarship on the Middle East has tended to be 
Eurocentric in its analytical paradigms and its judgements. Through his own paradigm in which 
he describes western orientalism as the construction of an historiography of a subjected 
peoples, Said makes his greatest contribution to postcolonialism as a critical area.  
 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has made a core contribution to postcolonialism as an academic 
area through her Can the Subaltern Speak (1988) with the introduction of the concept of 
subaltern in a non-military sense to describe the condition of individuals in colonial 
populations. Chakravorty Spivak’s work has paid specific attention to the role of women in 
Asia during the colonial and postcolonial period. Her work is recognised as the first significant 
contribution specifically addressing the colonial and postcolonial experience of women in Asia.  
 
Both Said and Chakravorty Spivak explore the legacy of colonialism through critiquing the 
predominantly western discourse on what is essentially an eastern phenomenon. Both authors 
propose analytical perspectives exploring alternative approaches to the study of what 
emerges through their works as postcolonialism, derived partly from Marxist and revisionist 
perspectives, but most importantly reflecting alternative accounts for elements of indigenous 
culture and practices largely judged through conventional Eurocentric paradigms by preceding 
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authors. What Said and Chakravorty Spivak do not effectively do, however, is offer a political 
examination into the impact of colonialism on pre-existing forms of polity in Asia and the 
continuing impact of these forms of polity upon the postcolonial state. This dynamic, the 
competition between the postcolonial state and pre-existing polities is, this study will argue, 
the determining phenomenon in the current conditions of instability and volatility that 
characterise the postcolonial state in Asia.  
 
One of the most significant authors in the area of postcolonialism over the last ten years has 
been Robert Young. Young’s two most notable contributions are White Mythologies: Writing 
History and the West (2004) and Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (2001). Through 
these works, Young makes the case that the historiography of colonialism has tended to 
address what have widely been considered universal themes derived from a Marxist 
interpretation of the dynamics driving colonialism and postcolonialism. Young suggests that 
this perspective is not universal, and is in fact the imposition of a Eurocentric analytical 
paradigm upon a phenomenon that is as diverse in its manifestations as in the socio-cultural 
and political foundations of its causal dynamics and structures. In this way, Young is 
distinguished from the established architects of postcolonial discourse such as Said and 
Chakravorty Spivak who have tended to interpret postcolonialism through a paradigm 
significantly influenced by Marxist analytical tools and perspectives which view the socio-
cultural impact of colonialism as derived primarily from its economic impact.  
 
Young is correct to distinguish between postcolonialism in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The 
basis of his differentiation is the variation in pre-existing indigenous cultural, political and 
economic realities found between and within these regions. Through this, Young challenges 
the conventional perspective of postcolonialism, both in terms of its theory and its 
conventional historiography. However, Young does not fully explore the larger theme that is 
the focus of this study: the struggle for legitimacy by the postcolonial state against competing 
forms of indigenous political identity that precede European colonialism, that have endured 
the political and socio-economic impact of the postcolonial state, and that have now re-
emerged as a threat to the postcolonial state’s survival and influence.  
 
As part of this interpretation, this study proposes an understanding of postcolonialism 
particular to the experience of Asia, that expands upon the more widely accepted 
understanding of the phenomenon in the established discourse on the subject by 
commentators such as Said, Chakravorty Spivak and Homi K. Bhabha.  
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1.7.2  Arabia 
The literature within the field of postcolonialism thus far does not adequately address the 
experience of states that were not colonised for an extensive period by European powers, but 
still manifest a number of characteristics that are mirrored in more conventional postcolonial 
states. This phenomenon is due to the fact that the territorial contours and institutional 
arrangement of these states were determined by European colonial powers and disregarded 
the then existent indigenous forms of polity, identity and territoriality. This resulted in the 
creation of ‘artificial’ states, since experiencing a crisis of legitimacy and consequently 
authority 
 
For example, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq emerged directly as a result of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement of 1916 which was concluded by Anglo-French concert during World War I 
(Kedourie 1976: 159-63). The territories of these states were determined according to Anglo-
French strategic considerations more so than in response to any indigenous basis of political 
identity commensurate with the form of the subsequent Arab states (Fromkin 1989: 286-88). 
 
State authority in the Arab experience has been transnational in both the Ottoman and the 
preceding Abbasid cases (Muir 1891: 178, 588-91). Both represented polity on a much larger 
scale than the current Arab state. As a result, the modern Arab state has experienced a crisis 
of legitimacy from the outset, borne of the fact that it has no natural predecessor and does 
not represent an indigenous polity that corresponds with its territorial form. Arab society, 
predominantly tribal in character at the time of the dissolution of Ottoman authority, did not 
have a local political precedent from which the newly emergent Arab state was derived. 
Consequently, the Arab state has been very slow to impart an identity upon Arab society, 
particularly Arab tribal society, derived from the state. This is most clearly manifest amongst 
the Bedouin tribes of northern Arabia who, as a community, continue to function largely 
disregarding the Arab state.29  
 
This crisis of legitimacy has been further fuelled by the fact that from the outset, these states 
were administered by a political system wholly unfamiliar to the populations of those states, 
derived from unfamiliar sources of jurisprudential and political thought.30 These systems were 
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 Discussions with tribesmen of the al-Rashaydah branch from western Saudi Arabia. There was an 
unprecedented expression of distance from the state, not experienced in previous visits and discussions. 
Highly likely to have been in reaction to events in Iraq, where tribesmen of the same tribe reside. 5
th
 
June, 2007, Kuba, Saudi Arabia.  
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 Jordan‟s Organic Law was established in 1928. After three iterations, the 1952 constitution, still in 
use today, was adopted. It establishes a hereditary monarchy, and a civil judiciary, both departures 
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imposed by new authorities which, while indigenous, had little legitimacy due to the 
unfamiliarity of the system they implemented and the normative values from which the 
system was derived. This crisis was further exacerbated by the widely held notion that all of 
this was in concert with aims of European colonial powers, whether or not these powers were 
previously responsible for the direct administration of the territories which subsequently 
became the Arab states. The arbitrary territorial design of the Arab states, detached from any 
historically determinant factors, along with the institutional arrangement of the state in 
accordance with principles unfamiliar to the populations of these states, has resulted in an 
enduring crisis of legitimacy that continues to afflict the functioning of the Arab state. Through 
this situation, pre-existing structures of polity, principally tribes, and pre-existing forms of 
political identity, whether derived from religion, language, ethnicity or region, have been able 
to endure, proliferate and now challenge the state. Hence, the challenges to the success of 
institutionalised political systems that characterise the conventional postcolonial state are also 
evident in the states of Arabia, states which did not experience an extensive period of direct 
colonial occupation prior to statehood but are, nonetheless, postcolonial in their character 
and essence.  
1.7.3 Turkey 
Although the term postcolonial is less applicable in the case of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey 
does manifest social, political and ideological fallout from the dissolution of Ottoman power 
and the emergence of the modern Middle East. Both Turkey and the Arab states were created 
from the remnants of the Ottoman administration of the Middle East. However, the Republic 
of Turkey was established on the basis of Turkish nationalism as the sole representative of 
Turkish political ambition (Berkes 1998: 435-7). Despite the arrangement intended through 
the Sykes-Picot agreement where France was to inherit south-eastern Anatolia,31 the Turkish 
state emerged as the whole Anatolian peninsula, a geographical feature which physically lent 
itself to the process of territorialisation that is essential in the formation of a political 
consciousness in a nation. Through this process however, Turkey detached itself from any 
administrative role regarding the Turkic populations in the Caucuses, the Balkans, and Central 
Asia, instead confining itself to the natural physical domain of the Anatolian peninsula. The 
result of these processes was the emergence of Turkey as a nation-state. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
from the sharia based adjudication  and  Imarah authority that Bedouin tribes were previously familiar 
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 „The Sykes-Picot agreement‟ 29th  November, 2001; 
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Despite the successful territorialisation of the Turkish state, the nation faced ideological and 
political volatility. The Turkish republic was founded on the basis of secular constitutionalism 
and the principles expounded by Mustafa Kemal. Within a year of the founding of the Turkish 
Republic, the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished and the eradication of the Islamic character of 
Turkish polity was underway. 32  This was achieved through a combination of efficient 
proliferation of state based education and state institutions, and the violent suppression of 
dissent (Armstrong 1961: 324).  
 
However, the state was unsuccessful in mitigating pre-state forms of identity. From the outset, 
the Turkish state has been in competition with Islamic leaning elements who seek a greater 
role for Islam in the institutional arrangement and constitution of the Turkish state. This has 
resulted in significant competition between the Turkish military and Turkish civil institutions, 
and amongst Turkish civil institutions over the respective roles of Kemalist secularism and 
Islam in the ideological life of Turkey. This ideological identity complex is manifest in Turkey’s 
strategic orientation, which sees it oscillating between a prime role in NATO and ally of Israel 
on the one hand, and greater engagement with the Arab states and the wider Muslim world 
on the other.  
 
Another just as salient identity complex left unreconciled by the Turkish state is that of the 
role of Kurdish nationalism in the political life of Turkey.  The outlawing of any expression of 
Kurdish nationalism as a facet of domestic policy was coupled with a military footing in which 
the Turkish military routinely engaged Kurdish nationalists, a footing continuing currently and 
extending to Kurdish areas inside Iraq.33 The spread of the Kurds across the borders of Turkey, 
Syria, Iraq and Iran has resulted in the issue of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish autonomy 
becoming the principal strategic challenge for Turkey, and the primary political challenge 
facing the Turkish state. Hence, although Turkey is not a postcolonial state as the term is 
generally applied to the political and social experience following direct colonisation, Turkey 
does share similar challenges of internal volatility with other postcolonial states. These arise 
from the ideological incongruity between Kemalist secularism and the ideological orientation 
of the wider Turkish population, and territorial incongruity between national and state 
territorialities, a feature most perceptible in the example of the Kurdish borderland. 
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1.8  Borderland Studies: Analytical Tools 
Over the last decade in particular, the study of borderlands has developed into a large, cross-
discipline academic area. Anthropologists, political scientists and international relations 
theorists, social scientists, geo-political strategists and economists are all concerned with and 
have contributed to the growing literature on borderlands, particularly as new theoretical and 
practical challenges to the nation-state system emerge. The literature on borderlands is wide 
in scope and tackles the phenomenon of borderlands from multiple theoretical perspectives. 
As such, the understanding of borderlands varies significantly across the literature from being 
a psycho-social experience to constituting a security challenge to the besieged state. It is 
treated as diversely as an historical determinant and a strategic conundrum. 
 
This study addresses an area inadequately covered in the current literature on borderlands. It 
addresses the phenomenon of the re-emergence of pre-state political identification as a 
challenge to the existent state, both on a sub-national and transnational level. The most 
perceptible outward manifestation of this phenomenon is in the borderlands that have 
developed where the boundaries of modern postcolonial states meet pre-state, trans-national 
and sub-national polities. Borderland dynamics are thus a manifestation of the competition 
between post-modern and pre-modern forms of polity.  
 
A number of analytical paradigms have been established in the literature addressing 
borderlands, through which the borderland phenomenon may be illuminated. Willem Van 
Schendel and Michiel Baud (1997) have proposed the borderland lifecycle as comprehensive 
paradigm accounting for the emergence, duration and demise of borderlands. Although 
relevant to the sub-discipline of borderland studies generally, in that the borderland lifecycle 
presents a larger framework within which to analyse dynamics of the borderland 
phenomenon, this study asserts that the model does not have an effective general 
applicability. The case of the Afghan borderland varies from the description of borderlands 
asserted by Baud and Van Schendel enough to the render the borderland lifecycle model 
inapplicable in describing the Afghan borderland. However, the fact that the model addresses 
some key elements in the borderland dynamic warrants a review of the borderland lifecycle 
model here. 
1.8.1  The borderland lifecycle 
The borderland lifecycle describes the experience of the borderland through six developmental 
stages. The first stage, the ‘embryonic stage’, precedes the demarcation of the border around 
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which a borderland will subsequently emerge. This ‘embryonic stage’ is characterised by a 
clash of contiguous zones of political, cultural, economic and demographic identities.34 Within 
the paradigm, Van Schendel and Baud do not adequately address the larger structural contexts 
within which these identity clashes may occur. There is no way, therefore, of determining 
through the borderland lifecycle whether or not the factors that generated these clashes can 
be ameliorated or contained through alternative sub-state, state or trans-state political 
structures.  
 
Assuming that these clashes of identity are followed by the demarcation of an international 
border, the borderland lifecycle then proceeds to its second stage which the model terms 
‘infancy’. This describes a situation in which the border is demarcated, but cross-border social 
networks remain strong, raising the possibility of the abrogation of the border altogether. 
However, the model does not present criteria through which to evaluate whether or not the 
border, and the borderland, will indeed develop beyond infancy, or relapse into the pre-
border reality.  
 
Assuming the border does develop further, the model suggests that the borderland evolves to 
the level of ‘adolescence’ in which the border begins to confine economic and social 
interaction between populations on either side of it, and hence begins to emerge as a psycho-
social reality. The model sees the further evolution of the borderland into ‘adulthood’ where 
the sustainability of cross-border social networks becomes extremely difficult due to controls 
on legal cross-border movement. In this stage, the borderland becomes characterised by 
illegal cross-border movements through styles and means generally regarded as smuggling or 
otherwise illicit. 
 
Van Schendel and Baud suggest two additional stages that some borderlands may manifest: 
borderlands may ‘decline’ or they may become ‘defunct’. The model posits that decline results 
from the inability or unwillingness of the state to sustain the degree of commitment required 
to impose effective border controls. This process leads to an erosion of the effectiveness of 
the border in constituting a barrier to population movement across it. This process can result 
in the emergence of a non-border where effective controls on the movement of people across 
the border are altogether absent. Whether or not a border that is in ‘decline’ becomes 
‘defunct’ is largely a function of the nature of sub-state, state and trans-state political 
structures which constitute the larger political environment within which the borderland 
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exists. Van Schendel and Baud stop short of suggesting the causal factors that render a border 
‘defunct’, not addressing the possibility that a border in ‘decline’ may be sustained by a state 
or a supra-state initiative.  
 
The Afghan borderland manifests a significant departure from the analytical model of the 
borderland lifecycle suggested by Van Schendel and Baud. Following the demarcation of the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border in 1893 (then between Afghanistan and India), the period that is 
described in the model as ‘infancy’ was characterised by a notable absence of the 
consolidation of the border both physically, and consequently, as a psycho-social construct. 
Any gradual emergence of the border as a limited international boundary, regardless of the de 
jure injunctions to that effect, largely eroded through the series of cross-border militancies 
that have arisen since. The ‘Pathan Revolt’ (1896-99), the Faqir of Ipi uprising (1937-47), the 
FATA uprising of 1960-62, the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan (1979-89), the Taliban 
phenomenon (1994-2001) and the ongoing insurgency since 2002 in both Afghanistan and 
FATA have each manifested a significant cross-border element, leading to the consolidation of 
cross-border interdependencies amongst the Pashtun borderland tribes. Hence, the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border has never emerged from infancy into any of the subsequent stages in the 
lifecycle, rendering the borderland lifecycle inapplicable in the case of the Afghan borderland.   
1.8.2  Scale 
Another analytical tool suggested by Van Schendel is the concept of ‘scale’ (Van Schendel 
2005: 7, 373-5). Through the concept of scale, Van Schendel identifies attributes of the 
borderland that transcend the states contiguous with it. The borderland may represent the 
meeting of differing regions or ‘zones’ associated with varying identities. These may include 
ethno-linguistic, geographic, socio-economic, ideological, political or civilisational identities. 
The borderlands on the southern periphery of the European Union, for example, represent the 
meeting of scale on a geographic and socio-economic level. The US-Mexico borderland, in 
contrast, may be characterised by a meeting of differing socio-economic zones exclusively. 
Through the scalar tool of analysis, it becomes apparent that the dynamics of borderlands are 
driven in part by the larger factors of scale determined by the geographic reality of the 
borderland as well as the nature of the wider political, socio-economic and ethno-linguistic 
construct within which the borderland is found.   
 
The scalar analytical tool has relevance in the case of the Afghan borderland. For much of its 
historiography, the Afghan borderland has been recorded as a geographic barrier between 
Indus Valley civilisations and Central Asian tribal nations. This feature has endured in 
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modernity as the borderland has come to represent a barrier between sustainable, 
institutionalised polity to its south, and diffuse tribal primacy to its north.  
1.9  Borderlands and the State 
Despite the absence of an effective Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the Afghan borderland 
manifests the characteristics of a borderland, perhaps to a greater degree than any other 
borderland currently studied. Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson (1999: 64-65) offer a 
theoretical explanation that may account for how such a borderland may emerge in the 
absence of an effective border. They suggest that one determining factor in the emergence of 
a borderland is the existence of a population as an ethno-linguistic minority in the physical 
periphery of the state, contiguous with a population of an identical ethno-linguistic identity 
that constitutes a much larger segment of the population in a neighbouring state or states. In 
such a scenario, the minority population on the periphery of the former state is highly likely to 
maintain pre-state socio-cultural ties with the population of the same ethno-linguistic identity 
across the border. Through sustained interaction, the region in question on the periphery of 
the former state exhibits characteristics of a borderland, as its full political and social 
integration within the state in which it lies is challenged by the ethno-linguistic and cultural 
bonds that tie it to the population of the neighbouring state or states.  
 
Such is the situation in the Afghan borderland. The series of cross-border militancies identified 
in section 1.8.1 have contributed to the obfuscation of the Durand Line as a physical, as well as 
a cultural and ideational construct. Despite this, the fact that the border transects the Pashtun 
population, an ethno-linguistically distinct population on the physical and political periphery of 
the state of Pakistan, has contributed to the emergence of the phenomenon of the Afghan 
borderland. This phenomenon was aided by the fact that the Pashtun population is a spatially 
concentrated minority in Pakistan, while also constituting the largest ethnic grouping in 
Afghanistan. This demographic dynamic has contributed greatly to the development of the 
Afghan borderland consistent with the model suggested by Donnan and Wilson (1999: 64-65).  
 
Although they make a valuable contribution to the literature on borderlands Donnan and 
Wilson do not examine the impact of enduring pre-state forms of political identity upon the 
state and specifically upon the borderland.  The crisis of the nation-state that they address 
emerges in parts of the world where pre-state forms of political identity have endured the 
emergence of the postcolonial state. Their observations can be more thoroughly and 
accurately explained in terms of a crisis of identity between pre-colonial, sub-national and 
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transnational forms of political identity on the one hand, and identity associated with the 
postcolonial state on the other. Identification with pre-modern forms of polity continues to 
endure, and has not been effectively uprooted or replaced by identification with the modern 
state. Rather, the modern state has become the backdrop against which competition between 
pre-state, sub-national or national groups is played out. The phenomena observed by Donnan 
and Wilson do indeed point to a crisis of the nation-state, particularly in Asia, but the origin of 
this crisis arises from the enduring identities associated with pre-state polities, and not from 
the failure of the modern nation-state to effectively control boundaries.  
1.10 Tribal Societies and Borderlands 
1.10.1   The Kurds 
There is a large literature addressing the experience of the Kurds from the last days of 
Ottoman authority to the present. The literature can be grouped into four general areas: 
indigenous Kurdish literature in the form of poetry and prose encompassing the culture of the 
Kurds dating from the mid-seventeenth century; Ottoman and British military records, 
including accounts of tribes, geography and strategic observations; anthropological studies 
from the mid-twentieth century to the present; socio-political studies addressing the 
experience of Kurdish society across borders.  
 
David McDowall’s A Modern History of the Kurds (2004) remains the most widely circulating 
volume accessed by a general readership addressing the Kurdish experience from the Ottoman 
period to the present and hence warrants a mention here despite the fact that the volume is 
not intended to project an argument, being instead a compilation covering salient aspects of 
Kurdish modern history.  
 
Martin Van Bruinessen remains at the forefront of academic research into the Kurds. Van 
Bruinessen’s Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (1992) is 
the principal academic enquiry into the socio-political dynamics of the Kurds. Through the 
work, Van Bruinessen distils the conclusion that familial/clan groupings and tribes are the 
main driving agents of social and political movements amongst the Kurds. Van Bruinessen 
(1999:26) also identifies a vibrant nationalist movement seeking independence and autonomy, 
countered by an overbearing conservative trend that functions to isolate the left-inclined 
elements within the larger movement for Kurdish autonomy. 
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Van Bruinessen’s observations demonstrate an intimate familiarity with the culture, norms  
and political trends of tribal Kurds. From the perspective of this study, however, Van 
Bruinessen’s perspective does not belong to that of borderland studies. The dynamics of 
social, economic, political and militant cross-border interaction, along with the fact that the 
population on both sides of the border is ethno-linguistically nearly homogenous while being a 
minority in both Turkey, Iran and Iraq, represents a classic case for examination from the 
borderlands perspective, something Van Bruinessen conspicuously omits. Although Agha, 
Shaikh and State was published in 1992, some years ahead of the main contributions to the 
borderlands perspective addressed previously in this chapter, the phenomenon of the Kurds 
demonstrates a number of perceptible attributes that can be expected to drive methods of 
analysis and models that approach those subsequently emergent in the works of Van Schendel 
and others. Hence, Bruinessen’s treatment of the Kurds represents an excellent candidate for 
further development from the borderlands perspective and is considered by this study to be a 
valuable examination to be built upon by subsequent analyses.  
1.10.2  Arab borderlands 
Bedouin tribal society is found predominantly across Jordan, Iraq and Israel, and the entirety 
of the Arabian Peninsula. Bedouin tribal identity clearly predominates over identities 
associated with these states. This is most clearly manifest in the examples of the Saudi Arabian 
and Jordanian states.  
 
The Saudi state institutionalises the political dominance of the al-Saud tribe over the other 
tribes of the central Arabian peninsula. The monopolisation of state authority  by members of 
the al-Saud tribe consolidates tribalism as a political modality in the Arabian peninsula. 
Restricting state authority to members of the al-Saud enhances tribally based resentment 
among tribes not allied with the al-Saud. Identification with the Saudi state among non al-
Sauds, while manifest abroad, is not clearly exhibited on a daily basis within the Saudi state. 
35In Jordan, the legitimacy of the authority of the King is derived from his status as member of 
the Banu Hashim, being a direct descendant of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, the father of the Kings 
of Jordan, Syria and Iraq at the dissolution of Ottoman authority. Hence, support for the King is 
absolute amongst those Bedouin related by clan association or alliance with the monarchy, 
                                                          
35
 Discussions with tribesmen of the al-Rashaydah branch from western Saudi Arabia, 5
th
 June, 2007, 
Kuba, Saudi Arabia.  
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and very limited amongst Bedouin from rival tribes or those not allied with the monarchy, 
particularly in the southern region of Ma’an.36 
 
Where amongst the Kurds there is a vigorous Kurdish nationalism with tribal roots and 
organisation, the Bedouin do not manifest a pan-Arab identity in the nationalist sense. For the 
Bedouin, the tribe represents the principal form of political and social identity, and there is 
little identification with the state. The frequent and largely unhindered movement of the 
Bedouin across the Saudi-Jordanian border, the Saudi-Iraqi border and the Jordanian-Iraqi 
border is testament to this.  
 
As a tribal society, the Bedouin have been extensively addressed in literature. Ibn Khuldun’s 
groundbreaking al-Muqaddimah (1377) deliberates extensively on the reciprocal affect upon 
Bedouin and non-Bedouin through mutual interaction. Retrospectively, al-Muqaddimah may 
be considered the first and still one of the most thorough treatments of Bedouin society from 
a multi-disciplinary perspective. The great distinction between al-Muqaddima and what 
preceded it in terms of scholarship warrants its mention here.  
 
Amongst current scholarship, the work of Donald Cole is notable. Cole explores the impact of 
modernity upon the Bedouin in his multi-disciplinary work Where Have the Bedouin Gone? 
(2003), which follows on from his strictly anthropological 1971 Doctoral dissertation exploring 
the Al-Murrah tribe in Saudi Arabia’s Rub al-Khali. Cole accurately identifies the main dynamics 
within Bedouin tribal society but does not specifically explore borderland dynamics in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Cedric Parizot (2008) does explore cross-border Bedouin movements 
between the Negev and historical Palestine in Crossing Borders, Retaining Boundaries (2008). 
However, his work is an anthropological examination charting the changes in tribal and familial 
association arising from challenges to cross-border movement between the Negev, Jordan and 
the West Bank. 
 
There is an absence of literature exploring the Bedouin experience across the borders of Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan and Iraq from the borderlands perspective. This study suggests that the reason 
for this is that the Arab states do not typically manifest realities conventionally associated with 
borderlands. There is a great deal of ethno-linguistic homogeneity across the borders of the 
Arab states in Arabia. This is a significant variation from the cases of the Kurds and the 
Pashtuns where each is a minority in the states in which they reside. Because Arabia has been 
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 Observed by the author in Ma‟an Jordan, January 2006. 
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a part of a transnational experience from the Abbasid period through to the Ottoman, the 
concept of independent and sovereign states is not part of the cultural experience of the 
Bedouin. Indeed the dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 was met with the 
proclamation of an Arab Caliphate by Sharif Hussein (Teitelbaum 2001: 243), but was shortly 
deposed by the emerging al-Saud clan from whom Hussein fled to what was then Transjordan.   
 
Further, there is extensive cross-border movement between the populations of Arabia. 
Palestinian and Iraqi diaspora currently constitutes the majority of the population of Jordan, 
and cross-border movement is frequent, large-scale and easy.37 The Hajj and Umrah gatherings 
in Saudi Arabia ensure continued large-scale cross-border movement on the scale of millions,38 
while Bedouin migrations maintain a steady stream of temporary migration across borders. 
This study suggests that the Arab states have yet to take on a sense of legitimacy amongst the 
indigenous Arab population, particularly the Bedouin population. The states may yield 
exclusive power over largely defined territory, but have yet to replace existing identities 
derived from the tribe and clan.  
1.11  Discourses on the Afghan Borderland 
Pashtun tribal society is a broadly studied phenomenon on which scholarship has been 
conducted dating from the Babur-nama of the mid-seventeenth century.39 English language 
scholarship dates from the first substantive contact between the British and the Pashtuns in 
                                                          
37
 Jordan‟s population of just over 6 million includes around a million Palestinian refugees still living 
in camps, and as much as twice that number integrated into Jordanian society. In addition there are 
between 700,000 and a million Iraqi‟s living in Jordan as refugees as a result of the war in Iraq.  See: 
„UNRWA Country and Area Distribution of Palestinian Refugees‟; 
http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pdf/rr_countryandarea.pdf  .  Accessed 17
th
 October, 2010. See 
also Black, Ian „Rich or Poor. A million Iraqi refugees strain the hospitality of Jordan‟ The Guardian  
24
th
January, 2007; http://wwwguardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan24/iraq.ianblack  . Accessed 17
th
 October 
2010.  
38
 Saudi Prince Khalid al Faisal, who is the governor of Makkah (Mecca), placed the number of Hajj 
pilgrims at 2,521,000 for Hajj 1430 A.H. (2009 C.E.). See: The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 
Washington D.C.,  Public Affairs Section,  „2,521,000 pilgrims participated in Hajj 1430‟; 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news11290904.aspx  . Accessed 18th October, 2010. The 
lesser pilgrimage of Umrah saw 3,950,000 in 2010. See Nuqudy News Portal “ةيدوعسلا: فصو رايلم ريال 
قافوا هيرمتعملا غلابلا مهددع 3,950 نويلم”  available at  http://www.nuqudy.com/20100912922/arab-markets/ 
. Accessed 20
th
 October, 2010.  
39
 The Baburnama is an autobiographical account of Zahir ud Din Muhammad Babur, founder of the 
Mughal Empire, firstly in Afghanistan and then over most of the Indian subcontinent, between 1526 
and 1858. Included in it is a section addressing the origins and tribal organanisation of the Pashtuns, the 
first such literary work to do so. See: Beveridge, Annette (translator) Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur 
,Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1979.  
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the early nineteenth century.40  Since then, an extensive body of literature has been 
developed addressing the Pashtun tribal phenomenon from historical, sociological and 
anthropological perspectives. Absent from this literature is a treatment of the Afghan 
borderland specifically from the perspective of borderland studies, an omission made more 
conspicuous by the fact that the Afghan borderland is one of the most enduring, salient and 
dynamic borderlands of all .  
 
Extensive literature has been dedicated to mapping the Pashto language and the Pashtun 
culture manifest in pashtunwali. This literature constitutes indispensable background 
information for a borderland study, establishing the socio-cultural context within which the 
borderland phenomenon occurs. The core works in this regard in the English language 
emerged in the 1950s, a period that saw a growth in the treatment of Pashtun tribes in 
sociological literature. Olaf Caroe’s The Pathans (1958) remains the most comprehensive 
treatise in the English language on Pashtun society to date. James Spain’s The Way of the 
Pathans (1962) is another work of note from the same period. Beyond these authors, there 
have been a host of works by retired diplomats and military officials treating aspects of 
Pashtun culture, society, history and politics. A number of noteworthy analytical studies have 
been published between 1960 and 1980 treating specific themes within the social sciences, 
ranging from analyses of structures of tribal authority, to aspects of women’s roles both in the 
political life of the tribe and in family roles, to patterns of trade, land ownership and conflict 
resolution amongst tribes.  From this period, Louis Dupree’s Afghanistan (1973) is the most 
comprehensive, testified to by its lasting relevance today.  
 
The 1980’s saw a renewed focus in literature dedicated to Pashtun studies, driven by the 
writings of prominent journalists detailing their experiences with the mujahideen during the 
anti-Soviet campaign. A trend emerged seeing the publication of a large number of works 
covering Pashtun dynamics, largely portraying the Pashtun as egalitarian, freedom-loving and 
natural allies of the west.41 The emergence of the Taliban in the early 1990s was covered less 
extensively, with a renewed critical focus on the militia emerging from before the fall of the 
Taliban regime in 2001. Ahmed Rashid’s Taliban (2001) is a notable work from the period, 
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 The first major work in the English language is Mountstuart Elphinstone‟s An Account of the 
Kingdom of Caubul. See: Elphinstone, Mountstuart An Account of the  Kingdom of Caubul Longman, 
Hurst, Rees, Brown and Murray, London 1815 (Reprinted Oxford University Press, London, 1972). 
41
 Prominent in this trend are the works of Sandy Gall. As well as reporting from Afghanistan with the 
Mujahideen, Gall also produced two documentaries covering the anti-soviet struggle which were also 
published as written works: Afghanistan: Behind Russian Lines (1982); Allah Against the Gunships 
(1984); and Agony of a Nation (1986). 
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characterised by emboldening the threat perception of the Taliban, a trend further 
contributed to by literature dedicated to developmental aid and reconstruction efforts in the 
Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and FATA. During the same period, Pashtun culture has tended 
to be covered in the context of its suitability in providing a haven for trans-national threats to 
state-security, particularly to that of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but with an increasingly extra-
regional threat perception since 2009.42 Most of this literature falls within the perspectives of 
collective security and strategic studies.  
 
Beyond the security and strategic studies fields, the Afghan borderland has been treated in 
detail by indigenous authors from a socio-political and anthropological perspective. Azmat 
Hayat Khan’s The Durand Line (2005) remains the seminal contemporary work addressing the 
Durand Line from the socio-political and geo-political perspectives. Khan presents a thorough 
analysis of the Durand Line and the experiences of Afghanistan and Pakistan relating to it, 
exploring the impact of the Durand Line upon the tribes contiguous with it. However, Khan 
does not extend his detailed analysis beyond the Durand Line, or infer lessons from his study 
that are applicable in other contexts. The Durand Line presents detailed information, but is 
limited in the scope of analysis it presents. Iftkhar Hussain Shah’s Some Major Tribes along the 
Durand Line (2002) is another significant contribution to the sociological and anthropological 
discourse on the Afghan borderland. Essentially a survey of the tribal reality in FATA and 
southern Afghanistan, Some Major Tribes provides a detailed assessment of the demographic 
reality of the borderland. As with The Durand Line, Some Major Tribes falls short of providing a 
theoretical construct that may be applied in other realities. The most comprehensive survey of 
the borderland in the either English or Pashto is Sher Muhammad Mohmand’s FATA: A Socio-
Cultural and Geo-Political History (2003). This work is a complete survey of the tribal, social, 
cultural and political reality of the FATA region. The scope and degree of detail in FATA 
warrants its mentioning here, despite the fact that is not an academic enquiry and breaks no 
theoretical ground.   
1.12  Argument of the Hypothesis 
This study argues that the Pashtun tribes of the Afghan borderland are exhibiting a resurgence 
of autonomy from the state, as part of the re-territorialisation of the primary substructure of 
Pakhtunkhwa that underlies southern Afghanistan and north-western Pakistan. This 
                                                          
42This concern was initially brought to the author‟s at a seminar held at IISS, London 30 th November, 
2007. An unnamed representative of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC- an  MI5 affiliate)  
raised concerns over risks from terrorism associated with Pashtun tribesmen who travel to the west.  
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phenomenon is localised, tribally driven, and replicated across the entirety of Pakhtunkhwa. It 
is a product of the pashtunwali mandated autonomy of zai from which every kor, killi and khel 
derives its security, and through the protection of which each is able to raise its nang, and is 
able to realise its position within the larger clan or tribe. The study argues this through 
exploring the following principal areas: 
 
The study analyses the re-ascendance of tribal authority in the Afghan borderland since 2002, 
and the resurgence of the borderland as the primary political and security challenge to the 
Afghan and Pakistani states. This analysis considers the expansion of the domain of tribal 
authority into the regions of KP contiguous with FATA, as well as other areas of settled KP and 
Baluchistan where the state holds de jure authority. This examination also considers the 
ascendancy of tribal authority in the Afghan provinces contiguous with the border. The study 
then examines the re-ascendance of tribal authority across this area as a function of the re-
territorialisation of the enduring pre-state substructure of Pakhtunkhwa. 
 
The study explores the Pashtun cultural and historical context with an emphasis on the 
politically and strategically salient elements of pashtunwali, and the nature of segmentary 
territorialisation of the tribal zai within the larger spatial context of Pakhtunkhwa. It study 
examines the nature of the ethno-linguistic constitution of Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
addressing the relationship between ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, the spatial concentration 
of minorities, and the nature of borderlands in the Pakistan-Afghanistan context. It also 
explores the frequency and dynamics of cross-border interaction across the Durand Line 
between neighbouring clans and families, as part of an examination into the nature of the 
non-border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Through this exploration, the study identifies 
economic and social dynamics that impede the efforts of the state to assimilate the 
borderland by creating economic and political dependencies upon the core of the state.  
 
The study charts the effective withdrawal of the previously weak and ineffective civil 
administration of the Pakistani state from selected areas of KP, under successful challenge by 
ascendant tribal authority and tribal militancy. It also analyses the inverse effectiveness of the 
militarisation of the borderland by the state upon the withdrawal of civil administration, and 
upon resurgent tribal authority, as a function of civil-military competition. This study further 
addresses incongruities between the territorial contours of pre-state substructures and the 
postcolonial state, as manifest in the cases of the Kurds and the Bedouin Arab, as the principal 
factor challenging the primacy of the postcolonial state.  
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1.13  Expected Findings 
The study expects to find that the authority of state administrative structures has been 
successfully challenged in the borderland by tribal authority. This tribal authority is at once a 
localised phenomenon, and a wider phenomenon with the replication of the autonomy of zai 
across the wider Pashtun areas that constitute historical Pakhtunkhwa. Thus, this study 
expects to find that the re-territorialisation of Pakhtunkhwa is the underlying structural cause 
of the resurgence of tribal autonomy in the Afghan borderland.  
 
Further, the study expects to find that in Pakistan, the primacy of tribal authority is expanding 
from FATA into settled parts of KP and Baluchistan. The study expects to find that along with 
this expansion of tribal authority comes the expansion of the borderland’s grey economy, the 
laxity  or withdrawal of civil administration, the proliferation of jirga based adjudication and 
decision making mechanisms, and an expansion of tribal militancy.  
 
The study expects to find that in Afghanistan, the absence of viable state authority with writ 
across the Pashtun belt is filled by localised structures of tribal authority. Ghilzai-Durrani 
political rivalry is eclipsed by the re-territorialisation of pre-colonial Pakhtunkhwa, which is a 
primarily localised phenomenon. The continuation of the US led NATO military presence does 
not alter this trend, and in fact works as a catalyst for tribal and clan distance from the state.  
1.14  Research Methods 
This study seeks to do three things: Firstly, it establishes the larger theoretical framework 
within which the thesis question is placed. This pertains to the competition between enduring, 
pre-state substructures and the postcolonial state as an underlying cause of the political 
instability that characterises the experience of the postcolonial state in Asia. The study does 
this by addressing the cases of the Kurds, the Bedouin, and the Pashtuns. Secondly, the study 
examines in detail the Afghan borderland as a case where sub-state polities in the form of 
tribes are in direct competition with the Pakistani and Afghan states along the Durand Line. 
Thirdly, the study explores the underlying structural causes for resurgent tribal autonomy in 
the Afghan borderland by analysing ideational drivers for tribalism, patterns of inter-tribal 
competition, tribe-state competition, structures of economic flows across the borderland, 
structures of migratory flows across the borderland, and patterns of militancy. The study 
establishes its findings relating to these areas of examination through the modalities of 
literature examination, general contextual observation, and empirical analysis.  
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The study establishes the larger contextual framework of competition between the 
postcolonial state and pre-state forms of polity primarily through a survey of existing literature 
pertaining to the experience of the postcolonial state in the context of Asia. The study seeks to 
establish that Asia is characterised by political and administrative experiences, predating the 
advent of European colonialism by millennia, interrupted by a period of direct and indirect 
European colonialism between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. Three nodes of 
political gravity are particularly notable in this period: the Turko-Arab experience of west Asia, 
Mughal India, and successive dynasties in Persia- all three of which were transnational states 
with administrative centres and provincial differentiation. This study addresses the Turko-Arab 
experience of west Asia through the literature, examining varying paradigms of analysis of the 
experience of the postcolonial state against the backdrop of the larger transnational polity in 
Turkey and Arabia. 
  
The study then proceeds to examine normative, ideational, anthropological, and political 
aspects of Pashtun tribal society as a means through which to understand the psycho-social 
dynamics that underlie the social and political reality of the Afghan borderland. This the study 
does through a combination of literature examination and general contextual observation. 
This study does not seek to break new ground in the field of anthropology as it relates to 
Pashtun tribal phenomena. Extensive literature has already been dedicated to the study of 
Pashtun culture, norms, language and history from anthropological and historical perspective. 
This extensive body of work is referred to, and many of its findings adopted, by this study. 
Further, general observations of patterns of social organisation and behavioural norms 
amongst the tribal Pashtuns are made through this study. These observations, undertaken by 
the author, are referred to as contextual observations as they contribute to the establishment, 
along with literature analysis, of the larger socio-cultural context of Pashtun tribal society in 
the Afghan borderland.  
 
The study then proceeds to make a detailed analysis of dynamics within the Afghan 
borderland between and among the principal tribes, and between these tribes and the state. 
These dynamics include; structures and patterns of competition and alliance amongst the 
tribes, both within FATA and across the Durand Line; the conduct of the state and the military 
in the borderland; the structure of economic flows across the borderland – both state 
regulated and ‘unregulated’; patterns of migration across the Durand Line; and trends in the 
militancy currently being waged across the borderland. In addition, the study makes a detailed 
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examination into the physical, demographic, infrastructural and geographic aspects of the 
borderland. In each specific aspect of borderland reality analysed, factors are divided into 
dependent and independent variables to be further analysed in the pursuit of possible cause-
effect relationships, and the elaboration of possible trends that may be replicable in other 
areas of examination. This detailed analysis is built upon empirically established findings. 
These are established through fieldwork across the borderland, carried out prior to and during 
the compilation of this study. Field work consisted of two fundamental aspects; participant 
observation and surveying.  
 
Participant observation involved living with and travelling amongst the tribal Pashtuns of the 
borderland for a total period of 4 months during the compilation of this study, and three years 
immediately preceding it. During these periods, detailed observations of the nature of tribal 
Pashtun social and political life were made relating to pashtunwali, Pashto, rites relating to 
marriage, birth and death, tribal conflict, jirga, and how the Pashtun understand the impact of 
international events directly related to the borderland as part of a wider psycho-social 
paradigm revolving around khpal, kor, khel.  These observations form the basis of much of the 
analysis in this study of millennial tribal trends relating to conflict, autonomy and the notion of 
Pakhtunkhwa.  
 
Further to participant observation, field work was conducted in 2008-9 through the method of 
interviewing. Interviews were conducted with a variety of personalities from FATA, the 
military, the KP provincial administration and the Pakistani Federal administration, and 
representatives of the Afghan government. Interviews were guided by a series of questions 
formulated prior to fieldwork being undertaken, relating to tribal dynamics and tribe-state 
relations. However, through the course of fieldwork, it became apparent that different 
elements of the survey were of varying degrees of relevance for particular interviewees. 
Hence, interviews more closely resembled detailed conversations with particular individuals, 
guided by the themes considered most relevant for the interviewee at that point in time. The 
nature of the interviews were not of a quantitative method of analysis, in contrast with other 
studies that were conducted in FATA during the same period which relied heavily on numbers 
of subjects surveyed and interviewed in order to deduce a trend in the area of migration 
dynamics. 43  Rather, in this study interviews were conducted in order to construct a 
understanding of the deeper psycho-social driving factors behind many of the trends in the 
borderland, as well as seeking to verify information and analysis pertaining to the borderland 
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through interviewing personalities directly involved in developments as part of the military, 
the state and tribes. As such, the interviews are considered a qualitative method of analysis. 
1.15 Limitations of the Research Methodology 
1.15.1  Participant observation 
Limitations on the conduct of research arose from research methodology and the means and 
styles employed therein. Strictly objective observations that required maintenance of social 
distance would have resulted in even further limited access to tribesmen than was achieved, 
and would have resulted in very limited access to administrative and military officials. Thus, 
field work was deemed to be most effectively carried out through participatory observation. 
Through the employment of participant observation techniques, many interviews were 
conducted in the format of probing conversations rather than formally structured interviews. 
As well as limiting the amount of criticality that could be employed during such a conversation, 
such interviews were bound by the social dynamics associated with ephemeral guest-host 
relations.  
 
As is generally the case with participant observation, the capacity for unanticipated 
interference by the interviewer is a potentially significant limitation. Unanticipated 
interference in this case may have resulted from presenting a question outside the relatively 
rigid norms of Pashto conversation. This may have prompted the interviewee to make 
judgements that might not have been made otherwise. For example, on being asked directly 
whether or not the Durand Line was a significant barrier to the movement of people across it, 
many responses reiterated the widely held view that the Durand Line did not function as a 
barrier at all, even though in some cases the interviewee had no specific experience that 
would support such a view. On being asked the direct question, however, respondents felt it 
was important to state the position that has become a part of Pashtun culture, that the border 
does not separate the Pashtuns on either side of it. Evidently, the direct manner in which the 
question was raised, the fact that it was asked in a Pashto social context as part of ‘doing 
Pashto’, and the fact that the interaction was ephemeral, all combined to determine that the 
respondent would be highly likely to give an answer commensurate with the appropriate 
cultural norms and expectations. If the question was asked in a different style, for example 
through suggesting that the queues at the Torkham border post were terribly long due to the 
current security situation, the view of the Durand Line articulated by the interviewee might 
have been quite different.  In this manner, participant observation has the potential to 
produce results with limited objective verifiability. To reduce the impact of this limitation, a 
55 
  
number of formal interviews were conducted while maintaining social distance from the 
interviewees, with individuals more accustomed to the practice. 
1.15.2  Language 
Another aspect of ‘interference’ is in the language itself. Pashto is a language within which 
there are a number of distinct regional dialects. In cases, these dialects vary in vocabulary and 
the nature of idioms used while in other cases variation is more nuanced. Sensing a difference 
in dialect can place an interviewee within a defensive frame of mind as there is the risk that 
the interviewer may be from a rival clan, tribe, or from an intelligence organisation.44 It is 
difficult to verify whether or not an interviewee feels threatened and is making statements 
that are intended to be ambiguous and non-committal, but this was sensed across a number 
of interviews. Further problems presented by conducting interviews in Pashto were in 
interpreting expressions and adjectives. Determining the degree or magnitude of a 
phenomenon is difficult to ascertain due to the variance in the use of expressions between 
regions. For example, in Kohat and amongst the Afridi of Khyber unformed words, little more 
than a vocal inflexion, are used to indicated an affirmation. The elongation of the vocal 
inflexion indicates the degree of affirmation. This is in contrast with Yusufzai dialect in which 
precisely formed words are employed to convey affirmation, and the degree of agreement. 
The Yusufzai dialect is most widely used across KP, and tends to be understood by speakers of 
other dialects. Questions, when asked in Pashto, were asked in the Yusufzai dialect. 
Respondents used a variety of dialects both in Peshawar and around FATA and KP. The result is 
that while the questions were very likely to have been understood, the responses were 
understood in so far as the limits of dialect variation permitted. 
 
Interviews with academics at the University of Peshawar were conducted in English. In cases, 
this produced the highest degree of clarity and accuracy of all interviews in terms of the 
questions asked and the responses given. Although a positive development leading to more 
extensive and deeper interviews with such individuals, such interviews skewed the amount of 
information gained through the total of all interviews towards the English speaking 
respondents. This has the potential of limiting the representativeness of the aggregate of the 
interviews. 
 
                                                          
44
 This concern was directly raised on at least two occasions, in one case in August 2008 in Islamabad 
at F-10 market it was raised repeatedly in an interview and as a warning that the interviewee was 
indeed an intelligence  
official warning the interviewer not to proceed with the questions.  
56 
  
Other respondents spoke parochial English which itself produced a challenge in terms of 
understanding the respondents accurately. Some such respondents were heavily accented and 
frequently constructed fragmented sentences, prompting a reiteration of the question in a 
more basic form, or a reiteration of the response by the interviewer, to which the respondent 
would either agree or disagree. This process invariably reduces the depth and precision of 
judgments and responses, and as such constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of the 
interview process.  
1.15.2.1  Afghanistan 
Another limitation is the fact that travel into Afghanistan during the duration of field work was 
not possible. By August 2008, the Khyber Pass had become the scene of battles between 
various Afridi clans based upon support for rival religious authorities. It was during this period 
that the western reaches of Peshawar fell under the control of Afridi lashkars, reported in 
western media as a Taliban encroachment upon Peshawar.45 There was the option of travelling 
with an armed escort from Jamrud, through the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan, and measures 
to arrange such an expedition were undertaken. However, this entailed a prohibitive risk and 
was highly likely to have resulted in either defensive firing or evasive manoeuvring. Further, 
the part of Afghanistan relevant to this study is generally avoided by journalists and academics 
due to the relatively high risks of kidnapping. Most journalists and academics confine 
themselves to either Kabul, Herat or the relatively stable north of the country, locales of 
limited value for field work to be undertaken in the borderland.46 As a result, travel into 
Afghanistan was not undertaken. Interviews were, however, conducted with individuals from 
Afghanistan in Peshawar, London, and Omaha. In addition, literature pertaining to specific 
trends within tribal Pashtun dynamics in the context of the insurgency in Afghanistan were 
consulted. It must be mentioned, however, that the there is little external penetration of tribal 
southern Afghanistan by non-tribal individuals or organisations. Much of the limited literature 
relies on official Afghan sources,47 or Pakistani sources, neither of which provides analysis 
devoid of the implications for the local policy of each.  
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 See „Can Pakistani Troops make Peshawar safe?‟ 1st July, 2008; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7483963.stm  Accessed 20
th
 November, 2010. 
46
 A variety of academics and analysts, including such individuals as Rory Stewart and Antonio 
Giustozzi, have travelled in Afghanistan and published extensively. By admission, their fieldwork, 
however, does not include extensive travels through the tribal Pashtun areas of the borderland.  
47
 Telephonic conversations were held with associates of the late Ahmed Shah Masood in Kabul, as 
well as meetings with associates of Yunus Qanooni, based in London. A greater level of high quality 
primary research regarding the dynamics of southern Afghanistan very likely entails a prohibitive risk.  
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1.16 Organisation of the Study  
After the conclusion of chapter 1, the study proceeds through six sequential chapters.  Chapter 
2, Doing Pashto, provides background and perspective essential in understanding the 
dynamics of the borderland, through exploring the nature of Pashtun society as a patrilineal, 
segmentary society structured along tribal lines, governed by the normative code of 
pashtunwali. The chapter traces the historical origin of the Pashtun as a nation, giving an 
account of the differentiation of the patrilineal shajara. The chapter explores Pakhtunkhwa as 
a pre-state substructure within which the Afghan borderland emerges. Identifying possible 
changes to the form of Pashtun identity resulting from decades of violent instability in the 
borderland, the chapter explores the most salient aspects of pashtunwali and their strategic 
and political impact upon the borderland and beyond.  
 
Chapter 3, The Strategic Significance of the Afghan Borderland from Alexander to America, 
addresses the phenomenon of the Pashtun tribes as a borderland people from antiquity 
through to the modern age, suggesting that the Afghan borderland is an historically constant 
feature, formed by geographic, anthropological and wider political factors. The chapter 
examines the development of Pashtun tribal society through the successive waves of invasion 
that have traversed the Afghan borderland including the invasions of Alexander, the Central 
Asian Hordes, the Mongols, the subsequent northward campaigns of the Mughal rulers of 
central and northern India, Anglo-Russian rivalry, and the current international campaign 
across the borderland. The chapter goes on to examine how, in the context of this historical 
trajectory and through the analysis of scale, the patterns of reciprocal tribal influences across 
the Durand Line have become strategically and politically salient to the Afghan and Pakistani 
States.  
 
Chapter 4, Borderless Borderland, illustrates how pre-state substructures may respond to the 
imposition of an international boundary bisecting the substructure, in this case the tribal core 
of the larger substructure of Pakhtunkhwa. The chapter establishes the nature of the cross-
border interaction, primarily among the clans and families who live in the vicinity of the 
Durand Line, but also more generally among the Pashtun population across the borderland. 
Through the analysis of fieldwork and interviews, and the consultation of other studies 
including the field work and interviews conducted by others, the chapter charts the structure 
of cross-border interdependencies in the areas of marriage, the structure of economic flows, 
and jirga between the tribal Pashtuns residing in the agencies contiguous with the border, and 
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more widely between KP and Afghanistan. Upon the basis of these findings, the extent of 
indigenous cross-border activity is established, enabling an examination of the degree of 
impact of the border as a political, economic and social barrier between the population within 
a pre-state substructure.  
 
Chapter 5, The Retreating State, explores how the withdrawal from the borderland of the 
Pakistani and Afghan states, each driven by different causal factors, has accompanied the 
resurgence of tribally based structures of power and authority in the borderland. Examining 
the limited role of the civil administration in a wide range of responsibilities conventionally 
attributed to civil state structures, the chapter goes on to explore the impact of the 
militarisation of the borderland. It explores the competition between the civil and military 
roles of the state, charting the effect of this competition upon civil administration in the 
borderland, as well as its effect on the resurgence of tribal authority across the borderland. 
The chapter also explores the phenomenon of borderland expansion, illustrated more 
thoroughly in the final chapter. 
 
Chapter 6, The Future of the Afghan Borderland, examines the possible future scenarios 
resulting from tribal resurgence in the Afghan borderland. The chapter explores the attempts 
by the state at assimilating, accommodating or diminishing the autonomy of the borderland. 
Exploring political and military strategies for integration, the chapter explores the possibility of 
secession and the Pashtunistan question, contrasting it with the likelihood of the current 
situation of instability in the borderland perpetuating itself indefinitely. Against this backdrop, 
the chapter explores prospects for graduated development, assimilation and political progress 
in the borderland as a function of Pakistani and Afghan state policy towards the borderland.  
 
Chapter 7, The Dynamics of Borderland Autonomy, examines the findings of the study, 
including the underlying structural causes for the resurgence of borderland autonomy, and the 
dynamics of borderland expansion. The study places the findings in the larger context of 
challenges faced by the postcolonial state in Asia arising from the competition with pre-state 
substructures. The chapter then sets out to review of some of the fundamental limiting factors 
under which this study was conducted, before suggesting areas where this work may be 
expanded upon by other authors.  
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2 Doing Pashto1 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies and examines elements of the Pashtun social and political experience 
that are determinant in the continuity of the Pashtun as an enduring trans-border and pre-
state substructure. In parallel with the Kurds and Bedouin, the study identifies tribes as the 
principal driver of Pashtun identity and polity. In all three cases tribal structures and the 
associated norms of conduct arising in a segmentary and patrilineal society are the dominant 
socio-political features. These features constitute the basis of trans-border and sub-state 
identities, predating the relatively recent imposition of the postcolonial state and continuing 
to endure competition with it. However the study also identifies elements of the Pashtun 
tribal reality that distinguish it from the Kurdish case particularly, but also notably from the 
Bedouin experience in northern Arabia. These differences are identified as the causal variables 
in the resultant significant differences between the Afghan borderland and the Kurdish and 
Bedouin borderlands respectively.  
 
The chapter examines Pashtun tribal structures and their derived social dynamics as 
determinants of the functioning, autonomy and expansion of the Afghan borderland. These 
include the territorialisation of Pashtun tribalism as a driver in the increasing autonomy and 
further physical expansion of the borderland into KP, Baluchistan and southern Afghanistan. 
They also include core components of pashtunwali as the ideational basis of Pashtun political 
identity, including the territorial concepts of zai and Pakhtunkhwa. These observations will 
illuminate compound questions of identity emerging from the territorialisation of sub-state 
and trans-border tribal authority, a phenomenon that is widely found in tribal societies 
impacted by the imposition of the postcolonial state. 
 
The chapter traces the development and emergence of the Pashtun as a segmentary nation. It 
investigates the conceptual foundation of the term Pakhtunkhwa, which provides a frame of 
reference for describing the geographical context within which the Pashtun identity has 
developed. The chapter also discusses salient aspects of pashtunwali, the all encompassing 
code of conduct dictating Pashtun norms, customs and beliefs, and whether it has evolved, 
                                                          
1
 The idiom „Doing Pashto‟ is translated from the Pashto expression „Pakhto Kol‟. Jon Anderson 
provides a detailed treatment of the concept of „Pakhto Kol‟ in his doctoral dissertation entitled Doing 
Pakhto: Social Organisation of the Ghilzai Pakhtun. Anderson argues the meaning of the word Pashto 
encompasses not only the language but also the actions mandated under pashtunwali. Hence, the term 
Pashto refers to both the spoken language and the conduct of the tribal Pashtun in accordance with the 
edicts of pashtunwali. See: (Anderson 1979: 142). 
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eroded or otherwise reduced in its significance and impact upon Pashtun society and politics 
as recent years have seen the introduction of greater opportunities for literacy and greater 
economic enfranchisement in the borderland. The chapter also outlines the major tribes 
derived from the Pashtun shajara, providing some historical, spatial and political context to 
their present condition. An understanding of Pakhtunkhwa, pashtunwali, the historical 
formative influences on the region, and the major tribes derived from the Pashtun shajara all 
provide a foundation upon which more detailed analyses of specific themes within tribal 
Pashtun dynamics can subsequently be developed. 
2.2 Pashtunwali 
2.2.1  Pathans, Pakhtuns, Pashtuns and Afghans; a note on terminology 
Different renditions of the term Pashtun are used to describe the Pashtun nation. The term 
Pathan was widely used during the British administration of the then NWFP. It has been used 
by the two principal English language scholars of the Pashtun; Olaf Caroe in The Pathans 
(1958) and Akbar Ahmed in Millennium and Charisma Among Pathans (1976). The term finds 
its origin in the Makhzan-i-Afghani, an account of the Afghan origin of the Delhi sultanate 
written around 1612 AD by Ne'amatullah.2 In the Baburnama (Thackston 1996: 226) the 
Mughal emperor Babur (1526-1530) posits that the source of the term may be the fact that 
Pashtuns settled at Patna in India, and hence came to be known as Pathans. In any case, the 
term Pathan is an Indian usage that came into wider currency during the British Raj, a period 
in which extensive studies were conducted into various aspects of Pashtun social and political 
life.3 It is not used by the tribes of the Afghan borderland in any capacity. 
 
Across the entire Pashtun belt, three terms are used by the Pashtuns when referring to 
themselves. The term Pakhtun is widely used amongst the tribes who populate northern and 
central KP and FATA as well as the adjoining provinces of Afghanistan including Nangarhar, 
Laghman and Kunar. The Pashto of this large grouping is classified as the hard variant of the 
                                                          
2
 Ne’amatullah Harvi (Harawi) was a chronicler at the court of the Mughal Emperor Jahangir in the 
early seventeenth century. His work Makhzan-i-Afghani (History of the Afghans) is the first recorded 
account of the history, society and culture of the Pashtun. This study consults a 2002 reprint of the 
original. See Roy, Nirodbhusan Niamatullah’s History of the Afghans Sang-e-Meel Publications, 
Lahore, 2002.  
3
 Between Elphinstone‟s(1815) The Kingdom of Caubul. and Caroe‟s (1958 )The Pathans, a very large 
body of literature addressing Pashtun culture, geography, history, tribal structures and politics was 
produced by British military and civil administration officials. This scholarship includes academic, 
military and intelligence contributions. The bulk of this work is available for consultation at the India 
Records Office of the British Library, London. 
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language, characterised by the frequent use of the vocal inflexion ‘kh’. This is in contrast to the 
soft variant of Pashto spoken across the rest of the Pashtun belt where ‘kh’ is replaced by ‘sh’.4 
 
Pashtun is the most common rendition used in studies conducted in the English language 
today. The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World, and the Encyclopaedia Britannica use 
this soft variant widely, although not exclusively while the Encyclopaedia Iranica uses Pashtun 
predominantly but also references both Pashtun and Pakhtun in cases.5 The BBC also uses the 
term Pashtun and refers in its language service to Pashto.6 In keeping with this developing 
convention within the English language, this study uses the terms Pashtun and Pashto. The 
reality described by the term Pashtun is synonymous with that described by the hard variant 
pronunciation, Pakhtun. There is no variance in reality conveyed in variance in the 
pronunciation. 
 
As for the term Afghan, it is used widely amongst the Durrani and to a lesser extent amongst 
other tribes as referring to all Pashtuns. Raverty, in his ground-breaking Pashto dictionary, 
equates the words Afghan, Pashtun and Pakhtun, tracing the word Afghan back to its Persian 
root, fighan, and accounting for its evolution into the current form, Afghan (Raverty 1860: 39). 
Raverty’s account appears to reflect a commonly held understanding as it remains 
unchallenged in the literature treating Pashto linguistics. Today, however, in international 
convention the term Afghan describes an indigenous resident of the state of Afghanistan, a 
state in which the Pashtun account for around half of the population.  Although this study will 
not use the term Afghan as it is used by the Durrani in its historical context, the origin and 
convention associated with the term discussed here do shed light on the questions of identity 
amongst the Pashtuns to be explored further in this study.  
                                                          
4
 This is developed in the subsequent section on the Pashto language. For reference, the following 
approximation has been rendered through various oral traditions: A line from Peshawar to Jalalabad 
will separate the northern hard variant from the southern softer one. This maxim hasn‟t stood up to any 
criticality as far as the research for this study is concerned. The Khyber agency lies south of the line, 
but its inhabitants speak the hard variant, as do various pockets of population in the southern part of 
KP. However, there is clearly a greater concentration of soft-variant speakers of Pashto south of the 
line while speakers of the hard variant tend to be concentrated to the north of it. Ahmed (1980:116-17) 
charts the spatial distinction between the hard and soft variants. His work has become an often 
referenced source in other subsequent examinations of the issue.  
5
 For how each cites the Pashto and Pashtun see the following links: 
http://www.iranica.com/articles/gandapur-ser-mohammad-khan for dual use of Pashtun and Pakhtun; 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/445546/Pashtun for Pashtun (accessed January 2011). 
6
 Since 2001, nearly all references to the Pashtun in BBC media use „Pashtun‟ and Pashto. See: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pashto/index.shtml . Accessed 13th January, 2011.  
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2.2.2  Pashtunwali 
As in the cases of the Kurds and the Bedouin, the Pashtun are a nation in so far as they profess 
a common language, a commonly held account of their genealogical origin, and a shared 
historical experience within a common territory. In addition to these characteristics, and in 
further parallel with the Kurds and Bedouin which are also segmentary societies, the Pashtuns 
exhibit an ideational framework that reinforces the segmentary and patrilineal nature of their 
tribal society. However, in contrast with the parallel examples, the Pashtun are unique in the 
extent to which their ideational framework is codified, adhered to and enforced, and 
generates a political and strategic impact.  
 
Pashtunwali is the conduct of interaction between individuals, clans and tribes in accordance 
with commonly held norms and edicts that regulate all aspects of individual, social and 
political life. Pashtunwali establishes general criteria which regulate conduct through 
establishing objectives and values to which tribes, clans and individuals aspire. It encapsulates 
the totality of what it means to be Pashtun. Pashtun politics, society and war can be 
understood only through understanding how the concepts emanating from pashtunwali shape 
the Pashtun psyche. 
 
Defining pashtunwali is particularly challenging as it remains unwritten. Its origins have been 
the focus of extensive speculation by anthropologists for over a century, and by tribesmen for 
much longer. Rather than define pashtunwali, it will be more meaningful for this study to 
analyse how these widely understood and adhered to aspects of pashtunwali constitute the 
ideational basis for both tribal independence and tribal interdependence, both of which are 
core features of the enduring nature of sub-state tribal polity in the Afghan borderland, and of 
the increasing autonomy and territorial expansion of these tribal polities.  
 
This study identifies badal (retribution), nanawatey (provision of asylum to an enemy), 
melmastiya (hospitality) and nang-o-namus (honour) as the most politically and strategically 
salient precepts of pashtunwali. Additionally it recognises that pragmatism and opportunism 
are virtues amongst tribal Pashtuns, who are largely engaged in a permanent state of zero-
sum brinkmanship with surrounding tribes This unconventional notion virtue is captured by 
Dupree (1980: 127); 
 
Honour and hospitality, hostility and ambush, are paired in the Afghan mind. 
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It is true that pashtunwali is in origin an austere code adhered to by individuals leading largely 
rigorous lives, dominated by a sense of siege and often ending violently. However Dupree’s 
characterisation does not address the core theme in pashtunwali that makes it enduring and 
widely adhered to; the combining of spiritual identity and temporal identity into a single 
identity that forms the basis of a parochial world-view at the centre of which is the Pashtun, 
his kor, his khel, his qawm and his nang. An affront to any of these, therefore, constitutes an 
affront on a spiritual as well as a physical level, an attribute that stems from the fusion of the 
Islamic creed and enduring pre-Islamic norms of conduct among tribal Pashtuns (Nyrop, 
Seekins 1973: 181). Although Gankovsky (1964: 22-35) postulates that the essential 
components of the fundamentals of Pashtun culture had developed by the second millennium 
AD, it must be stated that most accounts suggest that a significant portion of the Pashtun 
remained outside the Islamic world at that point. Hence, pre-Islamic injunctions of 
pashtunwali continue to persist (Marsden 1998: 85-6), despite the conservative Islamic 
characterisation of Pashtun tribesmen currently, particularly in English language accounts.  
2.2.3  Badal 
Linguistically, the Pashto term badal refers to the transaction of exchange made in the settling 
of accounts (Raverty 1860: 47). In the context of pashtunwali, it refers to an act of vengeance 
aimed at redressing the perceived deficit of honour incurred through the indignity of having 
suffered a wrong committed against property, blood or honour (Dupree 1980: 126). Badal is a 
central aspect of pashtunwali in the context of maintaining stability in the violent environment 
of the Afghan borderland. Its value as a deterrent against crimes cannot be understated. The 
edict of badal mandates tribal support from both the tribe of the aggrieved and the accused in 
dispensing the reciprocal violence that is mandated in cases of violent crime, theft or severe 
insolence. Through exacting badal, the prestige of the tribe or clan of the affronted is restored, 
as is that of the accused in accepting that the badal was justified, hence demonstrating an 
adherence to the edicts of pashtunwali. In all cases, adherence to the code of pashtunwali 
functions to redeem nang.  
 
The Pashtun, committed as he ostensibly is in his adherence to the Islamic sharia, perceives 
the concept of badal to be derived from Islamic canonical texts that prescribe reciprocal 
retaliation for personal injury or murder.7 However, in a marked departure from Islamic 
canonical jurisprudence, the Pashtun tribesman doesn’t resort to a judicial process, nor does 
he await the pronouncement of a qazi or mullah. His perception of an affront to his nang 
                                                          
7
 The Koran, Surah II verse 178, translated by  Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Dar as Salaam, Riyadh 
1996, p. 65.  
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warrants a reciprocal response with no need for sanction from any temporal or spiritual 
authority.8 This is the epitome of autonomy for the tribesman; the right to exact retribution as 
he sees fit, without regard for the consequences of such action from any higher legislative or 
judicial body.  
 
Such action is perceived as virtuous and honourable (Barth 1959: 136-138). According to nang-
e-Pakhto (code of honour - a term sometimes used interchangeably with pashtunwali), an un-
avenged injury or insult is deeply shameful where the honour of the aggrieved can be 
redeemed only by an action of retribution (Raverty 1860: 495). Those who fail to fulfil the 
obligations of pashtunwali by abrogating insult or injury though badal invariably lose prestige 
in the eyes of their tribe, and in doing so render themselves liable to paighore.9 
 
Further to mandating badal, pashtunwali enables badal to be sought in an unconventional 
manner. The aggrieved can lie in wait for months, or even years for the opportunity to exact 
badal.10 He may endure all manner of hardship, placing himself and his family in great 
difficulty and danger, in pursuit of redemption in the eyes of his family, clan and tribe.  
 
Pennell (1908: 18) recounts an incident involving a Pashtun girl who sought badal in response 
to the slaying of her brother by shooting the suspected murderer in a crowded bazaar, all after 
a magistrate had dismissed her appeal for justice based on a lack of evidence (Pennel 1908: 
18). Found guilty of murder, she was sentenced to a penitentiary on the Andaman Islands. On 
being transported, she remarked that she was content with her fate having restored the nang 
of her family (Pennel 1908: 18). 
 
Political agency in FATA has led to some evolution in the practice of the badal. In high profile 
cases of criminality, the exacting of badal has actually been facilitated by tribal leadership on 
behalf of the aggrieved.11 It is very likely that organising badal in this manner is aimed at 
                                                          
8
 Observed by the author in Tor Ghar (PATA) in January 2001.  
9
 Observed by the author in Khwajgan, Kuz Pakhli in June 2001 in a dispute between two clans over 
the right to hold congregational Friday prayers in a newly constructed mosque. One party felt allowing 
such a practice would undermine the nang of the primary clan. A jirga led to a resolution before the 
eruption of full-scale hostilities.  
10
 An oral tradition narrated amongst the tribal Pashtuns states „Pakhtun sil kaala warasto akhpal badal 
mekhwa khasta wali usum talwar uwarko‟. This can be rendered in English as „A Pakhtun took his 
revenge after a hundred years, and still too soon‟.   
11
 In a high-profile case of abduction in March 2009 in the Khyber agency, the tribal leader Mangal 
Bagh organised the exacting of badal by an aggrieved party through the killing of the alleged 
abductors. This case was brought to the attention of foreign media and was reported in video 25 
March, 2009. See: http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/video/Taliban-impose-Sharia-law-in-Khyber-
Agency-region-of-Pakistan/Video/200903415248508?lpos=video_Article_Related_Content_Region 
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conferring legitimacy upon both the organisational endeavour and the edict itself. In this 
manner, the profile of the tribal leadership is enhanced. Such efforts at gaining legitimacy are 
emergent in a context where the struggle for tribal leadership is contested by a greater 
number of khans and maliks than ever before. The current widespread availability of large 
weapons, money and manpower results in a severely contested struggle for leadership. 
Anderson (1979: 195-205) deliberates extensively on the dynamics that limit the emergence of 
khans amongst the Ghilzai in the Afghan borderland. The same dynamic appropriately 
describes the struggle for khangi in the FATA region. 
2.2.4  Nanawatey 
Nanawatey is derived from the root verb ‘to enter’ and linguistically refers to being able to get 
into a house or place of safety.12 As an attribute of pashtunwali, it describes the seeking of 
protection with a complete stranger, or even a longstanding rival or enemy. In the case of the 
latter, nanawatey can be a means through which to terminate the state of belligerence 
(Dupree 1980: 126). It is an attribute of Pashtun society that, while clans can be engaged in a 
perpetual state of confrontation, they will extend an unmitigated duty of hospitality even to 
enemies if enemies approach as guests or as seeking shelter or asylum. Nanawatey is an edict 
wherein any individual who approaches the abode of a khan, malik or any member of a clan, is 
granted an absolute form of asylum. Tribal perception of the Pashtun’s honour is linked to the 
degree of difficulty and sacrifice endured in providing and maintaining that asylum. In the one 
single exception to the extension of nanawatey, there is no such asylum in cases of tor, or 
crimes involving the reputation or nang of a woman (Khan 2008: 76).  
 
Pashtun oral tradition is replete with examples of nanawatey. Such oral traditions transferred 
through families and clans over generations instil a sense of what nanawatey represents. In 
one widely narrated case, a killer unknowingly beseeches the brother of his victim who 
unreservedly accepts the invocation of nanawatey while knowing that the petitioner is in fact 
the killer he himself has been seeking to exact badal from. The nang, or honour, of the host is 
restored through providing asylum in such a testing circumstance. Having restored honour 
through the provision of nanawatey to one’s enemies, and therein having earned high regard 
                                                                                                                                                                      
_3&lid=VIDEO_15248508_Taliban_impose_Sharia_law_in_Khyber_Agency_region_of_Pakistan . 
Accessed  29
th
 April 2009.  
 
12
For a detailed treatment of nanawatey  drawing on a wide variety of sources in English and Pashto 
see: „Nanawatey‟; http://www.khyber.org/culture/pashtoonwalai/nanawatey.shtml . Accessed 12th 
January, 2011. 
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in the perception of one’s family, clan and tribe, the host is freely permitted to continue to 
pursue revenge, despite having extended nanawatey to restore his nang (Stewart 2007: 155).  
 
Currently, across the Afghan borderland, nanawatey continues to be practiced widely. 
Through the post anti-Soviet jihad years, the borderland had become notorious for harbouring 
fugitives escaping the Pakistani authorities who had sought nanawatey amongst the tribesmen 
of FATA. Since the emergence of the Taliban militia in Afghanistan, the forced adherence to 
austere Islamic injunctions across FATA has functioned to deter many fugitives from seeking 
refuge in the borderland. According to security analysts, it is this element of pashtunwali – the 
provision of nanawatey to ostensibly devout Muslims - that forms the principal obstacle to the 
successful apprehension of individuals accused of aiding and abetting international terrorism, 
suspected of now seeking asylum in the borderland.13 Consequently, it is this edict of 
pashtunwali that has brought the norms of the Afghan borderland into direct confrontation 
with the judicial and executive authorities of the state of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
2.2.5 Melmastiya  
Melmastiya is derived from the noun melma (guest) and can be rendered into English as 
hospitality. As a specific edict within pashtunwali, it describes the attribute of providing for the 
needs of guests to the extent of incurring hardship or loss for oneself and family (Khan 2008: 
77). In contrast to nanawatey, melmastiya is not the result of beseeching a host but is the de 
facto position extended to travellers and visitors, and is expected as such by visitors. The 
specific practices associated with melmastiya exhibit some variance between tribes, but the 
principle of hospitality extended to all guests retains a high degree of attention amongst all 
tribes, taking precedence even over badal (Caroe 1958: 188).  
 
Although receiving guests is a common event in doing Pashto, it is taken extremely seriously. 
Providing hospitality presents an opportunity for gaining prestige or nang, and also for 
committing sharm. Linguistic expression in Pashto is rich in idioms expressing hospitality. 
Widely used greetings include ‘Har Kala Rasha’ (You are welcome in any condition, or always) 
and ‘Pa Khair Raghley’ (You have arrived at a place of refuge). These expressions are invoked 
to reflect the seriousness with which hospitality is regarded.  
 
In an accurate description of melmastiya, Caroe (1958: 351) mentions:  
                                                          
13 US attempts to offer bounties for information leading to the capture or killing of such suspects have 
met limited success in FATA. See: ‘US bounty scheme struggles in Pakistan’ 8
th
 April, 2009; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7990538.stm. Accessed  14th January,  2011. 
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The giving of hospitality to the guest is a national point of honour, so much so that the 
reproach to an inhospitable man is that he is devoid of Pashto, a creature of contempt. 
It is the greatest of affronts to a Pashtun to carry off his guest, and his indignation will 
be directed not against the guest who quits him but to the person who prevails on him to 
leave.  
 
In another example of melmastiya, Pennel (1908: 24-25) writes;  
 
On one occasion I came to a village with my companion rather late in the evening. The 
chief himself was away but his son received me with every mark of respect and killed a 
fowl and cooked a savoury Pullao ... late at night when the Khan returned and found on 
enquiry that the Bannu Padre Sahib was his guest, he asked if he had been suitably 
entertained. To his dismay he heard that only a chicken had been prepared for dinner. 
Immediately, therefore, he ordered a sheep to be killed and cooked, so that his honour 
might be saved.  
 
Pennel’s anecdote underscores the conception of melmastiya in the mind of the Pashtun. 
Consideration is given, not only to the guest, but principally to the host in terms of the 
inconvenience, difficulty and sacrifice made by the host. The example reinforces the notion 
that, the greater difficulty undertaken by the host in providing melmastiya, the greater the 
value attributed to him in the estimation of his clan and tribe.  
 
Melmastiya endures as a salient feature of pashtunwali and is the aspect of pashtunwali that 
most Pashtuns readily identify with as an exemplary attribute of their culture (Gohar and 
Yusufzai 2005: 33). It is practiced across the Pashtun belt, including FATA, KP, and Afghanistan 
and remains a defining aspect of Pashtun culture retained by Pashtuns as they move beyond 
the historical Pashtun homeland.14 Travellers through Pakhtunkhwa are very often considered 
melma (guests). The experience of being melma is often narrated by journalists, researchers, 
anthropologists and aid personnel the success of whose work in cases relies upon the 
melmastiya that is extended to them by the tribesmen amongst whom they travel.15 
Comprehending melmastiya and nanawatey provides an indispensable insight into the psycho-
                                                          
14
 Melmastiya was experienced across KP in the course of fieldwork between 1999 and 2003, and in 
2008.  Of particular note was that extended by Hassanzai tribesmen in the PATA district of Tor Ghar 
visited during these periods. 
15
 Jon Anderson (1979: 7) describes the melmastiya that was extended to him through his fieldwork 
amongst the Ghilzai.   
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social framework within which the Pashtun exist. Melmastiya and nanawatey, in the parochial 
mind of the Pashtun, are absolute concepts and pursued regardless of the tactical, strategic, 
and indeed geo-political implications of the practice. 
2.2.6  Nang-o-namus 
Linguistically, ‘nang-o-namus’ is a compound idiom from two constituents: nang and namus. 
Nang has been translated into English as ‘honour’ but is more accurately represented in 
English by ‘reputation’ (Raverty 1860: 495). Namus can also be literally translated as honour, 
but refers more specifically to the honour of one’s female relatives (Raverty 1860: 495). The 
connotation of the term namus is twofold; one aspect of it is that the presence of women in 
one’s family are regarded as an honour, and their company a privilege restricted to a small 
circle of males related either through blood or marriage. The second connotation is that one’s 
nang is a result of how closely one guards the namus with whose protection and well-being he 
is charged. Hence, the expression nang-o-namus describes the reputation one is afforded by 
guarding the sanctity of one’s womenfolk and one’s home which is primarily regarded as the 
exclusive domain of one’s womenfolk.16  
 
A violation of the sanctity of one’s nang-o-namus invariably engenders a rapid and violent 
response. The injuries and death suffered from retribution to an affront of another’s nang-o-
namus are not avenged according to the precepts of pashtunwali. Transgression of the 
inviobility of nang-o-namus carries paighore for those whose nang-o-namus has been violated 
as well as the family and clan of the one performing the transgression. There is no nanawatey 
offered to an individual who has carried out a tor, or transgression against nang-o-namus 
(Khan 2008: 76). Given that indignation associated with a violation of nang-o-namus is of such 
a significant scale, incidence of such transgression is uncommon within the tribal Pashtuns.17  
 
In origin the aspects of pashtunwali such as badal, melmastiya and nanawatey apply as widely 
to females as to males in Pashtun society. Fredrik Barth describes how Swati women seek 
                                                          
16
 Fieldwork across KP revealed that the homestead is typically divided into two sections. One is 
comprised of the majority of the space and facilities in the homestead and is considered the domain of 
the womenfolk where men may intrude with the permission of those inside. The second part is an 
annex usually termed a baytak, a term of unknown derivation, where male guests are received and 
entertained. The sections are usually enclosed within the fortified walls of the homestead, but are 
separated by an internal wall. Entrances to the two sections are separate.  
17
 Such incidents are seldom reported to administrative authorities, resulting in non-representative 
statistical data at the provincial high court at Peshawar. However, personal observations made during 
field work conducted in the Khyber agency in 2000 revealed that incidents involving a violation of 
nang-o-namus were very uncommon within clans. Further, no single incident was recalled by any of 
the interviewees over the entire period of fieldwork. This may, however, be a result of the extreme 
sense of tor associated with such incidents. 
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badal in disputes with women, and with men on behalf of, for example, deceased or 
debilitated males (Barth 1959: 137). Pennel describes at least two incidents, one each of badal 
and nanawatey, where the protagonists were women and the antagonists men (Pennel 1908: 
18). However, the relatively recent emergence of salafist oriented lashkars associated with the 
Taliban movement, and the emerging khans and maliks who are rising through tribal 
structures based on support from salafist militias has brought about a limit in the function of 
women in borderland society. How this emerging trend will impact the roles of women within 
the practice of pashtunwali is yet undetermined, as is the overall impact upon pashtunwali of 
such organisations.  
 
Pashtunwali as a social code has endured across the Afghan borderland for centuries, if not 
millennia as is suggested by Gankovsky (1964: 22-35). Its edicts are adhered to across the 
borderland by tribesmen and Pashtun resident in cities which, in the Afghan borderland, 
resemble towns as far as social dynamics are concerned due to the tribal and clan nature of 
the populations in the cities. Pashtunwali serves as the currency of a Pashtun identity that 
precedes the Pakistani and Afghan states. Although aspects of it such as melmastiya are 
mirrored to a degree in the wider cultural landscape of the Indus Valley, the contrast between 
many of its specific edicts such as nanawatey, paighore, tor and the prevalent cultural norms 
in the rest of Pakistan serve to enhance the cultural profile afforded by pashtunwali amongst 
the Pashtuns across the borderland. This results in a trans-border but sub-state cultural 
identity that manifests a territoriality in itself, characterised by the region within which 
pashtunwali and the practices of nang are adhered to and considered by this study to be the 
domain of tribal Pashtuns. This is aside from the territoriality arising from the autonomy of zai 
as a subset of the larger phenomenon of Pakhtunkhwa.  
2.3 Pakhtunkhwa 
2.3.1  The term ‘Pakhtunkhwa’ 
In Pashto, the suffix ‘khwa’ refers to a region, space or alternatively that which borders or 
limits. In origin, the Pashto term Pakhtunkhwa refers to the territory historically inhabited by 
the Pashtun national grouping (Raverty 1860: 179). The term Pakhtunkhwa as widely used 
amongst the Ghilzai, Karlanri and Yusufzai, literally means ‘space of the Pashtuns’. As for the 
Durrani, they have historically referred to the region in question as ‘Afghanistan’, as in Durrani 
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phraseology the terms ‘Afghan’ and ‘Pashtun’ are synonymous and represent the identical 
reality.18  
 
Clearly, the Durrani understanding of the term ‘Afghanistan’ directly contradicts current 
political convention where the term ‘Afghanistan’ represents a sovereign state that includes 
areas lying beyond the ancestral tribal lands of the Pashtuns, particularly the northern parts of 
the Afghan state. Further, much of the ‘Afghanistan’ of the Durrani lies in modern day 
Pakistan. Hence, to avoid the confusion inherent in using the term ‘Afghanistan’ in the Durrani 
context, this study will use the term Pakhtunkhwa in reference to the areas historically 
considered Pashtun homelands, populated overwhelmingly by Pashtuns. In this context, 
Pakhtunkhwa includes all of FATA, the contiguous areas of KP, the Yusufzai tribal belt running 
through northern KP, northern and western Baluchistan, and those areas of Afghanistan lying 
to the south and east of the central Afghan highlands.19   
 
In contrast with the larger domain of Pakhtunkhwa, the Afghan borderland as illustrated in 
Appendix V is determined by an altogether different dynamic. As illustrated in Appendix IX, 
Pakhtunkhwa incorporates an expanse of land that reaches into central Afghanistan and into 
Pakistan’s KP and Baluchistan provinces. The Afghan borderland does not extend throughout 
all of this territory. Indeed parts of Pakhtunkhwa extend to regions that are physically part of 
the geographic and political centre of the state, an extent to which the Afghan borderland 
does not reach. In Afghanistan this includes the capital Kabul and in Pakistan this extends to 
within thirty Kilometres of the vicinity of Islamabad.  
 
Territoriality in the Afghan borderland exists fundamentally as a tribal phenomenon, 
interpreted only partially by the state administrative structures in the borderland and the 
maps that chart them.20 The territorial domain that is inhabited by each tribe is referred to as 
the zai of that tribe. The connotation carried in the term is that it represents territory which is 
the historical domain of the tribe, but is not bounded by defined borders. Rather, the 
territorial domain of the tribe diminishes by gradients of influence as the tribal population 
                                                          
18
 (Raverty 1860: 179). Raverty doesn‟t equate the terms Afghan and Pashtun in an explicit statement 
to that effect. Rather, he mentions the origin of the Pashtuns and treats them with the terms Pashtun and 
Afghan interchangingly, where the two terms represent the identical reality. Subsequently, Caroe, 
Dupree and Spain have all mirrored the equivalence of the terms Afghan and Pashtun historically. 
19
 See Appendix IX.  
20
 Although the FATA area is comprised of seven tribal agencies, the  zai of the tribes that inhabit them 
are not confined to either the boundaries of the agency or the Durand Line. This is accurately reflected 
in the detailed tribal maps included as an annex in Caroe‟s The Pathans (1958: Annex I). 
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becomes gradually eclipsed by that of other tribes.21 This is more clearly the case amongst the 
Ghilzai, while amongst the Karlanri Waziri, some clans have quite deliberately demarcated the 
area within which rival clansmen are not welcome. Pakhtunkhwa represents a central tenet of 
pashtunwali in that it is considered the aggregate of the autonomous tribal zai of the Pashtun 
tribes and as that, it is the largest territorial grouping within Pashto lexicon, short of aalam 
which is the entire world. Implicit in this is the central position of Pakhtunkhwa within the 
aalam in the mind of the tribal Pashtun, a mythology that is only reinforced by the nature of 
current political and military attention paid in the world at large to the Afghan borderland. 
 
A further use of the term Pakhtunkhwa was initiated in the mid 1960s, by the Afghan regime 
in the context of the reunification of territories divided by the demarcation of the Durand Line. 
The Dauod regime actively sought the re-integration of the then NWFP and FATA with 
Afghanistan, and sponsored a number of parallel initiatives, diplomatic and guerrilla in nature, 
aimed at achieving this objective (Marwat 1991: 26-7). Hence, in contemporary political 
parlance, the term Pakhtunkhwa is sometimes used to refer to the pan-Pashtun nationalist 
agenda that variously seeks the re-integration of Pashtun majority areas in Pakistan with 
Afghanistan, or the complete independence of Pashtun majority areas from the states of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The use of Pakhtunkhwa in this study is as a term of reference to 
the geographic region described as the territorial aspect of pashtunwali. The use of the term in 
this study in no way seeks to advance the proposition of the political independence of 
Pakhtunkhwa from the modern day states of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nor does this study, 
through using the term Pakhtunkhwa, seek to advance a Pashtun nationalist agenda. Having 
established that, this study does raise critical questions over the legitimacy of the border 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, both from an historical perspective and in the context of 
questions of identity, legitimacy and authority currently.  
2.3.2  Historical context of Pakhtunkhwa 
A central theme within pashtunwali is the discourse on the origins of the Pashtun as a nation, 
and that of the Pashto language. A number of theories have emerged over the centuries 
accounting for the emergence of the Pashtun in Pakhtunkhwa. Prominent amongst these is 
the Israelite theory that suggests the Pashtuns are one of the lost tribes of Israel (Noelle 2004: 
159). Another explanation suggests that the Pashtuns are descended from the Bedouin Arabs 
of the Arabian Peninsula (Caroe 1958: 7-8). Neither of these explanations is based upon 
empirical findings, and are largely considered the product of an oral culture which itself has 
                                                          
21
 Jon Anderson (1979: 223-240) treats the concept of „zai‟ extensively in his doctoral dissertation.  
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historically contributed little to civilisation in the region, but which has recorded in detail and 
now mirrors much of what has occurred around it (Anderson 1979: 25). 
 
The recorded history of Pakhtunkhwa reveals that it has been invaded or traversed 
sequentially by Greeks, Arabs, Persians, Mongols and White Huns, amongst others. 
Archaeological evidence reveals that there have been numerous migrations of varying sizes 
into and through Pakhtunkhwa over the last ten thousand years.22  
 
The Greek campaigns through Pakhtunkhwa led by Alexander in 326 B.C.E., while far reaching 
in scope were, more significantly, brief (Holt 2006: 66). The brief period of Alexander was 
followed by the re-emergence of two parallel polities in Pakhtunkhwa. Bactria, previously a 
satrapy of the Persian emperor Cyrus the Great (559-539 B.C..E.), re-emerged as Greco-Bactria 
where modern-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan meet northern Afghanistan in 
around 180 B.C.E. (Rawlinson 2002: 65). The Bactrian civilisation represented a fusion of 
Hellenistic and Persian cultures resultant from Greek administration of the mixed population 
comprised largely of Persians and Central Asian tribes (Caroe 1958: 63). The population at this 
time most likely spoke an east Iranian Bactrian dialect, but the Hellenised elite managed to 
impart a Greek character to Bactria, manifest in the construction of buildings in the Hellenic 
style, as well as the minting of coins bearing images of Zeus (Fussman 1996: 243-244). 
 
Gandhara, the second of the two polities, was an enduring Buddhist civilisation, existent in 
some form from early in the first millennium B.C.E. until the rule of Mahmud of Ghaznavi (997-
1030). Centred around Takshasila (modern-day Taxila) and Pushkalaavati (modern-day 
Charsadda), between the first and third centuries C.E. its domain stretched from Bactria in the 
north, through Pakhtunkhwa to the Indus valley in the south. While comparatively smaller 
than Bactria in area and population, Gandhara demonstrated advancement politically, 
economically and militarily. City development, agrarian and irrigation development were 
advanced during its zenith during the second century C.E. (Caroe 1958: 61-173). Centres of 
Gandharan civilisation were established at Purushpura (modern-day Peshawar) as well as at 
numerous other localities across the area that are no longer population centres.   
 
Gandhara was, however, soon to be impacted by a geo-strategic trend that would dominate 
the region for the next two millennia: the southward sweep into the Indus Valley of northern 
                                                          
22
 Louis Dupree‟s Afghanistan is a treatise on the cultural and political history of the country, highly 
regarded as the single most comprehensive work on the country. While not as detailed in its treatment 
of Pashto and Pashtuns as other earlier works, Afghanistan does treat the anthropological history of 
Pakhtunkhwa well.  See Dupree (1980: 253-264).  
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tribal peoples. The first of these was by the Saka. Originating north of the Syr Darya, the Saka 
were displaced from their original lands by the Yueh-Chi, who in turn were displaced from 
their ancestral lands in western China during the first century C.E. (Watson 1961: 231). The 
now nomadic Saka invaded Bactria,23 as the Hellenist cultural influence in Bactria became 
subsumed by indigenous Indo-Iranian and Turkic culture and languages.24   
 
 By the end of the third century C.E., the southward movement of the Saka had dismantled the 
social and political structures of Gandhara also, returning civilisation in the region to a 
nomadic existence for a brief period. The Saka were in turn subdued by the Middle Iranian 
Parthians (247-224 B.C.E.) within the century, only to re-emerge as the Kushan, pushing the 
Parthians back to the Persian frontier. Under Kanishka (127-151 C.E.), the Kushan Empire 
expanded to include all of Pakhtunkhwa, stretching to Yarkand in Chinese Turkestan, Khokand 
in Central Asia, Sindh and Agra (Hunter 2005: 147). Kanishka established his Kushan capital at 
the Gandharan capital of Purushapura. 
  
The Kushan Empire, while expansive, was again short lived and fragmented within a century 
after Kanishka, giving rise to the Sassanids (224-651 C.E.) who emerged as a Persian 
dominated indigenous force, consolidating their influence across Pakhtunkhwa and 
northwards into Central Asia (Caroe 1958: 73-74). The Sassanids built a century long dynasty, 
only to succumb to another southward invasion from between the two Darya (trans-oxiana), 
this time by the nomadic Hephthalites, or White Huns (420-560 C.E.). The White Huns, of no 
relation to the European Huns, held the domain of the receding Sassanians for nearly a 
century. By the sixth century C.E., the Hephthalites had disappeared from historical records as 
a structured polity, succumbing to further southward Turkic nomadic excursions (Vogelsang 
2002: 171), merging with the peoples of Punjab, Kashmir and Pakhtunkhwa. The dissolution of 
Hephthalite influence led to a temporary resurgence of Sassanid rule in Pakhtunkhwa. It was 
during this Sassanid resurgence that the Arabs arrived at what they termed Khorasan in the 
middle of the 7th century (Muir 1891: 178-180) .   
 
After defeating the Sassanid Persians at Battle of Qadissya in 637 AD, Arab expansion 
continued eastward through Sassanid territory, leading to a routing of the Aryans at Nihawand 
in 642 (Muir 1891: 179). Following that defeat, all of the Sassanian eastern territories fell to 
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 Craig Benjamin makes these observations in his unpublished work The Yuezhi Migration and 
Sogdia; http://www.transoxiana.org/Eran/Articles/benjamin.html . Accessed 19th January, 2011. 
24
 Although this is the preponderant view, a notable exception is William Tarn (1966: 114-118) who 
suggests that the Saka migration did not result in the conquest of Bactria. 
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the Arab expansion. That expansion, however, didn’t penetrate deeply into Pakhtunkhwa for 
another two centuries. The Arab conquerors were content instead to accept royalties from the 
then Hindu rulers of Kabul, while concentrating on subduing northern Khorasan.  
 
A number of internal political crises led to the slowing of Arab expansion into Pakhtunkhwa 
during the eighth and ninth centuries (Muir 1891: 423-426). The Arab presence in 
Pakhtunkhwa remained essentially military in nature. There was no large-scale settlement of 
Arabs in the region of the same level as witnessed in North Africa or the Eastern 
Mediterranean coast. Over the next two centuries, Arab influence dissipated, precipitated by a 
Turkic purging of the Arabic-speaking inhabitants of Khorasan, and was replaced by an 
indigenous Muslim influence as the indigenous population largely adopted Islam (Muir 1891: 
431). Through processes of economic and social integration, the remaining Arabs were largely 
assimilated into indigenous society. Today, a distinct community of between 50,000-100,000 
Arab individuals remains in north-central Afghanistan around the city of Kunduz. These 
‘Central Asian Arabs’ have largely assimilated into the local culture and have adopted local 
languages. Very few still speak Arabic, and those who do retain a dialect quite far removed 
from the language of their forefathers (Dupree 1980: 63, 503-504).  
 
As this development matured, a still further invasion from Central Asia, unprecedented in its 
scope, swept southward through Pakhtunkhwa and then westward. The horde of Ghengis 
Khan eventually succumbed to defeat by the Arabs at the decisive battle of Ain Jalut in 
historical Palestine in 1260 (Jackson 1999: 709). The reverberations of that defeat permeated 
the Mongol horde, which subsequently fell to infighting and was consumed by the processes 
of disintegration. Within fifty years, the Mongol domination of Eurasia was reduced to a 
number of competing Khanates, unable to project Mongol power beyond Central Asia.  
 
The exception to this was the Mughal dynasty in India, descendant from the Mongol Khan 
Timur-e-Lang (Tamarlane). Following the defeat of the Ghilzai Khan Ibrahim Lodi by the 
Mughal King Babur in 1526, Pakhtunkhwa was ruled from India, although this rule was 
constantly challenged by the Muslim Safavid thrusts eastward from Persia (Caroe 1958: 137). 
The Perso-Mughal struggle for supremacy over Pakhtunkhwa continued into the eighteenth 
century until the emergence of the first Pashtun ruler of the whole of Pakhtunkhwa, Ahmed 
Shah Abdali, known as Durr-i-Durran or Durrani in 1747 (Caroe 1958: 256).  
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This historical synopsis demonstrates that the principal formative genealogical, cultural and 
linguistic influences upon Pakhtunkhwa are primarily Central Asian and Persian, with an 
enduring reflection of the limited Arab impact upon the region. This synopsis also 
demonstrates two geostrategic constants: the existence of a great migratory tract stretching 
from between the Syr and Amu Darya southward into the Indus Valley and the repeated 
eastward thrusts of successive polities established in the Iranian Plateau. These geostrategic 
trends, established over millennia, constitute the wider formative context within which 
Pakhtunkhwa emerged. The emergence of a resilient and resistant, tribally based national 
grouping in the region of Pakhtunkhwa has reversed trends of this wider formative context. 
The Pashtun have, over the last four centuries, extended their own influence westward into 
the Iranian Plateau, northward to the banks of the Amu Darya, and southward into the Indus 
Valley. This counter-current to the historical trend preceding it is still impacting the wider 
strategic context as the primary substructure of Pakhtunkhwa seeks to re-emerge through 
competition with Pakistan and Afghanistan as a sustainable polity.  
2.3.3  The emergence of the Pashtuns 
The question of the origin of the Pashtun is left partially addressed. The area inhabited by the 
Pashtuns lies between the historical empires of the Indian subcontinent, Persia and those of 
Central Asia with armies of the latter two having traversed the geography of Pakhtunkhwa and 
left their mark among the differing phenotypes of the various clans and tribes. The Pashtun 
are thus at least partially emergent from the intermixing of a number of ethnicities across 
Pakhtunkhwa over the preceding millennia.  
 
Volume IV of Grierson’s Linguistic Survey of India (1928) dedicates significant discourse to the 
question of the origin of the Pashtuns and Pashto. He cites the often noted reference to 
Alexander the Great’s experience with the Apridi tribe made by Herodotus in the 5th century 
B.C.E. as potential evidence of the existence of the Pashtuns in the Afghan borderland since 
(Grierson 1928: 5-7). The Afridi today are the predominant tribe in the Khyber agency of FATA 
and pronounce their name as ‘Apridi’, where the ‘f’ is often rendered as ‘p’ in the Khyber 
accent of Pashto. Further, the Rig Veda, compiled in the second millennia B.C.E. (Oberlies 
1998: 155), makes reference to the ‘Avgans’ as ‘warlike horsemen of the northern 
tribes’(Caroe 1958: 39-42). 
  
These early historical references, which are the most authentic from a number of others, point 
to the presence of some of the Pashtun tribes in the Suleiman and Safed Koh  mountains since 
the beginning of the recorded history of the region. Further analysis by ethnologists and 
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linguists has pointed to the similarities between the vocabulary used amongst the Ghilzai 
tribesmen and that used by the Central Asian Turkic Hordes. From this has emerged the 
suggestion that the Ghilzai are in fact derived from Turkic stock, a suggestion that has weaved 
its way into Pashtun oral genealogical history.25 Similar analysis of Durrani vocabulary, accents 
and pre-modern history illustrates a greater Safavid Persian influence amongst the Durrani 
than amongst other tribes.26  
 
Hence, the origin of the Pashtun appears to be in the Suleiman and Safed Koh mountains at 
some point in the second millennium B.C.E. However, those progenitors did not begin to 
dominate the high plains south of the Hazarajat until the first millennium C.E. That domination 
occurred through the inclusion over the first millennium of Turkic and Persian peoples, who 
have traversed Pakhtunkhwa for millennia, into what would become the Pashtun tribes. 
2.3.4 Pashto 
Speaking Pashto well is a core component of doing Pashto; and speaking and doing Pashto 
well constitute the foundation of pashtunwali. There is a large literature within the fields of 
linguistics and anthropology dedicated to the origins and development of Pashto. This is partly 
due to the fact that, while Pashto does include vocabulary and grammar that is closely related 
to middle Farsi and classical Farsi,27 much of the language is unrelated to Farsi, its derivative 
Dari, or the various languages present in the northern Indian subcontinent including Punjabi, 
Saraiki, Hindi, Urdu, Hindko, and Chitrali.28 Many Pashtuns thus believe that Pashto is derived 
from a pre-Gandharan root, a position opposed by prominent linguists.29 The debate occupies 
a significant enough position within borderland culture to warrant attention in this study.  
 
Pashtun society has developed over the centuries as a largely non-literate society in which 
cultural concepts are communicated orally, a phenomenon still evident amongst the Pashtun 
                                                          
25
See: Nazary, Ali Maisam Origins of the Afghans (Pashtuns) (unpublished) 2007, available at: 
http://afghanprofile.net/index.php?Itemid=28&id=29&option=com_content&task=view (accessed 
January 2011). Nazary references his article from Caroe (1958), Ne‟amatllah‟s Maghzan-e-Afghan 
(1612), and Al Beruni‟s Tareekh al Hind (1030).  
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Morgenstierne places Pashto within the Northeast Arian branch of the Indo European language 
group. See „A Brief Introduction to Pashto Language‟; 
http://www.pashtoweb.com/HistoryPashtoE.htm. Accessed 21st February, 2011. 
28
 The author holds fluency in Pashto and all of these languages, save Chitrali. A comparison of Pashto 
and Chitrali was made at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, in April 2000.  
29
Morgenstierne believes Pashto is derived from a post-Gandharan Saka root. See:  „A Brief 
Introduction to Pashto Language‟; http://www.pashtoweb.com/HistoryPashtoE.htm . Accessed 21st 
February, 2011. 
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today.30 Consequently, the historiography of Pashto presents, at best, a partial picture of the 
language’s recent development. The earliest surviving written works (in prose) date from the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, with Akhund Darvez’s Makhzan ul Islam (1603) being 
considered the earliest example of Pashto prose.31 However, oral traditions amongst the 
Pashtun place the origin of the language far before this period. The eighteenth century poetry 
compilation entitled Pata Khazana (1728) includes Pashto works by eighth and ninth century 
Pashtun literary figures (Dupree 1980, p. 73). It is impossible to verify whether or not these 
figures existed during the time frames attributed to them, and whether or not they actually 
did compile the poetry with which they are affiliated in Pashtun oral tradition. However, what 
can be established is that the written Pashto works of the beginning of the sixteenth century 
make reference to far older sources of Pashto, indicating that the language was in use far 
before it was written.  
 
As for the spoken language, Georg Morgenstierne places Pashto in the north-east Aryan group 
of the Indo-European family (Caroe 1958: 64-68). Morgenstierne suggests that the origin of 
the Pashto can be traced back to the presence of the Saka in Bactria and Gandhara around the 
beginning of the first millennium (Caroe 1958: 64-68). Caroe posits that the language actually 
predates the arrival of the Sakas, suggesting that a deeply embedded Indo-Iranian 
grammatical element in Pashto actually dates from Achaemenid Persian, the language of the 
Achaemenid Empire during the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. (Caroe 1958: 64-68).  
 
Both Caroe (1958: 64-68) and Morgenstierne (1926: 5, 22) have acknowledged that the linkage 
between Pashto and the languages from the Indo-European family surrounding Pakhtunkhwa 
is difficult to map. Pashto exhibits a vast vocabulary that is unique to itself, despite its 
inclusion of Persian, Arabic, Turkic and various Indian vocabularies. This uniqueness of Pashto 
and the uncertainty surrounding its origins serves to reinforce the Pashtun linguistic identity, 
distinguishing the borderlanders and the surrounding Pashtun population from the wider 
society in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hence, Pashto has become a central aspect of the 
borderland identity.  
 
                                                          
30
 Dupree uses to the term non-literate in contrast to illiterate, to describe the fact that cultural discourse 
in Afghanistan is largely unwritten. He points out that attempts by the Afghan state to expand the 
literate use of Pashto as an official language have met significant barriers, despite Pashto being the 
most widely spoken language in Afghanistan. See Dupree pp. 60-83.  
31
 The dates attributed to the earliest works of Pashto prose vary slightly. See: „A Brief Introduction to 
Pashto Language‟; http://pashtoweb.com/HistoryPashtoE.htm. Accessed 21st February, 2011. 
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2.4  Pashtun Tribal Genealogy 
Tribes are the drivers of the Afghan borderland and the principal agents behind its resurgent 
autonomy and its expansion into the larger domain of Pakhtunkhwa. The tribes that comprise 
the Pashtun nation are the basic units of political and military organisation across the Afghan 
borderland. Peace and stability in the borderland are the result of tribal truces, while the 
instability and violence that far more often characterise the borderland, result from shifting 
patterns of inter-tribal conflict. In order to comprehend the dynamics between these tribes, it 
is essential to understand the inter-relationships between them derived from the Pashtun 
shajara.  
2.4.1  The Pashtun shajara 
Pashtun identity is largely based on patrilineage. A significant aspect of Pashtun social 
intercourse revolves around seeking to determine exactly whom one is interacting with in 
terms of lineage, while conveying one’s own identity in terms of family, clan and tribe. This is 
done in the pursuit of conducting even ephemeral relationships according to the norms arising 
from pashtunwali.32 The underlying motivation for this is to establish the deterrent inherent in 
hailing from a clan and a tribe, protecting an individual from the threats and dangers 
associated with being unable to call upon close allies for the defence of one’s self, one’s 
honour and one’s vital interests. Establishing such familiarity as that arising from recognised 
heritage also establishes rights and responsibilities to and from others. In the major urban 
centres of KP, this has tended to result in extensive incidence of nepotism relating to state and 
civil bureaucracy and administration. Such nepotism is viewed as virtue in the context of 
pashtunwali, illustrating one of the fulcrums of incompatibility between pashtunwali and the 
modern state. This is one of the fundamental reasons for the relative failure of the state in 
much of Pakhtunkhwa.  
 
In accordance with Pashtun oral tradition and the norms of pashtunwali, Pashtuns consider 
themselves as part of one large family descendant from a single progenitor (Caroe 1958: 8). 
This perception of origin entails a certain duty of responsibility towards all Pashtuns, 
embodied in the code of pashtunwali. This perception also establishes the view widely carried 
by Pashtuns of all non-Pashtuns as either melma (guests) or baraney (foreign). The distinction 
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 In Peshawar, where there is extensive interaction across clan and tribal lines between previously 
unfamiliar individuals, introductions are followed – if not immediately then soon enough – by an 
exchange of information on clan background in an attempt to elicit specific tribal and clan information 
without obtrusive and explicit questioning. This was observed in field work in Peshawar in November-
December 2000, November-December 2001 and July-September 2008.  
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between them is the duration such non-Pashtuns are present in Pakhtunkhwa. Travellers are 
invariably melma, while even non-Pashtun communities long resident in Pakhtunkhwa, such as 
the Gujjar, Awan and Jadun are considered baraney. 33 
 
The single progenitor of all Pashtuns, according to Pashtun oral tradition, is Qays Abdul-
Rashid, resident in the region of Ghowr in the seventh century C.E. (Caroe 1958: 8). Although 
empirical evidence to support this assertion is impossible to establish, Qays’ existence and the 
details attributed to him are asserted as fact through oral traditions widely recounted amongst 
all Pashtun tribes. Some oral traditions go so far as to assert that Qays was a direct descendant 
of the Bani Israel or children of Israel (Caroe, 1958: 7). One view even suggests that Qays’ 
origin is derived from King Solomon, through a son attributed to him named Afghana. This 
tradition is related in Ne’matullah Harvi’s Makhzan-i-Afghani, but is not supported by any 
historical records (Dom 1965: 108) It is far more likely that this is a further example of how the 
Pashtuns have compiled an oral history from the cultures and traditions surrounding the 
historical Afghan borderland. 
 
Qays is said to have had three sons: Sarbanr, Bitan, and Ghurghusht. A fourth son, Karlanri, is 
attributed to Qays in some traditions. Others suggest that in fact Karlanri was adopted. 
Raverty (1860: 993) opines that Karlanri was not a son of Qays, neither adopted nor natural, 
but was a son of Sharkbun bin Sarbanr bin Qays. 
  
According to oral tradition, as Islam emerged in the seventh century C.E., a principal general of 
the early Islamic army either wrote to Qays or, by some accounts, visited him. Khalid bin 
Walid, a Bedouin Quraishite noble invited Qays to accept Islam as the continuation of the 
divine message bestowed previously upon the Bani Israel. Qays duly accepted, and from that 
point on his progeny was Muslim.  
  
Sarbanr bin Qays is the major patrilineal father after Qays, giving rise to the largest section of 
Pashtun tribes.34 Sarbanr himself had two sons whom tradition recounts: Sharkbun and 
Karshbun. From Sharkbun’s progeny arose the tribes who occupy the western regions of 
                                                          
33
 This was observed in field work in January-March 2002 in the environs of Abbotabad, north-eastern 
KP known for having a population of mixed ethnicity. Pashtuns complained of being considered 
baraney by tribal Pashtuns from FATA on account of their long-term association with non-Pashtun 
baraney. Also, while lost in Peshawar in February 2002, it was observed by the author that tribesmen 
resident in Peshawar would extend the right of melmastiya, to the extent of providing an escort to the 
destination sought, on the pretext of melmastiya being extended to a traveller. 
34
 The following account of the development of the Pashtun shajara,  is taken from Caroe (1958: 12-
37), Khan (2008: 313-366), and Mohmand (2002: 48, 141, 188).  
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modern-day Afghanistan. Most notable from among is the Abdali tribe, also known as the 
Durrani. The Durrani tribe is divided further into a number of well-known clans. These include 
the Popalzai, Saddozai, Alikozai, Achakzai, Muhammadzai and Alizai. The Premiership of the 
Afghan state has tended to be drawn from within these clans for the majority of the last two 
centuries, particularly among the Saddozai and Muhammadzai, and most recently among the 
Popalzai.  
 
From Karshbun bin Qays arose another section of prominent tribes centred around the 
eastern parts of Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. This grouping includes the principal 
eastern tribe, the Yusufzai, as well as the Mohmand and Shinwari. While the Yusufzai are the 
largest tribe from this branch of the shajara, the Mohmand and the Shinwari are older, 
particularly the Shinwari who descend directly from Kasi bin Karshbun. 
 
Bitan bin Qays, the second son of Qays Abdul-Rashid, is the progenitor of the largest Pashtun 
tribe of all – the Ghilzai. The Ghilzai (or Khilji in the Turkic influenced pronunciation that 
characterises this tribe) reside in central Pakhtunkhwa and largely retain their nomadic roots. 
Cousin to the Ghilzai from the same branch of the shajara are the Lodi tribes. These include 
the Sur, the Niazai and the Lodi clan, a namesake of the parent tribe, but three generations 
removed from Ibrahim Lodi, patriarch of the Lodi tribe. Along with the Sur, the Lodi clan ruled 
the Sultanate of Delhi from the mid-fifteenth to mid-sixteenth centuries. The Delhi Lodi are 
largely considered ‘Persianised’ Pashtuns or Farsiwaal (Farsi speakers), having adopted the 
language and customs of the Sassanian Persian dynasty.  
 
The branch of the Pashtun shajara issuing forth from Ghurghusht is comparatively smaller 
than the branches mentioned previously. The main tribes emanating from this branch are the 
Kakar, Jadun, and the Musa Khel. The Jadun are found in the Hazara division of KP, around 
Abbotabad. They are largely considered by the surrounding Yusufzai to have departed from 
the Pashtun shajara through forsaking elements of pashtunwali and adopting the Hindko 
language. Nonetheless, most genealogies acknowledge the Jadun as part of the shajara issuing 
forth from Ghurghusht.  As for the Kakars and Musa Khel, they reside in areas contiguous with 
Baluchistan and in parts of Baluchistan. Caroe observes that the Kakar have adopted 
characteristics of the Baluch such as uncommon esteem for their Khans, an attribute at odds 
with the more egalitarian and almost anarchic norms of the other Pashtun tribes. They do, 
however, speak Pashto and follow pashtunwali.  
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The remaining principal tribes are descendant from the Karlanri branch of the Pashtun shajara. 
The Karlanri tribes inhabit FATA and parts of KP on both banks of the Indus. In aggregate, the 
Karlanri tribes constitute the largest grouping of all Pashtuns, although no single tribe rivals 
the size of either the Ghilzai or the Yusufzai.  
 
The Karlanri branch of the shajara includes almost all of the tribes against whom the British 
Indian army conducted the three major Afghan wars (1839-1842, 1878-1881, 1919). Amongst 
the Karlanri are found the Dawr, Utman Khel, Orakzai, Afridi, Khattak, Wazir and Mehsud. 
From these, the Dawr, are the oldest, followed by the Orakzai and Utman Khel. The Mehsud 
and Wazir are the youngest tribes amongst this branch of the shajara, though the most 
politically and militarily influential in FATA today.  
2.5 The Major Tribes 
2.5.1  The Durrani 
The Durrani have been the ruling tribe among the Pashtuns over the last two centuries, albeit 
an intensely contested position. A key feature of the Durrani that has enabled the tribe to hold 
tenuous  authority over the Pashtuns has been the tendency for the tribe to have an overall 
Khan or Sardar  as he is referred to in Persian and Indian texts (Clements 2003: 81). This is in 
addition to the Khans on the level of sub-tribes and khel (Clements 2003: 81). The Durrani 
tribe includes the prominent sub-tribes of the Popalzai, Sadozai Barakzai, Alikozai, 
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Muhammadzai, and the Achakzai. Originally named the Abdali, the tribe originates from the 
western region of Afghanistan in the provinces of Nimruz, Farah and Helmand (Elphinstone 
1815: 84-88) and currently populates Nimroz, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar and northern parts of 
Baluchistan. The Durrani manifest a notable Persian influence on their dialect of Pashto, 
through the common elongation of vowels, and the use of certain elements of vocabulary 
(Elphinstone 1815: 84-8). They have an historical affiliation with the Tajik population of 
northeast Afghanistan, alliance with whom has been essential in subduing the numerically 
superior Ghilzai. 
 
For much of the seventeenth century, prior to Ghilzai Hotaki ascendancy (1709-1738), the 
Pashtun tribes of the Abdali and Ghilzai had remained under Safavid Persian domination.  The 
Persian Shah Nadir Shah Afshari (1736-47) subdued the Hotaki emergence, relying heavily 
upon rival Abdali tribesmen to counter the Ghilzai. Among these Abdali was Ahmed Shah 
Abdali who, following the assassination of Nader Shah in 1747, took the leadership of the 
Afsharid empire and began unifying the Pashtun tribes under his own leadership. Ahmed Shah, 
known as Durri-Durran (pearl of pearls-from which the name Durrani is derived) succeeded in 
consolidating the Pashtun into a single polity for the first time in their history. So unique an 
achievement was this in Pashtun political experience, that most historians date the origin of 
the modern Afghan state from this development.35 When Elphinstone arrived in northern India 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, he encountered a Durrani empire extending far 
beyond present day Afghanistan, despite the fact that it had been contracting for years from 
its maximum extension reached under Ahmed Shah in the preceding decades. Elphinstone’s 
map of the ‘Kingdom of Caubul’ includes modern day Pakistan and parts of northern India 
(Elphinstone 1815: Appendix). 
 
The Durrani dynasty continued to wield influence over Pakhtunkhwa for the next century, 
alternating the seat of power between the direct descendants of Ahmed Shah from the 
Saddozai clan of the Abdali, and the Barakzai clan who are a branch of the Abdali, descendant 
from Abdal and his son Zirak. However, this influence fluctuated as Pakhtunkhwa descended 
into the tribal instability that had preceded Ahmed Shah’s reign, through a series of Ghilzai 
inspired revolts and insurrections (Dupree 1980: 343-9).  
 
                                                          
35
 Dupree (1980), Barfield (2010), and the Library of Congress (2001), all accept this premise. See 
Afghanistan: a country study Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2001 p. 14.  
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Durrani influence over Pakhtunkhwa suffered three major challenges that were to mitigate its 
power over time. The first of these was the refusal of the Ghilzai to accept Durrani suzerainty. 
The Ghilzai repeatedly arose in insurrection following the death of Ahmed Shah, effectively 
paralysing Durrani authority for significant periods (Clements 2003: 94). The second was the 
advance into Pakhtunkhwa of the Sikh empire of Ranjit Singh, who controlled Peshawar (1834-
1849) and extended the reach of his empire into the Khyber Pass (Caroe 1958: 312-313). The 
third major challenge was the arrival of the British in Pakhtunkhwa. British influence 
established itself east of the Indus and also around Peshawar, ultimately penetrating the 
Khyber Pass. The British Indian army was unable to establish a permanent presence west of 
the pass in the Ghilzai territories of what is now Afghanistan. The three Anglo-Afghan wars 
(1839-1842, 1878-1881, 1919) did, however, further consolidate British influence over the 
eastern regions of Pakhtunkhwa, ultimately leading to the acknowledgement of the Durand 
Line by both the Durrani and the British as the de facto delimiter of influence between the two 
powers.  
 
Successive Durrani rulers refused to accept the presence of the British in Pakhtunkhwa, 
evidenced by King Amanullah Khan’s ability to rally Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand line 
to attack British forces in the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 (Dupree 1980: 442). Prior to 
1919, reference by the Durrani to Afghanistan always incorporated the entire Pakhtunkhwa, 
as the term ‘Afghan’ in Durrani parlance is synonymous with ‘Pashtun’. However, at the treaty 
of Rawalpindi (1919), the British obviated their understanding of the meaning of Afghanistan 
when the treaty established the limits of influence of both the British and the Durrani as being 
the Khyber Pass (Runion 2007: 89). Successive Durrani rulers refused to accept the validity of 
the Durand Line, a position Hamid Karzai has also adopted.36 
 
The Durrani continued to dominate the politics of the Afghan state from 1919 through the 
reign of King Zahir Shah, hailing from the Muhammadzai clan of the Abdali, until the Saur 
revolution of 1978 (Hiro 1996: 236), barring a brief period of tribal insurrection which saw the 
Tajik Bacha-e-Saqao assume kingship for part of 1929.  
 
                                                          
36
 In February 2006, while visiting Charsadda, KP on the occasion of the passing of Abdul Wali Khan, 
founder of the NAP, Karzai stated that the Durand Line was  a “...line of hate that could not be 
accepted...”. See: „Durand Line Serves as Line of Hate: Karzai‟ SANA; 
http://afghanembassy.com/news/ . Accessed 23
rd
  February, 2011. In the preparation for the Loya Jirga 
of 2007, Afghan recognition of the Durand Line became a Pakistani pre-condition which was 
eventually dropped. See „Karzai for jirga to crush Taleban‟ 6th October, 2006;  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5412458.stm . Accessed 21
st
 February, 2011. 
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The Soviet invasion following soon after the 1978 Saur revolution saw a break in the continuity 
of the Durrani dynasty, precipitating a political vacuum that would endure for the next two 
decades that saw the emergence of key Ghilzai and Tajik factions led by Gulbudeen 
Hekmatyaar and Ahmed Shah Masoud respectively (Coll 2004: 120-3). Through these 
developments, the Durrani remained on the periphery of political influence, a situation 
partially reversed by the swearing in of Afghan President Hamid Karzai following the US led 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Karzai hails from the Popalzai, the parent branch of the 
Saddozai clan of Ahmed Shah Durrani.37 However, Karzai’s inability to subdue the Ghilzai 
dominated Hizb-i-Islami of Hekmatyaar and other Pashtun militias indicates that Karzai is 
unlikely to be in a position to re-establish Durrani dominance, despite the international 
support enjoyed by his administration. Further, the current insurgency in Afghanistan, while 
initially dominated by the Ghilzai had, by 2007, incorporated a number of prominent Durrani 
tribesmen (Giustozzi 2007: 47-9). This fusion of Ghilzai and Durrani in the leadership of the 
insurgency may be a key factor in its longevity and expansion since 2006 to where, by the end 
of 2008, it had spread by 50% each year to the overwhelming majority of the Afghan state.38  
2.5.2 The Ghilzai 
The Ghilzai represent the largest Pashtun tribe by population numbering between 7 and 9 
million.39 They populate an area stretching from Kandahar to Khost, including the provinces of 
Uruzgan, Ghazni, Zabul and Paktika, touching the Suleiman Mountains in the south and the 
Central Afghan Highlands in the north.40 The overwhelming majority of the Ghilzai are found in 
Afghanistan while some Ghilzai clans reside in FATA. Prominent sub-tribes of the Ghilzai 
include the Hotak, Tokhi, Kharoti, Suleiman Khel, AliKhel, Taraki, Ahmedzai, and Jabar Khel. 
The Ghilzai have been in a state of belligerence with the Durrani for most of the recorded 
history of Pakhtunkhwa, although only since the 1978 Saur revolution have they succeeded in 
attaining Afghan authority. 
 
As well as being the parent tribe of the Ghaznavids (963-1187), and the Lodhi of the Delhi 
Sultanate (1206-1527), the Ghilzai were the first Pashtuns to successfully revolt against Persian 
rule in the early eighteenth century, establishing the Hotaki dynasty (1709-1738) based at 
                                                          
37
  Biographical sketch of Hamid Karzai; http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/president.html . 
Accessed 14
th
 April, 2010. 
38
 See: „Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance‟, ICOS Reports; 
http://www.icosgroup.net/modules/reports/struggle_for_kabul. Accessed 22
nd
 February, 2011.  
39
 According to Ethnologue Languages of the World (fifth ed., 2005), the Ghilzai comprise 24% of the 
Afghan population. By deduction, that gives a number of between 7 and 9 million,. See: 
http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=AF . Accessed 14
th
 March, 2011. 
40
 See Appendix VII. 
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Kandahar (Malleson 1878: 227). Within Pakhtunkhwa, the Ghilzai have not succeeded in 
establishing their exclusive authority over the Durrani and the rest of the Pashtuns, but as a 
tribe the Ghilzai wield great influence both through the Afghan state and among the Pashtun 
tribes more widely.  
 
Organisational structures within the Ghilzai tend to vary between sub-tribes and clans, from 
institutionalised, lineage based khangi41 to coalescence around a charismatic male who 
emerges as khan. There is no overall leadership of the Ghilzai as a tribe, and clan leadership is 
usually established through the practice of jirga. Ghilzai clans are resistant to the emergence 
of a single khan or malik across clan lines, and to the emergence of Mullahs exhorting trans-
tribal jihad (Anderson 1979: 136). 
 
The Pakistan state has been able to establish strong ties between it and numerous Ghilzai 
khans and maliks in Afghanistan.42 This support, as has been the case historically, has largely 
been due to Ghilzai concerns of Durrani domination. Through Pakistani largesse over the last 
30 years, the Ghilzai have been able to maintain a position of military and numerical 
superiority over the Durrani, although the Afghan state remains dominated by a joint Durrani-
Tajik political alliance.43   
 
With the disintegration of Durrani influence following the Soviet invasion, the possibility of 
Ghilzai authority became appealing to those Ghilzai active in the anti-Soviet struggle. An 
examination of the main mujahideen groups during the anti-Soviet struggle reveals that the 
Ghilzai enjoyed a prominent position amongst the Pakistan and US aided mujahideen. 
Gulbudeen Hekmatyaar became Pakistan’s favoured mujahideen commander and enjoyed 
significant assistance for his Hizb-i-Islami (Coll 2004: 120-123). Hekmatyaar is a Ghilzai hailing 
from the Kharoti clan, one of the dominant Ghilzai clans found in Helmand, Zabul, Nangarhar 
and Ghazni.  
 
                                                          
41
 Khangi is a Pashto word describing the rights and privileges of the position of a khan. 
42
 Field work in KP between September and December 2000 revealed that the majority of students from 
Afghanistan studying in the largest madrassas in KP were from the Ghilzai populated areas of 
Afghanistan. The principal madrassa seen was the Dar al Uluum e Haqani led by Maulana Sami-ul-
Haq at Akora Khattaq, KP. This is the madrassa from which many Taliban militiamen emerged in the 
early 1990s including Taliban leader Mullah Omar.   
43
 The Presidency remains with the Durrani Popalzai Hamid Karzai, while senior positions remain 
dominated by former Northern Alliance personalities hailing from the Tajik minority. Marshal 
Mohammad Fahim is first Vice-President. Mohammad Atmar (formerly of KHAD – the KGB 
extension in Afghanistan) was replaced in June 2010 as the interior minister by Bismillah Khan who 
was a staunch ally of Ahmed Shah Masood in the Northern Alliance. Yunus Qanooni (Northern 
Alliance commander) is speaker of the Wolesi Jirga (House of  Representatives).  
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This strategy of supporting the Ghilzai in insurrection partly resulted in response to the fact 
that the Soviet Union was itself seeking to facilitate the re-emergence of Ghilzai authority over 
Afghanistan through firstly supporting Nur Muhammad Taraki, then President Hafizullah Amin 
and then his successor Babrak Karmal, the former two being Ghilzai.44 Hence, amongst the 
political medium of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet coup d’etat of 1978 represented a transition 
from Durrani to Ghilzai authority.45  
 
Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 and the subsequent fall of the Najibullah 
government in 1992 Gulbudeen Hekmatyaar, a Hotaki Ghilzai (Rashid 2001: 23-4), became 
Prime Minister of Afghanistan. Hekmatyaar never assumed his post at Kabul, being promptly 
opposed by Massoud’s militia in response to a Presidential request by then President Rabbani. 
Hekmatyaar was unable to effectively consolidate Ghilzai authority, leading to a full-blown civil 
war by the end of 1992 (Hiro 1996: 261-9). The Taliban movement, which began to emerge 
around Kandahar in 1994, (Nojumi 2002: 118) moved into the vacuum created by that conflict, 
meeting limited resistance in the Ghilzai areas.46  
  
Whereas in the case of the Durrani, the emergence of Hamid Karzai as President of 
Afghanistan has placed him in the position of de facto leader of the tribe, the Ghilzai lack a 
singular leadership figure around which the various clans could coalesce. Both Mullah Omar 
and Gulbudeen Hekmatyaar, as Ghilzai tribesmen, were potential leaders of the Ghilzai. Yet 
neither was able to consolidate his influence over the entire tribe, largely due to the presence 
of the other. The current refusal of Hekmatyaar and Omar to form a united Ghilzai initiative is 
due to the fact that the Taliban currently enjoy widespread support in the Ghilzai heartland 
from where they initially emerged in 1994.47 In contrast, Hekmatyaar’s support, while much 
weaker, is concentrated in the eastern provinces surrounding Nangarhar.48 Hence the Taliban 
perceive their influence over the Ghilzai as substantial enough to withstand any attempt by 
Hekmatyaar to impose his authority over the key central provinces, while at the same time, 
                                                          
44 Interview with Professor Shaista Wahab, University of  Nebraska, Omaha in 19th December, 2008. 
There is speculation over the ethnicity of Babrak Karmal, with suggestions that he was actually an 
ethnic Kashmiri or Tajik who projected himself as a Pashtun. See: Kakar, M. Hassan Afghanistan: The 
Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response  1979-1982 University of California Press, 1997  p. 66. 
45
 Interview with Professor Shaista Wahab, University of  Nebraska, Omaha in 19
th
 December, 2008.   
46
 As Marsden (1999: 128) points out, the rapidity with which the Taliban swept the Pashtun areas after 
the eighteen month siege of Kabul took observers by surprise, many postulating that it was the 
voluntary withdrawal of Hekmatyaar „s Hizb-e-Islami that made it possible. Coll (2004: 333) makes an 
explicit claim that  Hekmatyaar‟s men stood down as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. 
47
 Interview with Brigadier A, Islamabad, July 28
th
, 2008. 
48
 Interview with Brigadier A, Islamabad, July 28
th
, 2008. 
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the Taliban continue to extend their influence eastward and southward. Hekmatyaar has little 
to offer Omar in terms of progress towards the goal of unifying the Ghilzai under a single 
leadership. Further, the leadership of the Taliban is currently evolving beyond a Ghilzai 
dominated structure to one incorporating Durrani elements also (Giustozzi 2007: 47-49). This 
appears to have expanded the support base of the Taliban, transforming the militia into a pan-
Pashtun insurgency engaged in a millennial uprising against the baraney.49  
2.5.3  The Yusufzai 
The Yusufzai are the largest Pashtun tribe resident in Pakistan, second only to the Ghilzai of 
Afghanistan in overall population (Barth 1959: 5). The Yusufzai are spread over a large area 
stretching from the Bajaur agency contiguous with the Durand line, to the eastern most 
reaches of Mansehra (Caroe 1958: 182-3). Yusufzai territories include the Pashtun heartland 
areas of the Swat Valley, Dir, Malakand, Swabi, Mardan and the extremely mountainous 
Kohistan in northern KP. Prominent Yusufzai clans include the Mamund, Hassanzai, Akazai, 
Chagharzai, and Khan Khel. The Yusufzai are the most widely studied Pashtun tribe, having 
been the subject of study by Elphinstone (1815), Caroe (1958), Barth (1959), Spain (1962), 
Ahmed (1976), and Lindholm (1982).50 These studies have annotated Yusufzai tribal and clan 
structures, politics, history, language and marriage practices.  
 
According to Yusufzai oral traditions, the tribe originally emerged from Kandahar and by the 
thirteenth century had moved westward to Kabul. Instrumental in ushering in Ulugh Beg into 
the Kingship of Kabul in the early fifteenth century, then persecuted by him in an attempt to 
protect his throne, the Yusufzai moved eastward to avoid continued persecution, crossing the 
Indus River into the fertile valleys of present day KP (Caroe 1958: 173-175). By the mid-
fifteenth century the Yusufzai had begun a drive into the Swat Valley, displacing the 
indigenous Swati peoples (Barth 1959: 7). The valley and its environs were particularly fertile 
lands, drawing the Yusufzai to continue eastward into the irrigated foothills of the Pir Pangi 
and Hindu Kush ranges in what was then the Hazara region.51 Consolidating these conquests, 
the Yusufzai adopted an agricultural orientation, growing rapidly in population. By the advent 
                                                          
49
  Ahmed (1980: 107) addresses the concept of millennial uprising, as part of a millennial Pashtun 
consciousness resulting in pan-Pashtun militancy usually precipitated by the presence of a foreign force 
in Pakhtunkhwa.   
50
 All of the abovementioned have written on the Yusufzai extensively, with Caroe and Barth having 
compiled comprehensive writings on the tribe. However, Akbar S. Ahmed remains the authority, with 
Millenium and Charisma among Pathans (1980) in which he submits an excellent critique of Barth‟s 
Political Leadership among Pathans (1959).  
51
 Caroe includes a map in addendum entitled „Tribal Locations of the Pathans’ placing the various 
tribal concentrations across KP. 
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of the British presence in KP, the Yusufzai were the principal tribe east of the Indus River 
(Caroe 1958: 365, 385-387). 
 
Ahmed (1976: 73) identifies two elements diverging elements with the Yusufzai: nang and 
qalang. The former tend to reside in hill tracts around upper Swat and exhibit conventional 
practices of pashtunwali, renown for their Pashto (Pukhtu in their pronunciation). In contrast, 
the qalang exhibit an adaptation to agrarian lifestyle. Among them, the practice of nang tends 
to be interpreted in the context of land ownership, as does khangi. Qalang Pashtuns have also 
evolved the system of wesh (Ahmed 1976: 35-40), a Swat specific practice for the inheritance 
of agricultural land in the Swat valley, derived from the forces of growing population and a 
limiting topography. The variation in the two is manifest in the reaction of each to the 
presence of the British during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
The agrarian clans that had settled east of the Swat valley largely acquiesced to the British 
presence.52 For them, the British represented an administrative presence and opportunity for 
economic and political development. These clans took up positions with the British 
administration of KP.53 Some even travelled to various corners of the British Empire, including 
East Africa, South East Asia and the United Kingdom.54 Many gained British citizenship during 
the period between partition and the independence drive of the 1950s and 1960s that saw 
most of Britain’s imperial possession gain nominal political independence. 
  
Elements of the Yusufzai characterised as nang, maintained a belligerent attitude towards the 
British presence. Lashkar-men based at the Asmaas centre in the Malakand agency undertook 
a religiously inspired, or justified, jihad against the British occupation of parts of Pakhtunkhwa 
                                                          
52
 Field work among the Yusufzai of Hazara division in September-December 1999, November-
December 2000, November-December 2001 revealed the historical importance attributed by the British 
to Baffa, Hazara Division. Baffa, populated almost exclusively by Yusufzai, was given the status of 
„town‟ as early as the 1870s, and saw the establishment of a Boys High School from that era.  Baffa lies 
in the Pakhli plain, a vast agricultural tract in north-central KP. Its inhabitants were, at the time of the 
British administration of KP, largely farmers.  
53
 Field work among the Yusufzai of Hazara division in September-December 1999, November-
December 2000, November-December 2001 included an interview with Abdullah Khan of Khwajgan, 
Mansehra division (born 1916), who rose to the position of Inspector of Schools in the British 
administration.  Another individual, Mohmmad Umar Khan, (since deceased) had fought with British 
forces in then Siam prior to the partition of the subcontinent. 
54
 Field work among the Yusufzai of Hazara Division in September-December 1999, November-
December 2000, November-December 2001 revealed that individuals from Hazara had resettled in 
Malaysia, the United States, Uganda, Kenya and the United Kingdom. A significant number had 
departed from KP while the province was under British administration.  
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(Khalil 2000: 70). Despite facing reprisals from the British, this struggle continued until 
Partition and the withdrawal of the British presence.55  
 
By the end on the nineteenth century, British administration saw the Swat Valley descend into 
violence arising from internecine conflict over increasingly sparse agricultural lands, as well as 
doctrinally inspired violence directed at the British presence (Caroe 1958: 387-8). It was during 
this period that the phenomenon of the clergyman emerging as a leader in battle and in tribal 
affairs, a primarily Yusuzai phenomenon, first arose in the Swat valley and its environs. 
Examples of this phenomenon included the 1897 uprising of the ‘lewaney mullah’ or ‘mad 
mullah’, who was able to raise an army of ten thousand predominantly Yusufzai tribesmen in 
what came to be known as the ‘great Pathan revolt’ (Barth 1995: 21-2). A similar lashkar was 
raised in 1948 and marched to Kashmir.56 The activities of Sufi Muhammad of the TNSM are 
seen by many Yusufzai as a continuation of this trend.   
 
Following Partition, the question of Swat’s accession to Pakistan was formally raised among 
the rulers of Swat and rejected on a number of occasions. It was during the presidency of Ayub 
Khan in 1969 that Swat was formally admitted to Pakistan as a part of the then NWFP (Barth 
1995: 126). Many Yusufzai areas outside the valley continued to remain autonomous tribal 
areas under federal or provincial administration, but independent of any interference from 
Pakistan in any practical sense.57 However, by the 1980’s most of the smaller autonomous 
tribal areas had acceded to Pakistan, at least nominally. The remoteness of many Yusufzai 
areas insured the government’s lack of involvement, both developmentally and politically.58  
 
A result of US involvement in Pakistan and Afghanistan through the 1980’s was that 
emigration to the United States amongst Yusufzai males increased significantly.59 Many of the 
young men who emigrated were soon joined in the US by their families and have remained 
there. This trend has led to a large flow of remittances of foreign currency back to the Yusufzai 
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 Khalil (2000: 305-12)  describes the last major British military operation to combat the mujahideen 
based at Asmaas in 1935, noting the failure of that operation. The base continued to function until the 
British withdrawal in 1947 made its purpose obsolete. 
56
 Interview with family members of participants in the „jihad of 1948‟, Shinkiari, KP January 2001. 
57
 Interview with Sultan Mahmud Khan Swati, March 2000, one of the first school teachers in the area 
who travelled around the PATA, lying to the east of Swat, most of which has since acceded to the 
Mansehra Division.  
58
 Batgram, Kohistan and the Malakand division remained Provincially Administered Tribal Areas 
(PATA) until the 1970s. Mountainous terrain and small, dispersed centres of population underscored 
the lack of involvement from the provincial capital Peshawar. 
59
 Field work among the Yusufzai of Hazara Division in September-December 1999 revealed that 
emigration to the United States amongst Yusufzai peaked between 1982 and 1989.  
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areas, particularly Swat and Mansehra.60 The impact of this flow of foreign currency has been 
significant. While the position of khans and maliks within the clans hasn’t been eroded 
altogether, the autonomy of other households, and of clans with less influence has been 
significantly increased. The ability to purchase automobiles and electricity generators has 
reduced the dependency of corollary families upon the khans and maliks for patronage. The 
availability of money has also meant greater opportunities for education, further 
compounding the structure of clan politics as new centres of influence develop around the 
previously politically weak. 
 
The collective impact of these developments, the integration into Pakistan and the greater 
availability of wealth due to remittances from foreign sources, have had a measured effect on 
eroding the tribal aspect of Yusufzai identity. Although there is no standing Yusufzai lashkar, 
and no singular leadership jirga of the Yusufzai tribe, the root concepts of pashtunwali 
including badal and ghairat are still dominant. Clan feuds and retributive killings still occur, 
although clashes between lashkars are less common among the Yusufzai than among the 
Waziri and Mohmand for example. 61 
2.5.4  The Karlanri tribes  
The Karlanri tribes primarily inhabit FATA, a territory known as Yaghistan62 until the early 
twentieth century. Each tribe is significantly smaller than the much larger Yusufzai, but in 
aggregate the Karlanri number 6 million,63 comparable with the Ghilzai. The major Karlanri 
tribes include the Wazir, Mehsud, Afridi, Utmanzai, Orakzai, Mohmand and Khattak, of which 
the Waziri, Mehsud and Afridi have a particularly salient strategic and political role in the 
Afghan borderland 
 
The population of North Waziristan numbers just under 400,000 with the vast majority 
belonging to the Waziri tribe who occupy fortified homesteads in the hilliest areas of the south 
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 Field work among the Yusufzai of Hazara division in September-December 1999 revealed that the 
Swat Valley and Mansehra has experienced an infusion of foreign currency since the late 1980‟s 
resulting in the construction of concrete houses, the wide availability of electrical appliances, and the 
sending of children away from village madrassas to provincial schools.  
61
 Field work among the Yusufzai of Hazara Division in September-December 2000 revealed an 
incident in upper Pakhli where a clan issued a call to arms in response to a dispute over the holding of 
congregational Friday prayers at a newly built mosque. A violent clash was avoided through the 
arbitration of a jirga. The frequency of such incidents in northern KP is far less than the near-monthly 
feuds between the Mehsud and Wazir in South Waziristan. 
62
 Sana Haroon (2007: 30-1) describes Yaghistan as both a „land of dissidence‟ and of the „free‟.   
63
 The 1998 census of Pakistan placed the population of FATA at 3.17 million, almost all of whom 
were Karlanri. In addition, much of the population of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tank and D.I. Khan is 
of Karlanri origin. 
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of the agency.64 A sizeable minority of the population belong to the Dawr tribe, who are 
farmers and have cultivated the valleys of Waziristan to raise crops and livestock.65 Although 
considered among the most austere of Pashtuns by other tribes, the Waziri have historically 
been given to enjoying pastimes considered un-Islamic by other tribes, such dancing and 
singing at their Hujras, a place usually the scene of clan negotiations, jirgas, and melmastiya.  
 
The Waziri are the dominant tribe in North Waziristan, and are present across the Durand Line 
in Khost, Paktia and Paktika.  Prominent sub-tribes are the Ahmedzai and Utmanzai. Major 
clans of the former include the Hussein Khel and Kalo Khel, while the latter includes the 
Ibrahim Khel, Wali Khel and Mumit Khel.  North Waziristan has maintained an open border, 
and links contiguously with the Khost province of Afghanistan.66 The cave complex at Tora 
Bora, scene of a major battle between US-led forces and al-Qaeda fighters in December 2001, 
rises from the hills of North Waziristan. There is wide speculation that following the battle, 
high value targets sought by the US-led coalition escaped from Tora Bora into North 
Waziristan.67 Following the battle, the Pakistani military sought to move into North Waziristan 
with a large contingent of regular infantry forces. A series of fierce fire exchanges between the 
Waziri and the Pakistan military has forced the Pakistani military to concede that a military 
engagement at best will remain inconclusive, creating the environment for a political 
engagement with the Waziris.68 
 
The Mehsud are the dominant tribe in South Waziristan, although there are clans of Waziri 
and Urmar in the agency. The Mehsud consists of three major sub-tribes; Manzai, Bahlozai, 
and Shaman Khel, together forming ‘mizh threy Mehsud’ (we three Mehsud). They are the 
most notorious of all the Karlanri clans for their disposition towards fighting. Amongst them is 
an oral tradition relating to the repudiation of any foreign presence from Mehsud territories, 
no doubt galvanised by the successes gained at the expense of British expeditions in the early 
twentieth century as a cultural narrative. Caroe (1958: 397), in keeping with this cultural 
narrative, describes the Mehsud as having a deep-seated instinct which drives them at all cost 
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 Hassan Abbas details Wazisirstan‟s tribal structure in „Profiles of Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies‟, 
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor http://jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=202 . Accessed 17
th
 
May, 2007. 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Hassan Abbas „Profiles of Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies‟, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 
http://jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=202 . Accessed 18
th
 May, 2007. 
67
 Numerous analysts and governmental officials have alleged this, but there is no indisputable 
evidence confirming the presence of Bin Laden at Tora Bora, his withdrawal into North Waziristan, or 
his whereabouts currently. 
68
 The most significant engagement was at Kalushah in March 2004, where Pakistani forces suffered 
losses that led to a tactical retreat and a cease-fire. 
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to resist subjection. Aside from the narrative, there are a number of factors that account for 
the Mehsud predisposition towards pursuing martial options. The Mehsud are not an 
historically pastoral tribe. Land in the Mehsud zai is arid, rocky and experiences climate 
extremes both in summer and winter. This has resulted in the Mehsud developing a tribal 
culture of raiding caravans and settled areas, then retreating into the rugged terrain of their 
zai. Further, the Mehsud rivalry with the Wazir is extreme. As explained by Dr. Azmat Hayat 
Khan;69 
 
The Mehsud and Wazir can each ally with a Hindu,70 but can never ally with each 
other.  
 
In September 2006, the Pakistani government announced that a deal had been reached with 
the TTP leadership in South Waziristan, representing the Taliban and allied supporters from 
the Mehsud and Waziri tribes. The deal included provisions for the withdrawal of Pakistani 
forces from Waziristan, conditional upon the cessation of the TTP’s harbouring of foreign 
militants engaged in attacks against Pakistani forces. In keeping with the pashtunwali norm of 
nanawatey, ardently adhered to by the Mehsud and Wazir, tribal representatives were not 
asked to surrender their foreign melma, rather to keep an account of who they were, and to 
persuade them not to engage in attacks against the Pakistani forces while under the 
protection of the Mehsud and Waziri (T. Khan 2007: 64-5). A notable feature of the deal was 
the subsequent revelation that it was concluded between representatives of Pakistan and the 
Islamic Imara of Waziristan. The term reflects the autonomy that the Mehsud and Waziri seek 
in their relations with Pakistan.  
 
The Afridi are perhaps the oldest of the Pashtun tribes, of whom records date back to 
Herodotus. The Afridi are divided into eight clans; Adam Khel, Aka Khel, Kamar Khel, Kuki Khel, 
Malikdin Khel, Qambar Khel, Sepah, and Zakka Khel. The Afridi, or Apridi as they describe 
themselves, inhabit the southern part of the Safed Koh Range, the Khyber Pass, and the 
Maidan of Tirah.  They are considered the most pragmatic and perhaps unpredictable of the 
Karlanri tribes, with a proven martial prowess against Mughal, British and Russian campaigns. 
The Afridi participate in local jirgaey, as is the convention, but are also invited to jirgaey in 
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 Interview with Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan, 5
th
 August 2008, Peshawar University, Peshawar.  
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 Prior to partition, Tank and DI Khan - districts contiguous with South Waziristan - had a significant 
Hindu population. Hindu merchants were often bankers, and reviled particularly among Mehsud and 
Waziri tribesmen for the practice of lending money to make a profit; a practice alien to both the 
Mehsud and Waziri. As a result, both tribes developed an enmity for Hindu bankers , surpassed in 
intensity only by the enmity for each other.  
94 
  
Afghanistan among the Shinwari, and Jirgaey in Mardan in KP. This is on account of the central 
role of the tribe in trans-Khyber trade.  
 
The Afridi are an enterprising tribe, producing a number of very successful businessmen who 
have profited immensely from the ‘grey’ trade across the Durand Line. The Afridi are the main 
source of disruption to NATO convoys through the Khyber Pass, with interdicted items traded 
at the Bara market on the edge of Afridi territory outside Peshawar. The market is a major 
centre for weapons and narcotics, despite efforts by the Pakistani government to curtail the 
trade, which continues to be plied by the Afridi. 
2.6  Conclusion 
Segmentary structures organised around patrilineal descent constitute enduring, indigenous 
roots of identity and polity amongst the Kurds, the Bedouin and the Pashtuns. Historically, 
these roots have variously been the foundation of, accommodated by, and then countered by 
the state. The nature and arrangement of successive states claiming authority over these tribal 
territories have varied over the centuries, but in the case of all three societies the tribes and 
their cultures have endured these states and currently continue to endure the postcolonial 
state. The challenge presented to these tribal societies in the form of the modern postcolonial 
state is unprecedented in terms of technology, military capability, and economy. Yet in these 
challenges lie opportunities that tribesmen are both creating and exploiting, most observable 
in borderlands, in pursuit of the preservation of identities, cultures and polities that are 
evidently far more enduring than the transitory states that are still struggling for legitimacy, 
identity and control more than half a century after their founding.  
 
These dynamics are most evident in the Afghan borderland which hosts the largest tribal 
society in the world in the Pashtun, divided between the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan 
but under the effective authority of neither. Present in the narrative of the crowded 
historiography of Asia for millennia, the Pashtun are unique amongst tribal societies in the 
degree to which they are structurally and spacially differentiated, with each of the Ghilzai, 
Durrani, Yusufzai and Karlanri tribal branches drawing their origin from the Pashtun patrilineal 
shajara. The result is an aggregate of autonomous zai, interaction between which is directed 
by the all-encompassing framework of pashtunwali. 
 
Elements of pashtunwali have a major political and strategic impact in the borderland and the 
wider region. This chapter addresses nanawatey, badal and melmastiya as salient elements of 
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pashtunwali that have seen, for example, transnational militants seek refuge under the 
pretext of nanawatey, or exploit hospitality under the edict of melmastiya amongst the tribes 
of FATA.  
 
Territoriality manifests through pashtunwali in the territorial concept of zai as it pertains to 
Pakhtunkhwa. The emergence of Pakhtunkhwa as a primary structure of identity and 
organisation in the first millennium was in itself a counter-current to the preponderant trend 
of southward tribal migrations from trans-oxiana and eastward thrusts from the Iranian 
Plateau. The Pashtun tribes achieved the territorialisation of Pakhtunkhwa in a widely 
contested space through martial experience, which in turn preserved the primacy of the clan 
and tribe as a structure of security and influence. This feature, the protection of tribal space by 
a patrilineally-derived militia, endures in the perceived independence of zai and the existence 
of the lashkar or arbakai. This forms a core element of Pashtun psycho-social awareness and 
identity that has become a point of physical and political competition between Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and the tribes of the borderland. Other aspects of Pashtun identity that 
exacerbate this competition are the world view of the tribal Pashtun embedded in 
pashtunwali that revolves around khpal, kor, khel, zai, Pakhtunkhwa and then aalam. This 
myopic conception of the centrality of the position of the Pashtun, both in the region and 
globally, is reinforced by international events which for a decade have often pivoted around 
the borderland, magnifying the impact of the actions of tribesmen to where inter-tribal 
dynamics have taken on global import. Thus, in the mind of the tribal Pashtun, the struggle for 
the primacy and autonomy of zai and atrap are played out on the widest stage of all, the 
aalam or world stage.  
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3 The Strategic Significance of the Afghan Borderland from 
Alexander to America 
3.1  Introduction 
As the primary driver of pre-state substructures in Asia, tribes orient the strategic and political 
reality of the states they underlie. Through pivotal states,1 tribal substructures can impact 
regional and global inter-state dynamics. Turkey and Pakistan are pivotal states in Asia. Each is 
impacted by tribally driven substructures, and each state has achieved a different level of 
success in accommodating or diminishing the impact of tribes on stability and policy 
trajectory. Where Turkey has been successful in establishing the primacy of the state in its 
southeast borderland through a combination of militarisation and infrastructure development, 
Pakistan has been unable to diminish the impact of tribes on its borderland. 
The Pashtun tribes have functioned as borderlanders within the topographical environment of 
the Suleiman Range throughout the region’s historiography. This chapter explores the 
strategic significance of these tribes within their environment, analysing the Afghan 
borderland as an enduring geo-political and sociological constant that has functioned as a 
borderland between polities for millennia. The chapter explores strategic function of the 
borderland, from its function as a gateway from the highlands of Central Asia to the fertile 
plains of the Indian subcontinent, to its role as the setting for the strategic contests between 
Britain and Russia known as the ‘great game’, to its function in the anti-Soviet struggle of the 
1980’s, and as a fulcrum in the present anti-NATO insurgency in Afghanistan. 
Through this examination, the chapter reveals that the Afghan borderland is the core of the 
wider substructure of Pakhtunkhwa, underlying Pakistan and Afghanistan. That substructure 
has functioned as a pivotal and enduring strategic element that has impacted the region 
through its history. The incongruities between the postcolonial states and the underlying 
substructure of Pakhtunkhwa continue to create socio-political contusion in the Afghan 
borderland and the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 „Pivotal States‟ are those in which stability and developmental  progress, or the lack thereof,  can 
impact a surrounding region. The concept was articulated by Paul Kennedy, Emily Hill and Robert 
Chase in a 1996 Foreign Affairs article. See: „Pivotal States and US Strategy‟ Foreign Affairs V. 75  
no. 1, January/February 1996; http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51621/robert-chase-emily-hill-
paul-kennedy/pivotal-states-and-us-strategy. Accessed  23
rd
 February, 2011. 
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3.2  A Gateway to India 
3.2.1 Borders and pre-colonial substructures  
The architecture of postcolonial states in Asia is raised over a fluid but defined matrix of pre-
colonial polities that have existed on a sub-state, state, and trans-state scale. The two principal 
trans-state polities that dominated western Asia at the eve of European colonialism were the 
Ottoman realm and the Qajar Persian Empire. Each incorporated a number of diverse ethno-
linguistic communities, many of which were either de jure or de facto administrative units.2 On 
the periphery of these domains were smaller entities enjoying degrees of autonomy from 
administrative centres, usually on account of their tribal and/or nomadic populations. The 
Kurds, the Bedouin and Pashtuns were each such national groupings, nominally affiliated with 
a capital but largely left to their own indigenous political devices. Of these three, the Kurds 
were the focus of the most sustained and successful state attempts to accommodate and 
manipulate tribal dynamics.3 
With Ottoman dissolution and the strategic encirclement of Qajar Persia by Russian and British 
forces by the turn of the twentieth century, the formerly trans-national domains of Turkey and 
Iran descended into entities more closely resembling national states, with their former 
territories giving rise to a number of sub-national states which were either colonised directly 
or emerged as new states under titular heads and governments placed into authority through 
colonial agreement. The Arab states and Afghanistan are examples of the latter. Turkey 
emerged as an independent state with a nationalist, anti-colonial head of state, but 
ideologically, strategically and politically it came under the direct influence of firstly Germany, 
prior to and during World War I, and then subsequently Britain. Huntington (1997:74-77) 
points out the social and ideological contusion experienced by Turkey through Kemalism, and 
posits that the resolution of this ideological complex still eludes Turkey and manifests in 
Turkey’s strategic uncertainty vis-à-vis its role in Europe and the Middle East. 
The construction of states in Afghanistan and Arabia, however, revealed more direct political 
and social incongruities. The demarcation by Britain and France, in the aftermath of the Sykes-
Picot treaty, of international borders with no political precedent or natural, indigenous basis, 
led to a crisis of legitimacy in the new Arab states that remains to be resolved. This has 
                                                          
2
 Both Ottoman and Persian administration was based upon the Vilayet system, patterned on the 
Abbassid Wilayah system, often reflecting indigenous tribal, ethnic, linguistic or geographical features 
as the example of Ottoman administration of Iraq demonstrates. Persian administration alternately used 
the term Satrap, derived from the Turkic Etrap (Karpat 2002: 201).   
3
 Van Bruinessen, Martin Kurds, States and Tribes Utrecht University,1998 (unpublished) p. 5.; 
http://www.let.uu.nl/˜martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Kurds, states, tribes.htm . Accessed 
9
th
 January, 2011. 
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resulted in political structures that perpetuate a single head of state for decades and are 
characterised by repression and the absence of political and judicial transparency.  
As for the case of Afghanistan, the demarcation of its boundaries was premised initially on the 
physical defence of British India from Russian encroachment (Johnson 2003: 697-99), and then 
subsequently on the determination of the limits of Russia’s eastward expansion (Sykes 1926: 
134-35). These strategic considerations, along with the protracted nature of Britain’s own 
military involvement in Afghanistan through the nineteenth century, resulted in the 
determination of Afghanistan’s boundaries primarily through strategic and military expedient. 
This process either ignored ethno-linguistic realities and indigenous structures of polity and 
organisation, or may have been designed to rupture the authority and influence of these tribal 
structures as part of a strategic logic that would ensure the survival of the successor states of 
Afghanistan and India. The lingering implications of the process of demarcation are the 
principal causes of the social, demographic and ethno-linguistic incongruities that underlie the 
instability prevalent in Afghanistan and Pakistan today.  
The strategic vision through which the Afghan state was demarcated, and through which the 
tribal challenge of the Afghan borderland was considered, was largely a function of the 
geography and topography of the borderland. This chapter will proceed through addressing 
the geographic context of the borderland, tracing its strategic impact over time with a view to 
establishing the nature of its current strategic salience, and the role of the Pashtun tribes as 
strategic drivers in the borderland.  
3.2.2  A gateway to India 
To the south and west of the Afghan borderland stretches the arid and rocky expanse of 
interior Baluchistan and the Mekran desert, notorious for having decimated Alexander’s 
armies on their westward march home in 325 B.C.E. (Wood 2001: 211). To its north and east 
lie some of the highest mountain peaks in the world in the Pir Pangi, Pamir and Hindu Kush 
ranges. Between these geographical extremes lies the comparative mediocrity of the Suleiman 
mountain range, through which a number of passes have historically functioned as viable year-
round access points to the fertile Gangetic plains for armies and caravans from the Central 
Asian highlands.  
Thus the Afghan borderland functions as a geographical gateway between the arid south-
central Eurasian landmass, and the well watered plains of the Indian subcontinent. This 
geographical gateway has functioned, and continues to function, as an economic tether 
between what are in effect two separate continents, a tether which has been sustained in 
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times of war, peace and political upheaval. What is today a borderland between the states of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan is in fact an historical constant that has had an impact on the scales 
of states, continents and civilizations.  
For limited periods over the last two millennia however, the Afghan borderland has been 
subsumed by a single, greater polity unifying the high plains lying to the north of the Suleiman 
Range and the arable plains of present day Punjab. The most enduring of such polities was 
Gandhara. Centred around the Peshawar valley, Gandhara extended north to Kapisa, just 
north of present day Kabul, and south to Taxila in present-day Punjab, although in some 
historical texts the term Gandhara is taken to refer to an even larger region stretching as far 
westward as Kandahar (Fergusson 2004: 47). The trans-borderland Gandharan civilization 
emerged into prominence in the first century C.E. in the absence of any major population 
movement or military movement southward from Central Asia into the Indian subcontinent, 
thus emerging at a time of relative stability in an otherwise turbulent region. For a brief period 
between the second and third centuries C.E. the Kushans pushed southward from the 
remnants of Bactria through Gandhara, deep into the Deccan plains of the central Indian 
subcontinent, setting a precedent for the southward invasion of the subcontinent from Central 
Asia through the Afghan borderland (Puri 1999: 247-250). The Kushans, however, soon 
fragmented and were absorbed into the emerging Gupta Empire (Caroe 1956: 79). The Guptas 
expanded to incorporate the entire northern subcontinent including the Indus river valley, but 
did not expand beyond the Suleiman range. Hence, during the fourth century C.E. the Afghan 
borderland resumed its historical role as a borderland between the Sassanid Empire lying to 
the north and west, and the Gupta Empire of north India lying to the south and east.  
It was the southward forays of firstly the invading Arabs and then the Islamised Perso-Turks, 
launched from central present-day Afghanistan, that eventually overran the declining 
remnants of the Gandharan civilization that lingered in the Afghan borderland until tenth 
century.4 The southward sweep of firstly the Arabs in the late ninth century C.E., then 
subsequently the Perso-Turk Ghaznavids (963-1187) met significant resistance from the tribal 
inhabitants of the Suleiman range, although the invaders were able to cross the Afghan 
borderland and penetrate present-day Punjab, subsuming the by then fragmented north 
Indian Kingdoms through decades of relentless campaigns (Rose 1997: 211). It is from this 
period that the tribesmen of the Suleiman Range enter historiography as a strategic factor. 
Having initially resisted repeated Ghaznavid advances, the tribesmen were subsequently 
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 Spuler (1970: 147) provides a detailed account of the Persianisation of the originallyTurkic 
Ghaznavids, and their expansion. 
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instrumental in Ghaznavid southward expansion. Al-Utbi, a chronicler of the Ghaznavid ruler 
Mahmud (997-1030) records how Mahmud’s army relied upon ‘Satanic Afghans... who 
ascended the mountains like goats and descended like torrents of water’ (Grierson 1928: 7). 
From this period, two prominent features of the tribesmen emerged; martial prowess in a 
mountainous environment, and the ability to switch loyalties with little or no moral qualms. 
Led by these tribesmen, the Ghaznavids were able to subsume the borderland into a larger 
polity reaching from the central highlands north of the Suleiman Range in to the Gangetic 
plains. The Ghazni based Ghaznavid Empire was succeeded by the Ghor based Ghorids (1148-
1215) over much of the same territory. The Ghorids, however, soon fell victim to the 
geographic challenges of the borderland and by the early thirteenth century, the Ghorid 
empire had divided along the Suleiman Range.  
The northern portion came to be known as the Timurid domain while the Delhi Sultanate 
(1206-1527) inherited the southern portion of the empire (Islam 1999: 269). The border 
between them remained relatively fluid, with the tribes of the Suleiman range maintaining 
their independence from both, but providing safe passage along the vital trade links between 
them that crossed the mountain passes through autonomous tribal territory.  The role of the 
Afghan borderland as a physical barrier, and the political and military obstacles it and its 
inhabitants presented to the Ghorids, cannot be understated in seeking to understand the 
causes behind the breaking away of the Delhi Sultanate from Ghor. As a geographic barrier, 
movement across the borderland was compounded by the powerful tribes who inhabited the 
borderland, and remained beyond the control of the armies sent to subdue them. This 
challenge effectively cut-off the Delhi Sultanate for periods, on an administrative level, from 
Ghor, leading to the increasing autonomy of the Delhi sultanate. 
By the Mughal period (1526-1858), Pashtun tribes had settled across the Peshawar valley and 
northern KP, including the Swat valley. The tribes continued to be of strategic salience to the 
Mughals as protectors of the trans-Suleiman trade between Central Asia and the subcontinent.  
In 1672, Khushal Khan Khattak (1613-1689) forwent his loyalty to the Mughal ruler Aurangzeb 
(1658-1707), and rose in rebellion against the Mughals, breaking vital economic links through 
the borderland.5 This rebellion was that order of a strategic threat that it drew Auranzeb from 
Delhi to the Kabul River at Attock to suppress the rebellion which was partially achieved by 
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 For a fuller treatment of Khushal Khan Khattak see: Sayid Anwar ul Haq‟s  ‘Mutakhi’bat Khushal 
Khan Khattak’ Pashto Literary Academy, Peshawar 1989.  Also see: Ahmed Jaan‟s ‘Khushal Khan 
Khattak, De Pakhto Shaaraano haal’ 
http://www.khyber.org/people/literary/KhushalKhanKhattak.shtml . Accessed 24
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1674. Following the rebellion, Khattak continued to unsuccessfully pursue trans-tribal unity 
until his death. Since that period, the Pashtun tribes have not collectively acceded to external 
suzerainty, instead seeking to project authority across and beyond the borderland through 
elusive pan-Pashtun polity.  
3.3 The Durrani State 
The Pashtuns have lived on the periphery of other Asian civilisations for most of their history, 
and beyond the writ of the polities established around the Afghan borderland. They have been 
unable to coalesce around a single polity that eclipses tribal authority but for limited periods. 
The first significant success at pan-Pashtun unity of which there is an historical record began in 
1709 under the leadership of Mirwais Khan Hotak (1673-1715), a Ghilzai tribal leader from the 
powerful Hotak clan. Mirwais arose in insurrection against the then Safavid governor of 
Kandahar, killing him and other representatives of the Safavid dynasty (Malleson 1878: 225). 
Successfully resisting a succession of Safavid armies dispatched to subdue him, Mirwais 
remained in control of the province of Kandahar, rallying support among the Pashtuns for 
championing the cause of Sunni Islam over Safavid Shi’ism (Malleson 1878: 227-234).  Mirwais 
died in 1715, succeeded by his brother Abdul Aziz Hotak, who was himself shortly succeeded 
by Mirwais’ son Mahmud Hotak (1697-1725). Mahmud successfully subdued the Abdali 
Pashtuns who had arisen in insurrection with support from the Safavids, and by 1722 had 
taken the Safavid capital of Isfahan (Malleson 1878: 237, 240).  For seven years, Hotaki rule 
unified the entire Afghan borderland and surrounding territories stretching from eastern 
central Persia into the Peshawar Valley. The significance of this period stems from the fact that 
the tribes of the Afghan borderland, for the first time, were the masters of the region 
surrounding the borderland. Being tribal, both organisationally but also in a psycho-social 
sense, and having no cultural experience of administrating a state or indeed a structured army, 
the Hotaki fell to infighting and the Pashtun domain was in turn conquered by the Persian 
commander Nader Shah in 1729 (Dupree 1980: 329).  
Nader Shah (1698-1747) established his own dynasty, the Afsharid, over the ruins of the 
Safavids, consolidating much of western Pakhtunkhwa and the bulk of the territories of 
Safavid Persia (Axworthy 2006: 79-82). After Nader Shah’s assassination in 1747, the eastern 
Afsharid provinces, corresponding with western Afghanistan today and then termed Khorasan, 
were ruled by Ahmed Shah Abdali (1722-1773). Ahmed Shah was a Pashtun of the Abdali tribe 
and had been a bodyguard and close confidant of Nader Shah. Upon being declared Khan of 
the Abdali at a loya jirga in 1747, he lent his title ‘Durr-i-Durran’ (pearl of pearls) to the tribe 
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which subsequently came to be known as the Durrani. Ahmed Shah set about removing Ghilzai 
authority from western Afghanistan, consolidating his own position within the Durrani tribe 
and consolidating the position of the Durrani over all Pashtun tribes with a series of alliances 
with the Yusufzai and the northern Tajiks.6 Although the hold of Ahmed Shah over the non-
Durrani Pashtuns was tenuous at best, and was constantly plagued by insurrection, he was 
able to expand Pashtun authority over the entire area of Pakhtunkhwa, and pushed into India, 
Kashmir and eastern and central Afsharid Persia. Ahmed Shah’s ability to form an alliance with 
the Tajiks extended his authority into the northern reaches of Pashtun territory, an 
achievement that has had the lasting legacy of being considered the founding of the modern 
Afghan state. However, the Durrani state began to crumble with Ahmed Shah's death in 1773, 
plagued by the twin insurmountable challenges of the constant Sikh uprisings in the Punjab 
and Ghilzai uprisings across the Pashtun belt (Dupree 1980: 338-44). These insurrections 
shortly fractured the Durrani state such that Ahmed Shah's successors ruled over receding 
territory which was increasingly fragmented. 
Through a retrospective analysis, the short lived nature of the Durrani state underlines a 
number of determinant factors that have characterised the strategic setting of the Afghan 
borderland historically, the current relevance of  some of which continues.  
1) The inter-tribal contest for supremacy and autonomy remains the defining attribute of 
socio-political conscience in the Afghan borderland and the wider areas of Pakhtunkhwa. The 
fundamental challenge that characterised the Durrani state was its inability to subdue Ghilzai 
resistance to Durrani led pan-Pashtun authority. The size and spread of the Ghilzai constituted 
the principal obstacle to Durrani aspirations, a challenge overcome for brief periods by 
projecting Pashtun military power externally and employing Ghilzai warriors in the pursuit of 
the riches of northern India, and through maintaining alliance with Tajiks and the Yusufzai to 
generate numerical and strategic superiority over the Ghilzai. This tribal challenge remains the 
state of affairs currently, an attribute that has endured the recent politically turbulent history 
of the borderland and of the state of Afghanistan. Currently, the size, organisation, 
territorialisation, and fighting capabilities of the tribes with the larger confederations7 of 
Ghilzai and Durrani determine that each remains sovereign within the territorial zai with which 
                                                          
6
 Davies, Colin C. “Ahmed Shah Durrani” Encyclopedia of Islam (EI2 CD-ROM edition v. 1.0) Ed. P.J 
Bearman, T. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. Van  Dozel, W.P. Heirichs et. al. Brill, Leiden,1999. 
7
 The term confederation here is employed to represent the loose nature of association within the larger 
groupings of Ghilzai and Durrani. It does not reflect an institutionalised arrangement as is more 
generally the connotation of the term in conventional political discourse. 
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each is associated, rendering the domination of a single tribe over all tribes in Pakhtunkhwa as 
distant a reality now as it was during the Durrani state.  
However, the post-Soviet withdrawal period, characterised by the failure of the mujahideen 
government and then the emergence of the Taliban, has demonstrated a further attribute that 
emerges millennially; that of Durrani-Ghilzai co-operation under a religious authoritarian 
figure.8 One of the key components of the rapidity with which the Taliban militia was able to 
extend authority over the overwhelming majority of the territory and population of 
Afghanistan between 1993 and 1999 was the ability of the militia to incorporate elements of 
both the Durrani and Ghilzai tribal confederations into its leadership structures. Giustozzi 
(2007: 47) tabulates the inclusion of both Durrani and Ghilzai principals within the leadership 
structure of the Taliban.9 By replacing tribal identity with ideational/religious identity in the 
political sphere, or more precisely by formulating a religious regime within which tribal 
identity was incorporated, a workable trans-tribal order was successfully developed under the 
Taliban. The persistence of the threat of the re-emergence of the Taliban currently, stems 
from the continued ability of the militia to draw support from across tribal lines under the 
same millennial pretext, a pretext the nascent state in Afghanistan is unable or unwilling to 
adopt but one that finds resonance from within the Karlanri and Yusufzai in Pakistan.10   
2) Historical Persia is a core factor that continues to impact the Afghan borderland in the form 
of present day Iran. The Persian Safavids (1501-1736) and the Afsharids (1736-1796) have 
ruled significant parts of Pakhtunkhwa, particularly the western parts populated by the Abdali, 
through whom Persian dynasties have historically sought to exert their own influence in 
Pakhtunkhwa.11 Both the Hotaki and Durrani states sought to reverse that influence through 
successfully invading eastern Persia and subduing Persian authority. Antagonism between the 
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 Here, the millennial attribute referred to is the periodic pan-Pashtun drive for unity that has a 
tendency to emerge once or twice in a century, fuelled by a call to arms on the basis of defending either 
religion and co-religionists, or the aggregate of Pakhtunkhwa from foreign invasion. It arose in the first 
two Anglo-Afghan wars in the nineteenth century, in the frontier insurrection of 1896-7, and during the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989. The phenomenon forms a subtext to Akbar 
Ahmed‟s (1976) Millennium and Charisma Among Pathans. 
9
 Rashid (2001: 98, 231-35) also identifies principals from both Ghilzai and Durrani in the leadership 
shura of the Taliban. 
10
 This is manifest in the continued presence of Pakistan based tribesmen in the insurgency in 
Afghanistan. Many are actually returning from long periods of madrassas education in Pakistan, but 
there is a number of  indigenous Karlanri tribesmen from South Wazristan, North Waziristan, Kurram 
and Bajaur who periodically participate in the Afghan insurgency. Interview with NCO-A, 3
rd
 
September 2008, north Pakhli, KP.  
11
 The Afsharid Persian ruler Nadir Shah bestowed military authority and political prestige upon 
Ahmed Shah Abdali, as was customary for the Persian monarchs to do with Abdali notables. Also, 
Persian rulers included Abdali lashkars as a component of their militaries in campaigns against the 
Ghilzai between the 14
th
 and 17
th
 centuries (Malleson 1878: 225-40).  
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Pashtun tribes, particularly the Ghilzai, and Persian authority has been borne of this 
adversarial political history and the fact that Persian dynasties have tended to espouse Shia 
Islam, considered heretical by many Ghilzai and Karlanri Pashtuns. Sustained Persian influence 
over the city of Herat and over the predominantly Hazarajat Shia population of west-central 
Afghanistan has rendered the region of Herat as the north-western boundary of Pakhtunkhwa 
while the west-central highlands, populated by the Hazarajat, have constituted the northern 
boundary. Since the Durrani state, Afghan rulers have sought to subdue the Hazarajat through 
alliances between the Durrani, Tajiks and Uzbeks, a dynamic that continues currently. 
Sustained Persian/Iranian influence over the Hazarajat means that Iran continues to constitute 
the western boundary of Pakhtunkhwa and a potentially significant internal factor in the tribal 
politics of the Afghan borderland.  
 3) Punjab has historically formed the southern barrier of the Afghan borderland. Roughly 
corresponding with the current Pakistani administrative province of Punjab today, Punjab has 
historically constituted a martial challenge to the southward expansion of the Pashtun tribes 
who, consequently, have historically moved northward and eastward in search of agricultural 
land. Both the Hotaki and the Durrani states did push southward through Punjab to its heart, 
the city of Lahore, but were unable to sustain an authoritative Pashtun presence. Sikh 
insurrections persisted, eventually leading to the counter thrust northward of Ranjit Singh, 
whose domain  extended to include the second Afghan capital of Peshawar from 1818 to 1849 
(Stewart 2008: 40). 
4) The most significant development in the region’s recent history and the event that has had 
the greatest impact upon the Afghan borderland in the last two centuries however, has been 
the British imperial expansion in India which included the eastern and southern parts of 
Pakhtunkhwa. After the dissolution of Company rule in India in the aftermath of the uprising 
of 1857, the British presence in Pakhtunkhwa – now in the form of the Raj - increased, with 
the British consolidating garrisons across what subsequently became the North West Frontier 
Province (Caroe 1958: 348-349). Having faced a serious set-back deep inside Pakhtunkhwa 
fifteen years previously in the first Anglo-Afghan war, British policy was at the period 
characterised by ‘masterly inactivity’ (Hopkirk 2001: 286). However, the ‘forward policy’ of the 
Disraeli government (1874-1880) would shortly precipitate another Anglo-Afghan war, 
beginning the chain of events that would ultimately lead to the demarcation of the Durand 
Line, a tactical solution to part of a larger strategic contest that has resulted in decades of still 
intense feuding between the successor states of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
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These factors; the Ghilzai-Durrani rivalry, the role of Persia/Iran in the west of Pakhtunkhwa, 
the Punjabi Sikh insurrections, and the presence of the British in India, are the major socio-
political and geo-strategic formative factors that have shaped, and continue to shape, the 
political context into which the Afghan borderland has emerged in its current form. Although 
presently the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan form the immediate political context 
surrounding the Afghan borderland, the themes mentioned above constitute enduring pre-
state and trans-state realities that function on a state level and are also manifest in the state – 
sub-state dynamic that continues to shape and dynamics of the Afghan borderland.  
3.4 Between the Lion and the Bear 
The global impact of the geo-political salience of the Afghan borderland is the result of a 
combination of factors including geography, ethnography, statism, military doctrine, and the 
reduction of time and space based obstacles through advances in military technology. Lord 
Curzon captured the inevitability of the continuing strategic and political salience of the region 
when he stated in 1908, in an address to the Royal Asia Society: 
If the Central Asian Society exists and is meeting in fifty or a hundred years hence, Afghanistan 
will be as vital and important a question as it is now.12 
Elphinstone’s arrival at Kabul in 1809 introduced a developing British technological capacity 
that would soon enable the crossing of vast territory, rapid communication over great 
distances, and the ability to bring greater force than ever to bear upon challenges to British 
imperial power. The British also introduced the region to the geo-strategic rivalry between 
Britain and its European rivals France and Russia, technologically capable of playing out their 
formerly European strategic rivalry across the entire Eurasian landmass. Hence, in many 
aspects the ‘great game’ between Russia and Britain that was played out through most of the 
19th century represents not just the meeting of two global powers in one of the most 
strategically salient areas of the Eurasian land mass, but also the introduction of the Afghan 
borderland to an age of unprecedented military and political, power harnessed and projected 
by the modern state.  
This chapter proceeds to review the major developments of the ‘great game’, demonstrating 
that the emergence of the state of Afghanistan, and to a lesser degree Pakistan, was the result 
of the regional strategic requirements of British policy, and not in response to indigenous 
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Quoted in Ahmed (2008: iii) from a speech given by Curzon at the Royal Asiatic Society, London 
1908.  
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structures of polity. This section reveals that pre-state structures of identity and authority 
have endured the strategic competitions between great powers across the Afghan borderland, 
and are now resurging as sub-state and trans-border challenges to the legitimacy and 
continuity of the sates of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
3.4.1 The ‘Great Game’13 
By the turn of the nineteenth century British influence was firmly established in the 
subcontinent and had begun to eclipse Mughal power.14 The ascendancy of Britain in the 
Indian subcontinent drew the attention of Britain’s European rivals, Russia and France, to 
India. Russia's first foray eastward came in 1801 as Paul I dispatched an inadequate force of 
just over 20,000 Cossacks from Orenburg tasked with marching through Central Asia into India 
to wrest the subcontinent from British influence (Hopkirk 2001: 28). This move by the 
somewhat naive Paul was in response to the purported ‘testament of Peter the Great’, 
envisioning a manifest destiny for Russia extending to India and beyond (Ragsdale: 1980 16, 
109-10). This campaign was the first of a number of Russian failures that achieved nothing 
militarily, but did reveal Russia's intention to establish its suzerainty over the Central Asian 
Khanates. 
The strategic engagement of Paul I’s successor, Czar Alexander, with Napoleon, constituted a 
clear threat to Britain's very presence in the Indian subcontinent as Napoleon had clearly 
stated his ambition to drive the British from India (Ragsdale 1988: 94). It was to counter this 
ambition that the diplomatic mission of Mountstuart Elphinstone was dispatched to Kabul in 
1808, in order to secure a treaty of friendship with the Amir of Kabul, Shah Shuja (Elphinstone 
1819: viii-x). Although Elphinstone was successful in concluding an agreement, the Shah was 
shortly deposed by his brother Mahmud Shah leaving the agreement un-ratified (Fraser-Tytler 
1953: 68). The consequences of this diplomatic stumble were, however, soon mitigated by the 
major rift that emerged between Alexander and Napoleon in 1809, putting into sequence 
events that would ultimately lead to Napoleon's ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812 and 
remove France as a threat to British influence in Asia. Encouraged by Napoleon’s defeat, Czar 
Alexander exercised growing influence over his eastern territories, constituting a serious cause 
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 The term „Great Game‟ is primarily a literary description of strategic contest in Central Asia between 
Great Britain and Russia during the nineteenth century, coming into wider currency through Rudyard 
Kipling‟s 1901 novel Kim. Russian historiography sparingly makes reference to a „Great Game‟, 
although there is mention of the Турниры теней (Turniry Teney) or Tournament of Shadows. Yapp 
(2001) suggests the term was employed to describe a number of different policy objectives in Asia 
during the period. Morgan (1973: 64) finds little evidence of the actions ascribed to the Calcutta 
government and its intelligence operations. See also Shareen Brysac and Karl Meyer Tournament of 
Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Asia Abacus, London 2001. 
14
 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Volume IV, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1908, pp. 332-34.  
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of concern for the British General staff at Calcutta who were operating under the authority of 
the East India Company. Whereas the spectre of a Napoleonic invasion of British India faded 
with Napoleon's defeat in Russia, the threat posed by Russia was just emerging. 
In anticipation of such a threat, the British government in India had dispatched two officers in 
1809 to reconnoitre the eastern reaches of Persia, including the cities of Herat and Merv, two 
cities thought to determine the route of any potential Russian invasion of India (Hopkirk 2001: 
39). Captain Charles Christie and Lieutenant Henry Pottinger returned to Calcutta with an 
assessment of the tribes inhabiting the regions they had traversed, including numbers of men 
under arms, structures of leadership there among, and descriptions of those geographical 
features that could facilitate or impede an offensive and defensive campaign (Hopkirk 2001: 
39-43). This mission set the qualitative precedent for subsequent British and Russian 
explorations of Central Asia that subsequently came to be known as the ‘great game’. 
Russia's first major eastward move of the ‘game’ came in 1819 with the dispatch of a Captain 
Muraviev from Orenburg to the Khanate of Khiva (Hopkirk 2001: 80). Muraviev’s was 
successful in scouting the terrain and concluding a mutual agreement to expand trade with the 
Khan of Khiva, Muhammad Raheem Bahadur (Muraviev 1871: 162). Returning to Russia in 
January 1820, Muraviev urged his military superiors to initiate a campaign for the annexation 
of Khiva, judging that a Russian force would be able to rely on the support of the 3000 or so 
Russian slaves held captive in the khanate (Muraviev 1871: 217). Muraviev’s assertions were 
overlooked in St. Petersburg as Russia was pre-occupied with a re-emergent threat from Persia 
which had embarked upon an expansive campaign seeking to reacquire its former territories in 
the Caucuses which had been ceded to Russia in the 1813 treaty of Gulistan (Hopkirk 2001: 
110). Russia went on to impose a succession of defeats upon the Persian military leading to 
the Russian annexation of Armenia (Ingram 1973: 512).  
Russian military successes in Asia now began to shape British perceptions of a Russian threat 
to British India, assisted by Colonel George De Lacy Evans’ publication of On the Practicability 
of an Invasion of British India (Yapp 1987: 652). Partly in consideration of this increasing 
awareness, the British Indian government in Calcutta dispatched a Lieutenant Arthur Connelly 
to reconnoitre Central Asia and present-day Afghanistan. Departing from Moscow in the 
autumn of 1829 with the knowledge of the Russian government, Connelly travelled through 
the Caucuses and Central Asia. Failing to reach Khiva, Connelly returned to India having 
followed the route he felt was most likely to be taken by a Russian army were it to march on 
British India (Conolly 1834: II, 134). 
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Connelly's travels were shortly followed by those of Captain Alexander Burnes who in 1832 
proceeded through Afghanistan to Bukhara, returning to India through Persia. Burnes realised 
that in order to establish any substantive influence in Central Asia, the British would have to 
establish a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, through which the movement of British goods 
into Afghanistan and Central Asia could be facilitated (Wright 1977: 101). This, of course, 
would afford Britain the pretext upon which to closely observe the nature of Russian 
expansion into Central Asia. Burnes asserted a British diplomatic mission in Afghanistan would 
demonstrate that the British government considered Afghanistan to be within its own sphere 
of political influence, possibly deterring any Russian ambition on or through the territories of 
Afghanistan. The Calcutta administration refused Burnes's advice, cautioning that such a move 
would be likely to draw a Russian response in kind, precipitating further expansion of Russian 
influence in Central Asia to reach Afghanistan (Hopkirk 2001: 165). 
However, the arrival of a new Governor General at Calcutta, in March 1836 ushered in a new 
approach to Afghanistan and by November 1836 Governor General Auckland had dispatched 
Burnes to Kabul to establish his diplomatic mission (Fraser-Tytler 1958: 93). As had been 
anticipated by the previous Calcutta administration, Russia did respond in kind by despatching 
a delegation to Kabul to seek an audience with Dost Muhammad, the Amir at Kabul, offering 
the Czar's friendship. Auckland responded by delivering a threat to the Amir through Burnes, 
suggesting that the British would be unwilling to hold back the advance of Ranjit Singh from 
Peshawar into Afghanistan were the Dost to conclude any agreement with the Russian 
delegation (Hopkirk 2001: 139-145). 
Auckland’s response precipitated a protracted military campaign from 1838 to 1839, resulting 
in the successful British defeat of the Dost, and his replacement with Britain’s ally Shah Shuja 
(Fraser-Tytler 1958: 112). However, the tribal khans viewed Shah Shuja as a British puppet, 
lending tribal support to Muhammad Akbar Khan, son of the deposed Dost (Yapp 1964: 350). 
Russia, in response to the increased involvement of Britain in Afghanistan and now virtually 
expelled from that country, sought to increase its gains in Central Asia, ultimately leading it to 
Afghanistan. The Eurasian interior, however, proved an insurmountable obstacle as the winter 
of 1840 left a Russian force dispatched to Khiva stranded in the steppes resulting in yet 
another military failure for Russia in Central Asia (Skrine 1904: 70).  
Britain’s own position in Kabul had begun to deteriorate. By August 1841 the Pashtun tribes 
were readying for an uprising against British presence (Yapp 1964: 354). The developing 
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tension finally erupted in November 1841 with the assassination of Alexander Burnes at the 
hands of an angry mob in Kabul (Fraser-Tytler 1958: 115). Within days Pashtun tribes began to 
amass at Kabul, besieging the British garrison which now found its presence in Kabul 
unsustainable. Led by Akbar Khan, the tribesmen lured the British out of the relative safety of 
the garrison under the pretext of safe passage. The retreating British column was then 
gradually broken down by marauding Ghilzai tribesmen resulting in the death and desertion of 
practically the entire contingent (Fraser-Tytler 1958: 115). 
Britain responded with decisive force, despatching two columns from Peshawar to relieve the 
Jalalabad garrison, each taking different routes eventually combining at Kabul (Hopkirk 2001: 
271-4). Finding that Akbar Khan had withdrawn from the city, the British proceeded to place 
Fateh, the son of Shah Shuja, onto the throne and now felt that they had restored both their 
military prestige and the political alignment of Kabul to Calcutta (Yapp 1964: 360). Fateh 
himself was promptly overthrown by Akbar Khan who resumed the throne at Kabul within 
months. However, Akbar had by now himself lost the support of the tribes resulting in a power 
vacuum which the British reasoned could only be effectively filled by Dost Muhammad. Hence 
1853 began with the restoration to power of the Dost who had been in exile in India, leaving 
Afghanistan politically where it had been prior to Auckland's evidently misguided interference 
(Hopkirk 2001: 288).  
It was in the midst of this commitment in Afghanistan that the events of 1857 in India 
unfolded. The British were forced to respond by engaging in a counter-insurgency extending 
across the subcontinent and lasting over two years, resulting in mass casualties among the 
indigenous inhabitants and high numbers of casualties among the British.15 It was a critical 
period for the British in India, whose recovery of the situation was in no little part due to the 
inaction of the of the Pashtun tribes under Dost Muhammad, whose involvement on the side 
of the uprising could have been a critical factor for the British in India (Hopkirk 2001: 290). As 
it was, the response to the uprising imposed a huge fiscal burden upon Britain as the debt of 
the government in Calcutta rose to over £100 million Sterling by the time the main 
developments in the Indian uprising had come to pass (Sykes 1859: 16). 
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 Amaresh Misra, an indigenous Indian author, has put the total number of Indians killed as a direct 
result of the events of 1857 and subsequent repercussions at over one million, including deaths from 
punitive killings that continued into the next decade, and the effects of famine exacerbated by the 
British authorities in India. See War of Civilisations: India AD 1857  (New Delhi, Rupa & Co, 2007). 
Most other accounts place the number of deaths at around 100,000. 
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The Russians observed the financial burden Britain was under, as well as Dost Muhammad’s 
reluctance to exploit Britain's weakness from north of the Suleiman range, and soon 
dispatched a further contingent to Khiva to examine the possibility of overcoming the 
independent khanates of the steppes. Arriving at Khiva in the summer of 1858, a Count Nikolai 
Ignatiev was able to travel on to the khanate of Bukhara finding the principal khanates in a 
state of belligerence with each other (Becker 1968: 14-18). This state of affairs inspired 
Ignatiev to petition Czar Alexander to annex the khanates, pushing further towards 
Afghanistan. Russia moved forward slowly, and by 1864 Russia moved troops to surround the 
khanate of Khokhand (Hopkirk 2001: 296-8). This move precipitated the Khan of Khokhand’s 
request to Britain for direct military assistance. It soon became evident that no military 
support from Britain would be forthcoming (Hopkirk 2001: 299). Now, Russia set upon a policy 
of aggressive expansion in Central Asia, while Britain continued along its newly declared 
trajectory of ‘masterly inactivity’ in Afghanistan (Hopkirk 2001: 303). Over the next eight years 
Russia steadily encroached upon, surrounded, and then took the principal khanates of 
Tashkent, Samarqand and Bukhara (Becker 1968: 25-8) culminating in the successful Russian 
assault on Khiva in May 1873 (Becker 1968: 52). Russian now had a continuous border 
stretching from the Caspian Sea to the lower Oxus River which became the de facto northern 
boundary of what would emerge as the Afghan state. Only 500 miles from the city of Herat, 
Russian forces were now within a range from which they could launch an offensive into India. 
The critical barrier to this endeavour remained the Pamir mountain range in which Russian 
explorers had been observed seeking out mountain passes through which artillery and infantry 
could be moved southward. 
3.4.2 The ‘Forward Policy’ 
Alarmed, the new Disraeli government in London brought to power in 1874 abandoned the 
previous policy of masterly in activity and embarked upon a ‘forward policy’ (Fraser-Tytler 
1958: 137). Through it, the British sought to engage the Amir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali, in a 
strategic relationship. Sher Ali, however, had established relations with Russian General 
Kaufmann, the conqueror of the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Samarkand and now the 
Governor General of the newly established Russian province of Turkestan (Hopkirk 2001: 394-
8). This prompted Britain to impose a diplomatic mission upon Kabul, a proposition that Sher 
Ali rejected on the grounds that it would oblige him to accept a similar Russian proposal, 
compromising what was ostensibly a position of declared neutrality (Fraser-Tytler 1958: 141-
4). Future events over the coming decades would reveal the difficulty of sustaining such a 
position by any Afghan ruler, a maxim that held true in the mid 20th century also. 
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In light of Anglo-Russian tension in the European strategic theatre during 1876-7, General 
Kaufman assembled a force of 20,000 Cossacks ready to move into India should hostilities 
have erupted between Russia and Britain (Pierce 1960: 39). In July 1878, the Treaty of Berlin 
saw a reduction of tensions in Europe, and although the likelihood of an Anglo-Russian war 
subsided, Kaufman dispatched the diplomatic mission to Kabul that had been delayed on 
account of the Anglo-Russian tensions, despite the protestations of Sher Ali (Fraser-Tytler 
1958: 144). Predictably, the British were alarmed at the apparent duplicity of the Amir,  and 
dispatched three columns totalling 35,000 men into Afghanistan, launching the second Anglo-
Afghan war  of 1878-1880 (Stewart 2007: 77). 
Adverse weather, ineffective communication, and incessant tribal insurgents plagued British 
forces (Hopkirk 2001: 385). Keen to avoid a further military disaster in Afghanistan, the British 
offered terms to the new Amir, Yaqoob Khan, who had succeeded his father the Sher in 
February 1879. Yaqoob Khan accepted a British diplomatic mission at Kabul, the surrendering 
of the Khyber pass to Britain, and the expulsion of all Russians from Afghanistan, resulting in 
the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879, through which Afghanistan effectively 
surrendered the conduct of her foreign affairs to Britain (Singhal 1982: 35-6). 
However, fears of a repeat of the fate of the first British mission to Kabul were borne out 
within weeks. Afghan troops began to amass at Kabul and soon stormed the British mission 
killing all of its members and ransacking the facility (Hopkirk 2001: 388). Again, predictably, 
the British sent a punitive campaign to Kabul to assist Yaqoob Khan in bringing the culprits to 
justice. Soon after the arrival of that punitive expedition in Kabul, a new and larger tribal force 
began to amass numbering close to 100,000 men (Barthrop 1982: 84). The British force in 
Kabul was forced to retreat to India, leaving the lasting impression upon the British 
government in Calcutta that Afghanistan was not to be ruled directly through a British Viceroy 
or occupied militarily. The withdrawal once again left Kabul in a political vacuum, not 
unnoticed by Russia which sought to convert Britain’s strategic failure into a Russian political 
success consistent with the zero-sum nature of Anglo-Russian strategic rivalry. Sensing the 
tenuous nature of the authority of Yaqoob Khan over Afghanistan, Russia sent forth Abdur 
Rahman Khan into Afghanistan from his residence under Russian protection in Tashkent in the 
spring of 1880 (Fraser-Tytler 1958: 155). A first cousin of Yaqoob Khan, Abdul Rahman Khan 
began to generate support in the north of the country, drawing the British to approach him. 
Soon, he was acknowledged by the British as the Amir of Afghanistan and British military was 
withdrawn from west of the Khyber Pass.  
113 
  
Not unlike the situation in Afghanistan currently, the Amir enjoyed support from the north of 
the country and Kabul, but not the south and west of the country, particularly Kandahar where 
the British fought a costly engagement with Abdur Rahman’s cousin and rival, Ayub Khan. By 
1881, as the British completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman took 
Kandahar, extending his authority to most of Afghanistan. A Durrani from the Barakzai clan, 
Abdur Rahman faced a series of rebellions from the rival Ghilzai for the duration of his rule, 
which he repressed forcefully (Dupree 1980: 344-362). None of the rebellions succeeded in 
reversing his rule or in creating a political power vacuum. Afghanistan remained relatively 
stable politically, and came to be considered a potential British ally, if not a stable buffer 
between British India and Russian Central Asia.  
The demarcation of the Durand Line was part of an understanding between Russia and Britain 
resulting  in the definition of the parameters  of the sphere of influence of each in Central Asia 
as one of the final plays in the nearly century long ‘great game’ (Sykes 1926: 213). By the 
1870s, Russia’s expansion in Central Asia had reached the Lower Oxus River. There was no 
indication that Russia would cease to extend its influence further south as it proceeded to 
attempt to cultivate political support at Kabul, initiating a number of diplomatic missions 
(Muraviev 1871: 162). Further, the Pandjeh crisis of 1885 indicated Russia’s southward 
ambitions beyond the Lower Oxus boundary (Hopkirk 2001: 418-424). Given the trans-Oxus 
population spread of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkomen, it is highly likely that the Russians sought 
to establish significant influence over and among these communities residing in northern 
present-day Afghanistan. 
The Russian perspective of British conduct in Afghanistan was that of repeated diplomatic and 
military incursions and campaigns into Afghanistan in order to establish sustained political and 
military influence.16 It was quite apparent that Russia would not be willing to accept the Lower 
Oxus as the northern boundary of Afghanistan without a reciprocal understanding from Britain 
leading to the definition of a southern boundary beyond which British influence would not 
extend northward (Sykes 1926: 210-212). 
3.4.3  The Durand Commission 
Thus, the Durand commission departed from Calcutta to Kabul in 1893 with an understanding 
that the demarcation of the southern boundary of Afghanistan would result in Russian 
acknowledgement of the Lower Oxus as the northern boundary of Afghanistan also, pending 
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 Although Russian historiography largely discounts that there ever was an Anglo-Russian „great 
game‟, Muraviev‟s mission and the subsequent exploits of Kaufmann correlated with British successes 
in Afghanistan just prior to and during the „forward policy‟. 
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the agreement of the Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman (Sykes 1926: 212). It thus becomes apparent 
that the demarcating of the Durand line through Pashtun tribal territories reflected the desire 
of the British first and foremost to have a resolution to the larger strategic question of the 
‘great game’ and determination of the respective spheres of influence for Britain and Russia. 
Local considerations of the impact of the demarcation of the line through Pashtun tribal 
territory were secondary and of a lesser import (Stewart 2007: 96-100). 
Following the conclusion of border demarcation, the geo-strategic contest around the Afghan 
borderland expanded. While the emergence of the Afghan state introduced a conventional 
political structure to what had remained a relatively amorphous geographic buffer,17 the 
Afghan state failed to displace the authority and influence of pre-existing structures of tribal 
authority, identity and organisation. Abdur Rahman’s rule was thus characterised by tribal 
insurrections, and the draconian response to such challenges as is afforded by state power. 
Ghilzai clans were uprooted from their historical zai and relocated around northern 
Afghanistan resulting in the pockets of Pashtun population that are spread across the Uzbek-
dominated northern provinces of Afghanistan today (Dupree 1980: 419).  
The Afghan state had to immediately contend with the challenge of the Durand Line in so far 
as it represented the forced secession of Afghan territory and its acquisition by British India. 
The period immediately following the demarcation of the Durand Line saw a series of 
insurrections across the borderland on the Indian side of the border that were facilitated by 
tribal elements remaining on the Afghan side of the border. Prominent among these 
insurrections was the pan-Pashtun tribal uprising of 1897-9 (Stewart 2008:100-113). Taking 
over two years to quash, the ‘great Pathan revolt’ was followed by a series of lesser 
insurrections that lasted until the withdrawal of the British immediately following Partition. 
Crucially, however, through both world wars Afghanistan did not embark upon any military 
action to reclaim the parts of Pakhtunkhwa which now lay under British suzerainty. Following 
the emergence of the state of Pakistan in 1947 however, the strategic scenario within which 
Afghanistan found itself was suddenly altered. Pakistan emerged from partition as a weak 
state, particularly so it's Western unit which shared a then indefensible border with 
Afghanistan stretching for over 2600 km. This presented Afghanistan with the opportunity to 
pursue its claims over the territory of Pakhtunkhwa that was now apportioned to Pakistan as 
the inheritor of the former British administered province of NWFP. 
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 As Elphinstone (1972: 112) famously observed in his treatise; “It is difficult to fix the limits of the 
Kingdom of Caubul.”. 
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3.5 A Greater Game: The Afghan Borderland through the Cold War 
Pakistan emerged into a post World War II strategic setting in Asia that was soon to be 
dominated by the Eisenhower doctrine which saw the United States embark upon a policy of 
containment of what it perceived as the threat of Soviet expansionism across and beyond the 
Eurasian land mass (Cleveland 2004: 315). Eisenhower drew particular international attention 
to both Pakistan and Afghanistan following his 1959 visit to Kabul, taken generally to be the 
first significant US move in an expanded multi-lateral ‘greater game’ over the following 
decades. Eisenhower’s visit demonstrated that the United States did not consider the Durand 
Line as a delimiter on US influence. Seeking to insulate the Central Asian Soviet republics from 
American intervention via Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was thus increasingly drawn into 
Afghanistan through the trans-Oxus populations of Tajiks and Uzbeks present in both the 
Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan. This trans-border 
demographic reality insured that the Soviet Union would take on a significant role in the 
internal political dynamics of Afghanistan.  
This it did through the person of Muhammad Daoud who became Prime Minister of 
Afghanistan in 1953 (Arnold 1985: 58-60). Daoud initially had strong non-communist 
credentials, as a first cousin of the monarch Muhammad Zahir Shah, and was careful to solicit 
aid from both the US and the USSR. However, it was through the communist Parchami and 
Khalqi political groupings around him that the USSR was able to extend considerable influence 
on the Afghan political medium (Arnold 1985: 58-60). After being excluded from government 
in 1963, Daoud made a sudden re-emergence in 1973 by overthrowing King Zahir Shah and 
proclaiming himself as the first ever President of the Republic of Afghanistan (Dupree 1980: 
485). This period saw a great increase in the level of Soviet military assistance provided to the 
Afghan state (Donaldson 1981: 220). In addition, Soviet officers oversaw the training of Afghan 
officers, establishing close political and ideological links with the Parchami and Khalqi oriented 
officers. It was these officers who were instrumental in the overthrow, with direct Soviet 
assistance, of Muhammad Daoud in 1978 (Donaldson 1981: 220-2). The Saur (Pashto for April) 
revolution saw the now Democratic Republic of Afghanistan embark upon a political trajectory 
far more closely aligned with the Soviet Union than that adopted by the previous government, 
introducing a number of Marxist inspired social and political changes (Dupree 1980: 774), as 
well as adopting tactics of mass arrests and executions of political opponents and dissidents 
(Kaplan 2001: 115). It is the resistance among the larger segment of rural tribal society across 
the borderland, to these changes and to the perceived spread of Marxism, that is widely 
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regarded as having initiated the contest that was subsequently the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad 
(Edwards 2002: 132-5), a struggle that played out according to both the dominant strategic 
scenario within which it was conducted, and the inter-tribal dynamic of conflict and alliance 
that characterises the Afghan borderland. 
The struggle within Afghanistan between the Marxist-oriented government and the rural 
population became a conventional proxy conflict between the Soviet Union which was 
materially supporting the Marxist-oriented government, and the United States and Pakistan 
which extended material support to the rural population (Lansford 2003: 127). By the 
beginning of 1980, the Soviet Union had deployed its 40th Army into Afghanistan to bolster 
the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul and to crush the rural insurgency that was spreading westward 
from the eastern province of Kunar (Garthoff 1994: 1017). As for the United States, it had 
actually been providing support for the insurgents since the summer of 197918 and was 
supplying materiél to what became known as the Afghan mujahideen with the assistance of 
Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and China (Dreyfuss 2005: 274-278). 
Regarding the tribal dimension of the insurgency, the Saur revolution of 1978 represented a 
shift in power within the Afghan state from the Durrani tribal confederation to the Ghilzai.19 
Muhammad Daoud was a Barakzai Durrani, the clan and tribe within which the authority of 
the Afghan state had remained for the majority of the preceding century. The principal 
personalities involved in orchestrating and leading the revolt against the government of 
Muhammad Daoud were all from the Ghilzai tribe including Hafizullah Amin, Nur Muhammad 
Taraki and Babrak Karmal.20 Thus the Saur revolution represented the termination of Durrani 
authority and its replacement with Ghilzai authority for the next turbulent decade. The pro-
Soviet Ghilzai dominated government, however, was unable to hold authority over the bulk of 
the Ghilzai. Leading Ghilzai tribesmen, prime among them being Gulbudeen Hekmatyaar, were 
supported by Pakistan (Rashid 2008: 10) in their guerrilla campaign to reverse the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan. As the campaign expanded, it drew support from both Ghilzai 
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 In a 1996 interview with Vincent Javert of  La Nouvelle Observateur, former US secretary of state 
Brzezinski stated that CIA assistance to anti-Marxist guerillas was approved by the US government in 
July 1979, more than five months before the Soviet invasion. See Javert, Vincent “Oui, la CIA est 
entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes”, La Nouvelle Observateur  No. 1732, 15-21 January 1998, p. 
76. 
19
 This insight was concurred with in discussions by Dr. Shaista Wahab at the University of Nebraska, 
Omaha  17
th
 December, 2008. 
20
 This understanding is resultant from an analysis of the names and familial backgrounds of the 
concerned individuals which reveals a definite trend towards the inclusion of Ghilzai tribe members to 
the exclusion of Durrani tribe members. Such an analysis remains to be published. These findings were 
corroborated through an interview with Dr. Shaista Wahab at the University of Omaha 19
th
 December, 
2008.   
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tribesmen and Durrani tribesmen21 in Helmand and Kandahar, with Kandahar city remaining 
under mujahideen influence despite repeated Soviet attempts to clear the city of insurgency.22   
With the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, the pro-Moscow government of Muhammad 
Najibullah, who himself hailed from the Ahmedzai clan of the Ghilzai tribe, remained in 
authority for another three years. Najibullah’s government collapsed in 1992, followed by the 
subsequent failure of the mujahideen factions to form a functioning government after which 
Afghanistan descended further into a multi-sided civil war. Into this political vacuum emerged 
a new pan-Pashtun phenomenon. By the time the Taliban had taken Kabul in September 1996, 
they had developed a formula of leadership that included among its members principals of 
both the Durrani confederation and of the Ghilzai (Rashid 2001: 98, 223-5). This formula 
contributed to the rapid expansion of the Taliban to where they dominated the overwhelming 
majority of Afghan territory, within a year of taking Kabul, with the notable exception of 
Badakshan, the Panjsher Valley, and contiguous parts of Takhar, Laghman and Baghlan.23 As a 
prospective unifying force in Afghanistan, the Taliban attracted engagement from the United 
States,24 driven by hydrocarbon transit considerations, and were recognised as the legitimate 
government of Afghanistan by the US’ allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.  
During this period, the degree of integration among the Pashtun populations on both sides of 
the Durand Line was on a greater scale than had  been previously, despite Pakistani hopes that 
the Taliban would recognise the Durand Line as the legitimate southern border of Afghanistan, 
something no Afghan government had yet done (Rashid 2001: 184-186). Road and transport 
linkages between Peshawar in KP and Jalalabad in Nangarhar were frequent, uninterrupted 
and unregulated, facilitating a large scale population flow in both directions.25 This was also 
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 However, the Hizb-i-Islami was less tolerant of tribal identities, engendering the impression that it 
was a primarily Ghilzai organisation. This is in contrast to the Taliban who were able to adapt 
puritanical Islamism to a tribal context effectively. See Jones (2008: 28-31). 
22
 Nur ul Haq Ulumi, former General in the Najibullah Regime, claims to have held Kandahar for the 
PDPA regime. However, his control of the city was tenuous, temporary and did not extend to the whole 
city and none of the surrounding areas. See: Mark Urban „A Meeting in Kandahar with a former 
General turned MP‟ 29th July, 2010; 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2010/07/kandahar_the_last_time_i.html. 
Accessed 20
th
 March, 2011.  
23
 The fall of Mazar-i-Sharif to theTaliban in August 1998 was the fall of the last bastion of the 
„Northern Alliance‟ (NA) outside of this region. Panjsher and Badakshan remained outside of Taliban 
control for the duration of the Taliban regime, while the Taliban held a tenuous grip over surrounding 
territories at the peak of their expansion in mid 1999.  
24
 In 1997, a Taliban delegation visited Unocal headquarters in Texas in discussions over the 
construction of a trans-Afghan pipeline. At the time, statements from the Clinton administration were 
considerably more accommodating than those that would follow within two years. See „Taliban in 
Texas for talks on gas pipeline‟4th December, 1997 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/west_asia/37021.stm. Accessed  16
th
 April, 2010. 
25
 Observed by the author in November 1999 in Peshawar and the Khyber agency. 
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the case between the cities of Quetta in Baluchistan province and Kandahar. Whereas 
previously, particularly during the Prime ministership of Muhammad Daoud, the government 
in Kabul continuously reiterated its position that Pakistan’s then NWFP was an integral part of 
Afghanistan, now many in Pakistan considered Afghanistan to be part of its own strategic 
depth and firmly within its military and intelligence sphere of influence.26 It is during this 
period that the infrastructure of Pakistan’s KP and Baluchistan provinces became the de facto 
infrastructure for southern Afghanistan in terms of medical facilities, education, trade, food 
and commodity supply as well as in terms of physical infrastructure.27 
3.5.1  2001 
This integration across the Durand Line became a serious challenge to Pakistan after the US 
led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. Following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 
Pakistan embarked upon a policy of ‘unstinting’ co-operation28 with the US, a decision that 
was strongly and widely opposed across Pakistan, particularly in KP and FATA.29 The political 
orientation of FATA and KP, previously always on the periphery of Pakistan’s political medium, 
now became more distinct and distant from the trajectory embarked upon by Islamabad. The 
reverberations of this contusion were felt across Pakistani society and within the military. The 
period between October and December 2001 saw a number of high-profile resignations and 
retirements of senior staff within the army, including the retirements of Lt. General Muzaffar 
Usmani (commander Karachi Corps) and Lt. General Mehmood Ahmed (Director General ISI). 
Further, speculation was rife in Rawalpindi that a coup d’etat against Musharraf was 
imminent.30 Despite strong opposition in society and from within the military to the extent of 
support pledged to the US, Musharraf took the unprecedented step in the summer of 2002 of 
gradually deploying the army into the autonomous FATA belt in support of US operations 
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 Interviews conducted at the Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad with Foreign Office analysts in 
December 2000 revealed the majority accepted the concept of Afghanistan as the „Strategic Depth‟ of 
Pakistan. The then director of the Institute, Ambassador Tanvir Ahmed Khan however, did not share 
this opinion.   
27
 Interviews conducted at the Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad with Foreign Office analysts in 
December 2000 revealed that the Pakistani government was constructing the communications 
infrastructure across Afghanistan for the Taliban regime. Numerous advisers on a host of technical 
issues were also assisting the regime.  
28Musharraf declared “unstinting support” for the US in a broadcast widely covered by media outlets on 
14
th
 September 2001. See „Analysis: Building a Coalition‟ 16th September, 2001;  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ji/world/americas/1546289.stm .  Accessed 17
th
 April, 2010. 
29
 This opposition manifested in an electoral victory for the Islamist opposition Muttahida Majlis 
Ammal (MMA) in provincial elections, and support for Sufi Muhammad‟s jihad expedition from FATA 
into Afghanistan to the amount of 10,000 fighters. See „Pakistan: Timeline on Swat Valley 
turbulence‟11th February, 2009  http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82864 . Accessed 19th 
April, 2010.  
30
 On 10
th
 October, 2001 a fire broke out at GHQ Rawalpindi. Informed witnesses suggested to the 
author that it resulted from a failed attempt to seize GHQ by elements from within the military opposed 
to Musharraf.  
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across the border. Predictably, this step drew a strong reaction from the tribal militias across 
the tribal belt, particularly in the Mohmand agency where opposition to army deployment 
resulted in a series of battles in which the army eventually prevailed.31 Clans from within the 
Karlanri tribes of FATA had closely supported the Taliban regime, with the encouragement and 
assistance of the Pakistani military, and had offered refuge to fellow tribesmen who had been 
part of the Taliban regime and sought sanctuary in FATA after the fall of the Taliban was 
complete by December 2001 (Rashid 2008: 270). Particular among these tribes were the 
Waziri, Mehsud, Orakzai, and the Yusufzai tribes of northern FATA. Now the army had 
embarked upon a counter-policy, and was engaging in military action against the tribesmen. 
The impact upon the tribesmen of what they perceived as this betrayal by the army can easily 
be understated.  
As US political and military pressure upon Pakistan to curtail the autonomy of these tribes 
increased, the tribes increasingly began to define their autonomy in opposition to the 
imposition of the military presence of the Pakistani military across the tribal belt. By 2004, the 
insurgency in FATA had extended to all tribal agencies. The Karlanri tribes found themselves 
engaged in an insurgency against a superior military force in the form of the Pakistani military 
operating from the south and east, while to the north and west lay the US led NATO forces 
against whom the Karlanri were assisting in the insurgency.32  Consistent with long-term 
trends, the FATA tribes found themselves once more besieged from north and south, forcing 
them to rely on geography, military prowess, and the tactical depth afforded by strong 
support from within the Ghilzai to the north and west of FATA in Afghanistan to overcome 
these challenges. Within this geographical core began the resurgence of borderland autonomy 
from the Pakistani state.   
By 2006 the government of Pakistan had been forced to enter into a number of political 
agreements with tribal militias including conditions relating to the withdrawal of Pakistani 
forces from the concerned tribal agencies (Khan 2004: 64). Among the agencies in which such 
truces were concluded were South Waziristan and North Waziristan.33 The subsequent draw-
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 By June 2003, Frontier Corps detachments had successfully subdued militancy in Mohmand, a 
situation that lasted over a year.  See: „Analysis: Pakistan‟s army in the tribal areas‟ 25th June, 2003; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3020552.stm. Accessed 24
th
  January, 2011.  
32
 Kornstadt, Alan K. & Katzman, Kenneth Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border 
Region and US Policy Congressional Research Service, November, 2008; 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34763_20081121.pdf . Accessed 25
th
 January, 2011.  
33
 Three „cease fire‟ deals were arranged between the Pakistani military and the Taliban in the 
Waziristans. Firstly, in March 2004, Nek Muhammad Wazir of South Waziristan concluded a cease-
fire with the military which lasted for 2 months until his death. A follow-up agreement was concluded 
between the military and Baitullah Mehsud which appeared to last through 2006. A third deal was 
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down of Pakistani forces from these agencies only increased US pressure upon Pakistan to 
comply with US strategic demands which required sustained Pakistani military pressure on the 
Waziristans specifically.34 By the end of 2006, the US had begun to unilaterally strike targets of 
tactical value within the tribal belt with drone launched missiles.35 One particular strike at 
Chenagai in Bajaur agency in October 2006 targeting a madrassa and resulting in the deaths of 
80 students36 precipitated a strong tribal response within the agency, further fuelling the tribal 
insurgency and galvanising cross-tribal support for emerging elements such as the Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and aligned militant groups.  
Gaining in strength, these tribal militias, now amalgamating under the umbrella of the TTP, 
began to expand the areas under their influence until they were able to draw a following in all 
seven tribal agencies and through areas of northern KP populated by the Yusufzai.37 By 2008, 
the militancy fuelled by these tribal lashkars had spread to the Swat Valley, Dir district and 
Buner. Support for the insurgency was also high in the adjacent districts of Mansehra and 
Kohistan.38 Although the army has since reversed a significant amount of the gains made by 
insurgents in Swat, Buner, Dir and Shangla, resentment against the army continues to remain 
high in the area.39  
The Afghan borderland is thus the setting for an insurgency against the Pakistani state. This 
sense of siege on the part of tribesmen in the areas in which the army has launched major 
operations has served to further galvanise tribal identity in contrast and indeed in opposition 
                                                                                                                                                                      
concluded between the military and militants in North Waziristan in September 2006. The „Red 
Mosque‟ siege in August 2007 effectively terminated all deals between the Taliban and the Pakistani 
military.  
34Shahzad, Saleem „Pakistan: Hello Al-Qaeda, Goodbye America‟ Asia Times September 8, 2006; 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI08Df03.html . Accessed 26
th
  January, 2011.   
35
 In January 2006, a US drone-launched missile struck  a suspected al-Qaeda leader, killing 18 alleged 
civilians. See „US air raid outrages Pakistan press‟ 18th January, 2006; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4623688.stm. Accessed  26
th
 January, 2011. On October 
29th 2006, a US drone attack killed at least 80 madrassa students. See: „Pakistan madrassas raid kills 
80‟ 30th October, 2006; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6097636.stm . Accessed 21st April, 
2010. These were the highest profile US drone attacks to date, after which the frequency and lethality 
of such attacks increased. 
36See: „Rally condemns Pakistan air raid‟; 31st October, 2006;  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6101092.stm . Accessed 11
th
 January, 2011. 
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 For a detailed analysis of the spread of the militancy from FATA across KP see „Pakistan conflict 
map‟13th May, 2009; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8047504.stm . Accessed 11th 
January, 2011. 
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 See: „One Killed in Possible Suicide Blast‟17th August, 2010; 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?ld=21689 . Accessed  12
th
 April, 2010. 
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 Shahzad, Saleem „Pakistan wield a double-edged sword‟18th July, 2009; 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KG18Df03.html . Accessed 9
th
 January, 2011. 
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to the state, and specifically the leadership of the army.40 Although the insurgency has not yet 
articulated the desire for an independent borderland area, the divergence in identity between 
the borderlanders and those who identify with the Pakistani state manifests a deep contrast 
that does not evidence any signs of amelioration in the current context.   
3.6 The Ghilzai and the Karlanri as Strategic Factors 
3.6.1 The Ghilzai 
While the geographic reality of the Afghan borderland may have determined its role as a 
gateway from the sparse Central Asian highlands to the fertile plains of the Indian 
subcontinent, it is the inhabitants of the borderland that have transformed this gateway into 
an autonomous region lying beyond the writ of the polities existing on either side of the 
Suleiman Range. The structural nature of Pashtun tribalism, the autonomy of its constituent 
zai, and the martial predisposition of its clans, constitute a significant strategic reality. That 
reality is currently a major challenge to international efforts to stabilise the states of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The borderland thus represents the struggle between the state, 
with its internationally backed administrative and military capabilities, and tribal structures, 
driven by tribal ideology that is resistant to the imposition of state authority over tribal zai. 
Hence, as part of examining the strategic reality of the Afghan borderland historically and 
currently, this chapter will proceed to examine those elements of Pashtun tribal structures 
within the Afghan borderland that function as strategic drivers.  
The dominant tribal structure along the northern and western front of the Afghan borderland 
in south-central and south-eastern Afghanistan is the Ghilzai tribal confederation. Estimates of 
Afghanistan's population vary and no reliable state organised census has been conducted for 
decades making it very difficult to suggest the population of the Ghilzai with any degree of 
accuracy. However, statistics compiled during the years of Soviet occupation suggest that the 
population of the Ghilzai is around one quarter of the entire population in Afghanistan.41 This 
would place the population of the Ghilzai tribal confederation at around 4.5 million. The 
Ghilzai dominate the Afghan provinces of Zabul, Ghazni, Uruzgan, Wardak, Paktya  and are 
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 In an interview recorded on 6
th
 October 2009, and broadcast on the Pakistani satellite channel ARY 
in January 2010,  Hakimullah Mehsud, then leader of the TTP, stated the reason for his opposition to 
the Army was the acceding of the army to a US plan to dismember Pakistan. In the interview, Mehsud 
declared his defence of Pakistan but opposition to the army which had accepted a role as an extension 
of US policy.  
41
 This number is corroborated by the 2005 version of „Ethnologue:’ Languages of the World‟. See 
Gordon, Raymond G., Jr. (ed.), Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Fifteenth edition., SIL 
International, Dallas 2005; available at http://www.ethnologue.com/. Accessed 12
th
 April, 2010. 
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found in and around Kabul, Kandahar, as well as in Ghilzai settlements across northern and 
Western Afghanistan (Anderson 1979:14, 40-45). 
As with the Karlanri tribes, the Ghilzai are organised on the basis of kor, khel and qawm 
(Anderson 1979:192). In addition to these structures of organisation, there two additional 
factors that introduce a spatial element to kor, khel and qawm. These are the killi and zai. 
Where the kor tends to be constituted of an immediate family including parents, spouse or 
spouses, siblings, the spouses of siblings, children, the children of siblings, and any 
grandchildren, the killi consists of a collection of kor of close patrilineal association in a given 
locality. A grouping of killi will thus tend to originate from the same genealogical branch and 
belong to the same khel. The size of a khel varies significantly and may be limited to part of a 
killi or may extend to include dozens of killi. The aggregate of the space inhabited by the khel 
is its zai, while the larger zai of a qawm may be referred to as an atrap (Anderson 1979: 192, 
223).  
This structured spatial arrangement has maintained genealogically based hierarchical 
structures of authority, manifest in the khan, maliks and the sanctity of the jirga (Anderson 
1979: 192-200). Hence, from a social organisational perspective, the Ghilzai as a tribal society 
have evolved effective command and control structures making them well suited for martial 
enterprises (Alam 2008: vii-xi). Spread over a large and sparse terrain, the Ghilzai maintain a 
pastoral and nomadic tradition. The Ghilzai have historically resisted the domination of the 
Durrani over the Pashtun belt and have led a series of insurrections against Durrani authority 
over the previous two centuries (Dupree 1980: 418-419). The Durrani have in the past served 
as clients of the Safavid Persians, the Afsharid Persians and the British in Pakhtunkhwa and 
wider afield, thus periodically transcending the tribal role of being borderlanders by 
administrating and ruling polities to the north and west of the borderland. The Ghilzai, in 
contrast, have remained in a state of belligerence with any authority seeking to administer the 
wider atrap of the Ghilzai from without and thus, despite inhabiting territories that extend 
beyond the Suleiman range into central Afghanistan, are considered in this study to be 
borderlanders. This consideration is not solely on account of Ghilzai autonomy from and 
opposition to state authority. Indeed, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw members of the 
Ghilzai rise to prominent positions within the Afghan state and military.42 Also, in the three 
decades since, prominent Ghilzai have remained in key positions both within the Afghan 
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 M. Jamil Hanafi‟s entry in the Encyclopedia Iranica entitled „Gilzi or Galzi‟ identifies the rise to 
prominence of the Ghilzai in post-Zahir Shah Afghanistan. See : M. Jamil Hanafi „Gilzi or Galzi‟;  
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government and in opposition to it. Rather, the consideration of the Ghilzai as borderlanders is 
largely based upon their adherence to the tribal structure of socio-spatial organisation which, 
as a sub-state and indeed pre-state phenomenon, endures largely in opposition to attempts by 
the state to eclipse it through conventional statist structures. It is in lieu of these observations, 
and due to the size of the Ghilzai as a tribe, that in the dynamic of the borderland the Ghilzai 
occupy a central position. 
3.6.2 The Karlanri 
The areas populated by the Ghilzai are contiguous with the areas populated by the Karlanri 
tribes which lie predominantly to the South and East of the Durand line in the FATA region of 
Pakistan. In aggregate, the size of the Karlanri tribes approaches over 5 million.43 However, 
none of the constituent Karlanri tribes is considered among the larger Pashtun tribes on its 
own. Indeed, for genealogical classification purposes, the Karlanri are grouped together on 
account of the common genealogical origin from which many of their constituent clans are 
derived.44 The fact that they occupy a swathe of topographically challenging territory that lies 
along the Durand Line and is nominally administered by Pakistan forms another commonality 
between them. While their autonomy is at the same time collective and disparate, it is the 
differences between them that are the determining attribute of the Karlanri. These tribes are 
characterised by a near perpetual condition of feuding and a high degree of militancy along 
tribal bases. Confrontations between the Waziri and Mehsud tribes in South and North 
Waziristan are perhaps among the most prolific among the Karlanri, often resulting in dozens 
of fatalities from each of the periodic violent engagements that these tribes engage in.45  
Each of the principal tribes from among the Karlanri functions autonomously within the zai 
which they inhabit, and have done so for centuries, although the tribesmen themselves 
identify with the tribe and clan and not with a fixed territory per se, stating “Mung Apridai” or 
“Mizh Wazir” when prompted to describe identity (Khan 2007: 17). The Karlanri have 
remained ardently opposed to the imposition of any state authority over their territories, 
                                                          
43
 Pakistan‟s sixth national census, scheduled for 2008, has been delayed due to the emergent political 
situation in the country. 1998 figures suggest that the population of FATA was 5.7 million. See 
Rahimullah Yusufzai‟s  „Analysis: Pakistan‟s Tribal Areas‟14th December, 2001; 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1711316.stm . Accessed 21
st
 April 2010. 
44
 The genealogical origin of the Karlanri tribes is addressed in Chapter 2 of this study. It is important 
to point out that a number of clans are attributed an external origin. The Orakzai tribe, according to oral 
tradition, is of Persian origin, as is the Urmar.  
45
 In January 2008, the Mehsud and Waziri fought a protracted battle over the alleged trespass of a 
military convoy over Mehsud territory allegedly facilitated by the Waziri. This episode was extensively 
covered in the Pakistani press. See: „Mehsud-Wazir tension grows after power cut‟17th January, 2008; 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\01\17\story_17-1-2008_pg7_33 . 
Accessed 23
rd
 January, 2010. 
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whether revenue collection, conscription or administration (Khan 2007: 5), a characteristic 
very similar to that exhibited by the Ghilzai. This is one of a number of factors that has 
contributed to the development of strong links between the Ghilzai and the Karlanri tribes 
across the Durand Line. Another significant factor is that a number of Karlanri clans reside in 
territories spatially dominated by Ghilzai clans and vice versa. This is particularly observed in 
the South Waziristan agency, and the contiguous provinces of Paktia and Nangarhar, as well as 
in the Kurram valley.46 
Among the Ghilzai and Karlanri tribes there has developed a protocol of reciprocal assistance 
in times of conflict. Following the demarcation of the Durand line in 1893, the Pashtun belt 
shortly erupted into a pan-Pashtun insurgency ostensibly aimed at mitigating the border. 
Despite assurances from the Afghan Amir, Abdur Rahman, to the contrary, historical, military 
and intelligence sources suggest that the insurgency was supported in a significant manner by 
Ghilzai and other tribesmen, encouraged by the Afghan state, who were assisting their ethnic 
and tribal kin in their struggle against the foreign presence of the British military (Churchill 
2002: 25). Although the treaty of Rawalpindi appeared to put an end to the claims of the 
Afghan government over the then NWFP, these were re-instigated with the emergence of the 
new states of Pakistan and India in 1947. On a number of occasions since then, particularly in 
the early 1960s, tribesmen from Nangarhar, Paktia and further afield have moved en masse 
into FATA to assist in uprisings against attempts by the Pakistani state to impose its writ over 
FATA (Dupree 1980: 539-540). Thus, the Karlanri tribes had the support of their Ghilzai 
neighbours, as well as that of the Karlanri present on the Afghan side of the border, increasing 
their military strength in countering the imposition of state authority over FATA.  
Reciprocally, during the years of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, a mass migration of 
Ghilzai and other tribes moved between southern and eastern Afghanistan into FATA, where 
they took refuge from the Soviet occupation.47 The Pakistani authorities and the US were 
particularly interested in cultivating strong support among these Ghilzai tribesmen against the 
pro-Soviet regime in Kabul that had been constituted largely from Ghilzai Marxists (Dreyfuss 
                                                          
46
 Taken from a map charting the spatial distribution of tribes along the Durand Line. Available at  
http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/triballocations.jpg . Accessed 6
th
 February, 2010. 
47
 Although refugees entering Pakistan came from all across Afghanistan, the geographic proximity of 
the Ghilzai areas with the Durand Line, along with the fact that in the last few years of the insurgency 
much of the fighting occurred around Khost and Paktiya, determined that many of the refugees were 
Ghilzai. A significant number remained in FATA among related clans. Afghan refugees made up 25% 
of FATA‟s population by 1989. For a full assessment of the Afghan refugee presence in FATA see: 
Syed Minhajul Hassan „The Impact of Afghan Crisis on Federally Administered Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan‟ in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan Area Study Centre, Peshawar, December 
2004, pp. 131-38. 
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2005: 262,268). Prominent leaders from among the Afghan resistance were accommodated at 
Peshawar in then NWFP which came to function as the headquarters of the resistance against 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, co-ordinated from the Maktab al Khidamaat (office of 
services).48 In Peshawar, resistance groups recruited largely from both the Afghan refugees 
that had resettled en masse in FATA and NWFP, and also from Karlanri tribal fighters. The 
effect upon tribal dynamics of these developments was to further galvanise the relationships 
between the Karlanri tribes and the Ghilzai in Afghanistan. 
When the Taliban emerged from Kandahar via Quetta to harness pan-Pashtun sentiment 
across the Pashtun belt, the militia relied heavily upon support for its cause from among the 
Pashtuns who had come from the tribal areas of Pakistan as well as those who had been 
recruited in Pakistan, but were originally either Ghilzai or Durrani now studying in madrassas 
in Pakistan (Rashid 2001: 31-33). Through this process of recruitment the Taliban militia was 
able to form a Ghilzai-Karlanri organisation that developed into a  pan-Pashtun organisation, a 
feature that was reflected in its 10 men Rahbari shura (Giustozzi 2007: 47, Rashid 2001: 98). 
This pan-Pashtun phenomenon saw the successful expansion of the domain controlled by the 
Taliban until it included most of Afghanistan, short of the Panjsher Valley which remained a 
Tajik strong hold. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The postcolonial state in Asia has been built over indigenous substructures which are in turn a 
function of primary geographic, ethno-linguistic and tribal realities. Prior to colonialism, under 
Ottoman and Qajar transnational authority, these substructures were the basis of de jure or de 
facto administrative and executive configurations. The territorial contours and institutional 
arrangement of the subsequent postcolonial state however, have created incongruities 
between it and these underlying substructures over which it is imposed. The postcolonial state 
seeks to suppress, reform or accommodate these substructures into the state enterprise. 
The geographic, ethno-linguistic and tribal reality of the Afghan borderland has functioned to 
prevent its assimilation with the Pakistani and Afghan states. This physical reality of the 
borderland is the setting of, and a formative contributant to, the psycho-social reality of the 
borderlanders which includes the clearly defined segmentary, patrilineal structures of 
                                                          
48
 The Maktab al Khidamaat (MAK) or „office of services‟ functioned in Peshawar from the early 
1980s until the assassination of its founder Abdullah Azzam in 1989. Although senior CIA officials 
state that the agency did not create or run the office, informed sources suggest that the CIA facilitated 
the financing and recruitment which the maktab carried out. See (Scheuer 2002: 41).  
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organisation that are the Pashtun tribes; the ideational framework of pashtunwali and its 
ubiquitous and demanding edicts; the autonomy of the zai; and the reliance on tribal jirgas for 
adjudication and decision making. The combination of these physical and psycho-social factors 
results in an enduring borderland identity amongst the Pashtun tribes that precedes the 
postcolonial state, and forms an underlying substructure that has manifest itself in the Hotaki, 
Qajar, Durrani and Mughal polities that have existed at various periods around the Afghan 
borderland over the last millennium. 
Hence, the Afghan borderland has not been created by the imposition of the postcolonial 
states of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Rather, the Afghan borderland is an enduring product of 
primary physical and psycho-social elements that have been shaped by successive waves of 
migration and invasion across the borderland and the larger historical domain of 
Pakhtunkhwa, the main processes of which are recorded in an historiography dating back over 
a millennium.  
For periods of its history the Afghan borderland has been subsumed by a single, trans-
borderland polity as in the cases of Gandhara between the first and fifth centuries C.E., the 
Ghaznavids in the twelfth century C.E., and in the example of the Durrani state in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries C.E.. Outside these periods however, the Afghan 
borderland has retained its autonomy and its role as a strategic buffer between polities 
established on the plains of India and those established in the central highlands of present-day 
Afghanistan. 
 This geo-political constant was formalised in the resolution to the strategic contest between 
Britain and Russia through the nineteenth century, as the contours of the state of Afghanistan 
which emerged as a strategic buffer between the Asian domains of the two European powers. 
These contours were primarily strategic considerations largely disregarding the socio-political 
Pashtun substructure across the borderland and the wider Pakhtunkhwa region resulting in 
the demarcation of the Durand Line through Karlanri and Ghilzai territory.  
The withdrawal of the British from India and the creation of Pakistan introduced the Afghan 
borderland to a new strategic formulation shaped by the Eisenhower doctrine. Strategic 
competition between the USSR and the US saw the United States attempt to encircle and limit 
the expansion of the Soviet Union beyond Central Asia, culminating in the US assisted reversal 
of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan by 1989. 
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The withdrawal of Soviet forces left the Afghan state and the borderland, which had been 
transformed to a strategic support point for the anti-Soviet mujahideen, in the condition of 
political vacuum. This vacuum has seen resurgence in the primacy of tribal authority, power, 
and legitimacy in the borderland which now constitutes the central challenge faced by 
Pakistan and Afghanistan in attempts to diminish and assimilate the borderland.  
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4 Borderless Borderland 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature on borderlands explores interdependencies between communities in contiguous 
sovereign states which can erode the exclusivity of the role of the state as the determinant of 
identity, and in cases where the state faces a crisis of legitimacy, the exclusivity of authority, 
power and legitimacy enjoyed by the state. Cross-border interdependencies generate 
elements of identity characterised by degrees of exclusion or autonomy from the state, often 
precipitated by the structure of economic flows in cross-border interdependent communities. 
This is particularly the case where state policy diverges from economic and social interests as 
perceived by the cross-border community.  
 
Such an analysis is contingent upon the international border functioning as a barrier to 
unrestricted movement between contiguous communities in neighbouring states. The 
borderland, in such analyses, emerges as territorial zone around the border, its expanse 
varying considerably from case to case, in which communities are impacted by the structure of 
cross-border flows, both regulated and unregulated.  
 
This perspective reflects the conventional treatment of borderlands in a European context 
offered by Wilson, O’Dowd and Anderson (2003) where borderlands are analysed as emerging 
as a function of international borders and the state. In the context of Asia, however, the 
challenge of borderlands takes on a more compound characteristic. Postcolonial states 
erected over primary, underlying substructures experience crises arising from incongruities 
between the contours of the postcolonial state, and of these underlying substructures. 
Borders between postcolonial states reflect the imposition of international boundaries across 
territory and populations identifying with enduring pre-state substructures arising from ethno-
linguistic identity, tribal identity, spatial identity and/or ideational identity. This brings the 
border, and the state which it delimits, into direct competition with these pre-state forms of 
identity and, in cases, polity. Hence, in Asia, borderlands represent competition between 
enduring pre-state identities and polities carried by populations as psycho-social phenomena, 
and identities and polities created and enforced by the postcolonial process.  
   
Pakhtunkhwa is a territorial substructure underlying significant parts of the states of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. Within Pakhtunkhwa, the Afghan borderland is the territory of primarily the 
Karlanri and Ghilzai tribes, organised into tribal polities that generate the borderland’s 
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autonomy from the state. The characteristics of the Afghan borderland, as they relate to 
identity, autonomy, tribal polity, economic flows, social structures and the diminishing role of 
the state, result not so much from the impact of the Durand Line as an international boundary 
running between and through tribes that are patrilineally and territorially related, as they do 
from the competition between the autonomous tribes concentrated in and around FATA, and 
the Pakistani state. Indeed, this study considers the Durand Line as a non-border with 
negligible effect in separating the populations on either side of it.  
 
This chapter quantifies the nature and scale of cross-border inter-tribal dynamics. The chapter 
explores the impact of the Durand Line on identity among the Pashtuns, its physical geography 
and ethnography, jirga as an inter-tribal and cross border political process, the structure of 
cross-border economic flows, and patterns of cross-border social interdependencies looking at 
patterns of cross-border marriage. Through this, the chapter constructs an understanding of 
the dynamics of inter-tribal cross-border interaction as a manifestation of the organic 
elements of the substructure of Pakhtunkhwa, and in doing so identifies driving factors behind 
tribal autonomy and its re-ascendancy through competition with the postcolonial state.  
4.2 The Durand Line and Identity 
Within the field of International relations, identity is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. This is 
evident in Asia, where the postcolonial state competes with pre-colonial substructures for 
legitimacy, authority and identity. The Afghan borderland represents the complex of identity 
in Asia, through competition in the borderland between sub-state, tribally based identities and 
identity associated with the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This identity complex is 
manifest, for example, in the continued insistence on tribal identity and autonomy amongst 
the Afridi of Khyber who, at the same time, insist they are part of Pakistan.1 The fact that 
Pakistan supplies intermittent electricity free of charge to the Khyber Agency undoubtedly 
influences the tribesmen’s declaration of Pakistaniat,2 but this Pakistaniat amongst the Afridi 
appears relative to the degree of affiliation with the Afghan state, which happens to be an 
even more distant source of identity among the Afridi at the eastern mouth of the Khyber pass 
than at the western, where Pakistaniat is far reduced. This study finds that within the larger 
identity of Pashtun, there are a multitude of identities which are a function of tribe, zai and 
                                                          
1
 Discussions of the author with unnamed Afridi tribesmen on 16
th
, 24
th
 August 2008, in the vicinity of 
the eastern opening of the Khyber Pass. The security conditions were not conducive to the conduct of a 
formal interview. 
2
 An Urdu expression where the suffix iat connotes the degree of the condition of the phenomenon 
preceding the suffix. Common iterations in urdu discourse include Islamiat, Kashmiriat, Pakistaniat. 
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geography. Pashtunwali functions as an important source of identity for tribesmen, as does 
the geography of the borderland and its historical role as a northern delimiter on the extent of 
influence of successive polities arising in the Indus Valley. The topography of the borderland 
and nature of its potent tribalism continue to be the principal determinants of identity in the 
borderland, and significant contributants to its political and military autonomy, and the 
character of economic flows across it.3  
4.2.1 The borderland and identity 
With non-static parameters, the Afghan borderland is a political condition arising within the 
geographical context of the Suleiman Range and the surrounding territories. The borderland’s 
most salient characteristic is its enduring autonomy from polities adjoining it, a condition 
significantly afforded by the nature of the physical terrain within which the borderland lies 
which, for centuries, has constituted a prohibitive obstacle to invading armies. The political 
condition of the borderland is not exclusively a result of its geography, although the geography 
is a principal component of it. Rather, the political condition arises from the human experience 
within this geographic context. The human experience manifests in the individual and 
collective behaviour of the borderlanders, which itself is determined by their psycho-social 
orientation. Tribal Pashtun conceptions of the collective atrap as a borderland which are 
founded on the ideational framework of pashtunwali constitute the underlying construct of 
the psycho-social reality of the borderlanders. This reality has been reinforced through 
centuries of existence as borderlanders and forms the basis of the pre-state and now sub-state 
conceptual schema of identity that characterises the inhabitants of the Afghan borderland.  
 
It has been suggested that the psycho-social condition of the borderlanders is itself a result of 
the physical geography of the borderland (Khan 2008: 3), where competition over sparse 
resources has led to the development of acute martial qualities among tribes, both 
organisationally and culturally. However, arriving at a judgement on the causal relationship 
between the physical environment and the psycho-social condition of its population is outside 
the scope of this study. This study proceeds upon the understanding that the political 
condition that is the borderland is resultant from both geography and the psycho-social 
orientation of the borderlanders. As such, tribal Pashtun perceptions of identity within the 
context of the borderland constitute a significant driving factor of the borderland dynamic. 
  
                                                          
3
 The Afghan Transit Trade and the legally marginalised economy emergent around it are treated 
extensively in this chapter.  
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This understanding can be expanded to an exploration of the multi-dimensional concept of 
identity. Among the multiple contributors to the formation of identity is territoriality, and 
more specifically the physical nature of the territory within which a specific community 
resides. Mountain dwellers in harsh and sparse environments will invariably evolve a lifestyle 
that varies from that among pastoral communities in fertile areas. Hence, in the Afghan 
borderland there is a variance in identity between the pastoral communities of Swat and 
Mansehra, and those communities in the arid and rugged mountains of South Waziristan. Both 
communities adhere to pashtunwali and consider themselves part of the larger Pashtun 
genealogical family, but each has evolved specific communal traits reflecting the lifestyle that 
is shaped by the physical environment of each. Hence, the inhabitants of Swat and Mansehra 
exhibit territoriality on a kor scale due to the centrality of agricultural land in the economic life 
of the community.4 The Wazir, in contrast, have developed a culture of opportunistic raiding 
and clan-based militancy given the scarcity of agricultural land.5 Territoriality among the Wazir 
is experienced on the level of khel and qawm, while the kor derives its status not from its own 
capacity to generate economic activity, but from the manpower and material strength it can 
provide to the khel.6 Thus it is established that within the borderland, there is a variance in 
identity among borderlanders derived, to a significant degree, from variation in the physical 
environment across the borderland. There are, however, important similarities in identity 
among borderlanders. 
 
The Afghan borderland occurs within a tribally differentiated, ethno-linguistic domain, the 
foundation of which is the Pashtun genealogical shajara and the normative precepts of 
pashtunwali. The territorialisation of this identity has historically taken the form of 
Pakhtunkhwa, a region that encompasses the Afghan borderland and a larger surrounding 
area reaching into Afghanistan and Pakistan that includes KP, western Baluchistan, Helmand, 
Kandahar, Zabul, Ghazni, Uruzgan, Logar, Nangarhar, Paktiya (including Khost and Paktika).7 
The Pashto language, pashtunwali, the Pashtun shajara and the territorialisation of these 
facets of identity contribute to the formation of a Pashtun identity which the inhabitants of 
                                                          
4
 Frederick Barth ( 1959: 44-46) treats the impact of ownership of agricultural land upon Swat 
Pashtuns, including the Swati Wesh system.  
5
 ‘Tribes and Castes in Bannu’ Gazetteer of the Bannu District, 1887. 
http://www.khyber.org/publications/031-035/tribescastesinbannu.shtm#Waziris . Accessed 8th January, 
2011.   
6
 Interview with NCO-A, upper Pakhli KP 3
rd
 September, 2008. 
7
 Khost and Paktika are administrative provinces, formed in 2004 from the province of Paktiya as part 
of an administrative reconfiguration. Paktiya province continues to exist as a smaller province. 
Appendix IX shows a rendition of the territorial extent of Pakhtunkhwa.   
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the borderland and the larger surrounding areas of Pakhtunkhwa manifest, albeit to varying 
degrees. 
 
In contrast, the borderland identity is not synonymous with the identity of Pashtun or of 
Pakhtunkhwa. The presence and exclusive authority of the states of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
is evident in significant parts of Pakhtunkhwa. Inhabitants of Kabul, Peshawar, Charsadda, 
Mardan and Mansehra have historically manifested the identities associated with the states in 
which each of these cities is located. In contrast, the borderland identity manifests autonomy 
from both states. The territorialisation of this identity largely corresponds with FATA and the 
contiguous areas of Afghanistan. These areas derive their autonomy from being able to sustain 
trans-border familial, economic, military and tribal links contrary to the attempts by the 
Pakistani state to enforce the border, an enterprise now pursued only nominally by the 
Pakistani government. 
4.2.2 Pashtun perceptions of the Durand Line 
Perceptions of the Durand Line constitute an important theme in Pashtun written culture and 
oral tradition. Judgements of its validity or lack thereof, inform debates over identity, 
authority and loyalty across the Pashtun belt. Treatment of the historical experience of the 
Durand Line in Pashtun culture illustrates a number of themes within the Pashtun identity, and 
more specifically of the borderlander identity within the larger identity of Pashtun. The ability 
of the FATA tribes to continue to cross the border as needed reinforces their identity as 
borderlanders, while the sequence of migrations across the border, largely from Afghanistan 
into FATA and KP in times of escalating violence in Afghanistan, and the associated cross-
border flow of trade and goods, reinforces a trans-border and pan-Pashtun identity among 
borderlanders, which can contrast with identity associated with the state within the larger 
identity of Pashtun. 
 
Within Pashtun perceptions of the Durand Line, there are elements upon which judgements 
are largely uniform, and aspects over which there is a marked variance. Regarding the actuality 
of the Durand Line, in so far as its effectiveness as a barrier separating the Pashtun 
populations of Pakistan and Afghanistan is concerned, judgements across the borderland and 
across Pakhtunkhwa are widely uniform over the fact that the Durand Line is largely 
ineffective as a barrier separating the Pashtun populations on either side of the border.8 This 
                                                          
8
 Field work in KP and FATA in 2000-2002 and July-September 2008 revealed, through a wide range 
of interviews, observations and dialogue, the practically unanimous judgement that the Durand Line 
was ineffective as a barrier separating the population of Pakistan from Afghanistan. Observations made 
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widespread judgement is derived from a number of principal factors including the physical 
geography of the border region, the ethnographic and economic realities of the populations 
that live along it, the reality of the tribal institution of the jirga which is practiced across the 
border, and by the political realities on the level of state and province that indeed both reflect 
and contribute to perpetuating the status quo of the non-border.  
 
However, in answer to the question of whether or not the border should exist, there is a 
marked difference of views. The position of the Afghan state and the intelligentsia in 
Afghanistan has historically revolved around the position that the border of Pakhtunkhwa 
should fall between the Pashtuns, including all of the Pashtuns of KP, and the other ethnicities 
which comprise Pakistan.9 This notion of greater Pakhtunkhwa includes the Pashtun cultural 
and historical centres of Charsadda, Swabi, Swat and other areas lying on the east bank of the 
Indus River within Pakistan’s KP. For this group of people, the Durand Line as a border is 
unacceptable. Various alternative boundaries have been suggested by proponents of this view, 
including the Indus River, KP’s boundary with Punjab province, and even KP’s Punjab boundary 
along with Baluchistan’s Punjab boundary.10  
 
The counter-opinion, most commonly found among Pashtuns within the Pakistani 
administration as well as among the intelligentsia in Pakistan, is that the border is a political 
and strategic necessity, the legitimacy of which has been established through international law 
and international conventions.11  Proponents of this perspective also cite the fact that 
Afghanistan is an ethnically heterogeneous state and as such does not represent the political 
aspirations of the Pashtuns. Pakistan’s KP province remains, according to this perspective, the 
historical and cultural centre of the Pashtuns, containing the political and cultural centres of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
by the author in both periods, revealed the extent of cross border movement through the main crossing 
points, reinforcing the validity of this judgement. This judgement is not countered in any academic 
publication. 
9
 For example, after coming to power in 1973, Daoud sent a letter to UN Sec. Gen. Kurt Waldheim 
informing him that Afghanistan did not consider interference in NWFP and Baluchistan as meddling in 
the affairs of a sovereign state as those provinces belonged to Afghanistan ( Marwat 1991: 67). 
10
 Pashtun nationalists generally fall into three categories: Those who seek  FATA and KP integrated 
into a greater Afghanistan; those who seek an independent Pashtunistan  carved out of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; those who had sought autonomy for the former NWFP within the Pakistani Federation, 
changing the name of NWFP to „Pakhtunkhwa‟. The government of Afghanistan has historically 
affiliated itself with the first group while the third group, largely represented by the ANP, is the main 
political force behind the name change from NWFP to KP in April 2010. The independent 
Pashtunistan movement reached a peak in activity prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and is 
widely considered to have been a proxy for Soviet intervention in Pakistan.    
11
 The position of Pakistan on the legitimacy of the border is derived from article 11 of the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.  Article 11 determines that successor states 
be bound by international borders agreed to by treaty. See The Durand Line Border Agreement 1893, 
Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2005  pp. 10, 20,21. 
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Peshawar, Swat, Swabi and Charsadda. This perspective has been the driving force behind a 
number of attempts to rename Pakistan’s former NWFP with a name reflecting its centrality to 
the Pashtun identity. During the 1980’s, the name Pakhtunkhwa was raised as an alternative 
to NWFP, but rejected by then President Zia-ul-Haq on account of its being perceived as 
nationalist and secessionist by the Punjab-dominated military.12 After joining the government 
in the summer of 2008 as a coalition partner, the nationalist ANP proposed a name change 
from NWFP to Pakhtunkhwa. As a member of the PPP led government, the ANP demand 
carried much more political weight than previous attempts at a name change and on 15th April, 
2010 the Zardari government ratified an amendment to the Pakistani constitution instituting 
the name change.13 NWFP became Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, an idiom indicating the province was 
not a new rendition of historical Pakhtunkhwa, but referred instead to the territory of 
Pakhtunkhwa historically associated with Khyber, including the Peshawar valley and the 
surrounding areas.   
 
Identity remains a compound phenomenon across Pakhtunkhwa. Within the larger identity of 
Pashtun, there are often conflicting identities associated with tribes, territory, environment, 
and the Pakistani and Afghan states. Amid this variance, there is a clearly perceptible identity 
of Pashtun which constitutes the foundation of the substructure of Pakhtunkhwa. Within the 
larger identity of Pashtun, there is a clearly discernable identity among borderlanders. This 
borderland identity results from the dynamics of cross-border movements in the areas of 
economic flows, jirga and tribal politics and militancy, and social interdependencies and 
marriage. It is also a product of the geography and ethnography of the borderland, which 
constitute significant challenges to the state in asserting its authority upon the borderland. 
4.3 The Physical Geography and Ethnography of the Durand Line 
4.3.1 Physical geography 
The tribes of the Afghan borderland demonstrate organisation, territorialisation, militancy and 
ideational vitality, factors which are the basis of a resurgence of tribal autonomy in the 
borderland. However, these factors alone are not in themselves the chief causes for the lack of 
success of the state in mitigating tribal autonomy and authority in the borderland. The 
geography and topography, within which this tribal dynamic unfolds, determine that the 
                                                          
12
 Taizai, Sher Zaman „A Matter of Identity‟ (unpublished) 2003; 
http://www.khyber.org/articles/2003/MatterofIdentity.shtml Accessed 5th January, 2011.   
13
 „NWFP officially renamed as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’ 15th April, 2010; 
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/07-senate-begins-
voting-on-18th-amendment-ha-02 . Accessed 9
th
 January 2011.  
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effective imposition of the Durand Line as an international border will constitute a 
considerable challenge to the state and its partners indefinitely, as will the surrounding 
borderland that extends across the same environment. 
  
The physical geography of the border traverses some of the most severe features in the 
region. From its northern origin where the boundaries of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan 
meet in Pamir Range, the first 250 KM of the Durand Line forms the southern boundary of the 
Wakhan corridor, traversing the Pamir Range where some peaks reach a height of 20,000 ft.14 
By Dir, a further 150 KM south, the mountains have reduced in height to closer to 10,000 ft, 
and are thickly forested with conifers, with an increasing population concentration. As the line 
reaches the northern agencies of FATA, the mountains along its path reduce further in height 
to around 4000 ft, but are increasingly rugged and arid.15 This remains the dominant feature 
for the next 400 KM until the Waziristans, where again the height of the mountains increases 
as does the aridity and ruggedness of the terrain to where, by South Waziristan, the border 
reaches the heart of the Suleiman range, a particularly arid and rugged mountain range given 
to temperature and topographical extremes. Consequently, the physical geography through 
which the Durand Line is drawn has been a prohibitive factor to the efforts of both Pakistan 
and Afghanistan to control movement across the border, and constitutes a very significant 
obstacle to the effectiveness of military operations.16   
 
Historically, northern invading armies have crossed this mountainous barrier into the Indus 
Valley through the Khyber Pass in the north and the Bolan Pass in the south (Caroe 1958: 48-
52). The Khyber Pass today lies along Highway N5, and transects the Durand Line at Torkham, 
a major border crossing point on the route from Peshawar to Jalalabad. The main route 
through the Bolan Pass is Highway N25, linking Quetta with Kandahar. The Chamman crossing 
point lies on this route, just south of Spin Boldak in Afghanistan. These border crossings are 
traversed by a near constant flow of civilian traffic largely composed of passenger cars, buses, 
coaches as well as trucks transporting the immense variety of goods that is the Afghan Transit 
Trade.17  
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 The distances and elevations are taken from the  1993 „Survey of  Pakistan’ produced in map form by 
the Survey of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, Punjab under the direction of Major General Jamil Ur Rahman 
Afridi, Surveyor General of Pakistan.  
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Physical observations conducted by the author along the tribal belt in August 2008 included a low 
altitude aerial survey of the Peshawar Valley and Khyber Pass. 
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 Firoz Khan Afridi „Pakistan Intelligence Officials believe Bin Laden Moving in Rugged Border 
Terrain‟1st October, 2005; http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2005/10/pakistan-intelligence-officials.html 
. Accessed 9
th
 April 2010.  This is an often repeated observation among NATO military officials.  
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 Observations made by the author between Nov-Dec. 2000,  Jan 2002,  and July-Sept. 2008. 
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The crossing points are manned on each side by border authorities. However, the de facto 
procedure of crossing the border is that any checking for documents is partial, largely 
unobtrusive and superficial. 18  Travel documents, while required officially by both 
governments, are as a matter of fact not required to cross the border. Approximately 1.2% of 
travellers crossing the border were stopped, asked for identification and recorded on a given 
day in November 2008.19 These individuals were predominantly of Hazara origin.20 A number 
of these reported successfully crossing the border with no form of identification. Pashtun 
travellers are almost exclusively not checked for documentation.21  An identity card from 
either state, or a confirmation of refugee status by the UNHCR in the form of an identification 
card to that effect suffice as documents establishing the identity of the traveller.22 These are 
easily available at the various kar khano markets surrounding Peshawar and in various bazaars 
in the city.23 Alternatively, a signed document from the local police station in Pakistan 
attesting the identity of the traveller suffices. Hindrance to the crossing of the border, where it 
arises, usually results from the interference of corrupt elements of the state authorities.24 
Both Afghan and Pakistani authorities are notorious for this, and intimidation in order to 
extract a bribe is widely anticipated as a norm among travellers. The lack of any rigorous 
control procedure is only eclipsed by the occasional absence of control procedures altogether, 
where cross-border traffic is not interrupted at all for the verification of travel documents.25  
 
A major factor contributing to the relatively unobtrusive border control procedures is the 
existence of hundreds of routes in the form of unpaved roads, trails and passes that lead 
across the border. Raverty (1867: vii), while serving with British forces in Afghanistan, placed 
the number of passes through the Suleiman range (before the demarcation of the border) at 
over 1700. This number has since only increased with the emergence of villages and small 
towns in proximity to the border, and the desire by smugglers to continually seek out 
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  Interview with Muhammad Shakeel, University of Peshawar, 16
th
 August 2008. Confirmed through 
observation by the author through August 2008.    
19
 Study on Cross-Border Population Movements Between Afghanistan and Pakistan UNHCR and 
Altain Consulting, Kabul, June 2009,  p.20. 
20
 Ibid.p.5 
21
 Study on Cross-Border Population Movements Between Afghanistan and Pakistan UNHCR and 
Altain Consulting, Kabul, June 2009,  p. 5. 
22
 Interview held in Saddar, Peshawar with Muhammad Tariq, former regional manager for KP and 
southern Afghanistan for a major private goods distributor, 24
th
 August, 2008.    
23
 Observed by the author in Peshawar, January-March 2000, November-December 2000, January 
2002.   
24
 Study on Cross-Border Population Movements Between Afghanistan and Pakistan UNHCR and 
Altain Consulting, Kabul,  June 2009  p.21. 
25
 Ibid.  
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previously unknown routes. These routes often pass through territory under dispute between 
tribes, while others remain the exclusive preserve of certain tribes. For example, the Afridi 
remain the patriarchs of the corollary routes that pass through the Khyber agency,26 while the 
Utmanzai Wazir remain the dominant force around the routes linking South Waziristan with 
Paktiya province in Afghanistan.27 
 
Routes across the border that connect minor roads on both sides number in the dozens, 
linking towns and major villages that lie in proximity to the border. The greatest 
concentrations of cross border-roads are found in the Kurram Agency, connecting the agency 
with Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province to the north and Pakitya province to the southwest, 
linking the strategically important towns of Parachinar in Kurram and Khost.28 North and South 
Waziristan are comparably interlinked with Paktiya, Paktika and Khost through a network of 
smaller roads. These roads are occasionally manned by military check-posts, which sometimes 
carry out obtrusive searches. By and large, however, transit through this road network is 
unimpeded.29 
 
Beyond this there is the reality that communities, and in some case families, find their homes, 
schools, businesses and mosques on different sides of the Durand Line. In Goshta, Nangarhar 
there is a well known situation where a father and son live on different sides of the Durand 
Line, and traverse it numerous times daily in common social interaction. 30 This is worthy of 
note because between Khyber and Nangarhar, the border is relatively perceptible due to the 
visibility of border control personnel and markers. This is in contrast to the situation along 
most of its length where the precise location of the border cannot be determined without 
reference to satellite assisted technology, a fact reflected in the observation that few 
borderlanders actually know the precise location of the border.31 This has resulted in, for 
example, schools and madrassas being attended by students from across the border. In some 
cases residential compounds find themselves divided by the border where the residential 
structure is divided from animal sheds or seeded land by the border.32 
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4.3.2  Ethnography 
The ethnographic reality of the ‘Zero Line’ as the Durand Line is also known, is that it borders 
certain ethnic groups and divides others. At its northern stretch along the Pamir Range, the 
line runs through a sparse ethnic Tajik population residing in Wakhan and Gilgit. The Wakhan 
corridor, which separates Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan from Tajikistan by as little as 23 KM at 
some points, functions as a strategic buffer and indeed was designed as such by the Durand 
commission (Sykes 1926: 213). However, as Magnus and Nagy (1998: 84) point out, the cross-
border cultural and economic links between Wakhan and Gilgit-Baltistan are strong, despite 
the extreme environment. 
  
Forming the eastern boundary of Afghanistan’s Tajik dominated Badakhshan province, the line 
then reaches the Nuristani areas of Kunar province, approximately 250 KM from its point of 
origin. Here the line divides the western Nuristani population, concentrated in Afghanistan’s 
Kunar province, and the Kalash people of Pakistan’s Chitral agency who are also a Nuristani 
race (Dupree 1980: 12-19). Whereas the centre of the Nuristani population is concentrated 
west of the Peeh River, Nuristani settlements can be found reaching up to the border area. 
The Kalash however, are largely confined to Pakistan’s Chitral agency (Ali and Rehman 2001: 
154-58).  
 
For the next 1000 KM, the line bisects the tribal Pashtun population who inhabit southern 
Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. The tribes present on both sides of the border function 
as largely autonomous centres of political and military authority, yet are closely linked through 
the reality that their status of autonomy is a commonly held virtue that, if compromised on by 
one tribe or region within the tribal belt on either side of the border, can compromise 
autonomy across the entire tribal belt. Hence, tribes have a common interest in the autonomy 
of all tribes, even though at any given time each maybe in a state of belligerence with one or 
more of the others.  
 
An aspect arising from the autonomous nature of these tribes is that they regard the 
sovereignty of the Pakistani and Afghan states in a relative context. While both states do 
exercise limited authority over the tribes present on the respective side of the border of 
each,33 neither has been able to decisively establish the writ of authority of the state over the 
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 The Pakistani government appoints a Political Agent for each of the seven tribal agencies who holds 
nominal authority over the agency and is responsible for the implementation of the Frontier Crimes 
Regulation (FCR) under which clans have the authority to enact judicial judgements in accordance with 
jirga and pashtunwali edicts ( Ali and Rahman 2001: 52-55). 
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tribes on their respective side. As such, the tribes divided by the border maintain their tribal 
relationships largely disregarding the border. The tribes populating the six tribal agencies 
(excluding the Orakzai agency which is separated from the border by the Kurram agency) that 
lie along the border continue their close associations, trade and movements among related 
tribes in Afghanistan across the line largely unhindered.34  
 
Where clans are bisected by the Durand Line, the frequency of cross-border linkages among 
households divided by the line is found to be higher than in other areas, as is to be expected. 
However, there are also ideational and political drivers of cross-border movements. In 
Mohmand and South Waziristan, for example, the Durand Line isn’t acknowledged at all, 
neither as an existential nor practical political factor. Indeed, in Mohmand the Durand Line 
remains un-demarcated.35 Hence, in the perception of the tribal Pashtuns in Mohmand and 
South Waziristan, cross-border movement isn’t considered cross-border by these tribes 
because the border doesn’t exist in their zai.36 This is a distinct proposition from crossing the 
border unimpeded, as it reflects an ideationally based rejection of the authority of the 
Pakistani and Afghan states to demarcate a border through the tribal zai, a manifestation of 
the degree of autonomy which the tribes within these agencies claim.37  
  
A further aspect of the ethnographic reality of borderlanders that challenges the effectiveness 
of the Durand Line as a border is the migratory style of the Kuchi or Powindah tribes. The 
Powindah are a cultural icon among the tribal Pashtuns and embody, within the Pashtun 
psyche, the sense of freedom and self-reliance that Pashtuns aspire to.38 These tribes migrate 
seasonally every winter from south and central Afghanistan to the Gomal River Valley in the 
South Waziristan Agency in FATA and Tank districts in KP, where they remain until the spring. 
Here the Pakistani government has designated land on which they graze their livestock. Akbar 
Ahmed (1982: 171-182) points out that, in the case of these Powindah, largely from the 
Suleiman Khel of the Ghilzai and the Dotani of the Lodhi, their migratory patterns and lifestyle 
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 Interview with Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan, Director, Area Study Centre, Peshawar University, 5
th
 August  
2008. 
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 Interview with Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan, Director, Area Study Centre, Peshawar University, 5
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are maintained as a deliberate political decision wherein they seek to maintain a lifestyle 
independent from the confines of and obligations to either the Pakistani or Afghan state. 
Hence, the Powindah trans-border lifestyle is described as determined  not solely by ecology, 
but increasingly by ideology, and by political cognizance (Ahmed 1982: 174). The numbers of 
Powindah who actually migrate seasonally are gradually decreasing as families increasingly 
adopt a sedentary lifestyle, establishing homesteads along the Gomal River valley with the 
permission of the Utmanzai Wazirs and the Ahmedzai in South Waziristan. However, the 
numbers of migratory Powindah remain significant. Statistics dating from before the Soviet 
invasion place the number of migratory families at around 1000 among the Dotani with a 
slightly less number of Suleiman Khel (Ahmed 1982: 180). Despite opportunities availed by 
many Powindahs to earn money as labourers in the Gulf states since, the number of migratory 
Powindah remains in the region of 10,000.39 The unobstructed seasonal movement of 
Powindah across the Durand Line underscores its ineffectiveness as an international boundary. 
The significant position of the Powindah within Pashtun tribal society deems their cross-
border migrations as exemplary, reinforcing perceptions of an integral nature of Pakhtunkhwa 
across the Durand Line. 
 
Thus the physical geography and ethnography of the Afghan borderland determine that it is a 
region through which an international boundary will remain ineffective in separating the 
populations on either side of it. Topographical extremes, cross-border ethno-linguistic 
communities, tribal structures and vibrant ideational precepts all function to distance the 
borderland from the state, enhancing the profile of its autonomy. A salient feature of the 
capacity of the Pashtun tribes to sustain and enhance the profile of their autonomy from the 
state is the process of jirga. 
4.4 Jirga 
4.4.1 Jirga as tribal politics 
If the tribe and its zai represent the social and territorial elements of autonomy in the Afghan 
borderland, the jirga is the political modality through which tribal autonomy and authority are 
expressed. Participation in and contribution to the jirga process is the medium through which 
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 Post-Soviet statistics on the movement of Powindahs are yet to be compiled by either the Ministry of 
Tribal Affairs in Afghanistan or the Pakistani government. However, observations of Powindah 
migration were made on a number of occasions between January 2000 and September 2008. By 
estimating their relative number in Peshawar and surrounding municipalities, and through 
conversations with them, this study estimates their number at around 10,000. This only includes those 
who do not settle temporarily in refugee camps such as Jalozai (since closed), east of Peshawar and 
Khaki, north of Mansehra.  
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rank and position within a clan and between clans is recognised and conferred, and as such 
jirga represents a central tenet of doing Pashto. As a central social and political factor in the 
life of the tribal Pashtun, patterns in the convening of jirga across the Durand Line are an 
accurate indicator of the impact of the border upon the structure of tribal association, alliance 
and opposition. This study thus examines the process of jirga as it is conducted among the 
tribes of the borderland.   
 
Jirga is the principal modality of tribal politics and adjudication to which all major decisions 
affecting the tribe are referred and through which conflict resolution and dispute adjudication 
is conducted. Larger issues affecting more than one tribe commonly see a loya jirga, a form of 
jirga including representatives from a number of tribes.40  
 
The origin of the term jirga is disputed. In origin, the Pashto word jirga refers to consultation, 
and a gathering for the purpose of consultation.41 In Dari, it describes a ring, derived from jirg 
meaning wrestling ring (Ghayaatudin 1871: 118-19). However, there is no variation in the 
meaning of the term among the Pashtun tribes. Jirga, as a process among the tribal Pashtuns 
today, is a frequently all male consultation aimed at reaching consensus, which then becomes 
binding upon the tribes and clans represented in the process. Rubin (1995: 42) states; 
 
The jirga includes all adult males and rules by consensus. In theory, a jirga can be 
convened at any level of tribal organisation from the smallest lineage to the largest 
confederation. Jirga’s are most commonly held at the lineage level, but there are larger 
tribal or even inter-tribal jirgas as well...  
 
The enduring phenomenon of the jirga is a central theme in pashtunwali and in the life of the 
borderland. Jirga is the modality through which the structure of authority and representation 
within the khel is maintained. The khan or malik of the clan is the patron of the jirga, but does 
not enjoy more authority over the jirga than the other participants.42 In this manner the jirga 
process reinforces the relative autonomy of each participant through affording him the right 
to speak and decide independently of all other participants. Decisions made by the jirga are 
taken through consensus or overwhelming majority, often lasting for days before consensus or 
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 Pashto Descriptive Dictionary The Afghan Academy of Sciences, Kabul, 1978.  p. 1272. 
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overwhelming majority can be reached. The outcome of a jirga is absolutely binding upon the 
members of the khel or killi who participated in it.43 Through the institution of jirga, the 
borderland maintains a distinct political and judicial structure that is representative and 
effective and, as such, is a key structural component in the autonomy of the borderland.  
 
In settled parts of KP, particularly among the Yusufzai, the jirga process has been partially 
amended by the presence of other methods of adjudication provided by the civil 
administration such as the police and the judiciary.44 This is most widely seen in Peshawar, 
Charsadda, Abbotabad and Mansehra where civil institutions operate with a degree of 
effectiveness. In these localities the civil administration is, in many cases, constrained by the 
pre-existing norms of jirga, is obligated to acknowledge and submit to that process, and 
respects the decisions made therein.45  
4.4.2 Jirga as conflict resolution 
Conflict resolution typically relates to the sphere of land disputes between clans and between 
tribes. This can be related to inheritance of land following the death of a land-holding khan or 
malik. It can be related to grazing rights for pastoral farming communities. Conflicts can also 
be related to riparian rights for tribal communities along rivers. Most frequently, however, 
jirgaey are related to conflict resolution following the settlement of badal between clans and 
between tribes. 
 
Through the summer of 2008, the Turi and Bangash tribes in the Kurram Agency were engaged 
in a particularly intense conflict leading to nearly 300 deaths and an unknown number of 
casualties.46 The violence was periodically halted to allow for the convening of jirgaey, a 
process that eventually saw the violence subsist by the end of October 2008. Despite the 
significant military offensive and defensive capacities of both the Turi and the Bangash, the 
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 Observations made by the author in November-December 2000 and June-July 2002 in Peshawar and 
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jirga’s decision is considered final and adhered to, and currently forms the basis of the release 
of prisoners and the opening of roads and the resumption of trade.47  
 
Often, a jirga convened to address an inter-tribal dispute will involve representatives from a 
third, non-aligned tribe to fulfil the role of the arbiter. In the case of the Turi-Bangash conflict 
of 2008, the jirga which led to its conclusion was comprised of 50 members from each of the 
two tribes plus 16 members each of the Orakzai and the Hangu tribes.48 The offices of the then 
Political Agent Kurram, Azam Khan, were used to facilitate the jirga.49  
 
Cross-border jirgaey are also a frequent occurrence. These are held within tribes on the level 
of clans, particularly among the tribes bisected by the Durand Line.50 Among these are the 
Mohmand, Shinwari, Afridi, Mangal, Achakzai and clans within the Waziri. Occasionally a jirga 
will involve surrounding tribes on both sides of the Durand Line. Alternatively, a tribe across 
the border will be asked to either act as an arbiter or send a delegation to participate in an 
inter-tribal jirga. Afridi tribesmen from the Khyber Agency in FATA are occasionally invited to 
participate, for example, in jirgaey in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province as well as in 
Charsadda, the cultural heart of KP.51   
4.4.3 Loya jirga 
Through 2007, the Afghan and Pakistani governments sought to facilitate parallel jirgaey, held 
concurrently in FATA and in Afghanistan, in an attempt to establish a pan-tribal front against 
insurgents in Afghanistan.52 The parallel jirgaey concept was rejected by participants and, 
ultimately, by the Afghan government. A single loya jirga was finally convened in August 2007 
in Kabul, and was termed cross-border on account of the participation of FATA tribes although, 
crucially, the Wazir did not participate forcing the jirga to conclude on general terms without 
mandating any specific sanction against those tribes considered more central to insurgent 
activities.53  
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The process of jirga on a clan or tribal level is driven by locally emergent issues and is not 
impacted by the Durand Line. This relates to the tribes and clans that live along and across the 
border, as well as tribes that reside physically distant from it. This is also evident in the case of 
the loya jirga of 2007 which was intended, at least on the part of state participants, to confer a 
distinction between Afghan and FATA/KP based tribes by instituting two simultaneous jirga 
processes. The rejection of that proposition by tribal representatives54 and the holding of a 
single jirga further evidence the proposition that the concept of jirga, as well as its process, 
supersedes state derived institutions of authority and adjudication among tribal Pashtuns 
across the borderland. The jirga process is thus a driving factor of the autonomy of the 
Pashtun tribes from state. Jirga is also a manifestation of the larger, cross-border substructure 
of Pakhtunkhwa in that jirga is a central tenet of doing Pashto, of which Pakhtunkhwa is the 
aggregate territorial component. As for the social component of this larger cross-border 
substructure, it is evident in the patterns of marriage and social interaction across the Durand 
Line.  
4.5 Family ties and marriage across the Durand Line 
4.5.1 Marriage as politics 
Marriage amongst tribal Pashtuns in the Afghan borderland is central element of family and 
clan life. It constitutes an important political element in patterns of alliance, truce and 
engagement between families and clans within a tribe. It is a principal source of izzaat, and 
potentially of paighore or tor, all central features of the social standing of a khan or malik and 
his kor. The frequency and extent of patterns of marriage across the Durand Line are a 
reflection of the border’s impact upon the social and political life of the borderland tribes. This 
study thus explores patterns of cross-border marriage amongst the tribes of the borderland.  
 
Marriage is a means through which two kor or khel are bound through forming blood ties, the 
determinant of the political order among Pashtun tribes, and is thus determined by political 
realities faced by a clan or family. If a clan or family finds its position weakened on account of 
the death of a leader or heir, or suffers a setback financially, militarily or in terms of land, it 
will place great value on marriage into  a clan with a stronger social position, more wealth, 
land or with greater martial strength to deter predation and enhance its security.55 Marriage is 
also a modality of conflict resolution. Thus, marriage may result from a settlement where the 
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side found to have committed a transgression presents a female for marriage with a male 
from the aggrieved side.56 Alternatively, it can be the result of a resolution to a long-standing 
dispute where a marriage insures the integration of blood lines, therefore mitigating the 
likelihood of conflict to emerge between the two closely related families or clans.57 It should 
be pointed out that in this context, the bonds arising from marriage are stronger than agnatic 
bonds, where tarboorwali or agnatic rivalry is a commonly observed phenomenon (Ahmed 
1976: 43). 
  
Accurate data related to the frequency of marriage and the spatial context within which it 
occurs across FATA has not been compiled.58 Among Pashtun tribes, data relating to women 
remains unverifiable. The names, ages and marital status of women, particularly widows or 
those yet unmarried, is kept secret by families, as is information relating to a woman 
expecting a child.59 Marriage is announced only immediately prior to its conduct, as any 
indication that a man is interested in a woman preceding an announcement of marriage 
creates the possibility of paighore, or an affront to zan. Based upon the same concerns, 
pregnancies are never announced, and are known only through the successful birth of a child. 
As a result, any census data relating to women remains unreliable and incomplete.   
 
Consequently there is no accurate statistical information regarding patterns of marriage 
among FATA residents. Official documents, where they establish the domicile of the individual, 
will record him or her as married. These are in the cases of the relatively few tribal individuals 
who pursue further education or employment with the Government of Pakistan, the KP 
administration or the office of the Political Agent. The vast majority of FATA residents remain 
outside the scope of officialdom, and their births, deaths and marriages remain unrecorded by 
official statistics. However, through interviews with individuals resident in FATA, and with 
those in administrative positions in FATA and KP, a picture of the main trends of marriage 
across the various agencies emerges.60 
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4.5.2 Trends in cross-border marriage 
This picture suggests that the impact of Durand Line upon marriage is negligible.61 Cross-
border marriages occur within clans living astride the border, and within clans resident in 
Peshawar and Kabul, Jalalabad and Khost. Marriage is a family, clan and tribal affair and 
proceeds according to those criteria regardless of the border.62  
 
Among tribal Pashtuns, the frequency of cross-border marriage is highest in the Parachinar 
area of the Kurram Agency,63 contiguous with Afghanistan’s Nangarhar and Paktiya provinces. 
Parachinar is closely linked with Jaji in Paktiya through trade and familial ties between the 
towns. Although the Turi tribe is the most significant tribe in Kurram and is found in the 
immediate vicinity of the Durand Line, marriages among the Turi tend to be confined to within 
the immediate vicinity of the Turi zai on account of the Turi being predominantly Shia and 
surrounded by predominantly hanafi Sunni tribes.64 Hence, there is limited cross-border 
marriage among the Turi. The Mangal, Muqbil and Jaji tribes, however, do conduct marriages 
within the tribe across the border. These tribes lie in both Kurram and Paktiya. Interaction 
between them across the border is of a high frequency as are patterns of marriage.  
 
Cross-border marriages are also frequent among the Mohmand.65 The Mohmand agency is 
contiguous with Afghanistan’s Nangarhar and Kunar provinces with the Durand Line remaining 
un-demarcated in the agency. Cross-border interaction among the Mohmand is as frequent as 
interaction between the Mohmand within the geographic limits of the agency.66 In terms of 
spatial spread, more Mohmand territory lies in Afghanistan than in FATA, although the 
concentration of Mohmand population is greater in FATA. Due to the availability of agricultural 
land in the Mohmand Agency and in the contiguous Peshawar FR which is predominantly 
populated by the Mohmand, the balance of economic influence within the tribe lies with the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
insight into marriage trends. While this did not provide a statistical map of marriage trends, it did 
enable a comparative analysis to be made between areas within FATA. The bulk of the following 
analysis is based on information gained through interviews with Jamil Ahmed, District Commissioner 
Kohat and  former Assistant Political Agent Mohmand Agency, Muhammad Nawaz Afridi, an official 
from Khyber Agency, and Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan, Director of the Area Study Centre Peshawar.    
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Mohmand resident in FATA. This suggests that Mohmand clans in Nangarhar and Kunar value 
maintaining clan ties with those Mohmand in FATA and Peshawar FR through marriage. 
 
Cross-border marriages are very common among the Shinwari, particularly between those in 
the Khyber Agency and Nangarhar province.67 The Shinwari are resident in the both Kurram 
and Khyber agencies, and Nangarhar province. Where the balance of clan and tribal influence 
lies is unclear, although the area populated by the Shinwari in Nangarhar is greater than the 
area they populate in Khyber and Kurram. This suggests that the tribe is based primarily in 
Nangarhar, and has claim to parts of Khyber and Kurram on account of the Shinwari clans 
resident in those agencies. The fact that the Shinwari, along with the Afridi, are a principal 
beneficiary of the Afghan Transit Trade (ATT) suggests that the tribe places great importance 
upon the Shinwari clans resident in FATA. Hence marriage is a means through which to 
maintain the close affiliation of the Shinwari in Nangarhar with those clans present in Khyber 
and Kurram, an association that has a direct economic bearing upon the tribe. 
  
Marriages across the Durand Line are very frequent among the Waziri.68 Waziri territories 
extend from Paktiya through northern Baluchistan and the two Waziristans into KP. The Waziri 
are particularly averse to allowing a cross tribal marriage to occur, and place great value upon 
the preservation of bloodlines.69 The intensification of military operations in South Waziristan 
through 2010 has reduced the frequency of border crossings between Warsak and Gula Din 
Kot, an area mostly populated by the Darwesh Khel. Cross border interaction and marriages, 
however, continue to occur across other stretches of the border in North Waziristan.70  
 
Although the Afridi are resident on both sides of the border, the concentration of Afridi 
population remains in the immediate vicinity of the Khyber Pass and the Khyber Agency. Afridi 
presence in Nangarhar is limited to the areas just north of the western mouth of the Khyber 
Pass. Here the Afridi clans populate extremely hilly areas and tend to confine marriage to 
within particular clans in a given killi.71 Hence the Afridis are less given to cross-border 
marriages than other tribes bisected by the border.72 It should be noted that this is a result of 
the spatial arrangement of the Afridi and the topography of their territory, not the 
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effectiveness of the Durand Line as a political boundary.  This is evidenced by the fact that 
those Afridi residing at the eastern mouth of the Khyber Pass, in the vicinity of the Peshawar 
Valley, do engage in marriage across clan lines,73 suggesting that the situation on the western 
mouth of the Khyber Pass is primarily a function of topography. 
 
Marriage is a central theme within the political life of the tribes of the Afghan borderland. It is 
conceived of principally as a political endeavour, and secondarily as fulfilment of the 
obligations arising from nang-o-namus, where a marriage may be conducted between families 
as part of a larger settlement to a dispute or conflict involving other aspects such as 
bequeathing land or money (Barth 1959: 96). A picture of cross-border marriages emerges in 
which clans of the Afridi, Shinwari, Mohmand, Muqbil, Mangal, Jaji and Waziri conduct 
marriages across the Durand Line, unimpeded by it. This phenomenon demonstrates that the 
larger social context of the Pashtun tribes transcends the territorial limits of the state, and 
reinforces the identification with a larger, cross-border social substructure. This phenomenon 
also demonstrates a distinct borderland cultural identity within the larger Pashtun identity, 
characterised by norms wherein cross-border blood-ties supersede the nominal imposition of 
the state and affiliation with its identities. This distinct borderland identity, occurring within a 
larger Pashtun identity, is further reinforced by the structure of economic flows across the 
borderland. 
4.6 The Economy of the Borderland 
Economic flows across borderlands in Asia reveal the degree to which the state is unable or 
unwilling to diminish or reform organic substructures that endure the imposition of the 
postcolonial state. These economic flows emerge as a result of the economic opportunities 
arising from the demarcation of an international boundary through a pre-state substructure. 
They are driven by, and in turn reinforce, the interdependence among communities within a 
single substructure divided by an international border. This reinforces the primacy of the 
substructure over the imposition of the border and, by association, over the authority state. 
Across the Afghan borderland, the economic flows between southeast Afghanistan, FATA, and 
KP demonstrate this trend.   
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FATA demonstrates a disproportionate level of economic vitality in comparison with its low 
level of achievement across all developmental indices.74  This economic vitality, however, does 
not manifest itself in the annual state bank reports on the state of the economy.75 Accurate 
statistics on the state of the borderland economy are not recorded largely because the bulk of 
the economic flows through FATA are considered illegal according to Pakistani law.76 Despite 
being conducted on the periphery of Pakistan’s legal environment, the scale of borderland 
trade is large enough to be considered a principal source of economic activity for KP and 
southern Afghanistan. Regulated bilateral trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan tripled in 
the period 2004-2008 to $1.63 billion annually, much of it materials and equipment used in 
reconstruction exported from Pakistan into Afghanistan.77 Unregulated trade flows, which are 
more reciprocal, amount to over $10 billion.78 
4.6.1  ATT 
Whereas the tribal agencies of FATA have historically sought to maintain independence from 
both Pakistan and Afghanistan, they have simultaneously sought to develop economic flows in 
close relation to both states. The principal source of economic activity for FATA is the Afghan 
Transit Trade (ATT). The ATT stems from the 1965 Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan where the latter receives goods at Karachi’s port Qasim, 
which are then moved overland to Afghanistan with concessionary or abolished rates of transit 
duty. The ATT, which consists of commodities of all types, is a significant portion of the $1.63 
billion of bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan that has actually fallen from $2 
billion in 2007.79 The drop from 2007 to 2008 was not mirrored in unregulated ‘black’ trade.80 
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 FATA lags behind the rest of Pakistan both in terms of the absolute developmental indices and 
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Hence, while the volume of regulated bilateral trade fluctuates, unregulated trade continues 
to grow.  
 
Under the ATT, the goods, which are transported by rail from Karachi to Quetta and Peshawar, 
are then moved to the Afghan border through truck convoys using the principal crossing 
points. The main crossing point for the ATT is Chamman, lying between Quetta and Kandahar, 
where the bulk of goods are moved into Afghanistan. Torkham, Nawapass, Marawara and 
Barikot are all additional significant crossing points for the ATT.81  
4.6.2  Bara and karkhano 
Once the goods enter Afghanistan, they are shortly transported back into Pakistan to be sold 
at what are termed the bara markets (also referred to as the kar khano) in the Khyber Agency 
on the outskirts of Peshawar, and on the outskirts of Quetta. The bara markets conduct trade 
outside the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s fiscal and customs authorities and hence no revenue is 
collected by the state on the movement of the various globally sourced items available at the 
markets from Afghanistan into FATA. Available products include virtually all items that are 
imported into Afghanistan through the ATT, but also items imported into Afghanistan from 
Iran, Central Asia, Russia, and increasingly the Persian Gulf and the Far East.82 This globally 
sourced import trade into Afghanistan is directly aimed at reaching the bara markets, from 
where distributors move the goods, upon which no duties have been paid, across Pakistan.83  
 
The location of the principal market in the autonomous Khyber Agency just outside the 
jurisdiction of the authorities at Peshawar, enables the distribution of products illegal in 
Pakistan. This includes weapons of all scales and a variety of narcotics.84 Narcotics are not 
                                                                                                                                                                      
volume of the illegal trade has kept par over recent years with the legal trade, driven significantly by 
the continued boom in opiate exports.  
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displayed along with other items, but are widely available. 85  Weapons are displayed 
prominently. Electronic appliances available include those manufactured in Europe, Russia, 
North America, China, Japan, and southeast Asia.86 High technology items are widely available, 
and it is often the case that vendors are unaware of the specific nature of the products they 
sell, particularly high technology items.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the locations of the major markets are Quetta and Khyber, the ATT generates 
revenue across the borderland. This is primarily through the transportation of goods across 
the various tribal agencies from nodes in Afghanistan to the main markets at Khyber and 
Quetta. While the volume of trade that moves into Afghanistan is protected by the ATTA, the 
return flow of goods into Pakistan without the payment of duties is illegal. Hence the ATT 
sourced goods are transported back into Pakistan through the numerous routes and passes 
that traverse the agencies, beyond the reach of border control authorities and paramilitary 
forces from both sides of the border. Tribesmen have proved efficient at transporting items 
through the mountain passes and ravines, with networks extending into Punjab and Sindh 
provinces.88 For a price, transporters are willing to transport illegal products such as weapons 
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and narcotics to the major cities.89 For an additional price, transporters will assume the 
responsibility for the protection of the product if they are interdicted by law enforcement 
personnel. This is usually through paying the additional transportation cost as a bribe to law 
enforcement personnel.90  
4.6.3 Pakistan to Afghanistan trade-flows 
A further source of income for the tribesmen is the flow of goods and services from Pakistan 
into Afghanistan which is not under the provisions of the ATT, and has not been cleared by 
Afghan authorities for import by the collection of import duties. This trade has arisen largely 
from the reconstruction of Kabul in recent years.91 It involves materials such as steel, timber, 
masonry, cement, industrial tools and machinery.92 To avoid having to pay import duties on 
entering Afghanistan, much of this trade is moved through FATA by tribesmen who, as with 
the ATT, move this trade through the various passes and routes lying beyond the reach of the 
border authorities on both sides.93  
 
Another aspect of cross-border trade that sustains the FATA tribes is the movement of food 
stuffs. Wheat is subsidised by the government in KP and hence is available across KP below the 
international price.94 Afghanistan, which experienced consecutive years of drought between 
1999 and 2002, perennially experiences shortages of food, a condition exacerbated by the 
growing of poppy which covers the majority of Afghanistan’s arable land.95 Subsidised wheat is 
therefore moved from KP through FATA into Afghanistan, where it is sold at marked up prices. 
While this is illegal, it is also a booming trade.96  
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Attempting to regulate trans-FATA trade, the government of KP has instituted a system 
referred to as the ‘card system’ or ‘parchey’ system where political agents in the various tribal 
agencies have the authority to issue a card entitling the holder to conduct trans-FATA trade 
legally. Although the government of KP claims the issuance of these cards is a transparent 
process, the actual prices for such cards run into the millions of dollars,97 and are a means 
through which the government of KP seeks to generate revenue from the trans-FATA trade.98 
 
Peshawar remains a major source of economic activity for tribesmen from both sides of the 
Durand Line. Hundreds of construction workers, significantly from Mohmand and Bajaur, 
congregate at specified locations where they are recruited for daily construction labour.99 
Working for extremely competitive wages, the influx of tribal labourers over the recent years 
has driven local Peshawarites out of the construction industry altogether.100 Transportation is 
another sector that employs tribesmen both as conductors and drivers of buses as well as 
taxis. Tribesmen dominate the bus networks across KP and across the whole of Pakistan. 
Beyond transportation and construction, tribesmen are widely employed as armed security 
personnel.101 The degeneration of the security situation in Pakistan generally and in KP 
specifically, clearly observable since 2006,102 has led to a growth in this industry. Tribesmen 
working in these jobs tend to return to their agencies of origin regularly, taking home money 
earned to contribute to the economy of the homestead which is typically a collective 
homestead inhabited by a number of closely related families. Unskilled daily wage labourers 
earn an average of $112 per month, while living expenses in Peshawar for unskilled workers 
amount to an average of over $90 per month.103 This results in an average saving of around 
$20 per month per worker. Armed security personnel typically earn around $100 per month.104  
4.6.4 Patronage and bounty 
A very significant source of economic activity for the tribes remains the patronage from the 
government of Pakistan which continues to pay the tribesmen significant stipends for their 
political and military loyalty. This in turn typically enhances the khangi within a tribe or clan 
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tribe as it demonstrates that the state recognises the khangi of the recipient of the payment. 
This patronage is in the form of nikkat and lungi payments.105 Nikkat is paid to the principal 
khans within a tribe such as the leaders of the clans who wield lashkars and enjoy the support 
of and authority over their clans. The nikkat varies from a quarter million rupees per month to 
millions, depending on the tactical salience of the clan in question.106 The lungi is paid to 
significant others within the tribal structure. Typically the lungi payment is significantly less 
than the nikkat. The khans then share this wealth with others through largesse, thereby 
becoming a central economic node for their clan. Hence the nikkat and lungi system does 
generate economic activity for the principal khans and the clansmen under their authority.  
 
Parallel to this is the influx of money from the US government spent on tribesmen in searching 
for significant leaders of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.107 Estimates place the amount of US money 
spent on informants within the FATA region as of December 2009 at $57 million, a significant 
amount that will invariably filter through the families and clans of the recipients.108 It is 
evident to observers that the source of the information regarding al-Qaeda principals in FATA 
is actually coming from the tribesmen themselves. Given the extent of animosity between the 
tribes, it is also quite evident that various tribes are providing information regarding al-Qaeda 
principals to Pakistani and US forces that implicates tribal enemies and rivals in an attempt to 
gain monetary benefits and bring about a military response against rival tribes.  
 
Money generated in FATA by the khans and maliks through all these means is then largely 
invested back into Pakistan. Tribesmen have purchased extensive property in KP and other 
parts of Pakistan. Real estate is the principal form of investment made by tribesmen in 
Pakistan.109 Enjoying a constitutional provision specific to them, tribesmen are absolved from 
having to pay any taxation on income generated in FATA, or any taxation on property 
purchased in Pakistan.110 Businesses established by tribesmen in Pakistan that generate an 
income in Pakistan are, however, subject to taxation.111  
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Tribesmen have utilised these provisions to enter the sector of property development on a 
large scale. The Deans Trade Centre in Peshawar, currently one of Asia’s largest retail centres, 
was developed by a conglomerate of Afridi tribesmen involving investment of over a billion 
Pakistani rupees.112 Other areas of property development include compressed natural gas 
(CNG) filling stations for cars. The sheer number of such stations in KP, far greater than that 
warranted by demand, demonstrates that such investment actually seeks to procure large 
tracts of real estate.113 On one stretch on the G.T. Road, on entering the district of Hassan 
Abdal, there are seven near contiguous very large CNG stations, each quite new and built to 
international standards of quality, but with very little customer traffic between the seven 
stations.114 
 
The largest single source of economic activity across Pakhtunkhwa, and Afghanistan’s principal 
export, is opiate derivatives forming the bulk of a $4.3 billion dollar black market that is larger 
than the legitimate GDP of the country.115 FATA remains a significant export route for opiates. 
However, the principal routes for opiate exports from Afghanistan remain Tajikistan and 
Iran.116 Nonetheless, the distribution of opiates across Pakistan does constitute a significant 
source of revenue for FATA tribesmen.117  
 
This economic survey of the Afghan borderland reveals that the revenue exclusions afforded 
to FATA by the constitution of Pakistan ensure that it remains a thriving economic node and 
source of income for the tribesmen who transport globally sourced commodities to FATA via 
Afghanistan, and then on to destinations in Pakistan. There is a strong economic motivation to 
perpetuate that autonomy on the part of the tribesmen of FATA. This economic reality is a 
driving factor behind the continuity of borderland autonomy. The political and economic will 
on the part of the Pakistani government to assimilate FATA with KP has not been evident thus 
far. Such an endeavour would also have to address the intractable question of the economic 
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dependency of southern Afghanistan upon FATA and KP, and would in effect result in 
disrupting an integrated economic zone linking the Afghan borderland, KP and much of 
southern Afghanistan.  
4.7 Medical Migration 
Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Quetta, and Peshawar are the main cities within Pakhtunkhwa. 
However, the concentration of population around northern and central KP, and eastern 
Afghanistan result in Peshawar’s position as a political and economic centre for the entire 
Pakhtunkhwa.118 
 
A distinguishing feature of Peshawar is its medical infrastructure. There are six principal state 
owned and operated hospitals in Peshawar with an even larger and growing number of private 
hospitals, clinics and laboratories.119 Relative to the region, these hospitals provide a high 
standard of medical care and have led to the development of Peshawar as a destination for 
medical travel across southern Afghanistan. This medical infrastructure remains one of the 
principal drivers of cross-border movement, attracting patients from over much of Afghanistan 
and FATA. 
  
Other than at Peshawar, the Afghan borderland has a minimal medical infrastructure. The 
agency administrative centres in each of the FATA agencies also house a basic hospital and 
clinics, albeit with limited capabilities.120 These facilities do attract patients from within each 
agency as well as from across the Durand Line. However, tribesmen state unequivocally that 
the facilities and expertise in Peshawar are of a much higher quality than those in FATA 
resulting in their travelling to Peshawar for medical care.121 Further, Kabul has seen a growth 
in the number of private hospitals since 2003, the prominent ones being CURE international, 
DK- German Medical Diagnostic Center, and Imran Clinic. However, each of these is a private 
facility and far beyond the means of most Afghans.  
 
In contrast, the Khyber Teaching Hospital in Peshawar charges a nominal fee, often not paid. 
Affiliated with the University of Peshawar, Khyber Teaching Hospital saw 40% of its beds 
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 Interview with Muhammad Nawaz Afridi, at Peshawar 23
rd
 August, 2008. This view was widely 
held among a number of interviewees and officials.  
119
 State hospitals include: Mission Hospital, Lady Reading Hospital, Khyber Teaching Hospital, 
Cromwell Hospital, and Al-Khidmat Hospital. These are supplanted by Rehman Medical Centre and 
Tehkal Medical Centre a prominent among the private hospitals and clinics in Peshawar. .  
120
 Interview with Dr. Muhammad Nawaz Khan at the Khyber Teaching Hospital. 8
th
  August, 2008. 
121
 Interview with Dr. Muhammad Nawaz Khan at the Khyber Teaching Hospital. 8
th
  August, 2008. 
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occupied by patients from Afghanistan in August 2008. 122  The hospital is immensely 
overcrowded. Apparatus is basic and electricity is intermittent. The intake of new patients has 
been reduced to two days per week, excluding cases of trauma. Yet large numbers of 
tribesmen with their families continue to descend on the hospital and are often seated in the 
court yards and steps outside the hospital.123 In the case of the Rehman Health Institute, a 
private hospital highly regarded for its apparatus and doctors, 90% of patients present in 
August 2008 were from across the Durand Line.124  
 
Medical migration constitutes a significant fraction of all cross-border travel from Afghanistan 
into Pakistan. In September and November 2008, surveys of individuals at the Torkham and 
Spin Boldak border crossings revealed that 9.5% were travelling to Pakistan for medical care,125 
the overwhelming majority of which were intending to travel on to Peshawar for medical care. 
The long-term trend for medical migration at these border-crossings is 11.2%, while 21% of 
migrants report that travel into Pakistan is for medical and social services.126 This percentage 
corresponded to approximately 2000 individuals a day crossing the border into Pakistan for 
medical care alone.127 
 
In addition to medical migrants entering Pakistan through the border-crossings at Torkham 
and Spin Boldak, an as of yet un-enumerated flow of persons continues across the hundreds of 
trails that traverse the Durand Line along much of its length. The percentage of these that 
travel to Pakistan for medical care is yet unknown, but is considered to be of a similar order to 
that arriving through Torkham and Spin Boldak. 128 
 
The role of Peshawar as the centre of medical infrastructure in the Afghan borderland has 
been enhanced as a result of the mass internal displacement of individuals through 2008 and 
2009 following major military operations in Swat, Bajaur, South Waziristan and Orakzai. 
                                                          
122
Interview with Dr. Muhammad Nawaz Khan at the Khyber Teaching Hospital. 8
th
  August, 2008  
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 Observed by author at Khyber Teaching Hospital, Peshawar in August 2008. 
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 Observed by author at Khyber Teaching Hospital, Peshawar in August 2008. 
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 Study on Cross-Border Population Movements Between Afghanistan and Pakistan UNHCR and 
Altain Consulting, Kabul, June 2009  pp. 22, 32.  
126
 Ibid. 
127
 Study on Cross-Border Population Movements Between Afghanistan and Pakistan UNHCR and 
Altain Consulting, Kabul, June 2009 pp. 22, 32.   
128
 The number of migrants that cross the border at points other than Torkham and Spin Boldak is 
higher than at those points, but tends to be from localities in the immediate vicinity of the border. Such 
crossings  are made by individuals a number of times a day in many cases.  Based on the number of 
villages in the immediate vicinity of the border, an estimation can be made of the number of cross-
border migrants. This number is of a similar order to that at the major crossing points, which makes for 
a total cross-border migration from Afghanistan into Pakistan on any given day of around 65,000 
individuals.  
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Estimates place the number of internally displaced at over 1 million,129 many of whom have 
arrived in Peshawar in pursuit of medical care. In response to this influx, the medical facilities 
in Peshawar are greatly overwhelmed, leading to the movement of internally displaced 
individuals and cross-border migrants beyond Peshawar, a trend reflected in statistics charting 
the destination within Pakistan of cross-border migrants which show that 6.6% of cross-border 
migrants now travel beyond KP to other destinations in Pakistan.130 
 
There is currently no method of verifying whether patients are from KP, FATA or Afghanistan. 
Patients report that there is no impediment to them in crossing the Durand Line into Pakistan 
for medical treatment.131 This absence of control, both at the border and in hospitals, has 
served to reinforce the position of Peshawar as the medical infrastructure for the entire 
Afghan borderland. This position, in turn, attracts increasing numbers of patients from further 
afield in Afghanistan, beyond the areas in proximity of the border.132 In November 2008, all 34 
provinces Afghanistan were represented at Torkham and Spin Boldak on a given day.133  67.5% 
of cross-border migrants, however, were from the Pashtun dominated provinces contiguous 
with the Durand Line. Hence Peshawar is integrated into both sides of the Afghan borderland 
across the Durand Line on account of, in addition to many other facets, its medical 
infrastructure.134 
4.8 Conclusion 
Borderlands in Asia are a form of reaction of the substructures that underlie the postcolonial 
state to the imposition of an international border across them. The incongruity between the 
contours of the postcolonial state and the primary substructures that underlie it results in the 
socio-political contusion that characterises borderlands in Asia. 
 
As part of the larger substructure of Pakhtunkhwa that underlies Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
the Afghan borderland has existed on a geo-physical level and psycho-social scale for over a 
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 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre maintains a data base on Pakistan‟s internally 
displaced population. See:  http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/pakistan . Accessed Janaury 
2011.  
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millennium. Despite the current absence of a conventional political manifestation, this larger 
substructure retains primacy as a psycho-social driving factor among the tribal Pashtuns, 
challenging the tenuous grip of the Pakistani and Afghan states over it.  
 
This study confirms that the Durand Line does not constitute an effective barrier between the 
tribal populations on either side of it. Further, its validity as an international boundary is 
continuously challenged by sub-state, tribal centres of power, authority and legitimacy that 
constitute a specific borderland identity within the larger Pashtun identity. 
  
These borderlanders are characterised by the frequency and scale of their inter-tribal cross-
border movements. Such patterns of movement manifest in the structure of cross-border 
economic flows, trends of cross-border marriage and social interaction and the jirga process, 
which is an inter-tribal political process disregarding of the border and part of the larger 
dynamic of inter-tribal politics and militancy which proceeds largely unimpeded by the Durand 
Line. These cross-border inter-tribal dynamics are a manifestation of the competition between 
the tribe as an enduring sub-state form of polity, and the state. The replication of this cross-
border dynamic across the borderland between a number of prominent tribes, establishes a 
collective disregard for the authority and legitimacy of the state in the borderland, enhanced 
by the mass cross-border movement on daily basis by individuals around the wider domain of 
Pakhtunkhwa in pursuit of objectives as varied as trade, medical care and education. 
 
The combination of this tribally driven disregard for the contours of the state, and mass cross-
border movement of individuals from across Pakhtunkhwa, creates interdependency between  
populations across the border, assimilating KP, FATA and southern Afghanistan on a practical 
level, as the cases of medical infrastructure and the structure of cross-borderland economic 
flows establish. This assimilation, evidenced by the prominence of Peshawar across the entire 
borderland and much of Pakhtunkhwa as a principal economic and infrastructural node, is 
driven by the re-emergence of the underlying substructure of Pakhtunkhwa as a primary 
ethno-linguistic, cultural and geographic identity. The near-obfuscation of the role of the 
Durand Line as an international border enhances the degree of autonomy of the tribes in the 
vicinity of the border, eliminating the barrier to a tribally driven re-territorialisation of pre-
state identity and polity.  
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5 The Retreating State 
5.1 Introduction 
The state is conventionally understood to describe an institutional arrangement through which 
compulsive power is exercised over a territory.1 This institutional arrangement may vary in its 
character, reflecting the prevalent ideational orientation and preponderant forms of identity 
underlying these institutions. Sovereignty, centralisation, external legitimacy, and a significant 
degree of internal consent are some of the additional elements conventionally considered to 
characterise a state. However, the variation in the degree to which these elements arise in 
states is great. Thus, this study considers these latter criteria to be of secondary importance in 
describing the state, reflecting the nature of its character more so than the essence of its 
existence. That essence, particularly in the post-colonial context in Asia, is a function of 
spatially limited and sustainable employment of compulsive power. 
Where the spatial context of the exercise of this power manifests a single or preponderant 
ethno-linguistic, cultural, ideational, or indeed ‘state’ identity, the state will represent the 
territoriality of political expression of its population. If, however, the spatial representation of 
the elements of nation discussed in section 1.3.2. are incongruent with its territoriality, the 
potential exists for a sub-state or trans-state national identity to challenge the contours of the 
state. Such a challenge questions the legitimacy of the state itself which is derived from the 
fact that it reflects the institutionalised expression of a preponderant identity within the state.  
In its attempts to assimilate underlying substructures into the contours of the state, the 
postcolonial state in Asia seeks to employ both civil and military structures to create both the 
incentive and compulsion to adopt the state as an exclusive political identity and political 
modality. This approach leads the Asian postcolonial state to a paradox. On the one hand, it 
seeks to establish the legitimacy of civilian administrative and executive organs on the basis of 
representative participation. On the other hand it employs the military to enforce the writ of 
civil institutions, which underscores the lack of legitimacy of these institutions. Further 
compounding this situation is the competition between civil and military organs for functional 
                                                          
1
 Barrow (1993: 9-10) points out that varying understandings of what the state is represent differing 
ideological perspectives on the nature of political function and strategy. These perspectives of the state 
vary from the regulator of the macro-economy to an obstacle to the expression of free will. Aside from 
these prescriptive accounts of the state, Max Weber (1919) introduces a descriptive account of the state 
as the legitimate source of power, that in turn being derived from its “monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory.” See: Max Weber „Politics as a Vocation‟ Munich University, 
January 1919 in David Owen and Tracy B. Strong The Vocation Lectures, Hackett, Indianapolis 2004, 
p. 32. 
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superiority. The result is that the Asian postcolonial state is characterised by a praetorian 
tendency which, over time, becomes the principal obstacle to exclusive legitimacy of the state.  
In the Afghan borderland, both Afghanistan and Pakistan have introduced and maintained 
military force as both a deterrent and an instrument of compulsion, aimed at facilitating the 
assimilation of tribally dominated territories with the state. Paradoxically, this initiative has 
resulted in the weakening of civil administrative and executive structures, further polarising 
borderlanders from the state, who then find themselves in competition with the military for 
superiority in the borderland. By enduring the employment of the military, regardless of its 
operational effectiveness, tribal structures enhance the profile of their autonomy and in turn 
are distanced further from the civil state.  
This chapter explores the dynamics of the recession of the state from the borderland in the 
critical areas of administrative writ, law enforcement and security, adjudication and education. 
Also exploring the phenomenon of militancy, the chapter demonstrates that the inadequate 
response of the state in these critical areas is a significant contributant to the resurgence of 
tribal autonomy in the Afghan borderland, a resurgence that is driven by the competition 
between the postcolonial states of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the underlying substructure 
of Pakhtunkhwa.           
5.2 Writ of the State 
The borderland lies at the political periphery of the state, where political institutions serve 
little function beyond representing the legitimacy of the authority of the political centre of the 
state over the borderland. Borderland political institutions are often electorally non-
representative, have no political impact on the centre of political power of the state, and 
consequently enjoy little legitimacy.  
To understand the underlying structural causes of tribal resurgence in the Afghan borderland, 
it is necessary to understand how the state is receding from the borderland, both territorially 
and in a psycho-social sense as a cultural phenomenon amongst the Pashtun tribal population 
of KP and FATA. As such, this chapter addresses the phenomenon of the ‘writ of the state’ as a 
conceptual criterion by which to examine the recession of the state in the borderland.  
5.2.1 The term ‘writ of the state’ 
‘Writ’ is a term originally used in a legal context. Carrying the connotation of sovereign judicial 
right, use of the term ‘writ’ has since expanded to refer to the sovereign nature of authority in 
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whatever context it is employed.2 In a political context, the ‘writ of the state’ is widely 
regarded as the exclusive authority of the state to issue decrees that are binding upon the 
population and over territories present within the state. ‘Writ of the state’ also describes the 
actual capacity of the state to impose and execute its decrees upon the population exclusively 
and without challenge, beyond institutional checks and balances upon executive authority. 
 A common example is the raising of a police force by the state to deter criminality and assist 
effective administration. In a conventional political sense, the state enjoys the sole right to 
raise a police force that in turn enjoys the exclusive authority to enforce decrees issued by the 
state. A challenge to the writ of the state in this context would be constituted by any rival or 
alternative police force raised from an alternative institution outside the structure of the state, 
or indeed quite possibly from a rival institution within the state.  
Afghanistan has faced crises relating to the writ of the state since its territorial demarcation. 
As addressed in section 3.4.3., the demarcation of Afghanistan’s territorial limits by 1893 was 
a resolution to the strategic contest between Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia, an 
observation evidenced by Mortimer Durand’s records of correspondence with both Amir 
Abdur-Rahman and the Calcutta government.3 Because the southern boundary in particular 
transects the tribal Pashtun population, thus limiting its legitimacy and effectiveness, the 
Afghan state experiences a crisis of legitimacy regarding its territoriality, and consequently its 
authority.   Constantly challenged by Ghilzai and Tajik tribal elements, the Durrani dominated 
executive has not effectively established legitimacy across the state in the intervening century, 
although the tenure of King Zahir Shah (1933-1973) did see relative stability and a gradual but 
definite expansion of the writ of the Afghan state beyond Kabul into the major cities of Mazar-
e-Sharif, Herat and Kandahar in the north, west and south of the country respectively. The 
domestic political turmoil of the intervening decades has culminated in an insurgency that 
continues to pervade much of Afghanistan, consisting of tribal, jihadist and intervening 
external state elements. The nascent writ of the Afghan state is challenged by these elements, 
and superseded by the authority of international forces, which provide the bulk of the 
hardware, manpower and expertise currently employed against the insurgency. Hence, in 
Afghanistan the writ of the state is a limited phenomenon. 
                                                          
2
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines writ as; “…a formal written authoritative command; 
someone’s power or influence.”  The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2002, p. 602.  
3
 Durand‟s correspondence and the larger context of the demarcation of the Durand Line is dealt 
covered in detail in Percy Sykes‟ biography of Durand. See Sykes, Percy The Right Honourable Sir 
Mortimer Durand: A Biography Cassell and Company, London, 1926.  
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 In Pakistan, the writ of the state is established in Punjab, Sindh, much of Gilgit-Baltistan, and 
parts of eastern KP. In these areas, the civil administration functions with a degree of 
effectiveness, and there are no sub-state structures that challenge the exclusivity of the state’s 
writ and its legitimacy. Society in Punjab does not reflect segmentary patrilinealism as a 
determinant social structure, and is not characterised by the territorial exclusivity of tribes, 
factors that are determinant features of FATA and the adjoining areas of KP. Further, feudal 
structures in the largely agrarian Punjab along with the largely Punjabi army constitute two 
parallel structures that consolidate and perpetuate the writ of the state in Punjab and 
adjacent areas in northern Sindh and eastern KP.  
In the Afghan borderland, however, the state has not effectively penetrated the enduring, pre-
state structures of tribally driven territorial autonomy. The system of political agency through 
which the Pakistani state nominally administers FATA, practically redundant due to the 
resurging tribal militancy across the agencies, is a state provided veneer over a tribally 
dominated system of local, zai based structures of authority and adjudication.4 The principal 
function of the political agent has remained as a facilitator of cross-agency and cross-
borderland economic flows.5 These economic flows include the provision of nikkat and lungi 
allowances, as well as the repatriation of ATT labelled commodities to the Khyber based bara 
or karkhano markets. The absence of the writ of the Pakistani state in the borderland currently 
manifests in the emergence of alternative judicial structures, rival military structures and re-
emergent, pre-state and sub-state centres of political gravity that enjoy both authority over 
the population and also legitimacy in a psycho-social context, despite their lack of sanction 
from, and their opposition to, the Pakistani and Afghan states. 6 
The absence of any state presence in the Afghan side of the borderland is a contributant to the 
difficulty facing the Pakistani state in seeking to extend its writ into FATA. The movement of 
tribesmen into and out of FATA from Afghanistan determines that the population of FATA is 
not static, and identifies with trans-border tribal polities. As a result, the options available to 
the Pakistani state in seeking to assimilate this population are compounded by the absence of 
a government in Kabul with an effective writ that extends into the borderland. The 
government of Pakistan thus resorts to a combination of incentives and intimidation designed 
                                                          
4
 Interview with Rehmat Shah Swati, Tanda, KP, 6
th
 July, 2008.
 
 
3
 Interview with Rehmat Shah Swati, Tanda, KP, 6
th
 July, 2008. 
 
6
 Here, „alternative judicial structures‟ refers to the multiple sharia courts that function across FATA 
and KP, a phenomenon treated in more detail in subsequent sections. „Alternative military structures‟ 
refers to the tribal lashkars that are active, in many cases against the Pakistani military, across FATA 
and KP, a phenomenon dealt with in detail in the section entitled „Militancy‟. 
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to manage the autonomy of the tribes of FATA. This includes the provision of vital services and 
limited infrastructure, largely in exchange for guaranteeing the uninterrupted flow of trade, 
and the containment of inter-tribal feuds. The withdrawal of such subsidised vital services has 
historically functioned as a disincentive, an approach dominating the Pakistani army’s 
engagement with FATA since 2002.  
5.3 Praetorian versus writ of the state 
KP is governed by a popularly elected provincial assembly that is currently administered 
through a chief minister elected by the assembly, and a federally appointed governor.7 The 
province is administratively divided into eighteen settled districts and seven tribal districts that 
are provincially administered (PATA- Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, as opposed to 
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas). However, the actual source of political authority 
within the province is the military, a fact that is reflected in the military domination of the 
federal state more generally. Pakistan remains a praetorian state in which the military 
periodically intervenes in civilian political processes in order to control the political direction of 
the state. This has been manifest in a number of military coups d’etat and stage-managed 
elections,8 as well as in the direct involvement of senior military officials in all levels of state 
and provincial administration.9 Retired, and in some cases serving, military officers staff 
virtually all major administrative posts in the state sector, although there has been a post-
Musharraf reduction in the number of military appointees to civil administration roles.10 
On a provincial level, eleven of KP’s twenty governors since 1970 have been senior military 
officers, while four of the remaining nine governors were appointed by military governments. 
Three of these were by Zia-ul- Haq (1979-88) and one was appointed by Musharraf (1999-
2008).11 The real seat of power in the province is the office of the corps commander at 
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 Portal of the Provincial Assembly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa;http://www.panwfp.gov.pk. Accessed 18
th
 
January, 2011.  
8
 Since 1947, Pakistan has spent 33 years under military rule; Ayub Khan (1958-1969), Yahya Khan 
(1969-1971), Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988), Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). Elections and referendums held 
by these military rulers have tended to be less than transparent. The April 2002 referendum on the 
presidency of Musharraf was such an example, with massive fraud observed by the author in Islamabad 
and Mansehra on the day of the referendum, primarily in the form of multiple votes cast by single 
individuals in support of the President. 
9
 This phenomenon is treated extensively by Ayesha SiddiqaAgha (2007) in Military, Inc. See; Agha, 
Ayesha Siddiqa Military, Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, Pluto Press, London 2007.  
10
  Nawaz, Shuja „Pakistan and army: a changing relationship? „ Daily Times 4th May, 2008; 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\05\04\story_4-5-2008_pg3_4 . Accessed 20
 th
 
January 2011.  
11
 See Appendix XVII for list of governors of NWFP and KP.  
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Peshawar, based in the Balla Hisar fort overlooking the city.12 The heavy and very visible 
presence of the military in the city of Peshawar supersedes the presence of the police and 
provincial administrative institutions such as the judiciary and revenue collection.13 This 
phenomenon has functioned to erode the development of effective political and 
administrative institutions in KP, as such institutions tend to be short lived, staffed with 
appointees agreeable to the objectives of the military, and unable or unwilling to make 
decisions counter to the objectives of the military on a day-to-day level. Provincial civil 
authority does not benefit from the ostensible distinction between civilian and military 
authorities. In fact, any such distinction is nominal, and provincial institutions actually provide 
a veneer of civil authority under which the praetorian continues to exercise actual power and 
authority. As a result of these factors, the civil administrative presence of the state in KP has 
remained weak, ineffective and unable to challenge the hold of tribal and clan structures over 
the population, a phenomenon extending into the cities. 14 
The military has also been unable to dislodge the primacy of tribal structures, despite the 
overt militarisation of KP. The army has included within its ranks significant numbers of 
Pashtun tribesmen from across KP and FATA, with some rising to senior positions and then 
seeking to represent the army to the tribes.15 However, this experience has not resulted in 
support for the army amongst tribesmen, and has in cases only further alienated tribes from 
the army.16  
The Pakistani state was born into a dispute with Afghanistan over the KP province which 
Afghanistan claimed as its own (Marwat 1991: 16). Pakistan was thus faced with the prospect 
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 In addition to the argument made in the text, this was observed in Peshawar through July-August 
2008, and January-March 2002 in numerous incidents involving disputes between civil administration 
officials and military personnel over a wide range of areas including traffic and law enforcement, 
airline reservations, public services and utilities, among others.  
13
 The inability of the provincial administration to challenge military officers and individuals affiliated 
with the armed services was observed on a number of occasions in Peshawar in July-August 2008, 
January 2002, February 2001.  
14
 This is on account of two factors: Firstly, the presence of tribal lashkars on the outskirts of the city of 
Peshawar, particularly Afridi tribesmen encamped by the neighborhood of Hayatabad in western 
Peshawar through the summer of 2008. Secondly, the large influx of tribal population into Peshawar 
resulting from military operations in Bajaur Agency in summer 2008. Both of these factors were 
observed by the author in August, 2008.  
15
 Hassan Abbas „Musharraf Contends with the Pashtun Element in the Pakistani Army‟ 1st November, 
2006; 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=953&tx_ttnews[backPid]=239&n
o_cache=1 . Accessed 23
rd
 February, 2011. 
16
 Lt. Gen Muhammad Jan Orakzai was corps commander at Peshawar in 2001-2. Originally from 
FATA, he attempted to visit the Orakzai agency to enlist the assistance of his tribesmen in furthering 
army penetration in to FATA in pursuit of al Qaeda suspects in late 2001. His helicopter, on arrival, 
was fired upon by his own tribesmen and he was forced to leave without meeting anyone. Discussions 
with Abdullah Jan Orakzai, a witness to the incident, Islamabad, July 2002.  
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of seeking to integrate into the state a region that had previously been considered a 
borderland beyond effective administrative control. This was counter to the claims of the 
Afghan state with which the borderland had identified historically, ethnically, linguistically, and 
culturally. This challenge was further exacerbated by the fact that the literacy rates amongst 
the Pashtuns were far below that of the usual low rates of literacy in Punjab.17 The insular and 
exclusive tribal structure that dominated the overwhelming majority of the Pashtun 
population functioned as yet a further barrier to state penetration. The weak and limited 
abilities of the state itself, combined with the above-mentioned challenges, ensured that the 
inability of the Pakistani state to effectively assimilate KP into the rest of the state with any 
degree of effectiveness would persist for years. 
Thus, since 1947 tribal and clan structures were able to perpetuate influence, authority and 
legitimacy relatively unimpeded by the state. The state continued to attempt to impose itself 
through the system of political agents in FATA, through the nikkat and lungi system, and 
through providing and withholding developmental assistance.18 However, these initiatives 
were unable to remain impervious to Pashtun tribal and clan rivalries and were invariably 
characterised by nepotism and non-transparent practices.19 State supported initiatives aimed 
at achieving the assimilation of tribal territories thus became initiatives through which tribal 
polities were able to penetrate the state’s administrative institutions and manipulate their 
functioning in accordance with tribal interests.  As a result, the institutional penetration of KP 
and FATA by the state failed to effectively dislodge the position of tribal and clan primacy in 
the borderland.20  
The cumulative result of these factors has been the emergence of nominally functional 
provincial administrative institutions that lack effectiveness and authority. Dominated by the 
military and largely ignored by tribal and clan structures, the failure of these institutions 
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 Interviews with education officials in August 2008 and April 2009 suggest that at the time of 
Partition, the literacy rate in then NWFP was less than 5%. Current estimates of literacy rates in KP 
vary. The 2002 NWFP Literacy Project claimed a literacy rate of 37% in NWFP, which increased to 
40% in 2005.  See; „Literacy Statistics: NWFP‟  April, 2010; 
http://www.paklife.net/rfer_library/Reports/4-10.pdf. Accessed 29
 th
  January, 2011.  
18
 Interview with Colonel B, at Blue Area, Islamabad, June 2002.  
19
 This was observed by the author at two institutions; The Foreign Office at Islamabad and The Quaid-
e-Azam University in Islamabad. Both observed from September 1999 to August 2000. 
20
 It should be noted that the political motivation on the part of the Pakistani state to integrate FATA 
with then NWFP was tempered by considerations over how this action would be perceived by India and 
the international community, potentially weakening Pakistan‟s case for the emancipation of Indian 
administered Kashmir. This was underlined by Pakistan‟s toleration of the pro-India activities of Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan‟s Khudai Khidmatgar movement which enjoyed substantial support in northern FATA, 
Dir, and Swabi/Mardan at the time of Partition. To suppress the Khudai Khidmatgar would have 
weakened Pakistan‟s position of extending support to the Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley 
who, according to Pakistan, were suffering oppression under Hindu administration. 
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represents the failure of the Pakistani state to impose its political writ over much of KP and 
FATA. Rather, the state has relegated the role of assimilating KP and FATA to the military, 
where continued operations against militants, the widespread presence of military check posts 
and the domination of all civil institutions by the military is considered a source of strength by 
the state.21 Repeatedly, President Zardari has stated that military operations in KP will 
continue until the ‘writ of the state’ is re-established.22  While military force may diminish the 
capabilities of the militants, the military thus far in KP and FATA has not established either the 
writ of the state, or the exclusive exercise of coercive power. Rather, the employment of the 
military continues to fuel a cycle of instability that has the cumulative result of eroding state 
authority. The continued presence of the military in all areas of state life has contributed to 
the failure of political institutions to mature and function effectively. This has led to the 
continuation, and indeed consolidation of sub-state centres of political authority, adjudication 
and militancy. Thus, as a result of the failure of the Pakistani state to effectively impact KP and 
FATA through the development and maturation of political institutions, the Afghan borderland 
remains a politically peripheral region in which tribal structures continue to exercise effective 
authority. 
5.4 The Structure of State Failures 
Beyond claims of sovereignty over territory, the writ of a modern state operates in the 
functioning of a number of civil administrative institutions. Some of these include provincial 
administration, the judiciary, the police force, systems of education, revenue collection, and in 
many cases an institution for vital infrastructure. In contrast with the core of a state, a 
borderland may be characterised by a diminished presence, or total absence, of these 
institutions and structures leading to the diminished writ of the state or its complete absence 
in the borderland.  
The previous section has detailed the fact that the administration of KP is dominated by the 
military. Governors of the province have tended to be either senior military officers, or civilian 
appointees by the military government. All provincial administrative institutions, and many 
private enterprises, are directly or indirectly under the influence of the military.23 Aside from 
                                                          
21
 Interviews with Brigadier A, 17
th
 March, 2004 (location withheld), and 28
th
 July, 2008 in Islamabad.  
22
 „War against militancy for country‟s survival, says Zardari  terms operation last option; NWFP 
leaders meet President‟  21st May, 2009; http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?215098. 
Accessed 30
th
 January, 2011.   
23
 During fieldwork in July and August 2008, obstruction to movement by the police promptly 
dissipated with the announcement of the name of a Colonel who advised that his name should be 
invoked should the police ever demand documents or instigate questioning. This was also observed at a 
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its domination by the military, the civil administration of KP has a limited presence across the 
province, with a non-uniform distribution. There is a discernable presence of the civil 
administration in Peshawar. Mardan, Swabi, and Charsadda in central KP demonstrate a visible 
and functioning civil administration, as does the Mansehra region of eastern KP. Outside of 
these areas, the civil administration of KP and FATA has failed to gain the loyalty of, and hold 
legitimacy in the perception of, the overwhelming majority of the population.  
5.4.1 Law enforcement 
A police force represents the presence of the civil administration and engages in core 
administrative roles, including the regulation of vehicular traffic, the maintenance of state 
sanctioned law and order, investigation of its violations, and deterring criminality through 
maintaining a visible presence.   
The presence of the police force is unequal across KP. In the city of Peshawar, the provincial 
capital with a population often placed at around 2 million,24 large sections of the city currently 
function with virtually no presence of police.25 The University Town section of the city, home 
to a large student population and a number of foreign aid workers and media personnel, does 
have a police station outside which up to four police vehicles may be parked at any time.26 
However, police personnel tend to remain in and around the vicinity of the station and are 
rarely seen on patrol around the city, often due to concerns over the safety of officers. Civilian 
resistance to the presence and actions of the police is also frequent and occasionally violent.27 
This is in addition to the fact that police officers tend to be lightly armed, if at all, often with 
bolt action rifles whereas automatic weapons are widespread amongst tribesmen,28 although 
                                                                                                                                                                      
police station where the author‟s rented vehicle had been impounded for no ostensible reason. Through 
discussions with military personnel, it was revealed that most large businesses in Peshawar retain the 
services of a middle ranking army officer, often recently retired but sometimes serving, in order to „cut 
through‟ administrative and judicial obstacles to business. 
24
 The web portal of the government of KP hosts statistics from the 1998 census of Pakistan which 
placed the population of Peshawar at 1.7 million. 
See:http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/aboutus/Area-Population.php   accessed 30
th
 January, 
2011. However, the military operations in FATA and KP since 2008 have seen waves of refugees 
descend upon Peshawar, with significant numbers staying. Also, a large movement of Afghans has 
made Peshawar home since the fall of Kabul to the Taliban. Hence, a more accurate estimation of the 
population in 2010 would around 2.5 million. 
25
 Observations regarding the presence of the police were made by the author in KP from July-
September, 2008. 
26
 Observed by the author in August 2008.  
27
 Observations made in Peshawar in February 2001 of an assault against a police officer on traffic duty 
made by a tribesman who alleged that the police officer had peered into the assailant‟s vehicle to „look‟ 
at the women present in the vehicle. This was not an isolated incident, with a number of similar 
narrations noted in informal conversations about the role of the police in KP.  
28
 Observations by the author made in Peshawar July-September 2008. Also, interviews with police 
officials January, 2001. 
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automatic weapons are less visible within the city of Peshawar than in the adjoining Khyber 
agency. Police officers in Peshawar tend to avoid altercations with tribesmen, on the 
understanding that intervention will invariably create violent opposition from co-tribesmen of 
individuals apprehended or harmed by police action.29 Police actions are thus more often 
defensive than offensive.30 
Police morale in KP is very low, with wages that are amongst the lowest in the state sector at 
around nine thousand Rupees per month.31 Police officers are frequently expected to provide 
their own resources to pay for fuel for patrol vehicles.32 This practice leads to widespread 
corruption amongst police officers, who routinely ask for assistance from motorists stopped 
for moving violations.33 Low morale is further exacerbated by the direct authority over any 
police officer enjoyed by any military officer, which occasionally results in the taunting and 
humiliation of police officers by military officers.34  
Outside Peshawar the presence of the police is varied. In southern KP the presence of the 
police reduces to practically non-existent, although the paramilitary Frontier Constabulary (FC) 
is visible and does man check posts along arterial routes.35 In this part of KP, as is the case in 
FATA, the presence of the FC is primarily a show of state-backed force. The FC does not carry 
out a policing role, and very frequently avoids engaging tribal militants. Where conflicts have 
occurred, the FC has frequently suffered materiél and manpower losses.36 In the areas of law 
enforcement, the experience of southern KP and of FATA is that the state seeks to impose its 
presence through a show of force, but has no effective deterrent, investigative, or 
administrative role.  
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Observations by the author made in Peshawar July-September 2008. Also, interviews with police 
officials January, 2001. 
30
 Observations by the author made in Peshawar July-September 2008. Also, interviews with police 
officials January, 2001. Two police stations were visited in August 2008 that had been attacked by 
tribesmen and were, in both cases, totally destroyed.  
31
 This amounts to approximately seventy five UK pounds per month. In 2009, the federal government 
announced it would increase  police wages by 150%. In many cases, this has yet to occur. See: Paul 
Wiseman and Zafar Sheikh „Pakistani Police underfunded, overwhelmed‟ 5th May, 2009; 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-05-05-pakistancops_N.htm . Accessed 2
 nd
 March, 2011.  
32
  Conversation with police officers in Islamabad, January 2001, including participant observation with 
police officers in pursuit of a criminal suspect in Islamabad. 
33
 Observed by the author on numerous occasions between January 1999 and August 2002. Police 
officers often ask for some contribution to cover expenses for tea and food, euphemisms for bribery. 
Upon refusal, the vehicle of the motorist in question is often impounded for a period of some hours, 
necessitating the payment of a release fee.  
34
 Observations made by the author in Peshawar, January-March 2001, July-September, 2008.  
35
 Observed by the author in Kohat district, July-August 2008. 
36
 Observed by the author in Kohat district in 12
th
-14
th
 August 2008 where tribal militias had destroyed 
paramilitary bunkers following a firefight.  
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In contrast, there is an observable and obtrusive police presence in northeast parts of KP, 
including the districts of Haripur, Abbottabad, and lower Mansehra.37 Police- manned check-
posts are frequent along main roads as are patrols. The population of Abbotabad district is 
unique in that it includes a significant non-Pashtun element, given its proximity to both Punjab 
and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. This demographic was evident in the opposition to the 
renaming of NWFP as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in April 2010.38  
The reality of policing in Punjab is in stark contrast to the experience of much of KP. There is a 
far greater visibility of the police in Punjab than in KP, with obtrusive police check posts at 
most major intersections and visible armed patrols.39 Although Rawalpindi is a garrison town 
with a large military presence, a similar feature as Peshawar, the Punjab police patrol all parts 
of the city at all hours,40 a direct contrast with Peshawar. The Punjab police aggressively 
enforce motoring regulations and conduct investigations into criminality, another direct 
contrast with the police experience in Peshawar.41 This direct contrast in the role and 
functioning of the police is a manifestation of the contrast in the presence of the state in these 
provinces. The Punjab police, while as under-equipped as their colleagues in KP, enjoy some 
degree of confidence amongst the population and are a significant organ of the state 
administration in the province, and are the state’s most visible aspect. This situation is far 
removed from that in central and southern KP where the imposition of the state upon the 
province through the police force is minimal. 
5.4.2  The judiciary 
The presence and functioning of a state sanctioned judiciary is another key indicator through 
which the degree of presence of the state can be analysed. The Pakistani state has a 
functioning judiciary that draws on both civil and sharia sources of law. Each of the state’s four 
provinces has a high court, which sits in the provincial capital. There is an overall Federal 
                                                          
37
 Observed by the author in north-east KP province in Jan.-March 2001, Jan.-March 2002, July-August 
2008. 
38
 In April 2010, demonstrations among the Hazarawaal community, an indigenous Hindko speaking 
grouping in the vicinity of Abbotabad, were held in opposition to the renaming of NWFP as Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa. Demonstrators felt that the renaming of the province would undermine the 
representation of non-Pashtun communities present in the Abbotabad area. Some sought the 
demarcation of an ethnic Hazara administrative division. See: „Anti-Pakhtunkhwa protest in Hazara 
Body to hold talks with Hazara representatives‟ available at 14th April, 2010; 
http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?226466 . Accessed 2
nd
 March, 2011.    
39
 Observed by the author in Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore July-September 2008.  
40
 Observed by the author through 2000 and 2001 where the police in Rawalpindi frequently stopped 
vehicles, at all hours, and carried out obtrusive documentation and driver identification checks, 
occasionally searching vehicles. 
41
 Observed by the author in Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore July-September 2008.  
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Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction as well as a Federal Sharia Court with original and 
appellate jurisdiction.42  
The Pakistani judiciary has been marred by incidence of corruption and politicisation. During 
the tenure of Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), it was widely alleged that the Supreme Court had 
been staffed by appointments that were politically aligned with Musharraf.43 Following the 
resignation of Musharraf in August 2008, Supreme Court justices deposed by him were 
reinstated, suggesting a restoration of transparency in the judiciary. In January 2009, President 
Zardari consented to the instatement of 32 local and provincial judges appointed by the Chief 
Justice,44 another sign of the judiciary’s independent function. 
There is a functioning judiciary in KP based at the Provincial High Court in Peshawar. There are 
local and district magistrates in all settled districts. Barristers and lawyers are easily 
accessible.45 Despite this, there is a strong and widespread tendency amongst the population 
to seek arbitration outside of the court system. This trend, observable since the mid-1990’s 
but increasing in momentum since 2002, seeks to pursue arbitration in accordance with the 
tribal precedents and edicts embodied in pashtunwali, and in accordance with sharia law.46 
This has been the case across FATA due to the provisions of the FCR which mandates judicial 
powers for the tribal jirga process and limits the jurisdiction of the federal and provincial 
judiciaries.47 This situation is mirrored across PATA, arising from the primacy of tribal authority 
in the seven PATA agencies. However, this study finds that there is a trend towards non-state 
sanctioned adjudication, usually in the form of sharia courts, also across parts settled KP. 
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 An outline of Pakistan‟s judiciary is available on the government‟s portal. See: 
http://www.pak.gov.pk/structure_government.aspx. Accessed 6
 th
  March,  2010.  
43
 In March 2009, Musharraf rendered Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry „dysfunctional‟ replacing him 
with Justice Javed Iqbal in a move many considered an attempt at silencing the judiciary over concerns 
voiced on the issue of abductions carried out by intelligence agencies. See: Zeeshan Mansoor „Judicial 
Crisis in Pakistan: Musharraf goes after the Supreme Court‟ 19th March, 2007; 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?contex=va&aid=5122. Accessed 16
th
 March, 2011.  
44
 In February 2009, President Zardari appointed two senior judges without consultation with the Chief 
Justice. On being challenged by the judiciary, the President withdrew the appointments and instead 
consented to a wider series of appointments made by the Chief Justice. See See: Zeehsan Haider 
„Pakistan government averts judicial confrontation‟ 17th February, 2010; 
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-46243020100217 . Accessed 3
rd
 January, 2011.  
45
 Observed by the author in July-August 2008. Lawyers tend to congregate at the Katcheri, an outdoor 
meeting point complete with desks, typewriters, and secretarial staff, where their services are available 
for a fee.   
46
 Although Anderson (1979:137) points out the variance between pashtunwali and sharia as 
understood and practiced amongst the Ghilzai, in the experience of the Yusufzai and most of NWFP 
the two concepts are largely synonymous.  
47
 FATA, FCR & Human Rights: Challenges and Responses Parliamentarians Commission for Human 
Rights, Islamabad, September 2005, p. 4.  
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Part of the motivation for this growing trend has been the perceived inefficiencies within the 
civil law procedure in KP. Courts typically face a backlog of cases and decisions often come 
months or years after the submission of a petition.48 Lawyers typically charge rates for their 
services that are beyond the capabilities of many of the plaintiffs. In contrast, the sharia 
courts, or Qazi courts as they are widely referred to, provide an expedient form of justice that 
is comparatively more accessible to any potential plaintiff than the civil court system.49  
It is this expedient form of sharia justice, and the greater cultural affinity for it amongst the 
Yusufzai, that is the principal motivation behind the drive for sharia courts across northern KP 
province, including the districts of Bajaur, Dir, Swat and Malakand.50 The TNSM movement 
among the predominantly Yusufzai tribesmen of northern KP led by Sufi Mohammad, 
established courts that adjudicated according to the Yusufzai conception of sharia law across 
much of the territories in which the group had influence in the late 1990’s.51 Initially, these 
courts functioned as an alternative structure through which the local population could seek 
arbitration and adjudication. Following their success, the sharia courts began to function as a 
replacement of the existing provincial judiciary. The fact that the sharia court concept spread 
rapidly across a significant portion of KP province despite the presence of the provincial court 
system suggests that, in popular Pashtun perception, the sharia courts were considered a 
legitimate source of arbitration, a perception the provincial judicial system lacked. 
Beyond northern KP, the trend for sharia adjudication has spread across southern KP and all of 
FATA. FATA is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation, a pre-Partition system through 
which the political agent in each agency nominally oversees the implementation of 
pashtunwali edicts through jirga. Article 247 (7) of the Pakistani constitution enshrines the 
status of FATA beyond the legislative and judicial reach of parliament,52 and thus forms the 
constitutional basis of FATA’s judicial exclusivity. The void left by the absence of a state 
sanctioned judiciary in FATA has been filled by tribally based sharia courts that extend their 
                                                          
48In May 2009, Pakistan‟s Chief Justice announced a „National Judicial Policy‟ aimed at clearing the 
backlog facing the judiciary and speeding up the judicial process. See: „National Judicial Policy 2009: 
A year for focus on Justice at the Grassroots Level‟ http://www.sindhhighcourt.gov.pk/njp2009.pdf. 
Accessed 22
nd
 January, 2011.  
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 Syed Shoaib Hassan „Swat Taleban find Sharia a challenge‟ 24th March, 2009; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7959100.stm. Accessed 16
 th
 March, 2011.  
50
 Sohail Abdul Nasir „Religious Organisation TNSM Re-emerges in Pakistan’ 17th May, 2006; 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=740&tx_ttnews[backPid]=239&n
o_cache=1.  Accessed 16
th
 March, 2011. 
51
  „Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) Movement for the Enforcement of the Islamic 
Sharia‟ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/tnsm.htm. Accessed  12th January, 2011. 
52
 FATA, FCR & Human Rights: Challenges and Responses Parliamentarians Commission for Human 
Rights, Islamabad, September 2005, p. 4.  
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remit to an entire zai. While the jirga structure persists in FATA, sharia courts address a wide 
variety of issues deemed too insignificant for jirga. Hence, sharia courts are currently 
established in Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, Karak  and Hangu in southern KP,53 in addition 
to being established in Malakand, Dir, Swat and Shangla in northern KP under the aegis of the 
TNSM. 
The example of the judiciary demonstrates the diminishing role of the state across much of KP. 
The legal writ of the court is a fundamental aspect of the writ of a state. In bypassing the state 
established court system, borderlanders are enhancing the trend of the borderland towards 
autonomy from the institutions of the state. This trend, in so far as the judiciary is concerned, 
is at least partially resultant from the inefficiencies in the conduct of the local, district and 
provincial courts in KP. The lack of effectiveness of the courts occurs against a backdrop of an 
existent alternative judicial process that emanates directly from the pashtunwali mandated 
institution of jirga and tribal affinity for sharia courts. This alternative, in the form of the 
sharia or Qazi courts, is a pre-state judicial process that is re-emerging along with the general 
resurgence of pre-state tribal polity and identity.  
5.4.3 Education 
State schools are a visible and widespread manifestations of the presence of the state. In the 
field of education, the state sector in Pakistan is very weak, manifest in a literacy rate of 
around 40%, and a rate in KP of around 30%.54 Literacy rates in FATA are considerably lower, 
varying considerably across the seven agencies. In the absence of an effective state sector in 
education in KP and FATA, two alternative autonomous systems have emerged. One is the 
growing area of private schools, while the other is the rapidly expanding network of 
madrassas.  
Private schools tend to be based in the major population centres of Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi, 
Kohat and Mansehra.55 Less developed localities may also have private schools, but these are 
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 Abdul Saboor Khan „Taliban impose sharia in Hangu‟ 3rd January, 2009. 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009/01/01/story_3-1-2009_pg7_1. Accessed 21
st
 
January, 2011. 
54
 Estimates of literacy rates in KP vary greatly from 30% to over 50%. This is partly due to the fact 
that higher rates of literacy are concentrated in and around Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi and Mansehra 
where there are private schools. Large areas of KP are without any formal education structure, and 
hence reflect a lower rate of literacy. The provincial government claims a province wide rate of literacy 
of 64% for males and 26% for females. See; http://www.nwfpfinance.gov.pk/chapter101.php . The 
CMDO, an NGO working to improve literacy in KP, reports a provincial literacy rate (in aggregate)of 
35.4%. See; http://www.cmdo.org/?q=node/8. Retrieved 8
th
 March, 2010.   
55
 Private schools were observed in these localities by the author between January 2001 and August 
2002. 
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sometimes little more than informal gatherings in fields or in a residential compound.56 The 
quality of education varies greatly between various private schools and between different 
localities. Private schools in Mansehra for example conduct studies in an English/Urdu medium 
involving professionally qualified staff and conventional ICT technologies. 57  In South 
Waziristan, in contrast, schools consist of some learning of Urdu, basic arithmetic and basic 
literacy usually conducted by a non-professional teacher with no teaching qualifications and in 
accordance with no discernable curriculum.58  
Madrassas have proliferated across KP and FATA, in both rural localities and major towns and 
cities. Madrassas tend to be fully autonomous initiatives usually established by collective 
consent in a particular locality. As a cultural norm, Pashtun clans usually nominate an 
individual or family to be responsible for the performance of religious rites. However the role 
of such ‘clergy’ varies between tribes. The Yusufzai, as recorded by Barth (1959: 92) and 
Ahmed (1976: 51), tend to value the clergy and establish for them a central role in the political 
life of the tribe. This is in contrast to the Waziri and the Ghilzai who tend to limit the role of 
clergy to the performance of religious rites (Anderson 1979: 49, 238). Despite this variation, 
madrassas are widespread across all districts of KP and FATA.  
The objective of madrassas is to impart religious knowledge from classical Arabic texts in 
preparing students to be able to function as clergymen on a village level. In addition to this, 
madrassas fulfil an essential social role, that of providing food, shelter and clothing to many of 
the poorest children in KP and FATA. As such, madrassas function to fulfil the state’s 
responsibility of providing some semblance of care for children who are often orphans or from 
highly impoverished backgrounds. This phenomenon was most evident in the aftermath of the 
earthquake of 2005 resulting in a large number of orphans in KP.59 
Since 2003, the government of Pakistan has sought to diminish the proliferation of madrassas 
in KP and regulate existing ones through establishing a system of registration with state 
authorities, leading to the provision of formal education in temporal subjects.60 Despite the 
large amount of funding that was received by the Pakistani government from international 
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 Observed in Kohistan, August 2008. Such school charge nominal fees, and serve as a primer before 
children are able to move to established schools in major population centres. Activities include basic 
literacy in Urdu and numeracy. 
57
 Observed in Mansehra and Abbotabad in August, 2008. Some schools offer both English and Urdu 
mediums of instruction. 
58
 Interview with NCO-A, upper Pakhli, KP, 3
rd
 September, 2008.  
59
 This was observed in Mansehra district in August 2008, in a visit to such a madrassa. 
60
 Zafar Abbas „Madrassas resist regulation drive‟ 24th August, 2005; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4181056.stm. Accessed  16
th
 March, 2011.  
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donors towards this initiative,61 the Pakistani government was unable to make any significant 
impact in the number and orientation of the madrassas, although it did succeed in registering 
a large number of the madrassas in KP and FATA, and in establishing a protocol through which 
militancy and weapons-related activities were virtually eliminated from suspected 
madrassas.62 
The proliferation of independent madrassas dedicated to imparting Islamic canonical 
knowledge and training with respect to Islamic rites has increased immensely in recent years 
across KP and FATA. This trend is occurring as the state school system in KP and FATA 
particularly remains largely inadequate to deal with the demands of the population in the 
province. As such, the emergence of these madrassas represents a further example of the 
receding nature of the state in KP where one of the most fundamental responsibilities of the 
state, education and literacy, is being carried out by local clan and tribe-based initiatives that 
orient education and literacy in the direction of Islamic theological knowledge within a tribal 
context to produce mullahs. This has resulted in a province-wide alternative education outside 
state regulation, that has no declared function of political-socialisation and acculturation with 
concepts and ideals arising from a state founded educational curriculum.  The implication is 
that this alternative educational system is producing individuals educated in a tribal context, 
dominated by pashtunwali and Islamist austerity, resulting in a psycho-socially distance from 
the state, and an affinity for tribal, pashtunwali derived authority.   
5.4.4 Firearms 
Firearms are an important aspect of culture among tribal Pashtuns. The security of the kor is a 
central element in the conduct of the individual and the family. Many homesteads are 
surrounding by fortified walls between 1M and 2M thick, and have murchee (firing holes in 
fortifications atop walls).63 The ownership and display of firearms is an important aspect of this 
protection of the homestead. Although settled districts do not manifest the frequency and 
                                                          
61„Britain doubles aid to Pakistan‟ 3rd July, 2008; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7486948.stm . Accessed  
22
nd
 January, 2011.  
62
 Interview with an Imam at madrassas Dar al Uluum Khwajgaan in northern Mansehra district who 
related the protocols followed by state intelligence officials in seeking to prevent madrassas from 
becoming centres for militancy 4
th
 September, 2008. 
63
 Observed in Afridi territories, August 2008. A destroyed FC check-post less than a mile from some 
fortified homesteads was also observed. A guide explained the kinetics of the destruction of the check- 
post.   
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scale of threat from rival clans as is seen in the tribal agencies, firearm ownership is 
widespread.64  
The regulation and control of firearm possession is an area in which the state is ineffective.  
Firearms are widely available in KP particularly. There is no accurate record of the number of 
firearms in KP, but estimates place the number of ubiquitous AK-47 copies at over two million, 
with that number again of a variety of shotguns and pistols.65 In 2002, the government of 
Pakistan proclaimed a freeze on the issuance of licenses for gun ownership and threatened to 
impose heavy fines and prison sentences on individuals caught with guns without the 
appropriate licensing.66 In the major cities in Punjab, this had the effect of people surrendering 
weapons, under an amnesty  program, to avoid severe penalties.67 In KP province, however, 
such an impact did not occur although the government did seek to impose its writ in this area 
forcefully.68 
Widespread unlicensed gun ownership has continued in KP, largely in disregard of the 2002 
statute outlawing unlicensed weapons, and limiting the type of weapons allowed.69 Since 
2006, there has been a steady increase in illegal gun ownership, largely in light of the 
deteriorating security situation in the cities of KP as opportunist criminals seek to exploit the 
prevailing trend of tribal militancy across the province. This trend has increased steeply in 
2008 and 2009.70 
While the demand for firearms has increased across KP as a result of widespread insecurity, 
parts of eastern KP have seen an opposing trend. Although the demand for firearms remains 
high, gun sales in areas such as Abbotabad and the adjoining district of Mansehra have been 
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 Every home visited in the duration of field work had firearms, although not always prominently 
displayed. 
65
 Discussions with Brigadier A, Islamabad, August 2008. 
66
 Despite varying coverage in the press on exactly what the penalties would be and which weapons 
would be affected by the legislation, and indeed whether or not the legislation would be enacted, 
interviews with gun shop owners in 2002-3 in Islamabad and Peshawar suggested that seizures and 
prosecutions had indeed been undertaken, as had a ban on the issuance of new licenses. For press 
coverage of the issue between 2001-2003, see 
http://www.gunpolicy.org/Topics/Guns_In_Pakistan.html . Accessed 19
th
 March, 2010. 
67
 The amnesty preceded the enforcement of the licensing laws which, when implemented, did lead to a 
large-scale recovery of illegal weapons. See: „Pakistan launches arms amnesty‟ 5th June, 2001; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1371207.stm . Accessed 16
th
 January, 2011. 
68
 A case observed by the author in March 2002 in Mansehra district, where police arrested a hunter 
using an unlicensed weapon, precipitating a jirga to attain his release.  
69
 Observed across KP July-Sept. 2008. An increase in prices for small arms across KP has been 
attributed to a shortage in weapons arising from increased demand. Interview with Muhammad 
Shakeel, Darra Adam Khel, August 2008.  
70
 See: ‟Political Patronage, PM Flood Pakistan with 400,000 Private Gun Permits‟ available at 
http://www.gunpolicy.org/Topics/Guns_In_Pakistan.html. Accessed  19
th
 March, 2010. 
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reduced and the presence of armouries and gun shops has decreased.71 Incidents of violent 
crime are also less frequent than in Peshawar and its environs,72 although the Pakhli plain and 
Tor Ghar are plagued by frequent home robberies by armed gangs.73  
This trend appears to be resultant from a number of factors. As has been established in this 
chapter, eastern KP, including Mansehra and Abbotabad, manifests many more attributes of 
the state than northern and southern KP. In addition to this, the area manifests a relatively 
heterogeneous population including Awans, Kashmiris and Punjabis. Hence the cultural affinity 
with firearms manifest amongst tribal Pashtuns is less prevalent in eastern KP.74 This is in stark 
contrast to the situation in Kohat and southern parts of KP where the weapons industry, 
although unregulated and technically illegal, is growing and continues to provide employment 
and economic opportunity to many tribesmen.75 Hence, this study finds that the relative 
reduction in the prevalence of firearms in eastern KP is a manifestation of the presence of the 
state’s administrative and judicial organs in the districts of Abbotabab, Haripur and southern 
Mansehra.  
The preceding analysis of elements of civil administration demonstrates the lack of presence 
of the Pakistani state across much of KP, PATA and FATA. Analysis reveals that the provincial 
civil administration has a weak presence, concentrated in Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi and 
Charsadda, and eastern districts of Mansehra and Abbotabad where the presence of the civil 
administration is notable. In addition to having a weak presence across the province, the civil 
administration is dominated by the military in its structure and functioning. This role of the 
military has functioned to weaken the civil administration, and has distanced the tribal 
population of the borderland from it. The employment of the military in operations across 
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 Over a five year period from July 2003 to July 2008, a substantive decrease in the number of gun 
shops was observed across the northern parts of KP and Peshawar. Discussions with proprietors 
suggest that this trend was largely the result of changes in legislation instituting severe punishment for 
possession of unlicensed arms. Discussions also revealed that the overwhelming majority of arms sales 
prior to that period were to unlicensed customers. 
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 Although accurate statistics related to violent crime are not kept, largely because most crimes go 
unreported, Peshawar demonstrated a number of violent crimes such as murder and abduction for 
ransom each day reported in the local press. There was no such report, whether in the press or brought 
to the awareness of officials through other means, in August 2008 in the Mansehra division. However, 
January and February 2010 brought a number of bombings of aid agencies and personnel perpetrated 
by suspected Islamist militants.  
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 Observed by the author in September 2008 in the upper Pakhli plain where homesteads are well 
armed and movement in vehicles requires the presence of a firearm, particularly after dark. An incident 
involving a vehicle was observed in passing through an area of intense foliage, between Baffa and 
Khwajgan, 4
th
 September, 2008. 
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 The north-east part of KP is home to a substantive population of ethnic Gujjars who speak Hindko 
and are outside the Pashtun shajara. Weapons do not figure as prominently in Gujjar cultural norms as 
they do amongst Pashtuns.   
75
 Observed by the author in Kohat district 12
th
-14th August 2008.  
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FATA has further alienated tribesmen from that institution, a trend that began following the 
initial deployment of the military in FATA in mid 2002. This alienation of the borderland from 
both civil and military organs of the Pakistani state has been a key catalyst in the resurgence of 
tribal authority across FATA, PATA and adjacent districts of KP during this timeframe. 
5.4.5 Civil administration in Afghanistan 
As has been explored in section 5.2 addressing the writ of the state, the state in Afghanistan 
has been in a condition of crisis of legitimacy for most of its history. The state, as an identity 
and as institutions, has failed to displace the primacy of tribally based identity, authority, 
adjudication and territoriality which are predominant in the south and east of Afghanistan, 
particularly in the borderland. In contrast, Anderson (1979: 67) observes that it is the tribe 
that has been able to penetrate and in cases manipulate the institutions of state to further 
tribal interests, resulting in a perpetuation of the failure of the state to assimilate the tribe.76 
In the central highlands and north of the country, however, the state has historically had an 
impact and continues to do so currently. This has been attributed to the fact that the 
population in the north tends to be predominantly non-Pashtun, exhibiting a less clearly 
defined segmentary patrilineal culture than the Pashtun in the south. Hence, the northern 
population tends not to exhibit enduring pre-state structures of polity on a tribal level, 
creating fewer obstacles for assimilation into the state in comparison to the Pashtun. The 
numerical inferiority of each of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazarajat populations vis-à-vis the 
Pashtun has tended to create a perception among these minority populations, of the state as a 
vehicle through which to project political influence to counter the numerical domination of 
Afghanistan by the Pashtun. Structures of the Afghan state, therefore, have always reflected a 
notable presence of Tajik participants, although the executive function has remained 
exclusively Pashtun since the tenure of Amir Abdur-Rahman (1880-1901). 
Currently, southern and eastern Afghanistan are characterised by the absence of the state. 
Any semblance of effective administration is limited to Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar. Cities in 
northern Afghanistan manifest a comparatively more effective presence of the state than in 
the south.77 The cities of Kunduz, Badghis, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif78 have emerged from the 
                                                          
76
 This observation was further supported by Dr. Shaista Wahab, in discussions at Omaha, Nebraska 
during December 2008, where Dr. Wahab highlighted the resurgence of Ghilzai authority through 
Afghan state between 1978 and 1992.  
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 Rajiv Chandrasekaran „7 U.S. Troops Killed in Attacks in Afghanistan‟ 6th July, 
2009;http://www.washingpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/06/AR2009070600191.html . 
Accessed 30
th
 January, 2011.  
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 Although Mazar-e-Sharif has been relatively peaceful and has seen the widespread presence of 
Afghan police and ANA personnel, Hekmatyaar‟s Hizb-e-Islami is still active in the area. See: Tony 
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post-2001 break down of authority that resulted from the US and NATO led invasion of 
Afghanistan and do manifest the presence of the Afghan state through structures of civil 
administration.79 However, the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktiya, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni, 
Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar and many of the areas surrounding Kabul continue to be 
characterised by the absence of any effective administration and the absence of the writ of 
the state. 80  In these provinces, almost all structures providing human developmental 
assistance are NGOs. The ministry of health has effectively relinquished its function to NGOs81 
which operate with little or no support from the Afghan government, often in danger of 
reprisal from militias who see them as an instrument of NATO intervention.82 There is a 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs, recently renamed as the Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs,83 but 
since 2010, it has been eclipsed in function by the Ministry for Refugees. The Ministry of Tribal 
and Border Affairs is now practically defunct, a fitting metaphor for the presence of the Afghan 
state amongst the predominantly Ghilzai clans in the vicinity of the Durand Line and Durrani 
clans in southern Kandarhar province. 
The ethno-linguistic and tribal barriers to state consolidation in Afghanistan are compounded 
by constitutionally mandated centralism. Article one hundred thirty seven of Afghanistan’s 
2003 constitution states that, in the context of delegating authority to local government, it 
seeks to preserve the principle of centralism.84 This is in response to the serious threat of 
fragmentation along a north-south divide facing the country in the aftermath of the failure of 
the mujahideen government and the Taliban. However, the centralism of the Afghan state 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Cross „Conspiracy theories blossom as violence increases in northern Afghanistan‟17th November, 
2009; http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/119/article_5872.asp . Accessed 29th January, 2011.   
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 This is manifest in projects as wide ranging as  the construction of a new airport (See:  Ministry of 
transport and Civil Aviation Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; http://www.motca.v.af/?id=104 accessed 
23
rd
 January, 2011), and support to the provincial judiciary (See: „Unit Nations Development 
Programme Afghanistan Support to Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism‟; 
http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Justice/PJCM_Q308_Report.pdf accessed 23
rd
 January 2011). 
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 See Ahmed Rashid „Afghanistan: Taleban‟s second coming‟ 2nd June, 2006; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5029190.stm. Accessed 24
th
 January, 2011. 
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 World Bank Report  „Afghanistan Building an Effective State‟  10th June, 2008; 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21
799277~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html. Accessed 12
th
  February, 2011. 
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 Discussion with representative of the Afghan NGO Safety Office, an EU initiative in Afghanistan, 
who wishes to remain anonymous. 
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 The Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs appeared to have no practical function, not even 
addressing the perennial conflicts between migrant Kuchi tribes and the Hazarajat whose lands through 
which they migrate, an issue ostensibly under the jurisdiction of the ministry. See: Fabrizio Foschini 
„The Kuchi-Hazara Conflict, Again‟ 17th May, 2010; http://www.aan-
afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=764. Accessed  16
th
 March, 2011. Its minister, Abdul Karim Brahui is a 
valuable Baluch ally of Karzai, and it appears he is being maintained in an administrative role as a 
political imperative.  
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 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Secretariat of the Constitutional 
Commission, Kabul, 2004 p. 37. 
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functions to impede the development of provincial authority, thereby rendering political and 
social reforms as centrally mandated. Such centrally mandated provisions are invariably 
regarded by the tribal Pashtun southerners as an interference by, and imposition of, Kabul 
based rivals in their affairs. 
 Another major challenge to the effective establishment of the writ of the state beyond those 
major cities in the north and Kabul where the state does have a decisive presence, is the 
dynamic of informal power structures and relationships. Such relationships continue to 
dominate the political medium in Afghanistan, 85  reducing the effectiveness of 
institutionalisation of power and influence through transparent structures. These relationships 
are predominantly tribal and clan in nature, and are considered to represent the actual 
dynamics of power and authority in Afghanistan. However, this informal dynamic involves the 
Durrani disproportionately vis-à-vis the Ghilzai. Unlike the Durrani, from whom almost all of 
Afghanistan’s rulers over the last two centuries have been, the Ghilzai are resistant to the 
emergence of representation beyond the level of clan (Anderson 1979: 216). This makes it 
very difficult to assimilate Ghilzai tribesmen into even the informal structures of power. 
 Thus the Afghan state faces tribally based resistance to its writ, predominantly amongst the 
Ghilzai, impeding the establishment of effective state administration across the borderland 
and the larger region of Ghilzai presence in the south and east of the country. The failure of 
the state to establish its effective writ is exacerbated by deep ethno-linguistically based 
divisions amongst the constituent minorities in Afghanistan, each concentrated in a separate 
area of the country. The insistence of the state on a centralist political culture, derived from 
fears of division along ethno-linguistic lines, is functioning to further distance the south from 
the centre. Concerns of Ghilzai tribesmen in the south over external interference in tribal and 
clan autonomy are bolstered by the existence of informal power structures that are non-
transparent, and tend to be dominated by the Durrani. 
5.5 Militancy 
5.5.1 Militancy and doing Pashto 
Militancy in the Afghan borderland has two core elements. There is a perpetual condition of 
militancy fuelled by tribal and clan rivalries which is a determining feature of Pashtun tribal 
dynamics in the borderland. There is militancy focused on the state and its international 
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partners in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. These two elements, ostensibly distinct in their 
processes, are intertwined in that the driving agent in both cases is the tribe or clan, driven to 
protect the autonomy of its zai from both immediate and larger, structural threats.86  
Militancy, or the organised employment of militant force on a sub-state level, is an enduring 
feature of Pashtun tribal society and reflects a strongly perceptible tribal dimension across 
FATA and the adjoining areas of KP province.  Each tribe or significant clan has a standing 
lashkar or arbakai which is employed in conflicts with neighbouring clans and tribes. These 
conflicts may emerge over grazing rights, transportation and thoroughfare rights, from long-
standing blood feuds, or part of the shifting structure of alliances that characterises the 
enduring political reality amongst the tribes. As a result of the almost exclusive autonomy 
within the tribal zai enjoyed by each tribe or significant clan across FATA, tribal lashkars have 
evolved into formidable fighting forces using modern weapons and communication devices as 
well as modern tactics.87  
Tribal conflicts are perpetual and typically claim dozens of lives per altercation. Such conflicts 
are most intense in South and North Waziristan, the Kurram agency, and the Khyber agency.88 
In addition to the main tribal and clan conflicts occurring in these agencies, there is also 
opportune violence on a clan or household/ familial basis that tends to erupt suddenly, is short 
lived and is often in response to a specific event or specific opportunity. Historically, the 
Pakistani military has tended to avoid direct involvement in tribal conflicts, concerning itself 
primarily with the containment of the effect of such conflicts upon neighbouring tribes, clans 
and towns.89 
In 2002, however, the Pakistani military entered the tribal areas in force in the pursuit of 
suspected al- Qaeda fugitives.90 In the following years, the Pakistani military has sought to 
isolate personalities within tribes suspected of harbouring al-Qaeda fugitives and significant 
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 Rahimullah Yusufzai has elaborated upon the impact of tribal competition among the FATA tribes 
upon the functioning of the TTP, with particular focus upon South Waziristan and Bajaur. The trend is 
more evident in South Waziristan between the Mehsud and Wazir than in Bajaur. Swat presents yet a 
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members of the original Taliban militia that took Kabul in 1996.91 By 2006, the Pakistani 
military was facing trans-tribal militant opposition to its presence across FATA (Nawaz 2009: 
9). This opposition has since expanded to all of the tribal agencies and a number of adjacent 
areas of KP, including Dir and Malakand in northern KP, and Kohat, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan 
in southern KP. From the perspective of the tribesmen, the conflict currently underway in 
FATA and KP resembles a trans-tribal militancy aimed at reversing the presence of the 
Pakistani military which is considered an alien or foreign force (Nawaz 2009: 18-20). 
5.5.2 The Structure of militancy in the borderland 
From an organisational perspective, the Pakistani Taliban, as anti-state insurgents in FATA 
have come to be known since 2005, is fractious, does not work in a coordinated manner across 
FATA and KP,92 and is given to numerous divisions along tribal and clan lines.93 The Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as the organisation is formally known, was most recently led by 
Hakimullah Mehsud based in northern South Waziristan. Following allegations of his death 
from injuries sustained in a suspected US drone attack in January 2010, before re-emerging by 
April 2010 as injured but alive, Hakimullah’s absence initiated a contest for leadership 
between a number of principal tribesmen who are considered the next tier of Mehsud 
leadership.  Amongst them were Qari Hussain Ahmed (a cousin of Hakimullah Mehsud), Wali 
ur Rahman (a Mehsud clansman of Hakimullah), and Noor Jamaal (an Orakzai with whom 
Hakimullah associated prior to January 2010). The pronouncement by Noor Jamaal that he 
would assume leadership over the TTP in March 2010 exacerbated the divisions within the 
organisation along clan lines. By April 2010, no clear leader had emerged and the organisation 
appeared to have been eclipsed by militancy along clan lines. The re-emergence of Hakimullah 
in April 2010 appeared to have ameliorated these divisions to a significant degree, although 
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 Comments made by Major Gen. Shaukat Sultan at Peshawar University, Area Study Centre, 
December 2004. 
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 A countering view is put forward by Claudio Franco who asserts that the TTP bypasses tribal 
structures in its operations and organisation and functions as an organisationally centralised yet 
operationally diffuse structure. This study proposes that, while Franco‟s perception does reflect the 
conditions surrounding the TTP between late 2007 and late 2009, events since then – including 
leadership struggles following the death of Baitullah and the alleged death of Hakimullah, and the 
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was previously understood to be. For Claudio Franco‟s perspective see: Claudio Franco „The Tehreek-
e-Taliban Pakistan‟  in Decoding the New Taliban (ed. Antonio Giustozzi) Columbia University Press, 
New York, 2009 pp. 269-289. 
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 Following reports of the death of Hakimullah Mehsud in January 2010, a number of potential leaders 
of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged.  These included Qari Hussain Ahmed Mehsud - a 
cousin of Hakimullah Mehsud, Wali ur Rahman Mehsud, and Noor Jamaal Orakzai. The potential for 
fragmentation between Mehsud and Orakzai elements of the TTP was heightened when Noor Jamaal 
proclaimed himself leader of the TTP in February 2010. Other elements of the organisation include the 
Abdullah Mehsud group which split from the main body of the TTP following the death of Abdullah 
Mehsud in 2007. Also, see the following notes referring to the examples of Qari Zainuddin and Nazir 
Ahmedzai Waziri. 
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the leadership of Hakimullah appears more tenuous than it was prior to his being injured by 
the drone attack in January 2010.   
Within North and South Waziristan, the Mehsud face strong opposition from a number of 
Waziri tribal leaders. This opposition has manifested itself in a number of inter-tribal and inter-
clan conflagrations and reciprocal assassinations, further escalating the confrontation 
between the Mehsud and the Waziri, as well as between clans within the Mehsud.94  
As is to be expected in such a scenario, the Pakistani military has sought to opportunely align 
itself with elements of the Waziri tribe95 to bolster opposition to the Mehsud who will 
continue to dominate the Pakistani Taliban whatever formulation it takes. However, this 
alignment has met with limited success as many elements of the Waziri tribe continue to voice 
support for militancy against the NATO presence in southern Afghanistan, particularly in the 
Helmand province,96 despite being allied with the Pakistani army against the Mehsud. Given 
the fact that the Pakistani military is politically aligned with the US and NATO in Afghanistan, it 
becomes difficult for the Pakistani military to sustain support for those Waziri engaged in 
militancy against the NATO led alliance despite the fact that those tribesmen may be in 
opposition to the Mehsud who remain the principal adversary for the Pakistani military in 
FATA.97 
                                                          
94
 In June 2009, Qari Zainuddin Mehsud, a rival of Baiutllah Mehsud was assassinated in South 
Waziristan. Zainuddin was from the Shaman Khel clan of the Mehsud while Baitullah hails from the 
Shobi Khel.  See: Mukhtar Khan „A Profile of the Late Qari Zainuddin Mahsud-Waziristan Militant 
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Monica, 2010.   
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In addition to the two Waziristans, another node of militancy in FATA is the Bajaur agency at 
the northern tip of FATA, adjacent to the Dir district in KP. Anti-state insurgency in the Bajaur 
agency erupted in 2006 following a series of missile strikes across Bajaur, purportedly carried 
out by US forces.98 One strike in particular hit the village of Khar, resulting in over 80 casualties 
of whom most were young adult madrassa students.99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100The 2006 missile strikes precipitated a tribally based movement for revenge against US 
forces, and against the Pakistani military which was widely seen as having facilitated the 
alleged US action through providing airspace and intelligence. The Khar strike was followed by 
a series of attacks throughout late 2006 and early 2007 against Pakistani military facilities and 
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 Witnesses reported that before the Pakistan army aviation helicopters arrived, a US drone flew over 
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 See: „Pakistan madrassas raid kills 80‟ 30th October, 2006; 
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militancy against the military and the state. The size of symbols reflects the relative intensity of the 
feature; i.e. a larger circle represent a node of greater militancy than a smaller circle and the width of 
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encampments across KP.101 Concurrently, in the adjacent Dir and Malakand districts, Sufi 
Muhammad's organisation continued to press for the establishment of sharia law courts 
across the areas where the TNSM had support, an area which correlates largely with the 
Yusufzai populated areas, the same tribe prevalent in Bajaur. This trend did not extend to 
Mardan, Swabi and Charsadda, all Yusufzai areas in which state institutions continue to 
function comparatively effectively.102 
By 2008, the success of the TNSM movement soon attracted a number of militants from across 
KP and FATA, describing themselves as loyalists of the Pakistani Taliban, but not exhibiting any 
particular loyalty to the then leader of the TTP, Baitullah Mehsud, then based in northern 
South Waziristan.103 Through 2008 and 2009, these militants initiated a campaign to pursue 
the expansion of territory in and around Swat in which sharia law would be implemented 
exclusively. During this time period, this movement began to generate popular support in the 
adjacent areas of Mansehra and Kohistan also, an expected development given the Yusufzai 
nature of the population across this entire area. Given the strategic salience of Swat and 
Mansehra with regards to Kashmir, and proximity to the Pakistani capital city of Islamabad, the 
Pakistani military was unwilling to concede these areas to the militants and thus engaged in a 
months long campaign to reverse the hold of militants over Swat and the adjacent Yusufzai 
areas after a truce between the state and militants brokered by Sufi Muhammad collapsed.104 
While the military has since been successful in diminishing the hold of the militants over the 
area, 105  it has not been successful in dislodging the calls for sharia, and the continued support 
for the cause of Sufi Mohammad.106 
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A further aspect of the militancy that enhances the profile of the tribes that wage it is the 
strategic depth they enjoy in terms of FATA, KP and Afghanistan. Militants from southern 
Afghanistan can escape operations conducted against them, for example by NATO forces, by 
retreating into FATA and into KP.107 Further, the militancy in Afghanistan draws recruits from 
FATA and KP, and vice versa with militancy in FATA and KP drawing militants from 
Afghanistan.108 Pakistan has expressed concern that the US troop build up in Afghanistan, 
underway since mid-2010109 will eventually force a movement of insurgents across the border 
into Baluchistan and FATA,110 a trend not yet evident in January 2011. As a result, the non-
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is being exploited by militants on both sides 
because, while it is fully disregarded by them, it is not disregarded by NATO, the US, and 
Pakistan, acting as a force delimiter on the operations of each.111 It is within this context that 
the Obama administration issued a series of policy proclamations dealing with Af-Pak, a 
synonym describing the unique trans-border nature of militancy in the Afghan borderland that 
encompasses so much of southern Afghanistan, FATA and adjoining parts of KP province.112 
With regards to whether or not this growth in militancy across FATA, KP and southern 
Afghanistan represents an expanding borderland, it has to be borne in mind that in the case of 
Afghan side of the borderland, the borderland is not so much expanding against a state as it is 
demonstrating the resurgence of tribal authority in the absence of any effective state 
presence. Hence, in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the state following the US and NATO 
led invasion of 2001, and the political vacuum that was subsequently created through it, tribal 
authorities have re-emerged and now constitute the sole source of authority in large parts of 
southern Afghanistan. The resurgence of tribal authority has driven, and then been further 
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fuelled by, the militancy that dominates the political landscape of southern Afghanistan. The 
former commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General McKiernan, stated before 
his dismissal from duty in January 2009, that the militancy in Afghanistan had taken on a tribal 
dynamic, a dynamic that, due to its complexities, the US would be unable to exploit.113 
Subsequently, a number of senior US army officers have encouraged the circulation of a study 
entitled One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan (Grant 2009), detailing an 
approach to tribal engagement that has been adopted by US special forces, founded upon a 
long-term engagement with tribal and clan leaders in order to turn them away from 
supporting the anti-NATO insurgency by demonstrating how their own long-term interests 
would be better served by offering assistance to US forces (Grant 2009: 13-18). A core premise 
is that being aligned with the US will invariably act at once as a deterrent and force multiplier 
for tribes and clans facing larger enemies.  
In the case of Pakistan, the pan-tribal militancy is an indicator of the resurgence of tribal 
authority across FATA where the civil administration has had a weak presence that is further 
eroding. The employment of the Pakistani military in FATA since mid 2002 has functioned to 
enhance the profile of tribal lashkars engaged in insurgency against the presence of the 
military in their respective zai. The reliance of the Pakistani state upon the military in seeking 
to establish the writ of the state across KP and FATA has resulted in both a weakening of the 
civil administration due to competition with the military, and greater alienation of tribesmen 
from the state more generally on account of the military’s imposition upon the autonomy of 
tribal zai. The confluence of these effects has resulted in two parallel developments. Firstly, as 
has been identified, the cumulative result of these developments is that tribal authority is 
ascendant across the Pakistani side of the borderland, mirroring the situation on the Afghan 
side. Secondly, the territorial scope of the borderland on the Pakistani side is expanding, 
details of which are identified in Chapter Seven. This expansion is synonymous with the 
effective withdrawal of the civil administration of the state from areas of KP adjacent with the 
borderland, and the emergence of tribally based structures of authority, judiciary and security 
in these areas. 
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 Comments made by former commander of US and NATO forces Gen. McKiernan in remarks made 
at the Atlantic Council on 18
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5.6 Conclusions 
In its attempts to accommodate, restructure or dismantle underlying pre-colonial 
substructures, the postcolonial state in Asia uses economic, educational and infrastructural 
development as an incentive for sub-state rivals to adopt the state enterprise. These civil 
initiatives are often accompanied by an employment of the military prior to, during and 
following such developmental initiatives. Turkey’s Greater Anatolia Project, a vast system of 
dams and irrigation in the southeast of the country (Kibaroglu 2002: 2-4), has been touted by 
the Turkish government as creating agricultural and economic opportunities for the tribal 
people of the southeast, who are predominantly tribal Kurds. It is a central part of the Turkish 
state’s approach to assimilating its southeast, along with an enduring military component of 
that initiative which was employed on a large scale as recently as May 2008.114  
In the case of Pakistan, the state has alternately provided and withheld free electricity, road 
construction, and the provision of schools and clinics in FATA in order to bring about the 
desired orientation of the Afridi, Mohmand, Mehsud, Waziri and Orakzai tribes particularly. 
This approach, combined with the nikkat and lungi system, has proven to be an effective 
means through which to manage, or moderate, tribal dissention. In the case of Afghanistan, 
the state is altogether absent, with vital services either non-existent or provided by NGOs 
whose presence and activities constitute the only social support mechanism in the areas of 
health care, infrastructure development, and non-religious education.  
These approaches have led to the state being eclipsed by tribal authority in the Afghan 
borderland. In the case of Pakistan, an underlying reason for this is the peripheral political 
importance of KP and FATA to the political process at the core of the Pakistani state. Over 
time, this peripheral status has been manifest in a lack of commitment on the part of the state 
to establish functional civil institutions that target an improvement in human developmental 
indices in FATA and KP, greater economic opportunities and a representative political 
structure. 
The employment of the Pakistani military across FATA in 2002, based upon strategic 
compulsions arising from the US led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, saw an erosion in the 
effectiveness of managing tribal dissent with the enticements of developmental assistance. 
The employment of the military has since resulted in a diminishing role for the civil state in 
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FATA and adjacent parts of KP. This can be explained by the paradox of combining incentives 
offered by the civil administration with deterrence and compulsion arising through the 
employment of the military. The functioning of civil institutions is undermined by competition 
with military organs that invariably encroach upon civil institutions, a dynamic that invariably 
results in the superiority of military institutions over civil. This erosion in the effectiveness of 
civil institutions distances the borderland population from the state’s approach at assimilation 
through civil institutions, enhancing the profile of alternative tribal structures and modalities 
of adjudication, conflict resolution, authority and leadership. This enhanced profile of tribal 
structures contributes to the rejection of the failing state in the borderland by tribesmen. The 
consequent reliance on alternative tribal structures invariably elicits a response from the 
military, which seeks to impose the authority of the state over the borderland through the use 
of force. This results in the further alienation of the tribes, which in turn rely on tribal lashkars 
for security, autonomy and influence. Hence, the employment of the military is a major 
obstacle to the assimilation of the borderland through civil institutional means.    
Thus, the tribal resurgence in the Afghan borderland is, to a significant degree, the result of 
the inadequate civil administrative practices over time by Pakistan, and a complete absence of 
civil administration by Afghanistan in the borderland. The emphasis of both states upon the 
employment of the military has led to an erosion in the effectiveness of the limited presence 
of civil institutions in the borderland, and has functioned to enhance the role of tribal 
structures in the provision of services related to security, adjudication, education, and has 
increased the prominence of tribes as principal sources of economic activity. This process has 
conferred increasing prominence upon the role of the tribe, its lashkar, and the jirga process, 
enhancing the profile of tribes as constituting a resurgent substructure underlying Pakistan 
and Afghanistan in the borderland.  
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6 Looking Forward: The Future of the Afghan Borderland 
6.1 Introduction 
The postcolonial state in Asia seeks to accommodate, assimilate or diminish the underlying 
organic substructures over which it is constructed. Most borderlands in Asia reveal the 
durability of the state in this endeavour. In the case of the Afghan borderland however, tribal 
substructures are resurging against the state’s attempts at assimilating or diminishing them.  
The competition between the underlying substructure of Pakhtunkhwa and the states of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan has impacted the international system through the direct 
involvement of global superpowers, an international military coalition, and trans-national 
terrorism. The last three decades in particular have seen an international military dimension of 
this competition that, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Taliban 
regime, has culminated in the presence of US and NATO military forces, committed to being 
present in Afghanistan in some capacity for decades.1  
The stated objectives of the current international military coalition in Afghanistan prioritise 
reconstruction and development, reduction of the scale of the narco-economy, development 
of the Afghan National Army, and countering the threat from the Taliban.2 However, the 
sustained international military presence in Afghanistan since 2001 has led to a situation in 
which, by the admission of the US force commander in Afghanistan, the insurgents are 
stronger than ever.3 
Since 2003, the tribes of the borderland have embarked upon what has since become evident 
as a pan-Pashtun millennial uprising against the state as an extension of the identity 
associated with Pakhtunkhwa. This phenomenon has resulted in an arc of anti-state militancy 
across FATA, southern KP and northern KP in Pakistan, and contiguous areas of Afghanistan. 
This militancy has a clearly discernable tribal and clan component to it, and centres around 
geographic nodes addressed in Chapter five. While it has a reciprocal impact on the wider 
insurgency in Afghanistan, it remains a distinct insurgency, both spatially and operationally.  
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 „UK may have 40-year Afghan role‟ 8th August, 2009; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8191018.stm. Accessed 1st February,  2011. 
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  For a fuller discussion of NATO‟s objectives in Afghanistan see; http://www.nato.int/isaf/. Accessed 
4
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3
 Yochi J. Dreazen and peter Spiegel „Taliban Now Winning‟ The Wall Street Journal 10th August, 
2009; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124986154654218153.html . Accessed 10th February, 2011. 
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As the tribes of the borderland increasingly assert their autonomy from the state, this chapter 
examines possible permutations in the sub-state – state dynamic in the borderland over the 
coming five years, from 2011 to 2016.   
6.2 The Political Assimilation of Pakistan’s Borderland 
Comprised of four ethnically distinct provinces and the ethnically diverse Gilgit-Baltistan 
region in its extreme north, the spectre of secession and disintegration has been a continual 
feature of Pakistan’s political experience from the outset. 4  KP, FATA and northwest 
Baluchistan5  represent the most acute manifestations of this phenomenon. There is a 
realisation among Pakistan’s political and military leadership of the necessity of assimilating 
the Afghan borderland with the rest of the country as a fundamental conditional for resolving 
the security challenges that have emerged since 2003 in the borderland.6 This has been 
variously interpreted as a need to establish the ‘writ of the state’, create economic 
opportunities, enhance developmental indices, and counter the often radical conservatism 
that contrasts starkly with social attitudes in Punjab and Sindh.7 It has also been suggested 
that assimilation see the abolition of FATA’s autonomous status and the extension of 
constitutional authority and judicial writ over the territory.8 
As has been established in Chapter 5, the writ of the Pakistani state does not extend across the 
borderland. It is challenged by sub-state tribal centres of power that are a manifestation of the 
underlying substructure of Pakhtunkhwa, which is in turn a manifestation of associative ethno-
linguistic, physical and psycho-social attributes. These are further galvanised by the strategic 
geography of the Afghan borderland and the relative political vacuum in the south of the 
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 This was most evident after the separation of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, 
and following the Baluch separatist insurgency of 1973-7. The initial success of the Soviet invasion and 
the slow emergence of the anti-Soviet insurgency prompted such concerns again between 1980-2. For 
contemporary analysis see Rizvi (1976: 378). 
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 Here, northwest Baluchistan is referred to as part of the Afghan borderland, manifesting Pashtun 
tribal dynamics. There is  a parallel but  distinct Baluch separatist insurgency being waged across much 
of interior and southern Baluchistan, not included here as part of the borderland dynamic. For a fuller 
treatment of the current insurgency in Baluchistan see Chattopadhyaya (2003: 861-902). 
6
 This was observed in a series of discussion groups/ seminars at the ISSI between April 1999 and 
August 2001.  For a similar perspective in the wider international strategic community on this issue 
see; George Perkovich and Selig Harrison „Will Pakistan Break Up?‟ 10th June, 2009; 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1358&prog=zgp&proj=znpp. 
Accessed 10
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 George Perkovich and Selig Harrison „Will Pakistan Break Up?‟ 10th June, 2009; 
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Accessed 10
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 February, 2011.  
8
 This position has been adopted by the ANP, as well as a number of local political pressure groups. 
See; „Pakistan: Political parties stress democratic reforms key for resolving FATA problems‟ 2nd April, 
2009; http://www.ndi.org/node/15396. Accessed 10
th
 February, 2011. 
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Afghan state. All of these factors contribute to the nature of the borderland and none of them, 
individually or in aggregate, can be resolved through the wielding of superior power in the 
borderland by the Pakistani state. 
The Pakistani state has sought to impose its authority across the borderland through the 
employment of superior military force. The presence of the military and supporting 
paramilitary organisations such as the Frontier Constabulary (FC) is highly visible, particularly 
in Peshawar, Kohat, Razmak, Miransha, and Khar.9  This military presence, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, does not facilitate the assimilation of the borderland. Rather it reinforces 
the perception that civil institutions are failing, forcing the state to employ the military to 
project its presence in the borderland. The large-scale employment of the military across KP 
and FATA, rather than assimilating the borderland with the rest of the state, further 
undermines the limited functioning of state institutions 10  which further distances the 
borderland from effective assimilation with the state. 
6.2.1 First tier and second tier khangi 
In order to be effective, the political assimilation of Pakistan’s borderland with the state 
requires the support of tribal principals within FATA. The first-tier tribal leadership is 
committed to the preservation of khangi as an instrument for ensuring the unity of the tribe, 
which in turn is crucial for the preservation of the autonomy of the tribe, its zai and the 
perpetuation of khangi. In this context, the matrix of inter-tribal competition and the 
associated edicts of pashtunwali function to consolidate khanghi, and the perpetuation of 
tribal primacy within the zai. This tier of leadership has adapted to the borderland economy, 
deriving economic benefits for the tribe from the structure of trans-FATA trade flows. This tier 
is also instrumental in guiding the dynamics of inter-tribal and trans-tribal militancy, 
establishing a dialogue with the leadership of the Pakistani military which has resulted in a 
series of short lived truces. This tier invariably views the encroachment of the state as a threat 
to tribal autonomy, and ultimately to khangi.  
On a kor and killi level, however, the capacity for engagement with the state is greater. The 
second-tier leadership, constituting those khans and maliks on a kor and killi level who 
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  This phenomenon was widely observed by the author across Peshawar, and along arterial routes 
connecting major towns across KP between July-September 2008. The presence of the military has 
increased further since then due to the large-scale employment of forces in Swat and Bajaur.  
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 As discussed in the preceding chapter, the authority of all military personnel extends over all civil 
administration personnel, except those who are retired military personnel. This was observed 
extensively across all periods of field work and research in KP. The cumulative effect of this structure 
of hierarchy is the undermining of the functioning of civilian institutions, leading to considerable 
inefficiencies in civil administration and to corruption.  
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participate in jirgaey but seldom convene them, perceives tribal interests in a different 
capacity than the first-tier of leadership. Second-tier khans and maliks acutely sense the fact 
that FATA sufferers from a chronic absence of basic services from the state, including basic 
healthcare facilities, electricity, basic schooling and navigable roads.11 The provision of such 
services by the state may create an incentive for these tribesmen to begin to relinquish a 
degree of autonomy in exchange for the benefits to wider tribal society from the provision of 
these basic services that are the exclusive preserve of the state. Without such an incentive, 
second-tier khans and maliks will continue to view first-tier khangi as a means of protection 
from the state, rather than a barrier to the benefits that come with a greater presence of the 
state.  
The experience of the Yusufzai in northern KP demonstrates the impact of engagement with 
second-tier khans and maliks. The Yusufzai areas of KP are largely characterised by a greater 
state presence than other regions of KP. Civil institutions function effectively in a number of 
Yusufzai dominated districts, particularly in central and eastern KP, and these regions are 
considered more closely associated with the state than with the borderland. Since 1980, the 
state has engaged in a series of infrastructure development projects across Yusufzai territories 
in KP, linking specific killi with the wider road system through providing paved roads and 
bridges. Electricity has reached the majority of killi, as have phone lines. The role of the District 
Health Officer (DHO) has expanded, as have the network of clinics, medical dispensaries, and 
hospitals. While most children do not have access to public schools, the situation is improving, 
supplanted by an expansion in the private education sector. Progress in this regard has not 
been uniform across Yusufzai areas, with Kohistan, Upper Swat, Tor Ghar falling far behind 
Mansehra, Abbotabad, Mardan and Charsadda in developmental indices. In Kohistan, Upper 
Swat and Tor Ghar, khanghi is still well entrenched. These areas have not fully acceded to KP 
with significant parts of Tor Ghar and Kohistan constituting PATA areas. Tribal militancy is very 
pronounced in these areas, and the military has been employed in a number of counter-
insurgency campaigns since 2003. In Mansehra, Abbotabad, Mardan and Charsadda, khangi is 
receding and occupies a ceremonial aspect of social life. Many khans have been surpassed in 
land holdings and wealth by previously client families, although this demographic 
transformation has not replaced the phenomenon of khangi altogether.  
The Yusufzai experience thus reveals a correlation between the provision of state 
infrastructure and developmental assistance, and the erosion of khangi. State-led 
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 Comments by Sahibazada Saeed, FATA secretary to the Governor of KP, made at Area Study 
Centre, Peshawar University, 8
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development and infrastructure projects in central and northern KP have been driven by 
strategic considerations. The Karakorum Highway (KKH), a vital economic and military artery, 
runs through Abbotabad, Mansehra and parts of Kohistan. Thus, assimilating Yusufzai 
territories into the state was a strategic imperative. Pakistan now faces a similar strategic 
compulsion in FATA. There is thus an alignment of strategic and developmental aims in the 
FATA. 
6.2.2 Political parties 
Part of the criticism levelled at the Federal government over its administrative practices in 
FATA has focused on the fact that it is illegal to undertake political activities in FATA.12 In 
August 2009 the government of Pakistan announced that the ban on political activities in FATA 
by political parties would be lifted.13 However, by February 2011 the Presidential decree 
required to implement this legislative decision had still not been issued, leading activists to 
point out that the lack of political activity and expression was a key component in the 
tendency towards anti-state militancy among the tribesmen of FATA.14 
With a very limited presence in the national assembly, confined to two seats, it is unclear how 
each of the major political parties in Pakistan would consider their respective political interests 
to be furthered through political activity in FATA. The main political parties that have a 
possibility of undertaking activities in FATA are the various strains of the Pakistan Muslim 
League (PML), the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), with a lesser role for the Awami National 
Party (ANP). The PML factions enjoy support from Punjabi voters and consistently field Punjabi 
candidates from the leading political families of Punjab (Wilder 1999: 224). The PML factions 
are thus unlikely to pursue the cultivation of support in an ethnically different and electorally 
insignificant region, particularly against the backdrop of increasing Punjabi-Pashtun 
polarisation in Pakistan since 2007. The PPP, which since its inception has been dominated by 
the Bhutto family of Sindh,15 enjoys the near exclusive support of the electorate in Sindh 
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province (Khan 2005: 127). As numerically inferior to the unified PML, the PPP has historically 
had a presence in KP, relying on Pashtun opposition to Punjabi political domination. In the 
2008 provincial elections, held in parallel to the national general election, the PPP took thirty 
seats, coming second behind the ANP’s forty eight, in a one hundred twenty four member 
assembly.16 It is the ANP, however, that stands to be most effective in FATA. The ANP, 
historically representing Pashtun interests but with a record of limited electoral success, has 
emerged into relative prominence since 2008 due to its alignment with the PPP with whom it 
is now a coalition partner in government. This alignment, widely perceived as effectively 
uniting non-Punjabis against the Punjabi dominated PML, has resulted in a renewed focus on 
the ANP in Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi and Charsadda in central KP.17 Transferring this support 
to FATA will require the ANP to adapt its electoral strategy, effective in the tribally 
homogenous Yusufzai territories of central KP, to the tribally diverse political landscape of 
FATA. 
That landscape has demonstrated a widely held disdain for conventional political parties since 
the establishment of the Taliban regime in Kabul in 1996, with little support for political 
parties committed to the democratic process and the relatively pluralistic ideals that underpin 
Pakistan’s ostensibly secular political medium.18  In contrast, the recent political history of the 
Afghan borderland suggests that there is widespread support for the political aims and 
objectives of the more radical Islamist parties such as the TNSM, the MMA and the various 
strains of the TTP.19 Against this background, compounded by the evidently widespread 
support across the population of FATA for the broader insurgency in Afghanistan and the 
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that FM radio stations run by various radicalist groups have engendered a great deal of support in the 
province. 
196 
  
insurgency in Afghan borderland, lifting the ban on political activities can only have a limited 
impact on the assimilation of the borderland with the state. 
The assimilation of the Afghan borderland with the rest of the state requires a fundamental 
restructuring of the political relationship of the state with KP and FATA, based upon a 
consistent and sustained initiative to reintroduce the state to both the KP and FATA. In order 
to succeed, this re-introduction will have to reflect a greater Pashtun presence in the 
institutions of state, both within KP and federally, and will have to introduce an effective 
initiative to increase the scope and quality of services provided by the state before the state 
can consider itself as holding sole authority across the Afghan borderland. In light of these 
observations, the judgement of this study is that the likelihood of such a situation developing 
over the coming five years is very limited. Current trends suggest that the Pakistani state will 
persist in prioritising military initiatives in KP and FATA over political initiatives, without 
addressing the above mentioned factors to any degree of effectiveness.  Hence, FATA and KP 
are highly unlikely to experience any significant degree of increased political integration with 
the Pakistani state in the coming five years. 
6.3 A Self-Sustaining End-State 
While the assimilation of the borderland with Pakistan is a challenging proposition towards 
which the Pakistani state has made little progress, the containment of the borderland as an 
autonomous zone may present a greater prospect for successful state policy towards the 
borderland. The Afghan borderland has endured as a borderland through centuries of a 
shifting regional political landscape, including the direct military intervention of superpowers 
in the modern age. Its enduring nature is partially a result of its strategic geography, its 
possibly consequent sociological reality, and the political experiences of the surrounding 
geographic space. Its volatility is caused by the enduring nature of the underlying substructure 
of Pakhtunkhwa and its resurgence in competition with the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Accommodating this substructure, formalising it and limiting the extent of its impact may 
present greater opportunities for success than consolidating the imposition of the state’s 
political medium over it. The two most salient aspects of the borderland reality that indicate 
the feasibility of this approach are the nature of tribal militancy across the borderland and the 
structure of economic flows across it.  
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6.3.1 Tribal militancy and the state 
The tribal nature of militancy in the Afghan borderland is an enduring feature. The Ghilzai and 
Karlanri dominated borderland was a source of near constant instability for the Durrani 
dynasty during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Dupree 1980: 346-48), and continued 
to plague the British administration of Northwest India through the nineteenth century 
through cyclic raids and punitive campaigns, including three major wars fought over the 
borderland.20 The separation of a large part of Pakhtunkhwa from the Afghan state as a result 
of the demarcation of the Durand Line created the conditions within which the Afghan state 
supported the southward and eastward forays of the Karlanri and Ghilzai tribesmen across the 
Durand Line into the British administered territories of Pakhtunkhwa,21 ostensibly to create a 
pan-Pashtun resistance to the continued British presence in Pakhtunkhwa (Davies 1975: 164). 
A number of insurrections followed, of which the main ones were the revolt of 1897, the 
campaigns of the Faqir of Ipi, and the activities of the Asmaas centre in Malakand. In each of 
these campaigns, militancy was orchestrated and carried out by tribesmen, with the possible 
exception of the Asmass campaign which received considerable support from other regions of 
India (Khalil 2000: 47, 70). 
This tribal aspect of militancy remained manifest through the turbulence of Pakistan-
Afghanistan relations during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1960 the Pakistani military was employed 
in an extensive campaign against tribesmen from the Bajaur agency (Fraser-Tytler 1967: 323), 
setting a precedent for the conduct of the military in the borderland.  By the time of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan's military leadership realised that the borderland 
that had previously presented a threat to the integrity of the state, also presented an 
opportunity through which the state could be consolidated in the borderland and through 
which the spectre of a Soviet -satellite Afghan state could be reversed. 
Through its campaign of orchestrating a tribally based anti-soviet insurgency in southern 
Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as the principal benefactor of the tribes of FATA and southern 
Afghanistan through the supply of sophisticated weaponry, intelligence and financing,22 
through the creation of a large network of madrassas espousing jihadist ideology, and through 
having accommodated them as refugees. The result was that by the emergence of the Taliban 
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in 1994, Pakistan was the principal source of materiél support for all of the major Karlanri and 
Ghilzai lashkars which by then were providing the manpower for the Taliban in their drive to 
expand over the whole of Afghanistan.23 In order to mitigate threats to its integrity arising 
from the borderland, Pakistan enabled the borderland tribes to extend their influence across 
the entire Afghan state through the Taliban movement. Assisted by Pakistani road building 
projects across western Afghanistan and the development of communications infrastructure 
provided by Pakistan,24 the borderland’s economy began to boom as the Durand Line was 
largely obfuscated, and Afghanistan was practically annexed.25  
The reversal of this policy by Pakistan in 2001 generated widespread opposition across the 
borderland. Pakistan sought to insulate itself from the impact of a now hostile borderland, 
intimately linked with a newly reconstituted Afghan state which, supported by an international 
military coalition, sought to establish credibility among the Pashtun tribes in both southern 
Afghanistan and FATA. For Pakistan, this situation is a return to the status quo ante before the 
Soviet invasion, a situation where an Afghan government competing for tribal loyalties against 
Pakistan presented a clear and present threat to the integrity of Pakistan. 
The competition between Islamabad and Kabul for the loyalties of the borderland tribes is 
driven by a threat perception premised upon the expectation that each state seeks to use the 
tribes to undermine the integrity and stability of the other. The abandonment of this threat 
perception may be highly unlikely over the next five years. However, there is the possibility 
that both states recognise and formalise the territoriality of the tribal Pashtuns as a premise 
upon which to establish greater cooperation derived from this territorial and political 
interdependence. Such a formalisation would limit the territorial extent of the autonomy of 
the Pashtun tribes, thereby leading to their strategic containment. The formalisation of this 
strategic containment could then be followed by the formalisation of the interdependencies 
arising from the structure of cross-borderland economic flows.  
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 Most literature dealing with the leadership of the Taliban describes Mullah Mohamed Omar as a 
Ghilzai of the Hotaki clan. See: (Giustozi 2008: 47), also see (Forest 2007: 463). The role of Pakistan 
in supporting the Taliban has been most vociferously declared by Colonel „Imam‟. Interview with 
Colonel „Imam‟ at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, July 2000. 
24
 Discussions at the Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), January 2000. Also, comments by 
Colonel Imam, ISSI, May 2000.  
25
 Observed in December 1999 where local buses would travel back and forth from Peshawar to 
Jalalabad unhindered. Passing through the Afridi controlled Khyber agency presented more of a 
difficulty than crossing from Torkham into Afghanistan. Small businesses would make the journey 
from Kabul and Jalalabad to Bara outside Peshawar, and return at the end of the trading day.  
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6.3.2 The borderland economy 
Under the ATT, goods enter Afghanistan through Pakistan without being taxed, to be re-
imported into Pakistan as taxable Afghan exports. This formal arrangement is undermined by 
the informal borderland economy which has grown to where 80% of Afghanistan’s trade is 
informal,26 covering a wide variety of commodities sourced from around the world, entering 
Pakistan untaxed across the trails and passages traversing the Durand Line.  
The political administration of KP and FATA has adapted to this growing economic reality, 
forcing the federal government to acclimatise to this economic arrangement across the Afghan 
borderland. Facing the impossible task of closing the border to the import of untaxed goods, 
the Pakistani government has instead sought to regulate trade through both formal and 
informal arrangements. The principal object in this approach appears to be controlling the 
flow of weapons and narcotics, while deriving some revenue from providing safe passage, 
albeit discreetly, to traders and goods traversing the border.27 
In addition, the cross-border trade is a source of income for many law enforcement personnel 
and customs officials tasked with regulating cross-border traffic. Guards at check posts along 
cross-border routes frequently harass traders and consumers seeking bribes, a practice that 
grows in scale with the size of shipments and the level of officialdom involved.28 Larger scale 
trader-level movements of goods require an arrangement with local police officials and excise 
and taxation officers to ensure harassment free importing into Pakistan.29 In this way, the 
informal economy is closely interwoven with the formal economy and conventional political 
structures. This has resulted in a situation where, for example, principal administrative 
positions are awarded through an informal bidding procedure where the price of appointment 
to the position of political agent in a FATA agency, for example, now reaches over US$1 
million.30 Hence, there is considerable institutional inertia, guided by a growing economic 
critical mass, which is averse to any significant change in the current conditions in FATA and 
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 „Afghanistan-State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty‟ World Bank Report , World 
Bank, Washington, DC, 2005 pp. 7-9. 
27
 Interview with Muhammad Awan, Provincial Excise and Taxation official, Peshawar, 13
th
 August, 
2008.  
28
 Bribery plagues all aspects of law enforcement in KP. In comments in August 2009, Imran Khan 
accused the government of dedicating 60% of law enforcement personnel to the protection of V.I.P‟s, 
describing corruption in KP as massive and unprecedented. He also accused to the government of 
awarding appointments on the basis of bidding. This corruption was observed first hand in February 
2000, and was also confirmed through interviews with Muhammad Awan, Provincial Excise and 
Taxation official, in Peshawar in August 2008.  
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 Interview with Muhammad Awan, Provincial Excise and Taxation official, Peshawar, 13
th
 August, 
2008. 
30
  Interview with OGDC chief engineer Muhammad Naeem Khan of Ughi disitrict, KP, in London  9
th
 
April,  2009. 
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the Afghan borderland. This institutional resistance to change extends to the political 
relationship between the Afghan and Pakistani states, a relationship that forms that backdrop 
to both the formal and informal economic arrangements. This institutional resistance to 
change is a significant factor in the failure of the Pakistani state to extend its writ formally over 
FATA, and is part of the reason for the reluctance of the state to establish conventional politics 
across FATA and parts of KP, and to extend conventional judicial processes and the rights and 
responsibilities arising therein to the inhabitants of FATA.31 
The Pakistani state cannot eliminate or significantly diminish the manifestations of the 
substructure of Pakhtunkhwa as they arise in the borderland in the form of tribal resurgence 
against the authority of the state. Both the tribally based militancy and the structure of cross-
borderland economic flows have forced the state to adapt to these phenomena, resulting in 
an institutional inertia to significant change. A series of peace deals between militants and the 
army has resulted in the non-deployment of troops in South Wazrisitan, and a reciprocal drop 
in insurgent attacks in 2011. In parallel, informal cross-borderland economic flows continue, 
abetted by the Zardari government’s unwillingness to implement structural changes to the ATT 
expected in January 2011. These factors demonstrate that the borderland has the potential to 
perpetuate its condition indefinitely. Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan will be successful in 
altering the nature of the borderland in order to assimilate it with either state, although there 
is the potential for a formalisation of the structure of interdependence around the borderland, 
as part of a policy of containment, in order to limit its impact upon either state.  
6.4 The Current Prospects for Gradual Change 
While political, institutional and economic inertia demonstrate that the current situation of 
the Afghan borderland, as illustrated in the previous section, can endure indefinitely, the 
large-scale internal displacement following military operations in Swat, Bajaur and Mohmand, 
and unprecedented flooding that devastated large parts of KP in the summer of 2010, create 
opportunities through which the borderland can undergo gradual change towards a degree of 
assimilation. However, the political actions required to realise these opportunities are 
axiomatic to the current security footing of the Pakistani state in the borderland.  
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 Prior to the introduction of political activities to FATA in August 2009, the Federal government 
repeatedly refused to alter the constitutional provisions that exclude FATA inhabitants from due 
judicial processes and the general constitutional entitlements and provisions provided all citizens of 
Pakistan. Rather, FATA remained the domain of the Political agent who rules through the Frontier 
Crimes Regulation which provided the political agent with unchecked executive authority. Despite the 
declaration by President Zardari of the introduction of political activities to FATA, this has yet to 
materialise.  
201 
  
The social dislocation across KP that has arisen from the series of counter-insurgency 
initiatives undertaken by the Pakistani military across FATA since 2008 has been immense. In 
the summer of 2008, an estimated 300,000 people were displaced from Bajaur agency as a 
result of military operations carried out by the Pakistani military in the agency.32 Many of 
these individuals descended upon Peshawar,33 while a large number relocated across FATA, KP 
and Nangarhar province in Afghanistan.34 This situation was further exacerbated by the 
displacement of an estimated 2,000,000 individuals as a result of further military operations in 
Swat, Malakand, Dir and various parts of FATA in 2009.35 
Social dislocation of this scale invariably leads to economic disruption, civil unrest, reciprocal 
violence and political instability. In the case of Pakistan, all of these have been manifest. Yet, 
this level of social dislocation, and the political and economic upheaval arising from it, present 
an opportunity for the state to establish its primacy in the borderland as the sole agent 
capable of meeting these large-scale and potentially destructive challenges. 
6.4.1 Opportunities arising from the flood 
In July 2010, KP saw unprecedented flooding which had extended to the rest of Pakistan by 
the end of July and through August. Nowshera and parts of Peshawar remained under three 
metres of water for nearly two weeks,36 resulting in the widespread destruction of homes and 
businesses. There are no accurate statistics for the number of persons displaced by the floods 
in KP, but estimates place the number of displaced persons at 150,000 in the first few days of 
the flood.37  
The scale of destruction and the number of internally displaced people in KP as a result of the 
flooding, along with the large-scale displacement of civilians resulting from the military 
campaigns in Swat, Bajaur and Mohmand present an opportunity for the government of 
Pakistan to re-establish the primacy of the civil administration in KP. The scale of these 
                                                          
32Saeed Shah „Thousands stuck in camps of no return‟ ; 26th October, 2008;   
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/26/pakistan-afghanistan. Accessed  23
rd
 February, 2011. 
33
 Observed in Peshawar, August 2008. The city experienced a population swell during the exodus. 
34
 The exodus was widely covered on news headlines on Khyber TV, a Pashto language satellite 
Television station operating in KP, 13
th
 -17
th
 August, 2008. 
35
 Joshua Partlow „Swat refgees Begin to Head Home‟ The Washington Post July 14th 2009 ; 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/13/AR2009071300150.html (accessed 
23
rd
 February, 2011). The actual number cited varies from 1.4 million to over 2 million. NPR and the 
Washington Post state 2 million.  
36
 Discussions with relief workers who were present in Nowshera in July, 2010 held 22
nd
 August, 2010.   
37
 Practically the entire population of Noweshera (Pop. 900,000 1998 census) was evacuated as were a 
number of surrounding areas, as well as areas surrounding Peshawar. The destruction and displacement 
caused in many areas of central and northern KP remains unrecorded, as most relief efforts remained 
concentrated in southern Punjab where the scale of destruction and displacement was greatest.  
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challenges can only be met effectively by the state. With the support of the international 
community, which has been forthcoming,38 the Pakistani state is in a position to re-establish its 
primacy in the afflicted area through being the principal agent of relief and redevelopment. 
This opportunity was missed in 2005 following the particularly destructive earthquake that 
struck KP and Kashmir in October of that year. 
Following the earthquake, the role of the state in rescue and relief work was minimal in the 
worst afflicted areas.39 Convoys of aid were assembled by private citizens in Islamabad, Lahore 
and Peshawar.40 However, these convoys wove along the Karakoram Highway in the vicinity of 
Balakot, which was totally destroyed, with little or no knowledge of the areas that were 
afflicted by the earthquake as the pattern of destruction was not uniform due to the varying 
and sometimes extreme topography of the area.41 The result was an unequal distribution of 
aid in the afflicted areas, with much of the aid never reaching the most severely affected 
communities.42 The earthquake created the opportunity for a number of militant groups,43 
which had manpower in the affected areas, to be able to reach survivors. These groups used 
the opportunity presented in the earthquake to raise their respective profiles among the 
population of KP while the state, in many communities, had no presence at all. Further, in the 
aftermath of the earthquake the state failed to present adequate reconstruction assistance to 
the worst hit communities leading to a situation where communities were living in tents and 
improvised dwellings almost three years after the earthquake.44 Rather than recognise the 
opportunity arising from the earthquake for the state to emerge as the primary source of 
authority and legitimacy in the borderland through providing immediate and effective relief 
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 Although lower than in previous crises such as the earthquake of 2005, the rate of international 
assistance did result in over $40 million in the first three weeks of the flooding. See: Simon Tisdal and 
Maseeh Rahman „Pakistan flood toll rises but International aid fails to flow‟ The Guardian  10th August 
2010 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/10/pakistan-flood-international-aid. Accessed 10
th
 
February, 2011 
39
 The author was the co-ordinator for a major relief project in the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake. The following observations are from discussions with engineers, medical personnel, rescue 
personel and pilots involved in the relief effort in the vicinity of Balakot, Mansehra, KP in October 
2005.  
40
 Interview with Engineer Muhammad Hanif Baksh and Omedh Khan, October 2005, vicinity of 
Balakot. 
41
 Interview with Engineer Muhammad Hanif Baksh and Omedh Khan, October 2005, vicinity of 
Balakot. 
42
 Muhammad Hanif Baksh, a civil engineer  and Adil Khan, a mountain trek guide, reported that 
emergency medical supplies were carried by foot over mountain terrain, inaccessible by vehicles to a 
number of remote communities that were severely affected by the earthquake in the Upper Pakhli 
region around Balakot, October 2005. 
43
 According to the Feinstein International Centre‟s report „Perceptions of the Pakistan Earthquake 
Response‟, the groups most effective on the ground were Hizbul Ansar, Jamat ud Dawa, and Lashkar-
e-Tayyiba. See: Wilder (2008:47). 
44
 Observed by the author in upper Pakhli, August 2008.  
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and redevelopment assistance, the Pakistani state relinquished this role to competitors who 
were effective in deriving utility from the opportunity. 
If the Pakistani state does not respond to the current relief challenges in the borderland 
effectively, its position in the borderland may reach an intractable level of inadequacy. The 
dominant aspect of the current approach of the state has been to maintain a heavy military 
footing aimed at demonstrating overwhelmingly superior force against militants, while 
employing relief assistance provided by the US military operating from the Pakistani army’s 
Shinkiari operating base.45 This assistance, while widely accepted by the afflicted communities, 
does little to enhance the role of the Pakistani state in the area and does nothing to establish 
the primacy of the Pakistani civil administration in the area. 
In a secondary role, the government of Pakistan has initiated a civil programme of relief and 
limited developmental support but, as of February 2011, this initiative falls far short of the 
scale of effort required to effectively rehabilitate the role of the state in KP. The government 
has provided aid for internally displaced individuals in the form of camps which provide tents 
and basic foodstuffs,46 supplanted by the efforts of NGOs which provide medical assistance, 
and additional food and shelter which is surprising to the majority of the displaced.47 Further, 
the government has arranged monetary compensation in the form of electronic debit cards for 
those whose properties have been damaged in Pakistani military operations in Bajaur, 
Mohmand and surrounding areas.48  
6.4.2  Targeting political gains 
The state is now trying to convert these initiatives into political support across the province. 
The current KP government is led by the ANP, a coalition partner in the PPP dominated federal 
government.49 The success or failure of the government's rehabilitation of its role in KP and 
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 Observed by the author at the Shinkiari base in August 2008. US forces provide air-dropped relief to 
the surrounding areas as part of a joint Pakistani-US relief initiative.  
46
 Comments by Prime minister Yusuf Raza Gilani, broadcast on Geo News, July 22
nd
 2010. 
47
 Interviews in Peshawar during the crisis in August 2008 revealed that, following the poor 
governmental response to the earthquake of 2005, many were expected a similarly inadequate response 
to this crisis but were surprised at the tent encampments, food and assistance provided.  Many 
speculated that this was a politically motivated response to counter the immense unpopularity of the 
Swat offensive.  
48
 For details of the government‟s debit card assistance programme, see : „Debit Cards Issued for IDPs‟ 
16
th
 January, 2010; http://www.nadra.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=164:-
debit-cards-issued-for-idps&catid=10:news-a-updates&Itemid=20. Accessed 24
th
 February, 2011. 
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 The NAP, predecessor to the ANP, was considered by the government of Zulfiqar Bhutto to be a 
secessionist organisation with Soviet support, and drew vocal support from President Dauod in 
Afghanistan- an ardent supporter of KP secession. See declassified Intelligence Note RNAN-41, 
Bureau of Research and Intelligence, US Department of State, August 23, 1973. 
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/arietti23aug1973.htm. Accessed 16
th
 March, 2011. 
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FATA largely depends upon the success or failure of the ANP in expanding its support beyond 
its historical base of support in Charsadda, Swabi and Mardan, across the province to include 
Peshawar, Kohat and Mansehra. If the ANP is able to generate widespread support across the 
province, participation in the conventional political process will be increased, legitimising the 
state and its civil administration in KP. Currently, the ANP enjoys more support than it has ever 
done previously, but it is still far from representing a majority of Pashtuns in KP.50 The ANP’s 
popularity at the 2008 elections arose from the perceived failure of the religiously founded 
MMA51 to achieve any of its electoral promises, including an edict for sharia to be applied 
across KP, and an end to drone strikes. This, along with the potential political impact of the 
ANP in Islamabad as a crucial coalition member in the PPP’s government to be, was a driving 
factor behind the growth in the ANP’s popularity in 2008. However, with the rising 
unpopularity of the Zardari government in 2011, and the continuation of drone strikes and the 
associated collateral damage, the prospects for greater success for the ANP are very limited.   
Although the Pakistani state has embarked upon a political course that utilises its potential 
political strengths in KP, rehabilitating its political presence in the borderland is a challenge 
facing more significant obstacles than can be addressed through the deployment of the army 
and the electoral success of the ANP. Principal among these is the continued presence of 
foreign forces in Afghanistan, and the reciprocal and growing insurgency being waged there, 
particularly in the southern and eastern regions that are the Afghan borderland. Repudiating a 
foreign military force appeals to pan-tribal sensibilities and hence the insurgency continues to 
draw support across tribes and across the Durand Line.52 This significantly compounds the 
political challenge faced by Pakistan in seeking to strengthen conventional political institutions 
in the borderland. While the ANP’s condemnation of the domestic terrorism perpetrated by 
Taliban-aligned militants in Pakistan may attract support from a significant portion of 
tribesmen, opposition to the anti-coalition insurgency in Afghanistan will not. Pakistan, as a 
coalition ally, must measure its stated opposition to the insurgency in Afghanistan when 
dealing with tribesmen of FATA. This has, in some circumstances, gained support from among 
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 In the 2008 National and Provincial elections, the ANP won a total of 13 out a possible 340 seats in 
the National Assembly, and 48 out of a total of 124 seats in the then NWFP assembly. See: „Election 
Commission of Pakistan- General Elections 2008‟ available at http://www.ecp.gov.pk/GE2008.aspx. 
Accessed  23
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 February, 2011. 
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 The MMA won a total of 14 seats in the Provincial assembly and 7 in the National Assembly. See: 
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Accessed  23
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 „Pakistan‟s tribal areas and militants‟; 22nd September, 2008; 
www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSSP151256, and ‘The Afghan-Pakistan Militant nexus’ 1st 
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the tribes that were opposed to the conduct of the Taliban and aligned movements in FATA, 
but at the same time were supportive of the insurgency in Afghanistan.53 This seemingly 
duplicitous position has attracted strong criticism from Pakistan's international allies, 54 
criticism that undermines the government’s ability to effectively counter, diminish and 
eradicate support for the Taliban-aligned militancy across FATA through the employment of 
large-scale military force. This also compounds the challenge of achieving the political 
rehabilitation of the borderland. 
Given the difficulty of this challenge, and the political context - both domestic and 
international - within which it is occurring, success in the initiative to rehabilitate the writ of 
the Pakistani state in KP and FATA is unlikely. Political institutions tend not to flourish in the 
midst of a low-intensity55 insurgency with a very intense asymmetric component. The security 
situation, in turn, is highly unlikely to be resolved without significant progress in the 
rehabilitation of political institutions in KP and FATA. The process of political rehabilitation can 
only occur with the co-operation of the tribesmen, something likely only when the tribesmen 
see that their interests and autonomy would be further enhanced and protected through 
greater political assimilation into the political institutions of the Pakistani state. 
6.5 The Possibility of Secession 
The threat of the secession of either FATA, or FATA and much of KP, from Pakistan has been a 
clear and present threat to the Pakistani state since its founding. This threat has been 
historically exacerbated by policies adopted in Kabul vis-à-vis the Durand Line and that part of 
Pakhtunkhwa that lies in Pakistan.  
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 In the summer of 2007, the Pakistani government extended support to Mullah Nazir, a Waziri 
opponent of Baitullah Mehsud, committed to removing Uzbeks from South Waziristan. See: 
„Pakistan‟s tribals- who is killing who?‟ 5th April, 2007; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6529147.stm. Accessed 24
th
 February, 2011. The Pakistan 
military supported Qari Saifuddin Mehsud, a Mehsud opponent of Baitullah, who was assassinated in 
June 2009 in South Waziristan. The Pakistani military arranged security for his funeral. Both Qari and 
Nazir were supported by the Pakistani military despite both stating support for the insurgency in 
Afghanistan.  
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 This criticism constituted the opposition to the „AfPak‟ strategy envisioning greater support for 
Pakistan between Jan-March 2009. See „Situation along Pakistan-Afghanistan border demands a 
comprehensive plan‟; 24th April, 2008; http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/830. Accessed  16th March 
2011. 
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  The US Army Field Manual describes low-intensity conflict as ‟...a political-military confrontation 
between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful 
competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and 
ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by 
a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-
intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global 
security implications.’ See: „Military operations in Low Intensity Conflicts‟ United States Department 
of the Army Field Manual, December 1990, p. 101. 
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Since Pakistan’s emergence, Afghanistan has denied the legitimacy of the Durand Line and has 
publicly and repeatedly declared its claim to FATA and KP (Burke 1988: 68-90). Under the 
Presidency of Muhammad Daud Khan (1973-78) particularly, the Afghan position was to 
support movements within Pakistan that were calling for the secession of KP and FATA from 
Pakistan as the fulfillment of Pashtun territorial and political ambitions (Ali 1990: 331). During 
this period, the National Awami Party (NAP) in Pakistan was the major main stream political 
party that engaged in secessionist politics on the basis of the territorialisation of Pashtun 
nationalism (Rashiduzaman 1970: 396-401). The secession of East Pakistan in 1971 raised the 
spectre of the disintegration of West Pakistan into smaller states, reflecting the clear ethnic 
divisions within West Pakistan. The threat of further disintegration was most acute in 
Baluchistan where between 1973 and 1977 a large-scale Pakistani military deployment 
engaged in an intense counter-insurgency effort aimed at suppressing separatist militancy 
(Cohen 2004: 220). It was during this period, when the Pakistani state was fighting to hold the 
province of Baluchistan, that the threat from the secession of KP and FATA became most 
acute. It was also during this period that the rhetoric from Dauod regime was as its peak 
(Marwat 1990: 13). 
This situation changed fundamentally with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The 
ensuing anti-Soviet insurgency, although instigated in the non-Pashtun communities of Kunar 
Province (Ahmar 2006: 6), was most effective in the Panjsher Valley and across the Pashtun 
belt where Kandahar remained under partial insurgent  control throughout the campaign (Roy 
1990: 191). After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, borderland tribesmen once more became the 
modality through which Pakistan was able to extend its influence in Afghanistan. This was 
achieved in the form of firstly the mujahideen,56 then the Hizb-e-Islami of Hekmatyaar, and 
finally through the Taliban under Mullah Omar during whose tenure over 90% of Afghanistan’s 
territory fell under the militia’s control.57  During this period, with the absence of an 
independent government in Kabul, the previously Kabul- backed call for secession ceased. 
Further, post-jihad dynamics functioned to effectively eliminate the Durand Line and 
integrated FATA, KP and Afghanistan to an unprecedented level. By the time the Taliban 
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3.5. „A Greater Game: The Afghan Borderland Through the Cold War‟.  
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 Bruno, Greg and Kaplan, Eben „The Taliban in Afghanistan‟ Council on Foreign Relations 3rd 
August, 2009; http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551. Accessed 17
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regime had taken Kabul, not only had the threat of secession dissipated, but the entire Afghan 
borderland was integrated intractably with Pakistan’s FATA and KP.58 
In 2002, however, the Karzai administration emerged as a Tajik dominated government,59 
firmly committed to greater ties with India and to reversing the involvement of Pakistan in 
Afghanistan’s internal affairs.60 Pakistan’s Afghan policy was now once again dominated by a 
threat perception centering on the possibility of Pashtun secessionist militancy possibly 
facilitated by Kabul. 
 It is within this context of Afghanistan demonstrating increasing security, defence and 
intelligence links with India,61 that Pakistan faces the challenge of insurgency across FATA and 
KP. The threat of secession has emerged from such groups as the TTP and TNSM,62 within a 
strategic setting in which Kabul has once again reiterated its belief that the Durand Line does 
not constitute a legitimate international boundary.63 
The fact that the current insurgency in FATA and parts of KP is an almost exclusively Pashtun 
phenomenon largely confined to areas where Pashtun tribal militancy is strongest, lends an 
ethnic dimension to what is essentially a tribal insurgency that is fuelled by resentment against 
the state, articulated in religious rhetoric. The overwhelmingly Punjabi dominated military’s 
response to the insurgent’s penetration of Swat in April 2009, has polarised the Pashtun-
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 This was observed directly in November 1999  on travel through the Khyber Agency. Interviews 
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Punjabi dynamic in borderland society further. 64  The intensification of Pashtun-Punjabi 
tensions has the potential to exacerbate the threat of the secession of KP and FATA from 
Pakistan.  
However, despite the growing ethnic tensions between Punjabis and Pashtuns, the secession 
of the Afghan borderland from Pakistan appears highly unlikely in the next five years. The 
principal political factor in determining whether or not secession is likely to occur is the policy 
of the Afghan state towards the secession of FATA and KP from Pakistan. For secession to take 
place, the Afghan state would have to be committed to supporting that scenario as a policy 
imperative. This is very unlikely on two accounts. Firstly, such a policy is likely to negatively 
impact Afghanistan, itself at a critical developmental and political juncture. Relations with 
Pakistan would very likely take on a belligerent dimension and vital economic links would be 
ruptured. Instability would increase as Pakistan would seek to re-acquire its northwest 
province. Without the unwavering support of a superpower for such an Afghan policy, it is 
highly unlikely to be adopted by the Afghan state. Secondly, for such an initiative to succeed, 
the tribes of FATA would have to be in support of the Afghan state’s initiative. Currently, the 
FATA tribes are largely in support of the insurgency against the Afghan government, an 
administration widely perceived by tribesmen in FATA as being an extension of US policy in 
Afghanistan. Hence, without the support of the Karlanri tribes, such a prospect as an Afghan 
backed secession of KP and/ or FATA from Pakistan is highly unlikely. 
The possibility of the secession of the whole borderland from both Pakistan and Afghanistan in 
the next five years is remote. Such a secession would be dependent upon the existence of a 
coherent structure of leadership among the Pashtun tribes, which was able to extend its 
influence across FATA, KP, and southern Afghanistan. The historical and current nature of 
inter-tribal competition in the borderland suggests that a coherent position for all the tribes to 
agree on has yet to emerge on any single political reality, making the likelihood of the 
emergence of a single tribal authority across the borderland distinctly remote. Particular tribal 
rivalries that would likely undermine attempts at such secession are those between the Waziri 
and Mehsud in the Waziristans, that between the Turi and Bangash in Kurram agency, and the 
perennial competition between the Ghilzai and Durrani, a contest the Durrani has been able to 
dominate historically through alliance with the Uzbek, Tajik and Hazarajat communities in 
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Afghanistan, an alliance without which the prospect for either the Ghilzai or Durrani 
dominating over the other is limited. This dependency on alliance integrates Tajik, Uzbek and 
Hazarajat national groupings into the politics of Pakhtunkhwa, further eroding the likelihood 
of the secession of Pakhtunkhwa from the rest of the Afghan state. 
 In the case of the Mehsud-Waziri rivalry, The Pakistani military has previously succeeded in 
maintaining shifting patterns of alliance, alternatively with various clans within each of the two 
tribes, in order to facilitate joint action against those clans sympathetic to ‘foreign fighters’ 
present in North and South Wazirstan.65 In the case of the rivalry between the Turi and 
Bangash, the predominantly Shia Turi have consistently sought government support and even 
protection from the rival Bangash, who have been in a state of conflict with the Turi since early 
2007.66 
The secession of the borderland from Pakistan, Afghanistan or from both states is highly 
unlikely over a five year period. Secession will not be accepted by Pakistan, which risks 
fragmentation along ethnic lines, or by Afghanistan, and appears thus far not to be an 
acceptable option for the US. Further, inter-tribal dynamics among the Pashtun demonstrate 
that sustainable pan-Pashtun leadership is an elusive aspect of Pashtun tribal culture, in the 
absence of which the political leadership necessary for the success of a Pashtun secessionist 
movement is highly unlikely to emerge. 
6.6 Pak-Af 
Pak-Af is a reversal of the Whitehouse initiated neologism Af-Pak, an expression that emerged 
in 2008, implying the necessity of considering southern Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan as 
a single strategic and policy theatre. Whereas Af-Pak suggests that FATA functions as an 
extension of the dynamics that occur in southeast Afghanistan, the expression Pak-Af, initiated 
here, suggests that it is FATA that holds the balance in the reciprocal relationship between the 
tribes across the Durand Line. 
The heart of the borderland is FATA, and the heart of FATA is the autonomy of its tribes, 
specifically the Wazir, Mehsud, Shinwari, Mohmand, Afridi and the Utmankhel, Mamund and 
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Tarkalanri of Bajaur. That autonomy, in turn, is a product of the strategic geography and 
topography of the borderland, the psycho-social orientation of the tribes embodied in 
pashtunwali, and the consequent structure of politics and economic flows across the 
borderland. These factors reinforce the primacy of tribal autonomy over the state in the 
borderland, a primacy that has been resurgent following the state’s attempt to impose its 
authority over the tribes through the deployment of the military in FATA in 2002. This 
resurgent autonomy has driven cross-border, inter-tribal interdependence. While encouraged 
by Pakistan during the anti-Soviet campaign and sustained through the Taliban regime, this 
inter-dependence has now emerged as a structure of cross-border alliances, population 
movements, economic flows, and cross-border militancy, none of which the Pakistani state has 
been effective in countering.   
The lasting effects of Pakistan’s past role in encouraging cross-border interdependence 
currently functions to enhance the profile of the Karlanri tribes vis-à-vis the Ghilzai and smaller 
tribes in southern Afghanistan. These effects include the fact that KP constitutes the 
infrastructure of southern Afghanistan, providing key medical, transport, educational and 
trade-related services. Pakistan has also provided communication infrastructure, food and 
developmental assistance and other vital services to southern Afghanistan, while hosting an 
unknown number of refugees during the Soviet-invasion and the following anti-Soviet 
campaign, generally placed at between three and five million.67 Much of that refugee 
population is now integrated into the social and economic life of KP, beyond the effect of the 
powerful and enduring cross-border tribal and clan linkages. Much of the Afghan population in 
Pakistan now has Pakistani identification cards, KP and FATA domicile certificates and Pakistani 
passports.68 Also, significant numbers of Pakistanis have taken Afghan passports, widely 
available in Peshawar. Some have then used these Afghan passports to seek political asylum in 
Europe and the US on the basis of escaping alleged persecution at the hands of the Taliban 
and various warlords in Afghanistan.69 
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The result of Pakistan having contributed extensively to the fostering of cross-border 
interdependence during the 1980s and 1990s is that the Karlanri are now the host tribes to 
Pashtun tribesmen from Afghanistan. The Karlanri dominate the territory in which migrant 
Afghans settle, they dominate the cross-borderland trade, they dominate the transportation 
networks, and they maintain organised and well armed lashkars. Vitally, the Karlanri control 
the passes linking FATA with southern Afghanistan. Thus, although the Karlanri do not control 
the space in which the Ghilzai reside in southern Afghanistan, the Ghilzai are dependent upon 
co-operation with the Karlanri for a variety of vital services from transportation to the supply 
of arms. Also, the Karlanri are widely regarded among the Ghilzai as having provided 
manpower for the Taliban between 1993 and 2001. Although the strategic significance of 
Karlanri manpower to the Ghilzai had been reduced by 2001, largely on account of the growth 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the assistance of the Karlanri in the post-2001 insurgency in 
Afghanistan is significant for the Taliban. FATA provides strategic depth to the Taliban, it is a 
source of arms and finance, and since January 2011, the Karlanri have identified NATO supply 
lines through FATA and Baluchistan as strategically salient objectives.  
 This cross-border, inter-tribal interdependence has led some commentators to suggest that 
this unique arrangement should be formalised in the shape of a confederation between the 
two states, or a larger federation in which the two states are unified.70 Proponents suggest 
that whether or not such an arrangement is effected politically, its core elements already exist 
on the ground. The practical absence of formal controls on population movement across the 
Durand Line, the lack of state control or effective regulation of cross-border trade, the 
unwillingness on the part of both the Pakistani and Afghan states to effectively alter this 
reality, all suggest that the two states have achieved a degree of unification that is intractable. 
There is considerable speculation that former Afghan king Zahir Shah and Pakistan's Ayub 
Khan did agree on a plan of eventual confederation between the two countries, with Zahir 
Shah remaining the titular head of state.71 Further, observers have commented that Pakistan’s 
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Zia ul Haq also intended to create such a confederation.72 Although it is unclear to what extent 
the post-Soviet mujahideen government was committed to the proposition of confederation 
with Pakistan, the succeeding Taliban regime practically achieved this during its tenure. 
The strategic arguments for such a confederation are widely circulated among Pakistan’s 
strategic community. Military officials are quick to point out that Afghanistan will provide 
Pakistan with much needed strategic depth vis-à-vis India.73 Various civilian analysts have 
pointed out that trade opportunities with the Central Asian republics would yield significant 
growth for the new confederation. Pakistan, according to proponents of this view, has the 
potential to provide Afghanistan with much needed agricultural produce, manufacturing and 
infrastructure elements, and can assist significantly with reconstruction after decades of war.74 
Opponents point out that Pakistan’s own economic situation is tenuous and far too fragile to 
be able to carry the burden of rehabilitating Afghanistan. They observe that Pakistan’s military 
is engaged in an enduring counter-insurgency operation that undermines the security and 
stability of the state, a phenomenon that would be compounded by an Afghanistan-Pakistan 
confederation. They observe that stability is tenuous in Pakistan’s multi-ethnic, multi-
provincial set up, a situation that would only be made immeasurably more complex through 
confederating with Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic population. They also point out that Tajik, 
Uzbek and Hazara minorities, the main constituents of the former Northern Alliance, have 
been committed to ending Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan. These communities are 
likely to see any attempt at confederation with Pakistan as a further attempt at Pakistani 
colonisation of Afghanistan. 
The international community has committed over 40 billion dollars75 and considerable human 
and other resources to preserve and rehabilitate the Afghan state. One of the principal effects 
of operation ‘enduring freedom’ has been to reverse Pakistan’s influence over Afghanistan, 
reconstituting Afghanistan's indigenous political institutions so that the state may function as 
a stable and progressive democracy. The international coalition has focused upon FATA as the 
epicentre of instability in Afghanistan and has sought to diminish this instability through a 
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combination of coalition and Pakistani efforts.76 The international community has issued no 
support for the proposition of confederation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and indeed, 
based upon current policy trajectories, appears to be completely opposed to such a 
development. The international system is committed to, and comprised of, the 
territorialisation of sovereignty in each of its constituent members, among whom are both 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
6.7 US Involvement in the Afghan Borderland 
The US is a significant catalyst in the Afghan borderland and a principal determinant in shaping 
its future. US involvement in the borderland dates from the 1957 Eisenhower doctrine,77 
intensifying during the US-Soviet struggle for influence in Afghanistan during the 1960s Dupree 
1980: 512-15). Following the 1978 Saur revolution, US involvement grew further through 
financial, logistical and materiel support for insurgents against firstly the Taraki regime (1978-
79), and then Soviet forces which entered Afghanistan on 24th December 1979.78  
After the 1992 collapse of the mujahideen government, the Ghilzai warlord Gulbudeen 
Hekmatyaar continued to receive US support through Pakistan (Coll 2005: 165) until his Hizb-i-
Islami was eclipsed by the emergence of the Ghilzai led and Durrani supported Taliban 
movement by 1995. The US remained engaged with the Taliban, both directly and through 
Pakistan, until after the fall of Kabul in 1996 and quite possibly into 1997.79  
6.7.1 US policy reversal and Tajik projection  
However, by 2001 the US had committed itself to a policy of opposition to the Taliban; a policy 
that was borne out by the end of 2001 in a US alliance with the Northern Alliance- formerly 
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backed by both Russia and Iran against the then US supported Pashtun movements such as 
Hizb-i-Islami and the Taliban.80 This policy change now committed the US to combating the 
same tribal structures it had previously sought to forge alliance with, while seeking alliance 
with the enemies of the US’ former allies.  
By assisting the Northern Alliance in filling the void left by the Taliban regime after its 
dissolution by the end of December 2001, the US sought to project the Tajik dominated post-
Taliban government as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. References to the former 
Northern Alliance and the Tajik population were now made with the term ‘Afghan’ while the 
Taliban were referred to as ‘Pashtun’. 81 The former Northern Alliance militia was grafted into 
the Afghan National Army and the police force.82 In this way, the US sought to remake 
Afghanistan in, what was considered by US strategic planners, a strategically sustainable 
form.83 These calculations were incorrect as the majority Pashtun population remained 
opposed to the domination of the Tajik minority both politically and in terms of security.84 
Despite this, the US continued to support the Afghan government which by 2004 had a 
Pashtun titular head in the form of Hamid Karzai. 
The election of Karzai as President in the 200485 general election appeared to placate Pashtun 
opposition to the Northern Alliance backed government. Further, during this period, the 
international community pledged over $40 billion to the reconstruction and development of 
Afghanistan in a series of international donor conferences held in the UK, Germany and 
Japan.86  However, little of the pledged resources have been spent on reconstruction projects 
in Afghanistan.87 In the tenth year of the US-led mission in Afghanistan, vital services do not 
                                                          
80
 Robert Nolan „The Northern Alliance‟ 25th September, 2001; 
http://www.fpa.org/newsletter_info2583/newsletter_info_sub_list.htm?section=The%20Northern%20A
lliance . Accessed 16
th
 March, 2011. 
81
 This was observed during numerous televised war-time briefings with US force commanders during 
the 2001 conflict. Since then, the term „Afghan‟ has remained in use to describe the Tajik dominated 
government and security services, as well as the Afghan National Army. 
82
 „The brewing political power struggle in Kabul‟ 20th October, 2003; http://www.kabul-
reconstructions.net/index.php?id=192 . Accessed 16
th
 March, 2011.  
83
 Interview with Brigadier A, 28
th
 July, 2008 Islamabad. Brigadier A was part of a Pakistani delegation 
which met with Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte and Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice in May-July 2005.  
84
 For a fuller treatment of Pashtun alienation under Tajik authority see; Afghanistan: The Problem of 
Pashtun Isolation Asia Report No. 62, International Crisis Group, Kabul/Brussels 2003.  
85
 Hamid Karzai was appointed Chairman of the Transitional Council on 22
nd
 December 2001, and 
appointed Interim President of Afghanistan on 13
th
 June, 2002. He was sworn in as President of 
Afghanistan on 7
th
 December, 2004. 
86
 „Donors pledge $20bn in Afghan aid‟ 12th June, 2008; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7449281.stm. Accessed  16
th
 March, 2011. 
87
 Peter Bergen testified before the US Congress on 23
rd
 April,  2007 that 86% of Afghan aid is 
„phantom‟ aid that is diverted to US companies and executives. See: Peter Bergen „Reuters Quotes 
215 
  
exist across much of the country. Clean drinking water is still a rarity,88 electricity- where 
available – is intermittent,89 and crime and violent opportunism are still widespread across the 
country.90 These phenomena are cited by many who gravitate towards the insurgency as 
evidencing the international coalition’s lack of concern with the reconstruction and 
development of Afghanistan.91  
6.7.2 Af-Pak 
Sensing the steady growth of the insurgency despite the growing employment of US personnel 
and materiél, the US announced a new strategy in March 2009 termed ‘AfPak’.92 Early in the 
campaign, the US had stated that it was in Afghanistan to destroy Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 
while facilitating the reconstruction of Afghanistan after nearly twenty-two years of war. With 
the proclamation of ‘AfPak’, the US declared a different approach. The ’AfPak’ strategy calls 
for a multi-dimensional approach to the Afghan borderland. The main components of this 
strategy include; greater monetary assistance to the governments of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, increased efforts at training Afghan National Army personnel and Pakistani 
paramilitary and military personnel in counter-insurgency tactics, greater intelligence sharing 
between the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a continuation and expansion of targeted 
strikes against suspected militant leaders in FATA. 93 This is in addition to the presence of US 
and NATO troops across Afghanistan aimed at providing security for the Afghan population 
and also committed to the reduction and eventual eradication of opiate production, an 
initiative tempered by the economic fact that opiate production is the principal source of 
income for the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan’s farmers. 94 
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The multiple challenges faced by the US in Afghanistan, which it seeks to address through the 
‘AfPak’ strategy, are compounded further by the political dimension of the international 
coalition. The members of the NATO-led coalition, which remains under the command of the 
US force commander in Afghanistan, have demonstrated varying resolve for the continuation 
of the mission in Afghanistan.95 The continued absence of quantifiable success in the mission 
has already led to an erosion of support,96 calling into question the validity of the US action by 
international norms and precedent in the event that the NATO mandate was unsustainable. 
Further, opinion among US policy planners and strategists on how to conduct the ‘AfPak’ 
policy is not uniform. In widely publicised comments made at the Atlantic Council in November 
2008, Gen. Mckiernan, then the joint commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, 
revealed that the insurgency had taken on a tribal dimension which the US was not in a 
position to exploit.97 McKiernan was promptly succeeded by Gen. McChrystal who pledged to 
discover within 18 months whether or not the multi-dimensional strategy of ‘AfPak’ was 
working. 98 
6.7.3 Impact of the Durand Line on US operations 
The US strategy in Afghanistan faces a major strategic loophole exploited by militants, in the 
form of the Durand Line, which the US is finding extremely difficult to close down. Militants 
retreating from Afghanistan into FATA cannot be pursued effectively across the Durand Line by 
US and NATO forces as the line constitutes an international boundary, despite having all the 
characteristics of a non-border.  Attempts by coalition forces to enter FATA in hot pursuit have 
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been repulsed by the Pakistani military99 which has deployed around 100,000 troops to the 
borderland, but has demonstrated limited effectiveness in countering cross-border insurgent 
movements. To overcome this challenge, the US has resorted to using unmanned aerial 
vehicles as a platform from which to launch missiles into compounds suspected of housing 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda principals. This tactic has resulted in limited operational success in terms 
of eliminating suspects,100 and comes at a high collateral cost.101 The collateral cost has fuelled 
anti-US and coalition sentiment across FATA and much of KP, adding to the formidable 
challenges faced by the Pakistani state in KP and FATA.  
The nature of the involvement of the US in the Afghan borderland is primarily military. In 
January 2011, the US had a contingent of over 110,000 troops in Afghanistan with the bulk 
concentrated in the Pashtun belt.102 Despite this level of commitment, and the associated 
fiscal costs, the US military presence is being increasingly countered by an insurgency that has 
spread well beyond its 2002 origins in the southwest of the country.103 By remaining on a 
military course, it is unclear how the US will be able quantify success in Afghanistan. Support 
for the insurgency is widespread across the Afghan borderland. Tribal lashkars are also 
committed to resisting the presence of the Pakistani military in FATA and much of KP on 
account of the Pakistani military having allied itself with the US led coalition.  
Commentators have pointed out that the US experience in Afghanistan mirrors that of Soviet 
Union. While there are similarities between the two experiences and many more differences, 
the salient association between the two experiences is that 9 years into each, both were 
experiencing opposition and resistance across Afghanistan, supported by the FATA tribes. In 
the Soviet Union’s experience, it was able to develop a political construct under which it 
withdrew its forces from Afghanistan during its ninth year of occupation. Gorbachev had 
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realised the inevitability of such a conclusion by 1986 and had been working towards it since 
then.104  
The Obama administration has identified July 2011 as the commencement for a US withdrawal 
from Afghanistan,105 although the rate of withdrawal and the final status of US military 
presence in Afghanistan has not yet been announced. The larger geo-strategic environment 
suggests that the US is highly likely to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan indefinitely. 
Central Asia, Pakistan and Iran are all crucial areas for US policy planners, and the utility of an 
operational capacity in Afghanistan is not understated. However, a wider political engagement 
with the tribal leaderships across Pakhtunkhwa still eludes the US. Although part of the 
problem is the relatively fluid and localised nature of tribal leadership among the Ghilzai 
specifically, by maintaining an almost exclusively military footing in Afghanistan the US is 
undermining any substantive capacity for non-military engagement with tribal leaderships. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In its competition with the underlying substructure of Pakhtunkhwa, the state continues to 
attempt to accommodate, assimilate or diminish the autonomy of the Afghan borderland. 
Previous chapters have identified political, economic and military initiatives sponsored by the 
state, formally and informally, as it tries to achieve a decisive and sustainable impact in the 
borderland. This chapter examines the possible permutations in the relationship between the 
state and the Afghan borderland over the coming five years.  
The chapter finds that as the substructure of Pakhtunkhwa continues to underlie the 
resurgence of tribal autonomy, the Afghan borderland will continue to constitute a multi-
dimensional challenge to Pakistan, Afghanistan, the US and the wider international community 
over the coming five years. The borderland, while remaining autonomous from Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, continues to impact the security, stability, and sustainability of both. The political 
symbiosis between Pakistan and Afghanistan, centered on the autonomous borderland, will 
continue as a major challenge to the multi-national effort to resuscitate the Afghan state and 
assist it in establishing its exclusive authority over the entirety of its territory.  
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 Interview with former Pakistani Ambassador to USSR, Tanvir Ahmed Khan, at the ISSI Islamabad, 
March 2000.   
105
 „US well-positioned to start Afghan withdrawal-Gates‟ 7th March, 2011; 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12662121. Accessed 7
th
 March, 2011.  
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Between 2007 and 2009, discussion was raised within the strategic community in the US over 
the future shape of the Pakistani state.106 Various maps detailing a reconfigured Pakistan were 
circulated in strategic journals.107 Within this context, the question of Pashtunistan and the 
secession of KP and FATA remerged. Opinion within Pakistan suggests that the possible 
dissolution of the Pakistani state is considered a likely scenario. 108 
However, this study finds that the critical conditions for the secession of KP and FATA from 
Pakistan are lacking within the Afghan borderland. Principally, the Afghan state appears not to 
be committed to a policy of pursuing the reclamation of FATA and KP, or encouraging the 
emergence of an independent Pashtunistan. Without Afghan state support  for secession, such 
a scenario would then require an unprecedented degree of unified action among the tribes of 
FATA that are themselves engaged in a near-continuous state of belligerence, as often 
directed internally as at external foes. In the absence of such co-ordination emerging, 
secession would then only transpire under a singular leadership across the entire Pashtun belt. 
Such a development has not been seen in the borderland yet. Hence it is the judgement of this 
study that the secession of KP and FATA from Pakistan is unlikely to transpire in the coming 
five years. 
While this chapter finds that the secession of FATA and KP is an unlikely scenario, the study 
finds that there has been a great degree of integration between the populations on both sides 
of the Durand Line. There has also emerged a significant degree of economic interdependency 
between the borderland as a whole, and population and territories adjacent to it in both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The consequent cross-border assimilation has rendered the Durand 
Line an international non-border, and has resulted in a political symbiosis where neither the 
Pakistani nor Afghan state enjoys exclusive authority over the borderland, while both states 
are driven to greater economic and social integration by it. This economic and social inter-
dependency between Afghanistan and Pakistan, driven by the greater cross-border 
assimilation, has led some commentators to suggest that the most stable political 
arrangement between the two countries would be a confederation or a larger federation, 
comprised of the two states. 
                                                          
106George Perkovich and Selig Harrison „Will Pakistan Break Up?‟ 10th June, 2009; 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1358&prog=zgp&proj=znpp. 
Accessed 16
th
 March 2011.  
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 Ralph Peters „Blood borders; How a better Middle East would look‟ Armed Forces Journal June 
2009; www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899 .  Accessed 16
th
 March, 2011. 
108
 Opinion in Pakistan is expectedly divided on the likelihood of dissolution of the state in the medium 
term future. However, while discussions of the perennial threat of dissolution have been generally 
discounted over recent years, the threat perception amongst Pakistanis currently, over this particular 
issue, is heightened. General discussions in Islamabad and Peshawar, July-August 2008.  
220 
  
This chapter, however, finds that the developmental and security challenges facing both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan render such a proposition highly unlikely in the coming five years. 
The chapter finds that the Afghan borderland is unlikely to manifest any transformational 
change over this period. The current dynamics within it are neither unprecedented nor 
unanticipated by Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US. Rather, the borderland will continue to 
challenge the hold of Pakistan and Afghanistan over it, as a product of the competition 
between the substructure of Pakhtunkhwa and the postcolonial state.  
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7 The Findings: The Dynamics of Borderland Autonomy 
7.1 Introduction 
This study has examined the underlying structural causes of the resurgence of tribal autonomy 
in the Afghan borderland. It has examined how this resurgence is a manifestation of 
competition between the underlying, pre-state substructure of Pakhtunkhwa, and the post-
colonial states of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
Pakistan and Afghanistan have been unable to effectively assimilate, accommodate or 
diminish tribal autonomy in the Afghan borderland. The Karlanri and Ghilzai tribes specifically, 
are demonstrating resurgence in autonomy, partially in response the militarisation of the 
borderland, but more significantly as the re-territorialisation of the pre-state and trans-border 
substructure of Pakhtunkhwa. 
This chapter presents the conclusions of this study. Focusing on the Afghan borderland, the 
chapter presents findings relating to the resurgence of Pakhtunkhwa and the particular 
dynamics of expansion of the Afghan borderland. The chapter then addresses the limitations 
under which this study was conducted, before suggesting the potential applications of these 
findings. The chapter then addresses further areas for study. 
7.2 The Findings 
This study makes the following findings: 
1) Tribal autonomy from the state is resurgent in the Afghan borderland since 2002. This 
resurgent autonomy has been triggered by the militarisation of FATA by the Pakistani 
military in 2002, and is driven by the re-territorialisation of the larger substructure of 
Pakhtunkhwa, underlying Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
2) The territory under effective tribal control is expanding from its core in FATA, Kunar, 
Nangarhar, Paktiya, Paktika, Khost, southern Ghazni, southern Zabul, and southern 
Kandahar. The settled KP districts of Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and the 
Frontier Region of Kohat, Dir, and parts of Malakand had effectively acceded to tribal 
authority by August 2008, as had northwest Baluchistan. Upper Swat, Kohistan and 
northern Mansehra also manifest the primacy of tribal authority. The primacy of tribal 
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authority1 across the provinces of Afghanistan and the latter three settled districts of KP 
particularly, physically removed from the border, evidence the observation that this tribal 
expansion is not limited to borderland dynamics, but is a product of the larger 
phenomenon of the re-territorialisation of the wider tribal atrap of Pakhtunkhwa.  
3) The failure by Pakistan and Afghanistan to provide vital services, basic infrastructure, and 
effective civil administration in the borderland has contributed to the primacy of the tribe 
as a source of identity, security, and economic opportunity for the borderland population. 
The absence of effective state-backed political and judicial structures has encouraged the 
emergence of the jirga process as the principal medium of decision making on an inter-
tribal and pan-tribal level, as well as the proliferation of qazi or sharia  courts as the prime 
modality for adjudication.  
4) Post-colonial states in Asia have varying experiences of competition with pre-state polities 
and identities. The militarisation of the Kurdish borderland by Turkey has been partially 
effective in diminishing the substructure of Kurdistan, although the Kurdish tribes retain 
the identity of that substructure. In contrast to the Kurdish and Pashtun substructure 
experiences, the states of Arabia are in competition with the political identity associated 
with the pre-colonial superstructure of a pan-Arab state, administered by the Ottomans in 
its last iteration. 
In addition, the study makes a number of corollary findings in the areas of; militarisation, the 
borderland economy, the non-border that is the Durand Line, and the future of the borderland 
in the coming five years.  
7.2.1 The growing autonomy of the Afghan borderland 
Since 2002, the Afghan borderland manifests a growing degree of autonomy from the state, 
particularly on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line but also discernable on the Afghan side. 
This growing autonomy manifests in a number of phenomena. Prime amongst these is the 
                                                          
1
 As Thomas Ruttig points out, the bulk of the Taliban in the south of Afghanistan are organised 
tribally or on the basis of clan. Hence, the movement seeks to incorporate existing tribal and clan 
networks, often relying on existing arbakai within a zai. However, Ruttig suggests that tribalism 
overall has weakened in Afghanistan over the last thirty years, and that centralised Kandahari authority 
exists over the multitude of dispersed clans aligned with the Taliban across the south of Afghanistan.  
This study suggests that, on the contrary, tribal structures – historically fluid and pragmatic in the 
dynamics of leadership and organisation – are emboldened during the preceding decades and constitute 
the principal form of identity among Pashtuns in the borderland and contiguous regions. For Ruttig‟s 
analysis, which remains the prime example of tribalism and the Taliban in English, see: Thomas Ruttig 
„How Tribal are the Taleban?‟ Afghan Analysts Network April 2010, available at: http://aan-
afghanistan.com/uploads/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf . Accessed 26
 h
 June, 
2011.  
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militant opposition to the presence of the Pakistani military in FATA which began immediately 
following the deployment of the military in 2002. Initially, opposition was not FATA-wide and 
had varying degrees of support as the Pakistani military sought to maintain a nominal 
presence in FATA in order to deflect international pressure then mounting on Pakistan for 
ostensibly doing very little to prevent wanted transnational jihadists from seeking refuge in 
and operating from FATA.2 Also, in 2002 a common perception among tribesmen that the 
presence of the Pakistani army was intended to be long-term and of a scale that would 
challenge the autonomy of the various tribal zai, had not yet developed. As the scale of the 
army’s employment in FATA increased, and the scope and frequency of military operations 
expanded, tribal opposition also expanded. By then end of 2003, tribally based militant 
opposition to the expansion of military operations demonstrated a notable growth to where, 
by 2007, it had reached all seven FATA agencies and all settled districts of KP adjacent to 
FATA.3 
While a militant insurgency in itself is not synonymous with autonomy, attributes of the 
militancy in FATA reveal that it is a vehicle through which tribal autonomy from the state is 
being increased. The main observable characteristic in this regard is the current condition of 
the insurgency. The insurgency has expanded, initially from South Waziristan in 20034 to all 
seven agencies and all settled districts of KP adjacent to FATA. This expansion indicates a 
degree of popularisation of the insurgency to where a significant number of clans across FATA 
have engaged in militant operations against the Pakistani military, albeit often on an 
opportune basis.5 The fact that the military has of yet been unable to curtail the geographic 
expansion of the insurgency reveals that the kinetic initiative is not with the counter 
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 Following the attacks of 11
th
 September, 2001 Pakistan came under intense pressure, initially to 
support US actions and then to do more to counter the anti-coalition insurgency that had found support 
in FATA.  See Frontline interview with Pakistan‟s ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, 3rd October, 
2006; http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/akram.html. Accessed 14th 
November, 2010.  
3
 In December 2007, 40 militant groups pledged their support to Baitullah Mehsud and joined the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). See:  Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA Asia Report 178, 
International Crisis Group, October 2009, p. 5.   
4
 After the 2001 US-led siege at Tora Bora, principal leaders of al-Qaeda are alleged to have entered 
South Waziristan. Since then, there has been US and Pakistani military pressure applied on South 
Waziristan. By 2003, tribal militants were engaging Pakistani troops in the agency. See: Imtiaz Ali 
„Military Victory in South Waziristan or the beginnings of a Long War?‟ 15th December, 2009; 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35832&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&
cHash=22a22efbd82. Accessed 16
th
 March, 2011.  
5
 The dynamics of the insurgency reveal that most attacks on the military employ „hit and run‟ guerrilla 
tactics, making it extremely difficult for the military to know exactly who the perpetrators of attacks 
are. This historically tested method enables tribal lashkars to engage in militancy against the military as 
is required by pashtunwali convention, while avoiding punitive actions from the military including the 
razing of residential compounds, arbitrary arrests, and targeted killings.   
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insurgency effort, but lies with the insurgents. In addition, the counter insurgency has been 
focused on territorial nodes within the agencies of northern South Waziristan, North 
Waziristan, Mohmand, Bajaur and upper Swat. In each area, homesteads of clans known to be 
supporting the insurgency have been either occupied or destroyed, an action aimed at forcing 
insurgent clans to capitulate.6 After operations in each node, the military has claimed that the 
respective areas have been cleared of militants.7  However, each is still considered a focus of 
militant organisation and support.8  This indicates that the insurgency, by virtue of its 
continuity and expanding scope, is unfolding in accordance with the objectives of the 
insurgents more so than in line with what the army is seeking to achieve in FATA and 
surrounding districts. Consequently, the comparative military success of the tribal militias in 
expanding the insurgency and enduring major operations launched by the Pakistani military, is 
a manifestation of, and contributant to, the increasing autonomy of the borderland from the 
state.  
Beyond an expanding militarisation countering the presence of the Pakistani state in the 
borderland, the increasing autonomy of the borderland is manifest in the increasing authority 
of tribal structures of leadership and organisation as an effective alternative sub-state system 
of social, political and military organisation to that of the state. In the absence of effective 
state authority in the Afghan borderland, tribal khans and maliks have emerged as local 
centres of power, seriously challenged only by elements within the clans and tribes 
themselves, and beyond any serious challenge from the state. This was observed in the 
appointment of Hakimullah Mehsud as the malik of the Mehsud tribe in September 2009,9 
following the death of Baitullah Mehsud in a suspected drone attack in South Waziristan. This 
is also evident from the series of targeted assassinations of tribal leaders across FATA since 
2005. Since 2005, the intensity of inter-tribal competition has escalated, resulting in the 
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 In operations in Swat and Bajaur, the military destroyed large numbers of homes. See „Pakistan Swat 
Valley Operation Destroys Homes, Draws Local Ire‟ 28th May, 2009; 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/28/pakistan-swat-valley-oper_n_209917.html. Accessed 14
th
 
November 2010.  Also see „Panorama: Britain‟s Terror Heartland‟ 12th December, 2008; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7780000/7780456.stm.  Accessed 14
th
 
November, 2010.  
7
 „Difficult task in former Pakistan Taliban bastion‟ 31st March, 2010; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8596226.stm. Accessed 14th March, 2011.  
8
 „Taliban launch attacks along north Pakistan border‟ 24th December, 2010;  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12072741. Accessed 14th March, 2011.  
 
9
 The appointment of Hakimullah was challenged by a number of second tier Mehsud maliks including 
Qazi Hussein Ahmed Mehsud, Waliur Rehman Mehsud,  and Mullah Noor Jamaal, before a tribal jirga 
decided on the appointment of Hakimullah as the leader of the Mehsud tribe in August 2009. Following 
reports of Hakimullah‟s death in January 2010, these personalities once again emerged as contenders 
for leadership. However, with the formal announcement by the TTP that Hakimullah Mehsud was still 
alive in May 2010, the leadership question appears to have been indefinitely postponed.  
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assassination of an undetermined number of khans and maliks across FATA, thought to 
number in the hundreds.  It has been suggested that these killings are orchestrated either by 
the Taliban10 or Pakistan’s intelligence agencies11 in order to quash tribal and clan resurgence 
which threatens the localised objectives of both organisations. Whether or not this trend is 
the result of an initiative by the Taliban or Pakistani agencies, this study considers the targeted 
killing of tribal leaders as evidence of the rising salience of tribal leadership in FATA.  
Growing tribal autonomy from the state has also resulted in an expansion of the institution of 
the jirga for the settlement of disputes and conflict resolution between clans.12 The expansion 
of the scope of the jirga since 2003 has been a direct result of the diminishing presence of 
provincial and state administrations from FATA and KP during the same period. In KP, the 
federal and provincial judiciaries are considered by many borderlanders as being corrupt and 
heavily weighted in favour of landowners and plaintiffs associated with the administrations. 
Despite this perception, the state has sought to impose its judicial presence and jirgaey  are 
currently being intellectually and politically challenged by the state as being regressive, 
oppressive, particularly demeaning to women and minorities, and often in violation of core 
principles of the state’s constitution.13 Yet jirgaey continue to be convened in the absence of a 
viable judiciary across the borderland from either the Pakistani or Afghan states.  
Distinct from jirgaey is the proliferation of sharia based courts, independent of the state’s 
judiciary across the borderland. Where the jirga is employed principally as a modality of 
conflict resolution between clans and families, sharia courts are employed largely to hold to 
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 „Taliban Violence Creating Social Revolution Among Pashtuns‟ 25th July, 2010; 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61600 . Accessed 15th November 2010.  
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 A number of sources suggest that the ISI has undertaken a campaign of assassinations of tribal 
leaders in order to reverse clan alignment with the Taliban. While this view remains unsubstantiated by 
academic enquiry, a number of informed sources suggest this may be the case. See „Interpreting Tribal 
Leaders of FATA‟ 6th March, 2010; http://criticalppp.com/archives/6779. Accessed  16th November 
2010. 
12
 This trend has actually been encouraged by the provincial administration of Khost which has 
established mechanisms to encourage alternative means of conflict resolution in the face of limited 
governmental legitimacy, and keeping with the norms and practices of the local population. See 
„Between the Jirga and the Judge: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Southeastern Afghanistan‟  TLO 
Program Brief/1 March, 2009;  http://www.usip.org/files/file/jirga_judge.pdf . Accessed  16
th
 
November, 2010.  
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 See „Court Moved Against FCR‟ 12th February, 2010; 
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/national/court-
moved-against-FCR-220 . Accessed  15
th
 November 2010. The FCR makes provision for jirgas to hold 
state-sanctioned authority in FATA.  Numerous reports published by relief agencies, NGO‟s, and 
government sponsored initiatives point out that women are generally excluded from jirgas but are 
beholden to jirga decisions which can often involve the forced betrothal of women as a means of 
conflict resolution.  
226 
  
account criminality, oversee matters of divorce, inheritance and crimes of tor which are 
affronts to the sanctity of nang associated with women.  
Jirgas employ a pragmatic code derived from pashtunwali, while sharia courts adjudicate in 
accordance with sharia edicts, albeit interpreted within a Pashtun cultural context.14 Whereas 
the proliferation of jirgas is a predictable development where the state is receding, and is a 
wholly indigenous social phenomenon, the proliferation of sharia courts is an indicator of the 
institutionalisation of autonomy of the borderland. The proliferation of sharia courts 
represents the growth of independent, local structures of adjudication that enjoy legitimacy 
amongst the population in clear contrast to the case of conventional civil courts. Prior to the 
observable phenomenon of increasing borderland autonomy since 2003, sharia courts were an 
alternative form of adjudication to the state judiciary, and were most common in northern KP 
in Dir, Swat, Mansehra and Kohistan.15 The sharia courts were largely viewed as a rival to the 
conventional judiciary which had come to be considered particularly corrupt and inconsonant 
with the cultural norms and edicts of pashtunwali.  However, following 2003, sharia courts 
began to proliferate across northern KP, southern KP and much of FATA.16 Partly driven by the 
resurgence of radicalism that invariably correlates with increasing tribal militancy as part of 
the millennial phenomenon addressed earlier in this study, the drive for sharia courts is also 
motivated by the expedient nature of sharia court justice.17 Sharia courts have thus come to 
be seen as a relief from the conventional court system that has been largely characterised as 
corrupt, excessively bureaucratic, and expensive.  
The most apparent aspect of the increasing autonomy of the borderland from the state has 
been the steady withdrawal of the state’s administrative presence from the borderland since 
2003.18 Consistent with trends observed in the retraction of the state-backed judiciary from 
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 This includes referring to exclusively Hanafi jurisprudential opinions, including the doctrines of 
istihsaan and masaale al  mursala, which are provisions for interpreting jurisprudential sources and 
precedents within the context of a particular culture and set of traditions.  
15
 Sharia courts were a central aspect of the campaign of the TNSM for the implementation of Sharia 
in districts of then NWFP (now KP) that are dominated by the Yusufzai, including Dir, Malakand and 
Swat. See „Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic 
Sharia‟; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/tnsm.htm. Accessed 24 th  November 2010.  
16
 This trend was enhanced by the groups such as Lashkar-e-Islami, TNSM, TTP and others which each 
established a system of sharia courts in their respective area of operation. The trend grew to where, by 
2009, the provincial government of NWFP sought to establish the Nizam-e-Adl, an ordinance 
establishing state backed sharia courts across the province.   
17„Swat Taleban find Sharia a challenge‟ 24th March, 2009; 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7959100.stm. Accessed 14
th
 March, 2011.   
18
 In 2003, observations made by the author revealed the civil administration was visible and 
functioning in both Peshawar and northern KP, although tribesmen were discussing sharia courts in 
hujras, and the MMA had just swept provincial elections, proposing a province-wide sharia bill. By 
2008, the situation had changed greatly, with sharia courts having proliferated across the province.  
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significant parts of KP in which tribal authority is ascendant, other elements of the civil 
administration are also retracting.  The state does maintain a functioning presence in the form 
of civil administration in the central KP districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi, and Charsadda, 
and the eastern KP districts of Mansehra and Abbotabad. In these areas there is evidence of a 
limited healthcare infrastructure; some state provided education, although private schools 
and madrassas supplant the state sector; a limited but observable police presence, although it 
is frequently challenged; and limited procedures for excise and tax collection. Additionally, 
there is conventional political activity with the ANP and PPP carrying more support in these 
areas than any other conventional political party. Beyond these districts, in southern and 
northern KP, the civil administration of the state is virtually non-existent, and tribal authority is 
ascendant. In this scenario the state has employed the Pakistani army and the Frontier Corps 
widely across the region in order to counter the proliferation of tribal authority. The presence 
of the military is eroding the limited effectiveness of state institutions further, as a result of 
the domination of the military over civil institutions. The result is that attempts by the 
Pakistani state to assimilate the borderland with the state, dependent upon the effective 
functioning of civil institutions, are undermined by the militarisation of the borderland 
undertaken to counter the proliferation of tribal authority. The cumulative result is that tribal 
autonomy in the borderland is consolidated through tribesmen enduring the presence of the 
military while supporting the insurgency to undermine it, moving the tribes and the 
borderland further from the state.    
7.2.2 Expansion of the Afghan borderland: southern KP 
In addition to the increasing autonomy of the borderland, this study finds that the Afghan 
borderland is exhibiting territorial expansion.  In ‘southern KP’, tribal authority has expanded 
into the provinces of Tank and Dera Ismail Khan (DI Khan) which are contiguous with South 
Waziristan, and the districts of Banu, Lakki Marwat and Kohat, which are contiguous with 
North Waziristan.  The city of DI Khan, capital of the DI Khan district, remains under state 
control, although heavy fighting periodically erupts around the city as militants seek to take 
over the city from the state.19 
Following the battle of Kalosha between tribal militants and the Pakistani army in South 
Waziristan in March 2004, the army was forced into a tactical retreat.20 Over the next two 
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 Since 2008, fighting in and around DI Khan has killed hundreds, often through bomb attacks. Press 
coverage only highlights attacks in which large numbers of casualties occur. The violence is attributed 
to militants seeking to disestablish the presence of the state from the city, which lies approximately 40 
miles from South Waziristan.  
20
 Observed with undisclosed location Brigadier A, 17
th
 March, 2004. 
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years, the army entered into a series of peace accords with the Mehsud, during which period 
tribal lashkars began moving into and through Tank, Bannu and DI Khan districts.21 Since 2006, 
these districts have been dominated by tribal lashkars, predominantly from the Mehsud, but 
also from the rival Wazir.22 Jirga and sharia courts are the primary institutions across these 
districts, and tribal lashkars patrolling across the area are observable.23 The city of DI Khan, 
however, continues to manifest a state presence. The ethnically mixed city has a functioning 
civil administration, a state-supported middle school, a number of small but functioning 
private institutions of further education, and a hospital. Vital utilities function and the police 
and paramilitary FC are observable in the city.24 
In each of the surrounding provinces, manifestations of the civil administration are very 
limited where present at all. Vital social and infrastructure services are not provided by the 
state, although the intermittent supply of electricity does reach Kohat and the cantonment 
towns at Tank and Bannu. Law enforcement agencies are nominally present in each of these 
areas and security forces traverse the main highways between military cantonments in armed 
convoys. De facto security is maintained by lashkars which patrol in off-road vehicles bearing 
heavy arms. There are school facilities and clinics at Bannu, Kohat, Karak and Lakki Marwat, 
but these are vastly inadequate both in number and quality. Many schools are being 
abandoned and clinics and medical dispensaries are understaffed. There are numerous 
destroyed buildings that were previously schools dotted around these areas.25 Of these areas, 
the districts of Tank and Kohat can be considered fully subsumed by the borderland, while 
Bannu, Karak and Lakki Marwat are increasingly exhibiting the characteristics of the former 
two provinces. DI Khan district is rapidly being subsumed by the borderland although the city 
of DI khan, Located on the border between Punjab and KP, does still manifest the presence of 
the civil administration. Other than in DI Khan, the Pakistani state is making no significant 
progress in holding or reclaiming authority in these districts.  
7.2.3 Northern KP 
In ‘northern KP’, tribal authority is expanding into Upper Dir, Lower Dir,26 Malakand27, upper 
Swat and Kohistan. These districts are physically distant from FATA, with only Lower Dir and 
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 Observed by author, March-June, 2006. 
22
 Observed by author, March-June, 2006 
23
 Observed by author, March-June, 2006 
24
 Observed by author, March-June, 2006 
25
 Observed by author, August 2008.  
26
 Dir district was divided into the administrative divisions of Upper Dir and Lower Dir in 1996. 
However, the distinction between the two remains nominal, particularly as the Upper Dir remains 
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Malakand being contiguous with FATA, forming the northern and eastern boundaries of Bajaur 
agency respectively. However, northern KP does have Provincially Administered Tribal Areas 
(PATA) in each of the following districts: Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Malakand, Kohistan, Swat and 
Mansehra.28 Northern KP has been the scene of popular movements against the presence of 
the state in these districts for some years, most affiliated with the TNSM originating in 
Malakand in the early 1990’s, and expanding influence through Dir and Swat.  
In October 2006, a missile strike destroyed a madrassa in Chenagai, Bajaur resulting in 80 
fatalities.29 Large-scale demonstrations followed, with tribesmen demanding badal. Within 
weeks, a series of attacks against the Pakistani military in northern KP had been undertaken,30 
opening a northern node in the FATA based militancy against the army. This militancy was 
shortly amalgamated with the existing campaign of the TNSM, and by 2008, tribal lashkars 
were moving unchallenged across northern KP. Sharia courts widely proliferated to where the 
state conceded recognition of their validity.31 At various points, lashkars cut off arterial roots 
such as the Karakoram Highway (KKH) to prevent the movement of Pakistani troops across 
northern KP.32 In the spring of 2009, the Pakistan army undertook a four-month long campaign 
to reverse the hold of tribal militants over Swat, resulting in the mass exodus of the civilian 
population between April-July 2009. As a result, civil administration is largely absent from 
upper Swat particularly, and has yet to be rehabilitated despite the conclusion of hostilities.  
The physical distance of upper Swat and Kohistan from the Durand Line, enhanced by the 
extreme topography which makes movement around the region slow and hazardous, 
demonstrates that the ascendancy of tribal authority in northern KP and eastern KP 
transcends the dynamics of the borderland.  Northern and eastern KP are not central to cross-
                                                                                                                                                                      
largely agrarian and sparsely populated. In this study, the term Dir refers to both Upper Dir and Lower 
Dir.  
 
27
 Malakand here refers to the administrative district of that name in KP adjacent to the Bajaur tribal 
agency. The Malakand Division refers to a larger area including Chitral, Dir, Swat and the Malakand 
district. Malakand Division was abolished in 2000, but is still referred to in some literature and 
amongst some interviewees.  
28
 The PATA status of Tor Ghar in northern Mansehra was annulled in February 2011. However, the 
decision is yet to be enacted, and the government faces strong opposition from the Hassanzai clan of 
Tor Ghar. 
29
 „Pakistan madrassas raid kills 80‟ 30th October, 2006;  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6097636.stm. Accessed 14th March, 2011.  
30
 „Bomber Kills 42 Pakistani troops‟ 8th November, 2006; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6127262.stm. Accessed 14th March 2011.  
31
 „Pakistan passes Swat Sharia deal‟ 13th April, 2009; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7996560.stm . Accessed 14th March, 2011.  
32
  Interview with Major A, involved in negotiating with militants who had captured a senior army 
officer and had blocked off the KKH. 29
th
 July, 2008 at Rawalpindi.  
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border economic flows, and do not exhibit cross-border social interaction, cross-border tribal 
alliances, or cross-border militancy. Yet, these districts are exhibiting a similar ascendancy of 
tribal authority, despite the intensive response of the Pakistani military and the consequent 
destructive impact upon the population. 
This study considers this phenomenon part of the millennial phenomenon of pan-Pashtun 
militancy which emerges as a collective-security response to a trans-tribal threat. Past 
iterations of this phenomenon have been assisted if not driven by the authority in Kabul, 
ostensibly as the Afghan state sought to reverse the presence of the British in Pashtun tribal 
territories (1897-99), and by the Pakistani state (1979-1989) in response to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan.  
The support of the tribal insurgency by a state in both cases directed the focus of the 
insurgency away from the supporting state, and towards the antagonist entity; the British in 
the ‘Great Pathan Revolt’ (1897-99), and the Soviet-backed Afghan forces and then Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan (1979-89). This resulted in a focus of the militancy away from 
territorialisation of tribal authority, and towards the defeat of a foreign entity in 
Pakhtunkhwa. 
In the current scenario, the insurgency in FATA and KP does not enjoy a state benefactor. It is 
not targeted at the removal of a foreign occupation, although the rhetoric circulated among 
tribesmen does identify the Pakistani military as being in support of the US drone attacks 
against FATA. Rather, the insurgency is being waged in pursuit of the ascendancy of tribal 
authority in response to the state militarisation of tribal zai. Although essentially local in focus, 
the cumulative strategic impact of such trans-tribal insurgency is the re-territorialisation of the 
larger atrap of Pakhtunkhwa. The associative identity of Pakhtunkhwa endures as the larger 
context within which tribal identity emerges as a localised phenomenon. As Pashtun tribal 
identity is increasingly determined in terms of distance from the state and its associative 
identities, identifying with Pakhtunkhwa becomes an alternative, larger identity derived from 
the trans-tribal experience of collective security. This accounts for the proliferation of trans-
tribal militancy across the physically and topographically disparate areas of Pashtun tribal 
presence in FATA, northern KP and southern KP. 
7.2.4 Central KP 
The study finds that in contrast with northern and southern parts of KP, the central districts of 
Peshawar, Nowshera, Mardan, and the eastern districts of Swabi, Abbotabad, southern 
Mansehra do not exhibit the characteristics associated re-ascendant tribal authority and 
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autonomy from the state. These districts manifest the continued administrative presence of 
the Pakistani state. Civil administration, although not uniformly prevalent across these 
districts, is evident to a functional degree in all of them. Law enforcement personnel are 
visible and, with the exception of Peshawar, the military is not widely visible in the towns and 
villages and along major roads on a daily basis. These districts are considered by this study to 
lie outside the borderland, beyond the territories into which the borderland is expanding, but 
not functionally separate from the re-emerging identity of Pakhtunkhwa. This is because 
Mardan and Swabi are historical centres of Pashtun culture, language and identity. The 
proximity to Punjab, the historical presence and activity of the NAP and subsequently ANP, 
and the strategic value of central KP to the Pakistani state historically, have all contributed to 
the close association of central KP with the state. Despite this, there is a clearly discernable 
affinity for Pakhtunkhwa as a larger form of identity among the population of Swabi and 
Mardan specifically, manifest in the historical position of the NAP towards the territorialisation 
of Pakhtunkhwa as a political formulation, and the insistence of the ANP on renaming NWFP 
as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Despite this affinity for Pakhtunkhwa, tribal ascendancy in central KP 
is not evident as the Yusufzai clans in this area have largely acceded to the state, relinquishing 
local autonomy in exchange for the developmental and infrastructural benefits. 
There is a variation in degree of state presence and authority across these districts.  Peshawar, 
as the provincial capital, is the seat of the provincial government, provincial High Court, and 
regional military leadership. The presence of these institutions has brought about the 
securitisation of Peshawar and has established the city as a node of government influence at 
the edge of FATA, although with limited success. The environs of Peshawar have acceded to 
the resurgent borderland, while the administrative, judicial and legislative institutions in the 
centre of the city have not. Swabi, Mardan and Nowshera demonstrate a greater degree of 
uniformity in the presence of the authority of the state. These districts have been integrated 
into the conventional political medium of the province and the state to a greater degree than 
other districts in KP. These districts exhibit a greater rate of literacy than other districts and 
field more professionals in the state and provincial administration than other areas. They are 
characterised by relatively developed infrastructure, although the severe flooding of 2010 did 
destroy large parts of Nowshera and the surrounding areas, severely reducing infrastructure 
development. 33  
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 In July 2010,  intense monsoon rain and a swelling of the Indus River resulted in vast flooding which 
first struck KP, and then the rest of the Indus Basin. The district of Nowshera was submerged. The 
withdrawal of flood waters revealed  severe infrastructure damage, which the government of KP and 
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7.2.5 Afghanistan 
The effective civil administration of the Afghan state is absent from Helmand, Kandahar, Ghor, 
Uruzgan, Zabul, Ghazni, Paktiya, Paktika, Khost, Nangarhar and Kunar. Following the fall of the 
Taliban regime, no supra-tribal structure has been able to assert its authority with any degree 
of effectiveness over southern Afghanistan. This has led to the consolidation of tribal authority 
within each respective zai. By October 2010, the Karzai government had recognised the 
centrality of incorporating lashkar representatives, affiliated with the Taliban, into a 
composite dialogue,34 a position first iterated by Robert Gates in October 2008.35 
While there is a discernable borderland dynamic in the vicinity of the Durand Line in 
Afghanistan, the wider primacy of tribal authority is not a product of borderland dynamics, 
although cross-border tribal links and cross-border economic flows do impact the capacity of 
tribes across southern Afghanistan to retain their primacy vis-à-vis attempts by the Afghan civil 
administration to eclipse tribal authority. 
This study considers that in southern Afghanistan, attempts at the imposition of state-based 
administrative authority over the primacy of the tribe or clan are facing resistance through the 
insurgency. The insurgency is at once widespread across the entire Pashtun belt, but at the 
same time localised in that the overwhelming majority of insurgent operations occur in the 
vicinity of the homes of insurgents.36 While the former Taliban regime claims leadership over 
the entire insurgency, this study suggests that characterising the insurgency as being waged by 
remnants of the Taliban regime enables the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan to attribute 
a political and operational centre of gravity to an otherwise amorphous, widespread and 
enduring low intensity campaign. Attempts by the Karzai administration to undertake dialogue 
with the Taliban are predicated upon this understanding. Such a dialogue may confer 
legitimacy upon the representatives of the insurgency by the Afghan state and the 
international coalition, but will do little to erode the insurgency itself which is a primarily local 
phenomenon replicated across the entire tribal belt.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
the Federal government have done little to repair, given the extent of the damage in other parts of KP 
and  Pakistan generally.  
34
 In October and November 2010, the Karzai administration offered safe passage to Kabul, protected 
by NATO personnel, to any Taliban commander who was willing to enter into talks. See „Nato‟s safe 
passage for Taliban‟ 15th October, 2010; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11553388. 
Accessed 14th March, 2011.  
35
 Bruno, Greg „A Tribal Strategy for Afghanistan‟ Council on Foreign Relations November 2008; 
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/tribal-strategy-afghanistan/p17686. Accessed 10th March, 2011. 
36
 The BBC‟s Paul Wood spent a year embedded with anti-Taliban fighters in Afghanistan in 2009-10. 
He confirms that most insurgents are active within 2 KM of where they live, suggesting they are in fact 
fighting encroachment upon their zai and khel and kor. His comments were made on 15
th
 November, 
2010 on the BBC‟s News at Ten. 
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The Afghan experience of Pakhtunkhwa has historically been one in which tribal authority has 
functioned as absolute, and in which the state has been a remote entity, relevant only in its 
capacity to instigate tribal uprisings to counter tribal rivals to state sovereignty. This is the 
situation to which the tribal militias seek to return. In this capacity, the widespread yet 
localised insurgency against the state and its international partners represents the re-
territorialisation of the pre-colonial substructure of Pakhtunkhwa underlying the Pakistani and 
Afghan states, a substructure which in the Afghan experience is a diffuse amalgamation of 
autonomous zai in which tribal authority is unchallenged by external, supra-tribal structures. 
7.2.6  Substructures and superstructures 
The study finds that primary substructures underlie other states in Asia. The territorial 
contours of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria are imposed over territories historically populated by 
Kurds, who constitute a population of around twenty five million, exhibiting tribal 
characteristics. The instability in southeast Turkey, northern Iraq and eastern Syria since the 
late 1990s is a result of the competition between the primary substructure of Kurdistan, and 
the states of Turkey, Iraq and Syria. However, in the case of Turkey, large-scale militarisation 
of the Kurdish borderland has resulted in the diminishing of the Kurdish insurgency and a 
partial assimilation of the Kurds into Turkish society. This has also been facilitated by the 
establishment of large scale infrastructure projects such as the GAP. 
Arabia, as the term is employed in this study, presents a different order of substructure. 
Where Kurdistan and Pakhtunkhwa represent the historical territorialisation of tribal polity, 
Arabia’s political experience with the state, prior to the period of European colonialism, has 
been predominantly transnational over the last millennium. The Arabian state, in the form of 
the Caliphate, represented polity on a transnational level, although the wilayah represented a 
more localised sub-national form of political administration. The post-colonial period saw the 
emergence of states largely in conformity with the Sykes-Picot arrangement of 1916 that 
created states without a previous political identity. As a result, the Arab state has had to 
compete for legitimacy against notions of a pre-colonial pan-Arab political identity. Hence, in 
the case of Arabia, the Arab state competes with a trans-state superstructure upon which the 
post-colonial Arab state has been raised. This superstructure consists of the larger pan-Arab 
identity, catered to by the Arab state in its drive for legitimacy. The United Arab Republic 
(1958-61) and The Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan (1958) were manifestations of the 
identification with this superstructure by Arab society. The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
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the wider instability in Libya, Yemen, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in 2011 are also a manifestation 
of the limited legitimacy of the Arab state and an identification with a larger superstructure.37 
7.2.7 Militarisation of the borderland 
The study finds that the impact of the large-scale employment of the Pakistani military in the 
city of Peshawar and its environs, as well as across the borderland, functions to further erode 
the already weak institutional presence of the Pakistani state in Peshawar and the across the 
borderland. The Pakistani state has employed around 100,000 military personnel across the 
borderland as a deterrent to tribal lashkars, and has executed three major offensives across 
the borderland between 2008 and 2010. This large-scale employment of troops has eroded 
the effectiveness of political institutions and processes as the army dominates the civilian 
administration, rendering its function largely irrelevant to the processes of authority, 
legitimacy and power in the borderland. 
7.2.8 The non-border 
This study confirms that the Durand Line separating Pakistan and Afghanistan is in fact a non-
border and does not affect the separation of the populations on either side of it. Population 
movement across the Durand Line is largely unhindered and proceeds across the border, 
driven by tribal and wider economic factors. However, the border does function as a force 
delimiter, generally preventing the intrusion into FATA of US and NATO forces and limiting the 
movement of Pakistani regular forces into Afghanistan. Tribal militants exploit this feature of 
the Durand Line and continue to move across it in both directions. Attempts by the Pakistani 
military to enforce greater separation along the Durand Line in 2006 and 2007 were strongly 
opposed by tribesmen, by Afghan officials and by elements of the Pakistani government.38 The 
Durand Line thus constitutes a unique boundary where the international community, 
ostensibly bound by international law and norms considers it an international border, while 
the reality on the ground demonstrates that only elements of the international presence in the 
borderland consider it such.  
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 Lamis Andoni describes these revolutions in terms or a renewed Arab nationalism based on a 
rejection of the previous politico-economic structure of the Arab state. See: Lamis Andoni „The 
resurrection of pan-Arabism‟ 11th February, 2011; 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201121115231647934.html. Accessed 16
th
  March, 
2011.   
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 See „Afghan „border fence‟ clash‟ 19th April, 2007; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6572399.stm. Accessed  21
st
 November, 2010.  See also 
„Pashtuns on both sides of Pak-Afghan border show opposition to fencing plan‟4th January, 2007: 
http://www.e-
ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/B909B9D998F79B0187257259007C256B?OpenDocument . 
Accessed 21
st
 November, 2010. 
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7.2.9  The borderland economy 
The study finds that the economy of the borderland is vibrant and is primarily driven by the 
ATT. The informal economy is significantly larger than the formal economy across the 
borderland.39 This economy largely derives from the existence of the border and the fact that 
many of the goods that enter into Afghanistan under ATT provisions are taxable on being re-
exported back into Pakistan, creating the demand for discreet importing. The Bara markets are 
the site of the transfer of these goods back into Pakistan without the payment of taxes and 
duties. Pakistani authorities have adapted to the scale of the Bara trade by introducing 
informal methods of regulation, including what are widely considered corrupt practices, so as 
to be aware of the nature and scale of items being imported into Pakistan, ostensibly to 
control the flow of opiates and weapons. In this way, the borderland economy has led to the 
emergence of an economic symbiosis between Pakistan, Afghanistan and FATA. While this 
economic dynamic functions to enhance the autonomy of the borderland by providing sources 
of income for tribesmen that are not derived from the nikkat and lungi systems,40 the same 
economic dynamic creates an interdependency between the Pakistani and Afghan states and 
the borderland. Each of these entities thus has an overriding interest in shielding the structure 
of cross-borderland economic flows from being impacted irreparably by fundamental changes 
in the wider structure of political interaction between them.  
7.2.10  The future of the borderland 
The study thus expects that over the next five years, from 2011 to 2016, the situation in the 
Afghan borderland will not demonstrate a fundamental change from the current situation. 
Attempts by the Pakistani government to rehabilitate political institutions in the borderland 
will meet with limited success in KP, but will not achieve any significant result in FATA which 
will continue to demonstrate its autonomy from the Pakistani state through a cyclic campaign 
of insurgency and conciliation. The economic flows between the borderland and the two 
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 The authority of statistics on the scale of the Afghan black market economy are difficult to verify, as 
indeed are the reliability of statistics regarding the official economy. Much of the growth demonstrated 
in aggregate statistics is a direct result of US and multilateral aid 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. Accessed 8
th
  March, 2011. 
The World Bank estimates that 33% of the Afghan economy is derived from the illegal narcotics trade. 
See: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21
133060~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html. Accessed 14
th
 March, 2011. The 
smuggling of gem stones, weapons and ATT goods accounts for almost 20%. These activities 
constitute more than half of the Afghan economy.  
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 The nikkat and lungi systems are a structure of payments made through the political agent to tribal 
and clan leaders within an agency from which the respective khans and maliks are expected to provide 
for the needs of their clans and tribes. It is detailed by Sher Muhammad Mohmand (2002: 
119,221,315).  
236 
  
states will continue through the ATT provisions. As such, institutional and situational economic 
inertia will prevent a fundamental change in the structure of the borderland economy from 
occurring. The military engagement from the US and NATO in Afghanistan will continue, albeit 
reduced by the operating limitations that the US administration has placed on the 
employment of the US military in Afghanistan.41 The localised yet widespread struggle for 
tribal primacy over external authority will continue in southern Afghanistan. The Afghan state 
will remain weak, unable to assert its authority over autonomous tribal zai, and unable to find 
representative partners from across the Pashtun belt with whom to conclude a lasting 
settlement to the struggle for tribal primacy. Neither Pakistan, Afghanistan nor the 
international community will undertake any significant measure to recognise the destabilising 
impact of the competition between the enduring and indigenous substructure of 
Pakhtunkhwa, and the post-colonial states of Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
These are the principal findings of this study. They provide an insight into the underlying 
structural causes of tribal ascendancy in Pakhtunkhwa, and explore the role of the state in 
response to the challenge of competition with a resurgent, pre-state substructure. 
7.3 Limitations of the Study 
Section 1.15 on page 55 (Chapter 1) identifies some of the principal limitations of the research 
methodology. In addition to these, the conduct of the study faced a number of limitations 
relating to the environment in KP, FATA and Afghanistan through the duration of this study, 
and primarily during the conduct of fieldwork in 2008. Hence, the authority of the findings of 
this study is limited by a number of factors identified in the following sub-sections.  
7.3.1 Militarisation 
The factor placing the greatest limitation upon the effectiveness of the above mentioned 
research modalities is the fact that the Afghan borderland is currently embroiled in a conflict 
to which a number of tribal lashkars are party, as is the Pakistani military and a number of 
Pakistani and foreign intelligence organisations.  
At the time field work was conducted between July and September 2008, violence in the 
borderland centred around two nodes; one in North/South Waziristan and the second in 
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 The US administration has publicly declared that it intends to  initiate a withdrawal of US troops 
from Afghanistan by July 2011.  
 
 
 
237 
  
Bajaur agency, with lesser loci of violence in upper Swat, the Kurram agency and the 
Mohmand agency. A risk assessment for field work in FATA and KP was made in March 2008.42 
At the time, violence was concentrated in the above mentioned nodes, and was characterised 
primarily by inter-tribal fighting between the Mehsud and the Waziri tribes. A series of cease-
fire agreements had been concluded between the Pakistani military and tribal militants, and 
risks associated with terrorism, although elevated in comparison with many places in Asia, 
were not unusual for Pakistan and were certainly not prohibitive as far as the conduct of field 
work for this study was concerned.  
In August 2008, during the conduct of field work, the Pakistani military undertook a major 
offensive in the Bajaur agency. The large-scale operation precipitated the mass exodus of 
around 300,000 individuals from the agency, many of whom descended upon Peshawar.43 
Reprisals undertaken by tribal militants in the form of terrorist attacks were carried out in and 
around Peshawar as well as other areas. These included the bombing of arterial roads and 
bridges, and attacks upon the infrastructure of the city of Peshawar, particularly electricity 
generation and distribution facilities.44 
In this climate, travel across Peshawar and into FATA became prohibitively dangerous. This 
situation also saw an increase in sporadic incidents of opportune violence and criminality in 
Peshawar, particularly in the west of the city, around the University of Peshawar, which lies in 
the immediate vicinity of the tribal areas. Although this situation did not impact the conduct of 
interviews on the University of Peshawar campus, it did limit access to tribesmen who have 
lived exclusively in the tribal areas. Hence, most of the interviews in this study were conducted 
with tribesmen who have had exposure to life outside the borderland, some of whom were 
able to converse in English and were able to discuss the situation in the borderland through 
the conventional analytical perspectives associated with developmental studies, history, 
sociology, and politics and international relations. Greater exposure to tribesmen with very 
limited or no experience outside the borderland would have provided a more detailed insight 
into the conceptual framework and conduct of individuals for whom the tribe and its affairs 
represent the entire scope of existence. Hence, the effectiveness of the field work in FATA and 
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 The University of London requirements for authorising funded field work include the conducting of a 
risk assessment. This was undertaken in March 2008.  
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 Saeed Shah „Thousands stuck in camps of no return‟ 26th October, 2008; 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/26/pakistan-afghanistan. Accessed 14th March, 2011.  
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 „Taliban blow up Pakistan electricity station: officials‟ 19th March, 2009; http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/world/03/19/09/taliban-blow-pakistan-electricity-station-officials . Accessed 19th 
November, 2010. Attacks on the electricity grid continued through the spring and summer of 2008.  
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Peshawar was limited by the upsurge in violence which took place across FATA in the summer 
of 2008. 
7.3.2 Access to South Waziristan 
Another important limitation upon the study is the non-accessibility of South Waziristan. The 
study finds that South Waziristan functions as a principal node of tribal re-ascendancy. The 
tribes in South Waziristan are well organized, well armed, comparatively large, and have 
defined structures of leadership and succession. The direct influence of the Mehsud and 
Waziri tribes extends into North Waziristan as well as the districts of Kohat, Bannu, Tank and 
DI Khan which lie in KP, and into to Afghanistan’s Ghazni, Paktiya and Zabul provinces. 
Although the areas of KP mentioned here were accessible, the agency of South Waziristan 
itself was not. Consequently, no fieldwork was conducted amongst Waziri and Mehsud 
tribesmen in their tribal zai. The insurgency in South Waziristan has extended to involve 
journalists and other non-combatants resulting in the deaths of a number of high profile 
reporters and other civilians outside of the tribal structures.45  Hence, travel to South 
Waziristan, although possible under the assistance of a military escort, was deemed 
prohibitive due to the risks associated with such travel and also due to the likely limited results 
in terms of interviews and the sharing of information that could be achieved in such 
circumstances. 
In order to minimise the impact of this limitation upon the overall study, interviews with 
individuals from South Waziristan and military personnel with extensive experience in the 
agency were conducted in Islamabad, Peshawar and Mansehra. These interviews provided a 
valuable insight into the agency and the tribal and military dynamics within it, as well as into 
the impact of South Waziristan upon the surrounding areas in KP and Afghanistan. 
7.3.3 Intelligence agencies 
Another significant limitation arose in conducting field work in an environment in which a 
number of competing intelligence agencies operate. The Inter-services Intelligence (ISI), the 
Intelligence Bureau (IB), and Military Intelligence (MI), are both very active in Peshawar and 
across the KP. Numerous principal personalities in KP society are functionaries of the 
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 „Two journalists killed in Pakistan‟ 9th February, 2005; 
http://pakistanpressclub.blogspot.com/2005/02/two-journalists-killed-in-pakistan.html. Accessed 20
th
 
November, 2010. See also: „Fears for BBC Pakistan Reporter‟ 30th November, 2006; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6165942.stm. Accessed  20
th
 November, 2010. Also, 
interview with Abid Abbas, journalist with APP abducted by Taliban in September 2009, and released 
unharmed within days.  
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intelligence community, some declared and others not.46 Field work was carried out in a 
manner, where possible, avoiding attention from intelligence personnel in consideration of the 
potentially considerable inconvenience that could arise from such attention. Nonetheless, at 
least three instances of interaction with intelligence personnel did occur during the course of 
the field work. These incidents resulted in a careful examination of interview questions by 
intelligence personnel, enquiry into movements and lodgings, and other aspects of field work. 
Due to this scenario, contact with tribesmen was, when known of by intelligence personnel, 
limited both in duration and content of discourse.  
In order to mitigate the potentially significant limitations upon the study arising from the 
activities of intelligence personnel, a number of interviews were restructured into 
conversations in a social setting, usually based upon introductions made through 
acquaintances who were aware of the fact that field work was being conducted. In this 
manner, the amount of information gathered was larger than would have been possible 
through more structured interviews, but was of a nature often indirectly related to the specific 
information being sought. This made for challenging social settings in which conversations 
would, only through significant effort and social skill, be guided towards an objective arising 
directly from the field work.   
As for individuals from within the academic and wider community in Peshawar who were 
associated with the intelligence agencies, interviews were limited in the some of the specific 
areas of inquiry. Information on tribes, tribal structures and personalities was relatively freely 
shared. However, viewpoints regarding the orientation of specific clans towards the Durand 
Line, the presence of the Pakistani military or the phenomenon of ‘Talibanisation’ were not 
shared. On specific occasions, discussions were halted abruptly. Interviews with individuals 
associated with intelligence agencies were thus limited in the amount of relevant information 
that was gained.  
On visiting the Interior Ministry, interviews were conducted in the presence of an observer 
who had a discernable influence upon the interviewee which resulted in some questions being 
avoided by the interviewee, ultimately leading to a prompt conclusion of the interview.  
Had the challenge presented by intelligence agencies not been as significant, interviews could 
have proceeded with a more direct and wholly relevant course of questioning. This is likely to 
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 Advice to this effect was rendered to the author by a number of sources in Peshawar, sometimes as a 
warning more so than advice. On at least one juncture in August 2010, the author was forced to leave 
Peshawar on notice of minutes. 
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have yielded information of greater value to the study in terms of depth and insight, and 
would have enabled the study to assert its findings with greater authority. The challenge 
presented by the intelligence agencies did, however, provide a valuable insight into the 
actuality of life in the borderland from the perspective of the state, and into the nature of the 
challenge it is facing in the borderland.  
7.4 Potential Applications of the Findings 
This study is an examination of resurgent tribal autonomy from the state as a manifestation of 
the pre-state substructure of Pakhtunkhwa, underlying Pakistan and Afghanistan. The study 
explores how the emergence of the post-colonial state in Asia has not extinguished 
identification with forms of polity that are no longer existent physically, but endure as psycho-
social constructs that have the potential to impact the modern state and the international 
state system. Identification with enduring forms of pre-state polity is shown to constitute a 
significant challenge to the primacy, security and integrity of the modern state in Asia.  
7.4.1 Coalition partners 
Individuals associated with the US Department of State, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC) in the UK, the Government of Afghanistan, and Pakistan Army and ISI have expressed an 
interest in the body of research undertaken in the preparation of this study. The study thus 
has relevance for institutions responsible for planning and executing state policy towards the 
borderland, and towards Pakistan and Afghanistan more generally. Such institutions have 
tended to limit analysis to operationally relevant and actionable judgements. However, the 
longevity of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the proliferation of insurgency in FATA and KP, the 
lack of progress in the reconstitution of the Afghan state’s civil administration, and the 
inability of Pakistan to be more effective in countering cross-border militancy, have led to a 
series of strategy reviews in the US and the UK. This review process has incorporated wider 
analyses, including the impact of tribal dynamics and the structure of economic flows across 
the borderland, upon the wider security scenario. This study provides a valuable contribution 
to this process.   
7.4.2 Aid organisations 
In addition to policy and military planners, this study will hold value for individuals and 
organisations associated with the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan and 
northwest Pakistan, and for providers of vital services through charitable work across the 
borderland. The study illuminates the concept of tribal zai in the borderland, as the 
territorialisation of tribal authority within which a particular tribe or clan holds supreme 
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authority. Such tribal zai is often defended heavily against encroachment from other tribes or 
clans. Moving safely through this region requires an awareness of this reality, and familiarity 
with the norms of conduct within this martially complex context. Another example is in the 
norms of pashtunwali, and the shaping of individual and collective conduct through the 
psycho-social prism of pashtunwali to which tribesmen attribute their conduct and morality. 
An understanding of pashtunwali is indispensible for individuals and organisations seeking to 
undertake relief and developmental work in the borderland, particularly with regards to 
women and girls. The study provides a detailed insight into the genealogical phenomenon of 
the Pashtun tribal shajara. The shajara provides a detailed tribal ‘map’ through which all tribes 
are able to determine their link to every other tribe in the borderland and wider afield. A 
demonstration of familiarity with the tribal shajara invariably endears tribesmen towards 
outsiders, the motivations of whom tribesmen are notoriously sceptical about.  A familiarity 
with the tribal shajara would enable those travelling through or working in the borderland to 
be able to understand which areas and which clans were likely to honour the guest of a related 
clan or tribe, and which were likely to view a traveller coming from the territories of a rival 
tribe with suspicion and contempt. The introductory chapters of this study thus provide an 
informative background with which an individual or group can understand how to conduct 
affairs in the tribal borderland. The study also provides an understanding of the reality of the 
borderland from the perspective of human development indices, a perspective valuable to 
practitioners of aid, development and reconstruction. The study outlines the nature of medical 
infrastructure and patterns of population movement that occur across the borderland, 
particularly across the Durand Line, to Peshawar in pursuit of medical attention. Such an 
understanding provides concerned organisations and individuals with a background upon 
which more effective decision can be made regarding where assistance is likely to be most 
effective when provided.  
7.4.3 The Pakistani military establishment 
The findings of this study will be of particular value to officials within the Pakistani state, both 
in the civil administration and the military. The findings of this study suggest that the re-
emergence of the autonomy of the borderland is significantly contributed to by a breakdown 
in the effective functioning of the civil administration of the Pakistani state in the borderland, 
resulting in a general withdrawal of the state from the borderland, and a consequent 
proliferation of counter-state tribal authority. The study also suggests that attempts by the 
Pakistani state to rehabilitate its political presence in the borderland have thus far been 
ineffective, and are undermined by the simultaneous large-scale employment of the Pakistani 
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military across the borderland, widely perceived by tribesmen to be part of a strategic 
coherence with US and NATO military objectives in Afghanistan more generally, and the 
borderland specifically. The study identifies increasing securitisation as a major barrier to the 
rehabilitation of functioning political institutions in the borderland and adjoining areas.  
7.4.4 Academic applications 
The findings of this study are also valuable to academics concerned with a theoretical 
examination of permutations in the international system arising from competition between 
pre-state substructures and the post-colonial states constructed upon them. This study thus 
focuses attention within the area of International Relations upon sub-state and pre-state 
polities, and their impact upon the current international system.  
The study also holds relevance for the sub-discipline of Borderland Studies. In introducing the 
phenomenon of pre-state substructures as primary forms of polity upon which the post-
colonial state has been raised, and through demonstrating that it is the competition between 
these enduring substructures and the state that drives the dynamics in borderlands, this study 
expands the conventional approach of borderland studies beyond its limited analyses of state-
borderland dynamics to analyses of primary phenomena that underlie both the state and the 
borderland.  
The study thus demonstrates the overlap between enquiry in the fields of International 
Relations and Borderland Studies, while also incorporating elements of Anthropology in 
establishing the primary nature of pre-state substructures. In this, the study illustrates the 
theoretical reach provided by a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding a wide-ranging 
phenomenon with implications in multiple disciplines.  
7.5 Areas for Future Study 
This study constitutes the first dedicated study to the examination of the Afghan borderland 
within the area of Borderland Studies. The core assertion of this study is established and 
evidenced through primary and secondary sources compiled through fieldwork, and through a 
continual process of literature review and analysis. Resulting from this process, closely related 
areas now present themselves for further in-depth study and analysis. This study introduces a 
number of such areas which, if elaborated upon through further dedicated and in-depth 
studies, would constitute a valuable contribution to Borderland Studies, Pashtun Studies and 
International Relations more generally.   
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7.5.1 Millennial revivalism among tribal Pashtuns 
An area for possible further study is the phenomenon of millennial revivalism amongst the 
Pashtun tribes. This study highlights how, currently, the tribes of the borderland are exhibiting 
a millennial phenomenon that is manifest in resurgent tribal autonomy and expanding tribal 
militancy focused on Pakistani state authority across the borderland, and in resistance to the 
reconstitution of the Afghan state. The study describes how this is an episodic phenomenon 
that tends to occur in circumstances of extenuating externally sourced threat across the tribal 
belt, forcing tribes to co-ordinate in their militancy. This study also observes that a similar 
situation emerged across the borderland in the ‘Pathan Revolt’ of 1898-9, and during the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989.  
A dedicated further study would examine the formative factors in pan-tribal militancy. It 
would examine the potential for the emergence of such militancy, and its dynamics once it 
emerged, in order to understand how it may transpire and eventually subside.  Within such a 
study would be an examination of how external groups and movements have been able to 
enter into and survive within the tribal context. Such a focus would shed light on questions of 
whether or not the militancy currently being waged in the borderland is fuelled by external 
militant groups, or whether the groups are actually driven by tribal dynamics under the 
leadership of tribal khans or maliks.  
7.5.2 The evolution of pashtunwali 
This study addresses the phenomenon of pashtunwali as a determining psycho-social 
construct driving much of the interpersonal and inter-tribal interaction across the borderland. 
The study outlines the strategically and politically salient components of pashtunwali; badal, 
nang, melmastiya, nanawatey, and Pashto. The study addresses how these concepts form 
behavioural parameters for the overwhelming majority of Pashtuns and the clans and tribes 
that inhabit the borderland.  
The Afghan borderland has been the scene of near continuous militancy for over three 
decades. It has been suggested that the sustained sense of siege that pervades much of the 
borderland, and the high rate of casualties amongst young Pashtun males, has led to erosion 
in the practice of pashtunwali and the degree to which it is adhered.47  Further, it has been 
suggested that the last three decades have ushered in a period of unprecedented circulation 
of wealth and commodities amongst the clans in the borderland. Greater opportunities for 
                                                          
47
  This was suggested to the author by editors of the Pakistan Security Research Unit Briefing Papers 
at the University of Bradford, as a subject for a briefing in March 2008.  
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travel to the Middle East, the Far East and the West have resulted in the flow of remittances 
back to families in the borderland. This changing economic reality constitutes a socio-
economic challenge to the nature of tribally based systems of social organisation. This 
challenge is furthered by the gradual growth of opportunities for literacy and education, 
largely on the physical periphery of the borderland, particularly amongst females.  
The aggregate impact of these trends upon pashtunwali and the associated norms of tribal 
organisation and interaction constitute an area in which extensive further study can be 
undertaken. Such a study has the potential to record the fundamental changes in the nature of 
an indigenous tribally based society as it faces the multiple challenges of development, 
economic pluralism and wider opportunities for literacy.   
7.5.3 The economy of the Afghan borderland 
An additional area for further study is the functioning of the borderland economy. This study 
asserts, in chapters five and six, that the borderland economy is a principal driver of the 
current situation in the borderland and is among the main driving factors limiting the potential 
for any fundamental change in the situation of the borderland over the next five years. The 
borderland economy is an important aspect of tribal autonomy, and has led to the 
development of an economic symbiosis between the borderland and the Pakistani state.  
A further study would examine the precise scale of the borderland economy as part of an 
analysis of whether or not borderland autonomy can be sustained through the borderland 
economy, particularly during circumstances of inter-tribal and tribe-state conflict. Such a study 
would provide an in-depth analysis of the structure of trade flows into the borderland through 
ATT provisions and more generally, as tribesmen organise global networks for sourcing goods 
and commodities, bringing them into Afghanistan which remains a tax and excise vacuum, 
before exporting principally to Pakistan, but also Iran and China. 
A key aspect of an examination into the borderland economy is that of the narco-economy. 
Afghanistan produces the overwhelming majority of the world’s opiates, and is the principal 
source of the heroin which reaches Europe and the United States. Opiate cultivation, 
processing and distribution remains the single largest source of economic activity in 
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Afghanistan, an industry that has grown on average more than 50% each year between 2002-
2007.48  
Such a study would address the economic and social impact of the opiate industry upon 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, an impact that arises largely from the distribution networks 
that move refined opiate products through these countries en route to Europe and the US.  
The study would explore how, despite the presence of more than 100,000 US and NATO 
personnel in Afghanistan, opiate cultivation has been able to proliferate in areas under the 
domination of NATO and US forces as well as in areas under the domination of the Taliban and 
associated tribal militants. 
An examination into the borderland economy, and its opiate-related aspect, would potentially 
also examine the structure of borderland autonomy, as economic interdependence between 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the borderland functions to limit the degree of borderland 
autonomy which each state is willing to accept, and which the tribes of the borderland 
themselves are willing to pursue. 
                                                          
48
For a comprehensive discussion relating to the state of opiate cultivation in Afghanistan see: 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snia-05025.pdf. Accessed 4th November, 
2009.  
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Appendix I: Interviews 
Following is a list of interviews conducted during field work for this study. The names of 
interviewees have been noted followed by a brief description of the details of interaction with 
each. Where names have been withheld, rank (where appropriate) and a letter of the alphabet 
have been used for identification. The list is divided into three parts. Part 1 lists civilian 
interviewees and is arranged alphabetically. Part 2 lists military respondents and proceeds by 
rank. Part 3 is comprised of additional notes and references.  
Part I: Civilian Interviewees 
Nawaaz Afridi – Tribesman from the Khyber Agency. 
Nawaz Afridi is an Afridi tribesman hailing from the Khyber agency who travels frequently 
between Khyber and Peshawar. He was interviewed in Peshawar on 23rd August 2008. He 
responded to all questions on the questionnaire and elaborated extensively based upon his 
own experiences in the Khyber agency.  Additionally, Afridi provided insight into the institution 
of jirga and also elaborated extensively on questions of identity as faced by tribesmen of FATA 
living on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line. Interview was conducted in English, which 
Nawaz Afridi had a moderate grasp of, and Pashto. 
Jamil Ahmed -Former D.C. Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan, Fort Monroe and Asst. to Political Agent in 
Mohmand Agency. 
Jamil Ahmed is a senior civil servant who has served in a number of capacities in the Pakistani 
administration in the Afghan borderland.  He was interviewed in Islamabad in the Presidential 
Secretariat on 25th August 2008. The interview was conducted in his office, in the presence of 
an unnamed official. Jamil Ahmed responded to nearly all questions on the questionnaire, and 
elaborated extensively on the social life of Mohmand agency. He provided additional insight 
into the agricultural and economic reality of the agency, and of the perception of the Durand 
Line prevailing amongst Mohmand tribesmen.  On questions relating to militancy and tribal 
lashkars he did not provide any response.  
Muhammad Awan – Customs and Excise official, provincial government of KP. 
Muhammad Awan is an official with the KP Department of Customs and Excise, based at 
Peshawar. He was interviewed in Peshawar on 13th August 2008. He did not submit answers to 
all questions on the questionnaire. Based upon his professional experience, more time and 
questions were dedicated to fiscal, regulatory, excise and taxation related issues. Muhammad 
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Awan provided extensive insight into the nature of economic flows across the borderland, 
detailing the constitutional tax exemptions provided by the Pakistani state to tribesmen of 
FATA. He also detailed flow of ATT goods, globally sourced flows eventually reaching the Bara 
markets, and the flow of capital generated therein back into Pakistan as investment in real 
estate and businesses.  
Dr. Muhammad Baseer – Faculty at the Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar. 
Dr. Muhammad Baseer was met at the Area Study Centre where he holds a faculty position. 
Unable to commit to a formal interview due to time constraints, he agreed to engage in a 
conversation following the line of enquiry of the questionnaire. 
Abdullah Khan- Formerly Headmaster of a number of schools in tribal and settled areas of 
NWFP. One of the first individuals from a tribal background to achieve a secondary education 
in the late 1920’s. 
Abdullah Khan is an elder of the Yusufzai of southern Pakhli. Approaching 100 years of age, 
Abdullah Khan enjoys the distinction of being the first individual to receive a formal education 
from his clan and the region from which he hails.  He was interviewed on 29th July 2008 at his 
home in Islamabad. Conducting a formal interview with him was challenging, and the 
interview was reformed into an extensive conversation with an informal structure. His 
personal experience across various regions of the borderland is vast and his knowledge of 
political and militant trends was extensive.   
Dr. Azamt Hayat Khan- Vice Chancellor Peshawar University and director of the Area Study 
Centre for Central Asia and Afghanistan at the University of Peshawar. 
Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan is the pre-eminent academic in Pakistan dealing with the area of FATA 
and Afghanistan. He agreed to being interviewed and offered a number of insights into 
research through telephone and e-mail, prior to the actual interview.  The interview with Dr. 
Khan was conducted on 5th August, 2008 at the Vice Chancellor’s office in the presence of 
additional staff. In addition to the questionnaire, Dr. Khan elaborated at length on a number of 
corollary issues related to identity, political and ideological orientation, cross-border 
economics and history. However, some questions were deemed inappropriate by him, 
particularly those related to the role of the state in influencing tribal patterns of alliance and 
opposition. In these instances, Dr. Khan abruptly became silent and remained so for a period.  
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Muhammad Naeem Khan- formerly Chief Engineer at the Oil & Gas Development Corporation 
(OGDC) Islamabad, Baluchistan.  
Muhammad Naeem Khan is a highly educated and well travelled senior official of Pakistan’s 
OGDC. He has worked at numerous locations across the borderland including remote parts of 
Baluchistan. Having spent years in Peshawar, he is particularly well placed to provide an 
insight into the political medium in NWFP and in Pakistan more generally. He was interviewed 
on July 29th 2008. In addition to responding to the standard questions, he was able to 
elaborate extensively on the psycho-social dispensation of tribesmen, illustrating his 
observations with numerous examples of personal involvement and direct observations.  
Dr. Muhammad Nawaz Khan- Doctor and Assistant Professor at the Khyber Medical Teaching 
Hospital, Peshawar. 
Dr. Nawaz is a senior doctor at the Khyber Medical Teaching Hospital in Peshawar where he 
practices medicine as a consultant and teaches. A formal interview was extremely difficult to 
conduct as Dr. Nawaz was considerably busy at the hospital which is where he consented to be 
visited. Despite his commitments, Dr. Nawaz was able to submit to a relatively structured 
conversation, albeit with interruptions, patterned along the lines of the questionnaire which 
was conducted on 8th August, 2008.  
Dr. Nawaz contributed extensive insight into the nature of cross-border movements between 
NWFP, FATA and southern Afghanistan, generally and for medical purposes. He and provided 
detailed information into the role of Peshawar as the principal urban node in the Afghan 
borderland. Dr. Nawaz provided some insight into the presence of the state in the borderland, 
and particularly in his given field. Dr. Nawaz was also able to facilitate introductions with other 
potential interviewees. 
Tanvir Ahmed Khan- Former Foreign Secretary and former Pakistani Ambassador to the USSR.  
Ambassador Khan was Director-General of the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad from 
1999-2001. Prior to that he served Pakistan’s foreign secretary and as ambassador to the 
USSR. Although he was not interviewed formally as interaction with him preceded the 
commencement of actual fieldwork and the conduct of the survey for this study, he did 
provide valuable insight into the role of Pakistan and the Soviet Union during and after the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
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Tariq Muhammad – Former regional manager for a marketing company covering southern 
Afghanistan and KP.  
Tariq Muhammad resides in the city centre of Peshawar and as senior level management in a 
company active in Pakistan and Afghanistan, has extensive experience in the borderland. Tariq 
Muhammad was interviewed on 23rd August, 2008 in Peshawar, where he submitted to the 
questions in the questionnaire. He was able to elaborate extensively on the economic and 
social conditions in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies.  He also provided deep insight into the 
Durand Line as it relates to the practical life of borderlanders, and its impact on borderland 
identity.  Tariq Muhammad also assisted in facilitating further interviews.  
Azizur Rahman – Khan Khel , Yusufzai elder at Village Tanda, KP.  
Azizur Rahman is the senior Khan within the Khan Khel.  He has extensive experience in tribal 
affairs, including jirga. Due to his advanced age and circumstances, he was unable to complete 
the questionnaire. Instead, questions along the theme of the questionnaire were put to him. 
He provided valuable insight into the emergence of the Taliban and the role of militant groups 
in fulfilling the void left by the absence of state aid in, for example, the aftermath of the 
earthquake. He was interviewed on 29th August, 2008. The interview was conducted in Pashto.  
Dr. Babar Shah – Faculty at the University of Peshawar, Area Study Centre and formerly of the 
Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.  
Dr. Babar Shah is a faculty member at Peshawar University. His doctoral dissertation relates to 
the Durand Line and Pakistan’s Afghan policy, issues on which he is a resident expert at the 
Area Study Centre. Dr. Shah was formerly a research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies 
Islamabad. Dr. Shah agreed to a formal interview and a number of informal conversations. A 
formal interview was conducted on 4th August, 2008 at the Area Study Centre, Peshawar 
University. In addition to the questionaire, Dr. Shah elaborated extensively on the economic 
and developmental situation in the Afghan borderland.  
Subsequent to the formal interview, a number of consultations were made with Dr. Shah 
regarding a number of issues including possible interviewee’s, the structure of militancy, 
profiles of tribal personalities, the role of the US in the Afghan borderland and possible 
applications of this study.  
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Muhammad Shakeel – Faculty at the Pakistan Studies Centre, University of Peshawar.  
Muhammad Shakeel is a faculty member of the department of Pakistan Studies at Peshawar 
University. His role in the organisation and facilitation of field work is particularly notable. 
Muhammad Shakeel  provided extensive library access and access to unpublished materials at 
the Department of Pakistan Studies.  Muhammad Shakeel was interviewed formally on 6th 
August, 2008 and responded to questions based upon the questionnaire. Additionally, he was 
interviewed in a more unstructured sitting on 12th August, 2008 during which he provided 
extensive insight into tribal economics and the social organisation of the Afridi in Khyber. On 
13th August, 2008 Muhammad Shakeel facilitated a trip through the tribal areas, including the 
Afridi areas of Darra Adam Khel. Muhammad Shakeel was also instrumental in arranging a 
number of interviews.  
Rehmat Shah Swati- Political Agent, South Waziristan. 
Rehmat Shah Swati is a pseudonym for a retired former political agent of South Wazirstan, 
hailing from Tanda, northern Mansehra, KP. He is currently compiling a work detailing his 
experience as political agent, in which he seeks to identify cases of financial impropriety 
relating to the agency, and hence is not mentioned by name. He has maintained extensive 
records of his experience, which he invited the author to consult.  
Dr. Shaista Wahab – Professor at the University of Nebraska, Omaha (UNO).  
Dr. Shaista Wahab is a professor at UNO where she co-ordinates the Arthur Paul Afghanistan 
Collection at the Criss Library. The collection is the most substantial on Afghanistan outside 
the country, and is a central research node for Afghan studies in the United States.  Dr. Wahab 
contributed extensive information, insight, analysis and assistance to this study. She was 
consulted between 11th and 14th December 2008 in Omaha, Nebraska. Dr. Wahab provided 
assistance in accessing written material, and contributed her own insight into Ghilzai tribal 
dynamics, particularly leading up to and during the Soviet invasion period.  
Muhammad Hanif Baksh  - Civil engineer. 
Muhammad Hanif Baksh is a civil Engineer resident in London, UK. In October 2005, he was an 
emergency respondent following the Pakistan earthquake.  After his return in November 2005, 
he gave a public seminar about his experience, which included accessing the most remote 
areas of the earthquake zone. 
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Omedh Khan – Manager, construction company. 
Omedh Khan runs a London construction firm. Along with Muhammad Hanif Baksh, in October 
2005 he was an emergency respondent following the Pakistan earthquake.  After his return in 
November 2005, he was also participant in the public seminar about his experience in the 
earthquake zone. 
Roshan Bibi 
Roshan Bibi is a local female elder in the western area of Peshawar, on the edge of Afridi 
territory. She is a commentator on political and tribal affairs, and is well informed of the Afridi.  
Abdel Aziz 
Abdel Aziz is a resident of western Peshawar and oldest son of Roshan bibi. He was a guide on 
travel into Khyber agency and visits to the Bara/ Karkhano markets.  
Part II: Military Respondents 
General Mirza Aslam Beg.(ret.) 
General Mirza Aslam was Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan Army, from August 1988 to August 
1991. Since then, he has been active participant in discussion on defence and strategic affairs. 
He was met once in the conduct of this study, and engaged in a discussion over the nature of 
Pakistan’s Afghan policy in light of the changes undertaken by the Musharraf regime. The 
dates and location of meeting with him have been withheld.  
Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul (ret.) 
Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul (ret.) is the former Director of inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He has 
extensive experience in Afghanistan, FATA and KP. He was instrumental in the development of 
the anti-Soviet mujahideen front, in the maktab al Khidmat (office of services), and since then, 
in the development of Pakistan’s pro-Taliban orientation between 1994 and 2001. He was 
interviewed on two occasions, although the time and place of the interviews have been 
withheld. He did not submit to the questionnaire. He did provide extensive insight into the 
tribal psyche and the role of the Pakistani state in militancy in the borderland.  
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Brigadier A – 
During the conduct of fieldwork, Brigadier A was a senior officer with an unnamed arm of the 
Pakistani Military. He retired from active service at the completion of this study, and is legally 
required not to engage in public activity for two years.  He has had extensive experience in the 
borderland, on both sides of the border and has extensive experience in Afghanistan. He has 
extensive experience of interaction with senior officials from the Bush Presidency 2004-2008. 
Brigadier A has provided invaluable insight into the dynamics of the borderland over a period 
of years beginning in 2000. Although he did not submit to the questionnaire, he did provide 
invaluable insights into the themes of the survey, as well as facilitating travel, interaction and 
safety in the borderland. He was met a number of times through the duration of this study. 
Interaction with him was conducted in English.  
Colonel A- 
Colonel A is an army aviator whose current employment details are withheld. He has extensive 
experience in KP and Gilgit-Baltistan. As a flyer, he has been intimately involved the efforts of 
the Pakistan military in the borderland. He has provided deep insight into the nature of 
confrontation between the tribal and trans-tribal militias and the Pakistani military.  Colonel A 
did not submit to a formal interview with the questionnaire. However, over a number of years, 
he has provided information, analysis and judgements that have greatly enhanced the quality 
and information threshold of this study.  Interaction with him was conducted in Pashto and 
English.  
Colonel B- 
Colonel B was a force commander (C.O.) in an unnamed tribal agency in FATA over dates that 
are withheld. The dates and places of interaction with him are withheld. He was met three 
times for consultation and discussion. He did not submit to the questionnaire. He did provide 
extensive insight into the operational reality of the army in FATA, including the scope of the 
operation and the likely result. Additionally, he provided insight into the failing of the state on 
the developmental front in FATA, explaining how and why developmental efforts by the state 
have thus far failed to result in sustained developmental progress. 
Colonel ‘Imam’  
Colonel ‘Imam’ was deployed in Afghanistan for much of the 1980’s through to 1995. He was 
Pakistan’s principal facilitator amongst Afghan insurgents during the anti-Soviet insurgency. 
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Since then, he played a central role as an arbiter between tribal lashkars in FATA and 
Afghanistan.  He was in Afghanistan during the rise of the Taliban. He was interviewed once. 
He did not submit to the questionnaire. The time and place of meeting with him have been 
withheld. Colonel Imam was reported killed in January 2011 in a tribal altercation. 
NCO-A  
NCO-A is a Non-Commissioned Officer of the Pakistan army. A member of the Khan Khel of the 
Yusufzai from northern Pakhli, he served for over twenty years in South Waziristan. His 
knowledge of the agency and people is extensive, as is his understanding of the operation of 
the political agent. Due to the circumstances of the interaction with him, involving a social 
setting and dinner, it was impractical to conduct the questionnaire. However, NCO-A provided 
extensive and deep insight into a number of areas relating to tribesmen, reality of the border 
in South Waziristan, and the experience of the army in South Waziristan. Discussions were 
conducted in Pashto on 3rd September, 2008.  
Part III: Additional Notes and References 
The conclusions of this study are significantly derived from field work across much of the 
Afghan borderland over a period of nine years. In addition to formal and informal interviews 
based on the main themes of the study, the insights and conclusions of this study are shaped 
by hundreds of interactions which revealed insights into borderland culture, society, politics 
and economics which enable this study to provide insight into areas beyond those illuminated 
by the formal interview process. Such interactions include the numerous anecdotes and 
observations arising in everyday interaction in the borderland in activities such as using public 
transportation, visiting bazaars, and social interaction including weddings, funerals and formal 
dinners.   
Beyond the insights arising from participant observation in such circumstances, additional 
insight into the Afghan borderland, from the perspective of both the militants and the 
Pakistani military was provided by a number of key military figures and lashkar men who 
refused to be cited or referred to due to the current nature of their deployments or their 
commitments. These include senior military officers deployed in the Swat Valley, Sia Chin, 
Bajaur agency and South Waziristan and tribesmen from Orakzai agency, Mohmand agency 
and South Waziristan. It has been advised that referring to them would compromise their 
safety and security and the operational integrity of current responsibilities as well as the safe 
conduct of this study while in Pakistan.  
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Additionally, a number of incidents of interaction with police officers also provided a valuable 
contribution to fieldwork. Although no formal interviews were conducted, and no police 
officer submitted to research questions, conversational interaction was frequent, insightful 
and at times entertaining. Officers within Capital Territory Police (CTP) in Islamabad were 
particularly engaging. A police pursuit was witnessed as a participant observer when it became 
apparent that the police had no vehicle of their own with which to pursue a suspected 
criminal. Police in Peshawar were less engaging and evidently more concerned with their own 
security, particularly during the summer of 2008.  
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Appendix II: The Interview Questions 
Following are the questions that were asked in interviews during fieldwork. The questions are 
divided into three areas. Part I establishes some facts about the respondent with a view to 
placing the respondent in as specific a context within the borderland dynamic as is possible. 
Part II explores the economic life of the borderland. Part III explores the nature of trans-
borderland integration by focusing on the role of the Durand Line as an international border. 
Part IV addresses wider issues relating to identity, loyalty, views of Pakistan’s role in the 
borderland thus far, views on militancy, and the future of the borderland.  
Not all questions were asked of all interviewees.  In a number of cases, respondents were 
reluctant to address issues. In other cases, the circumstances of the interaction did not enable 
the questionnaire to be used. However, in all cases, questions and discussions were oriented 
towards the subject areas addressed through the questions.  
Part I: Identification and Placement in the Borderland Socio-political Matrix 
Name, age and gender of interviewee. 
Date, time, location and duration of interview. 
Familial, clan, tribal background of interviewee. 
Professional background, level of education of interviewee. 
Additional observations on the above, including notes on circumstances of interview, conduct 
of interview, completion of survey questions, alternative/additional questions/discussions.  
Part II: Economic Life of the Borderland 
1) How significant a source of revenue generation for FATA, KP and southern Afghanistan is 
the ATT? 
2) Does the degree of this significance vary between different localities and between different 
tribes across the borderland? 
3) What ratio of this trade is between FATA and Afghanistan, and what ratio is between FATA 
and KP/Pakistan? 
4) Aside from ATT generated revenue, what are the principal sources of income for the 
borderlanders? 
5) How do these sources of income vary between tribes and between localities? Please 
elaborate. 
6) To what extent does the Durand Line form an obstacle to economic activity in FATA? 
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7) How does this vary between tribes and localities? 
8) How widely held are your observations? 
9) How extensive is livestock rearing/agricultural farming amongst borderlanders? How 
significant is it as a source of revenue generation?  
10) How closely is the economic life of the Ghilzai integrated with the economic life of the rest 
of the borderland? 
11) What ratio of Afghanistan-FATA- KP trade flows through the main crossing routes of 
Torkham and Chaman in comparison to alternative routes? 
12) How large is the volume in unregulated trade in comparison with regulated trade? 
13) Is cross-border trade regulated at all at the officially manned border crossings?  
14) Are the economic centres of the FATA tribes found in FATA, in KP or across the Durand 
Line?  
15) Do tribesmen re-invest wealth in the borderland, or in Pakistan and or Afghanistan? Please 
elaborate. 
16) How extensive is the trade in opiate derived products across the borderland? 
Part III: Cross-border tribal dynamics in the Borderland 
17) How extensive is regular non-refugee cross-border travel between FATA and Afghanistan? 
18) How does this vary across the length of the Durand Line?  
19) How extensive is refugee cross-border travel between FATA and Afghanistan? 
20) How widely held are your observations on this issue? 
21) How extensive is the practice of cross-border jirgas? 
22) Are cross-border jirgas limited to Mohmand, Kurram, and South Waziristan where the 
border remains undefined in places, or is the practice common across the borderland? 
 23) How extensive is the practice of cross-border marriage? 
24) To what extent does the border constitute a barrier to families who wish to conduct 
marriages across the border?  
25) How extensive is travel across the border to seek medical care? 
26) To what extent does the border constitute an obstacle to individuals seeking to cross the 
border for medical care? 
27) What are the implications for the integration of the borderland arising from the flow of 
patients from Afghanistan to Peshawar for medical care? 
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28) How extensive is cross border movement in the pursuit of education? 
29) To what extent does the Durand Line constitute a barrier to cross-border movement in the 
pursuit of education? 
30) How extensively established are transportation links across the border? 
31) To what extent are cross-border transportation links an integrating factor across the 
borderland? 
32) How would you characterise the influence of the Karlanri tribes of FATA over the tribes 
and clans in southern Afghanistan? 
33) How would you characterise the influence of the Ghilzai tribes and clans over the Karlanri?  
34) How effective is the Durand Line as an international border in separating the populations 
of southern Afghanistan and KP? 
35) How effective is the Durand Line as an international border as a barrier to legal 
international trade?  
36) How effective is the Durand Line as an international border as a barrier to legal 
international trade?  
Part IV: Identity and the Borderland. 
37) Do you consider yourself to be a Pakistani? 
38)Do you consider yourself to have loyalty to your tribe? Your clan? 
39) Do you believe that the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be there? 
40) Is it acceptable to you that the Pakistani military should be present in your zai?  
41) Do you support the establishment of sharia courts?  Why? Are they more accessible than 
civil courts? 
42) How effective is the police force in Peshawar? In KP? 
43) Do you agree with the FCR in FATA? 
44) Is the Pakistani state assisting the development of the borderland effectively? 
45) Is the Pakistani state neglectful of the borderland? 
46) Do you believe that law enforcement is effectively solving criminality in Peshawar? In KP? 
47) Do the police control the streets of Peshawar , or is it tribesmen? What about Mardan, 
Kohat, Hangu, Bannu, Swabi? 
 48) Do you believe that the Pakistani state is in crisis in the borderland? 
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49) Do you believe that the current situation in the borderland will ameliorate? Will it stay as it 
is? Will it get worse? 
50) Is the non-border leading to a greater integration of Pakistan and Afghanistan?  
51) Does the state provide you with electricity? 
52) Do your children go to a government school? 
53) Do you have a Shanakhti (Identity) card ?  
54) Are the police corrupt? Are they effective in deterring crime? 
55) Have you had to pay a bribe to the Police? 
56) Does the army control the government offices? 
57) Can you get things done without having to contact an army person for sifarish (nepotistic 
assistance)? 
58) Do you need to know someone from the army to protect you from the police? 
59) Should the lashkars attack the army? 
60) Should the army attack the tribes? 
61) Should the army remain in FATA? 
62) Are the army’s actions in FATA good for the tribal areas? 
63) Should Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa separate from Pakistan? 
64) Should the historical Pakhtunkhwa emerge out of Pakistan and Afghanistan? 
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Appendix III: FATA, KP and Southern Afghanistan* 
 
 
 
*This map is based upon a template published by the BBC at http://news.bbc.co.uk . The map has been altered from its original 
form.  
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Appendix IV: KP & FATA* 
 
 
*The darkly shaded areas represent the seven tribal agencies of FATA. The lightly shaded areas represent 
KP. Sourced from http://forum.pakistanidefence.com  
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Appendix V: The Afghan Borderland 
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Appendix VI: Expansion of Tribal Authority in Southern KP & FATA 
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Appendix VII: Expansion of Tribal Authority in Northern KP & FATA 
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Appendix VIII: Expansion of Tribal Authority in Central KP & FATA 
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Appendix IX: Pakhtunkhwa* 
 
 
 
*This map is based upon a template published by the BBC at http://news.bbc.co.uk . The map has been altered from its original 
form.  
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Appendix X: Pashtunistan* 
 
*This map represents a Soviet occupation era rendition of Pashtunistan. The depiction of Pashtunistan is larger than is generally 
considered by Pashtun nationalists subsequently. This was motivated by the political ambitions of the Soviet occupation era 
Afghan government in seeking to facilitate a secession of Baluchistan from Pakistan. The map is sourced from the Perry-Castaneda 
collection at the University of Texas. 
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Appendix XI: Hard Soft Pashto Variants 
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Appendix XII: Tribal Distribution across Borderland 
 
 
  Yusufzai                Karlanri                     Durrani             Ghilzai          
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Appendix XIII: Extent of Taliban control 1996-1999 
 
Taliban Control 1996. 
 
 
Taliban Control 1999. 
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Appendix XIV: The Tribes and Clans of FATA 
Bajaur Agency 
                          Utman Khel                 Tarkani  
 
 
 
 
 
Mohmand Agency 
 
                    Mohmand            Safi         Utman Khel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shamozai 
Asil 
Mandal 
Alizai 
Matakai 
Salarzai 
Mamund 
Charmang 
Lamar Utman 
Khel 
Ambar Utman 
Khel 
 
Tarakzai 
Halimazai 
Baizai 
Khwaizai 
Masawd 
Gurbaz 
Shinwari 
Qandhari 
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Orakzai Agency 
 
                             Ismailzai                         Daulatzai 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orakzai 
 
 
 
 
                            
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Lashkarzai Mishti Halimazai Muhammad Khel 
Aburahim Khel 
Mir Kalam Khel 
Abu Khel 
Sepoya 
Bar Muhammad 
Khel 
Abdul Aziz 
Mam Khel 
Sipha 
Mamazai 
Hassanzai 
Darwi Khel 
Haider Khel 
Biland Khel 
Bazid Khel 
Umarzai 
Samozai 
Aziz Khel 
Kutab Khel 
Char Khel 
Piran 
Palat 
Adizai 
Lodian 
Masti Khel 
           Shaikhan                     Mulla Khel  
Rabia Khel 
A’ Khel 
Isa Khel 
Tarakzai 
Halimazai 
Baizai 
Khwaizai 
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Kurram Agency 
 
                   Turi               Kharoti               Ghilzai          Parcham Kani    
 
 
                            
             
                     
 
 Gaudary           Wazir  Alisiaani          Zazi      Bangash                     
 
 
 
                            
             
 
                      
                     Zardan             Mangal          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sargalla 
Chardas
Kharoti 
Maulana 
Kharoti 
Ahmedzai 
Tota Khel 
Buda Khel 
KhaniKhel 
Khwajak 
Haji Khel 
Hassanzai 
Yusuf Khel 
Jalamzai 
Kharlachi 
Mandozai 
Stor Kor 
Baqar Khel 
Luqman 
Khel 
Urmar 
Multan 
Khel 
Bar Qawmi 
Kamangar 
Miral Khel 
Khajuri 
Zab 
Marghai 
Kamal Khel 
 
Bilyamin 
Khoidad Khel 
Masood 
Gidar Khel 
Sanni Khel 
Dretalli 
Ismaeelzai 
Alisiani 
 
Hasham Khel 
Ali Khel 
Mat Khel 
Baian Khel 
Matkhan 
Khel 
Afzal Khel 
Jankhan Khel 
Khan Khel 
Hassan Khel 
Safar Khel 
Motha 
Darvi Khel 
Dari Khel 
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South Waziristan 
                      Dottani                       Ghilzai                                  Wazir                   
                                                                                            Ahmedzai  
 
                
 
 
 
Mehsud 
                       Ibrahim Khel        Shabi Khel     Shaman  Khel           Bahlozai 
                                                                
 
 
                            
             
   
                          
Ibrahim 
Khel 
Maikdinai 
Palli Khel 
Giddi Khel 
Shabi Khel 
Astonai 
Bromal 
Sultanai 
Patonai 
Bibizai 
Shaman Khel 
Khalli Khel 
Char Khel 
Gallishai 
Budinzai 
Shahoor 
Kalu Khel 
Spirkai 
Nasridin 
Aimal Khel 
Nano Khel 
Shinqi 
Mand Khel 
Labezai 
Hassanzai 
Suleman Khel 
Sultan Khel 
Hassan Khan 
Khel 
Daro 
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North Waziristan 
 
Wazir 
Uthmanzai 
 
      Ibrahim Khel          Mohmit Khel               Wali Khel                      Mallizad     
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
                   
 
                       Zaka Khel       Kharoti       Sepah           Adam Khel      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Khyber 
Afridi 
                    Kuki Khel                  Aka Khel                    Qambar Khel               Kamar Khel 
 
 
 
                            
 
  
Sargal 
Madda Khel 
Manzar Khel 
Tori Khel la 
Chardas 
Bora Khel 
Wuzi Khel 
Ah Kabul Khel 
Jan Khel 
Baka Khel 
Daur 
Tappizad 
Iddak Khel 
Ibrahim Khel 
Khadri 
Siman 
Idak 
Mallakh 
Arghund 
Darpa Khel 
Masakhi 
So Khel 
Urmaz 
Hakim Khel 
Zerakai 
Mubarak 
Shahi 
Nasrudin 
Budai 
Shanai 
Maulana 
Kharoti 
Landi Khel 
Urmuz Khel  
Babrki 
Galai Khel 
Jawaki 
Bazid Khel 
Hassan Khel 
Ashu Khel 
Sikander Khel 
Multan Khel 
Abdal Khel 
Miri Khel 
Sahib Jan 
Sher Gulla 
 
Sheikh Mal Khel 
Wand Khel 
Dreplari 
Pass Kamar Khel 
Kuz Kamar Khel 
275 
  
 
 
Shinwari 
 
                                       Ali Sher Khel             Mullagori 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Khoga Khel 
Sheikhmal 
Khel 
Mianj Chamki 
Ahmed Khel 
Ismail Khel 
Daulat Khel 
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Appendix XV: Text of the Durand Line Agreement * 
Agreement between Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G. C. S. I., and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K. C. 
I. E., C. S. I. 
Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, 
and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling 
these questions by friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of 
influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between 
the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows: 
1. The eastern and southern frontier of his Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian 
border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement. 
  
2. The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying 
beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time 
exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India. 
  
3. The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the 
valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees, on the other hand, that he will at no 
time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal 
valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as 
shown in the detailed map already given to his Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the 
rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh. 
  
4. The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this may be 
practicable and desirable, by joint British and Afghan commissioners, whose object will be 
to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest 
possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due 
regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier. 
  
5. With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new 
British cantonment and concedes to the British Governmeni the rights purchased by him in 
the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier the line will be drawn as follows: 
 
From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal, which remains in British 
territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo 
spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half-way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan 
outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half-way between the 
railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning south-wards, will rejoin 
the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to 
Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will 
not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road. 
6. The above articles of' agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness 
the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences 
of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the 
Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail, 
such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to 
demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the 
future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two 
Governments. 
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7. Being fully satisfied of His Highness's goodwill to the British Government, and wishing to 
see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to 
the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves 
grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly 
spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government 
of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve 
lakhs now granted to His Highness. 
H. M. Durand, 
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. 
 
Kabul, November 12, 1893.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Text of treaties is sourced from C.W. Aitchison‟s (1933) compilation of treaties 
relating the Frontier. 
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Appendix XVI: Agreement on Afghanistan’s Northern Frontier 
Agreement between Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G. C. S. I., and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K. 
C. I. E., C. S. I., Establishing Afghanistan's Northern Frontier 
Whereas the British Government has represented to His Highness the Amir that the 
Russian Government presses for the literal fulfilment of the Agreement of 1873 
between Russia and England by which it was decided that the River Oxus should form 
the northern boundary of Afghanistan from Lake Victoria (Wood's Lake) or Sarikul on 
the east to the junction of the Kokcha with the Oxus, and whereas the British 
Government considers itself bound to abide by the terms of this Agreement, if the 
Russian Government equally abides by them, His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, 
G. C. S. I., Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, wishing to show his friendship to 
the British Government and his readiness to accept their advice in matters affecting his 
relations with Foreign Powers, hereby agrees that he will evacuate all the districts held 
by him to the north of this portion of the Oxus on the clear understanding that all the 
districts lying to the south of this portion of the Oxus, and not now in his possession, be 
handed over to him in exchange. And Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., 
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, hereby declares on the part of the British 
Government that the transfer to His Highness the Amir of the said districts lying to the 
south of the Oxus is an essential part of this transaction, and undertakes that 
arrangements will be made with the Russian Government to carry out the transfer of the 
said lands to the north and south of the Oxus. 
H. M. DURAND 
 
 
AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN 
 
 
Kabul, November 12, 1893 
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Appendix XVII: List of Governors of KP (Formerly NWFP) 
Name of Governor 
Entered 
Office Left Office 
Sir George 
Cunningham  15-Aug-47 09-Apr-48 
Sir Ambrose 
Dundas 09-Apr-48 16-Jul-49 
Sahibzada 
Mohammad 
Khurshid 16-Jul-49 14-Jan-50 
Mohammad 
Ibrahim Khan 
Jhagra 14-Jan-50 21-Feb-50 
Ismail Ibrahim 
Chundrigar  21-Feb-50 23-Nov-51 
Khwaja 
Shahabuddin  24-Nov-51 17-Nov-54 
Qurban Ali Shah 17-Nov-54 14-Oct-55 
Lieutenant-General 
K.M. Azhar Khan 01-Jul-70 25-Dec-71 
Hayat Sherpao 25-Dec-71 30-Apr-72 
Arbab Sikandar 
Khan 30-Apr-72 15-Feb-73 
Aslam Khattak 15-Feb-73 24-May-74 
Major-General 
(retired) Syed 
Ghawas 24-May-74 01-Mar-76 
Major-General 
(retired) 
Naseerullah Babar 01-Mar-76 06-Jul-77 
Justice Abdul 
Hakeem Khan 06-Jul-77 17-Sep-78 
Lieutenant-General 
Fazl-Haq, PA 11-Oct-78 12-Dec-85 
Nawabzada Abdul 
Ghafoor Khan Hoti 30-Dec-85 13-Apr-86 
Justice Syed 
Usman Ali Shah 13-Apr-86 27-Aug-86 
Fida Mohammad 
Khan 27-Aug-86 16-Jun-88 
Brigadier-General 
(retired) Amir 
Gulistan Janjua 16-Jun-88 19-Jul-93 
Major-General 
(retired) Khurshid 
Ali Khan 19-Jul-93 05-Nov-96 
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Lieutenant-General 
(retired) Arif 
Bangash 11-Nov-96 17-Aug-99 
Miangul Aurangzeb 17-Aug-99 21-Oct-99 
Lieutenant-General 
(retired) 
Mohammad Shafiq 21-Oct-99 14-Aug-00 
Lieutenant-General 
(retired) Iftikhar 
Hussain Shah 14-Aug-00 15-Mar-05 
Commander 
(retired) Khalilur 
Rehman 15-Mar-05 23-May-06 
Lieutenant-General 
(retired) Ali Jan 
Orakzai 23-May-06 07-Jan-08 
Owais Ahmed 
Ghani 07-Jan-08 09-Feb-11 
Syed Masood 
Kausar 10-Feb-11 Incumbent 
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